Saturday August 22, 2009
Human Rights and the Mexican Drug War
There is little question that fighting drug traffickers' efforts to take over the state or render it an effectively "ungoverned space" needs not only firepower but the support of the civilian population. The Mexican government of Felipe Calderón finds itself in that extremely difficult and dangerous nether world between needing to use the military in a war the military is not equipped to fight and not totally alienating the civilian population.
The New York Times today story on the State Department's report makes the point. Complaints of human rights abuses have jumped since the military entered the fray. It is a force that is neither trained nor interested in going after drug traffickers.
While the State Department cited several examples of progress, it was hardly a glowing endorsement. And a key Democratic senator said the report failed to adequately address the concerns about impunity within the Mexican military that led him to threaten to hold up millions of dollars in United States assistance.
"It is well known that the military justice system is manifestly ineffective," said a statement issued Tuesday by Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, which must approve disbursement of the Merida assistance. "And it is apparent that neither the Mexican government nor the State Department has treated human rights abuses by the military, which is engaging in an internal police function it is ill suited for, as a priority."
As in Afghanistan, Iraq, El Salvador and every other counterinsurgency effort (and it would be a mistake to think Mexico is facing anything less than a loose confederation of insurgent forces, each intent on controlling geographic territory to carry out its criminal activity) has shown, it is a tragic and costly mistake to think that the best way to gather information is to torture or execute the civilian population (or the enemy).
Every act of torture and murder by government forces moves an entire family to the side of the enemy who will then do everything possible to get revenge. While often viewed as the most expeditious way to acquire information or the result of sloppy intelligence, planning or execution, the abuses do far more damage than any intelligence they may produce.
This makes human rights behavior by government forces a matter of national security, not just a moral imperative. To move forward Mexico must do away with the opaque nature of the military tribunals, be willing to name names and publicly punish offenders. Anything less does the nation great harm.
There is an added complication that I witnessed in El Salvador and Colombia that I am sure is at play here. There are certainly serious abuses that go unpunished. There are also legions of people paid by the cartels to file, on top of that, endless streams of frivolous complaints that both inflate the number and make it much more difficult to investigate the real abuses.
After many years, the Colombian police and military still continue to carry out abuses, although the institutionalization of the abuses has been largely broken. The strongest evidence of the changing nature of the relationship between civilians and the police and military there is the huge volume of intelligence now generated by people who trust the government forces enough to pass on the information.
The government forces are often (certainly not always) viewed as less of a threat to the civilians than the FARC or other criminal organizations. While not a ringing endorsement, it is a long way from the days when the military could gather almost no intelligence at all.
Mexican officials are embarking on a long and slippery road. The military as an institution is fighting for something it does not necessarily believe in, which is a bad place from which to start. While it started out as one of Mexico's most trusted institutions, that trust is battered with every abuse committed.
Every loss there is a victory for the narcos and their desire to paint themselves as the protectors of the people. This is particularly true of groups like La Familia Michoacana, which fashions itself as a religious/civic organization, doing the work of both the Lord and the people.
Plan Merida cannot succeed without the goodwill of the Mexican people in the areas most affected. If that is impossible, neutrality has to be the minimum goal. That is a war that is far more difficult to wage than shooting war, but ultimately much more important.
The New York Times today story on the State Department's report makes the point. Complaints of human rights abuses have jumped since the military entered the fray. It is a force that is neither trained nor interested in going after drug traffickers.
While the State Department cited several examples of progress, it was hardly a glowing endorsement. And a key Democratic senator said the report failed to adequately address the concerns about impunity within the Mexican military that led him to threaten to hold up millions of dollars in United States assistance.
"It is well known that the military justice system is manifestly ineffective," said a statement issued Tuesday by Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, which must approve disbursement of the Merida assistance. "And it is apparent that neither the Mexican government nor the State Department has treated human rights abuses by the military, which is engaging in an internal police function it is ill suited for, as a priority."
As in Afghanistan, Iraq, El Salvador and every other counterinsurgency effort (and it would be a mistake to think Mexico is facing anything less than a loose confederation of insurgent forces, each intent on controlling geographic territory to carry out its criminal activity) has shown, it is a tragic and costly mistake to think that the best way to gather information is to torture or execute the civilian population (or the enemy).
Every act of torture and murder by government forces moves an entire family to the side of the enemy who will then do everything possible to get revenge. While often viewed as the most expeditious way to acquire information or the result of sloppy intelligence, planning or execution, the abuses do far more damage than any intelligence they may produce.
This makes human rights behavior by government forces a matter of national security, not just a moral imperative. To move forward Mexico must do away with the opaque nature of the military tribunals, be willing to name names and publicly punish offenders. Anything less does the nation great harm.
There is an added complication that I witnessed in El Salvador and Colombia that I am sure is at play here. There are certainly serious abuses that go unpunished. There are also legions of people paid by the cartels to file, on top of that, endless streams of frivolous complaints that both inflate the number and make it much more difficult to investigate the real abuses.
After many years, the Colombian police and military still continue to carry out abuses, although the institutionalization of the abuses has been largely broken. The strongest evidence of the changing nature of the relationship between civilians and the police and military there is the huge volume of intelligence now generated by people who trust the government forces enough to pass on the information.
The government forces are often (certainly not always) viewed as less of a threat to the civilians than the FARC or other criminal organizations. While not a ringing endorsement, it is a long way from the days when the military could gather almost no intelligence at all.
Mexican officials are embarking on a long and slippery road. The military as an institution is fighting for something it does not necessarily believe in, which is a bad place from which to start. While it started out as one of Mexico's most trusted institutions, that trust is battered with every abuse committed.
Every loss there is a victory for the narcos and their desire to paint themselves as the protectors of the people. This is particularly true of groups like La Familia Michoacana, which fashions itself as a religious/civic organization, doing the work of both the Lord and the people.
Plan Merida cannot succeed without the goodwill of the Mexican people in the areas most affected. If that is impossible, neutrality has to be the minimum goal. That is a war that is far more difficult to wage than shooting war, but ultimately much more important.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday September 9, 2009
Why the Merchant of Death May Not Stand Trial
Here is what I wrote today for Foreign Policy Magazine on the Thai judge's decision not to extradite Viktor Bout to the United States to stand trial:
Today, a Thai court ruled against extraditing notorious Russian weapons trafficker Viktor Bout to the United States -- a setback for the American legal system and a bad portent not just for U.S.-Thai relations, but also for relations between the United States and Russia.
James F. Entwistle, a senior U.S. official in Thailand, said he was "disappointed and mystified" at the ruling, which the United States intends to appeal. But the odds are in Bout's favor, as Thai appellate courts affirm lower-court rulings in the vast majority of cases.
Who is Viktor Bout and why does this case matter so much? The Russian dealer became known as the "Merchant of Death" for his exploits in delivering sophisticated weapons to war zones from Afghanistan to Colombia and Lebanon -- but mostly to Africa's most brutal thugs. Before he was finally nabbed last spring, Bout had been at work for decades, despite episodic Western efforts to stop him. He was the target of intelligence operations at the end of the Clinton administration. Several European governments, especially Belgium, have been after him for years. And, the United Nations has placed him on an international travel ban.
His extradition has become a top priority for an Obama administration seeking to prevent him from being released and further fanning conflicts around the world, particularly in his old stomping grounds of Afghanistan. The U.S. Justice Department had hoped Bout would stand trial after the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) caught him in a sting in March 2008.
Bout's capture was like a John Le Carré novel. In an elaborate ruse, DEA agents posed as guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and contacted the Russian arms dealer. The Colombian group, infamous for its kidnappings and cocaine trafficking, is designated a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union. Bout, a former Soviet officer, stated he could sell the "FARC" intermediaries sophisticated weaponry to fight the U.S.-backed government in Colombia and to target U.S. military and civilian advisors. After having his intermediaries hop-scotch around the world to meet with them, Bout agreed to fly to Bangkok to seal the deal in person.
There, according to the indictment in Southern District of New York, he met with the undercover agents posing as FARC commanders for two hours in a luxury hotel. He offered to sell the group 700 to 800 surface-to-air missiles, millions of rounds of ammunition, AK-47 assault rifles, two cargo planes, and drone aircraft to bomb U.S.-built radar facilities in Colombia. He specifically stated he wanted to help kill Americans, who, he said, were his enemy too. He offered weapons-training classes. It is all on tape.
For a guy who also supplied weapons to Charles Taylor of Liberia and the Taliban in Afghanistan, this was Bout at his worst. In better moments, he once flew humanitarian missions for the United Nations and French peacekeepers. At the start of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, he flew hundreds of missions for the U.S. military and civilian contractors, raking in millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars at a time when his operation was officially blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Department.
The United States never intended for Thai courts to try Bout. U.S. officials wanted him sent back to America to stand trial. In a shock, the Thai court today said no. The court's ruling was a little convoluted and off-point, perhaps on purpose given the stakes of the game. The court determined that Bout's guilt could not be decided in Thailand, clearly not exonerating him of the charges. But the judge also ruled the U.S. extradition request could not proceed because the FARC is not a designated terrorist group in Thailand.
"This is a political case," the judge at Bangkok's Criminal Court ruled. "The FARC is fighting for a political cause and is not a criminal gang. Thailand does not recognize the FARC as a terrorist group."
The judge also expressed skepticism that Bout could deliver what he promised in the meeting, asking where the accused would find such high-tech weaponry. The answer is: Anywhere and everywhere. Bout has sold Russian attack helicopters, anti-tank systems, and millions of assault rifles to the highest bidder. He possesses airlift capacity and access to the surplus arsenals of the former Soviet republics. Bout pioneered the full-service weapons procurement game.
Most of the defendant's legal arguments centered on the fact that no evidence linked him to the FARC. But the sole legal issue at hand was whether the extradition request was valid. The Thai foreign ministry testified in court that it was.
With strong Russian pressure mounting to keep Bout from being extradited -- the nation's Duma, or lower house of parliament, passed a resolution condemning the extradition request. The judge felt trapped. In March, he said in open court, amazingly, that he was in a "tough position" because "bilateral ties with Russia and the United States could be at stake." Apparently he decided he feared the Russians more than the Americans.
But that may be a mistake. A large, bipartisan group of senior congressional leaders have shown a strong interest in Bout's case, and some are already pushing for a retaliatory U.S. response.
Rep. Ed Royce, a California Republican who has led the congressional effort to hold Bout accountable for his actions, stated: "If this ruling holds, this [U.S.-Thai] relationship will be set back dramatically."
"While the Thai Foreign Ministry has stated that the extradition request meets the conditions of the Thai-American extradition treaty, the Russian government has been pushing hard for Bout's release," Royce continued. "Politics seems to have trumped the law. Something is rotten in Bangkok."
Something is rotten indeed.
Today, a Thai court ruled against extraditing notorious Russian weapons trafficker Viktor Bout to the United States -- a setback for the American legal system and a bad portent not just for U.S.-Thai relations, but also for relations between the United States and Russia.
James F. Entwistle, a senior U.S. official in Thailand, said he was "disappointed and mystified" at the ruling, which the United States intends to appeal. But the odds are in Bout's favor, as Thai appellate courts affirm lower-court rulings in the vast majority of cases.
Who is Viktor Bout and why does this case matter so much? The Russian dealer became known as the "Merchant of Death" for his exploits in delivering sophisticated weapons to war zones from Afghanistan to Colombia and Lebanon -- but mostly to Africa's most brutal thugs. Before he was finally nabbed last spring, Bout had been at work for decades, despite episodic Western efforts to stop him. He was the target of intelligence operations at the end of the Clinton administration. Several European governments, especially Belgium, have been after him for years. And, the United Nations has placed him on an international travel ban.
His extradition has become a top priority for an Obama administration seeking to prevent him from being released and further fanning conflicts around the world, particularly in his old stomping grounds of Afghanistan. The U.S. Justice Department had hoped Bout would stand trial after the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) caught him in a sting in March 2008.
Bout's capture was like a John Le Carré novel. In an elaborate ruse, DEA agents posed as guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and contacted the Russian arms dealer. The Colombian group, infamous for its kidnappings and cocaine trafficking, is designated a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union. Bout, a former Soviet officer, stated he could sell the "FARC" intermediaries sophisticated weaponry to fight the U.S.-backed government in Colombia and to target U.S. military and civilian advisors. After having his intermediaries hop-scotch around the world to meet with them, Bout agreed to fly to Bangkok to seal the deal in person.
There, according to the indictment in Southern District of New York, he met with the undercover agents posing as FARC commanders for two hours in a luxury hotel. He offered to sell the group 700 to 800 surface-to-air missiles, millions of rounds of ammunition, AK-47 assault rifles, two cargo planes, and drone aircraft to bomb U.S.-built radar facilities in Colombia. He specifically stated he wanted to help kill Americans, who, he said, were his enemy too. He offered weapons-training classes. It is all on tape.
For a guy who also supplied weapons to Charles Taylor of Liberia and the Taliban in Afghanistan, this was Bout at his worst. In better moments, he once flew humanitarian missions for the United Nations and French peacekeepers. At the start of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, he flew hundreds of missions for the U.S. military and civilian contractors, raking in millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars at a time when his operation was officially blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Department.
The United States never intended for Thai courts to try Bout. U.S. officials wanted him sent back to America to stand trial. In a shock, the Thai court today said no. The court's ruling was a little convoluted and off-point, perhaps on purpose given the stakes of the game. The court determined that Bout's guilt could not be decided in Thailand, clearly not exonerating him of the charges. But the judge also ruled the U.S. extradition request could not proceed because the FARC is not a designated terrorist group in Thailand.
"This is a political case," the judge at Bangkok's Criminal Court ruled. "The FARC is fighting for a political cause and is not a criminal gang. Thailand does not recognize the FARC as a terrorist group."
The judge also expressed skepticism that Bout could deliver what he promised in the meeting, asking where the accused would find such high-tech weaponry. The answer is: Anywhere and everywhere. Bout has sold Russian attack helicopters, anti-tank systems, and millions of assault rifles to the highest bidder. He possesses airlift capacity and access to the surplus arsenals of the former Soviet republics. Bout pioneered the full-service weapons procurement game.
Most of the defendant's legal arguments centered on the fact that no evidence linked him to the FARC. But the sole legal issue at hand was whether the extradition request was valid. The Thai foreign ministry testified in court that it was.
With strong Russian pressure mounting to keep Bout from being extradited -- the nation's Duma, or lower house of parliament, passed a resolution condemning the extradition request. The judge felt trapped. In March, he said in open court, amazingly, that he was in a "tough position" because "bilateral ties with Russia and the United States could be at stake." Apparently he decided he feared the Russians more than the Americans.
But that may be a mistake. A large, bipartisan group of senior congressional leaders have shown a strong interest in Bout's case, and some are already pushing for a retaliatory U.S. response.
Rep. Ed Royce, a California Republican who has led the congressional effort to hold Bout accountable for his actions, stated: "If this ruling holds, this [U.S.-Thai] relationship will be set back dramatically."
"While the Thai Foreign Ministry has stated that the extradition request meets the conditions of the Thai-American extradition treaty, the Russian government has been pushing hard for Bout's release," Royce continued. "Politics seems to have trumped the law. Something is rotten in Bangkok."
Something is rotten indeed.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday August 10, 2009
Shadow Facilitators and Alternative Crops in Afghanistan
One sign of how concerned the military and administration are about the situation is the new thinking that is going on while looking at old problems. Two important stories highlight just how sharp the change in strategy is.
The first is the New York Times piece on the addition of 50 drug lords to the list of Afghanis on the Pentagon's target list to kill or capture. This is recognition of the symbiotic and devastating link between the drug trade financing the Taliban (and al Qaeda). The 50 are what the DEA would call "shadow facilitators," those who are able to deal across criminal-terrorist-tribal-ethnic lines to buy opium, sell heroin, import surface-to-air missiles etc.
Lt. Col. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman...said that "there is a positive, well-known connection between the drug trade and financing for the insurgency and terrorism." Without directly addressing the existence of the target list, he said that it was "important to clarify that we are targeting terrorists with links to the drug trade, rather than targeting drug traffickers with links to terrorism."
That may be a distinction without a difference in the Af/Pak region, and one that has been made for years as the U.S. military resisted efforts to get drawn into counterdrug operations. But the fact remains that, unless the vast pool of resources flowing from the drug trade is dried up, there is no hope of defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda.
One reason is that the corruption from the opium/heroin trade has also almost completely corrupted the current government, making it both more difficult to combat and more corrosive within society. Never mind the money is used to sustain an army that has few other revenue streams.
But an equally-important part of the new strategy was laid out by the Washington Post in describing the new efforts to wean the local population off of the poppy harvest.
Rather than trying to forcibly eradicate the poppy harvest-a tactic that has been shown repeatedly not only to fail but to deeply alienate the local populations and have little overall impact, the new strategy calls for using basic economics to try to stop the poppy cultivation.
Given that many of the poppy growers survive the winters by taking out advance loans from the drug traffickers against the coming year's poppy harvest, the idea is to give the poppy farmers several alternatives to that credit market and labor market.
By selling wheat seeds and fruit saplings to farmers at token prices, offering cheap credit, and paying poppy-farm laborers to work on roads and irrigation ditches, U.S. and British officials hope to provide alternatives before the planting season begins in early October...We need a way to get money in [farmers'] hands right away," said a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan.
So in theory the upper echelons of the drug-terrorist (and corruption) network are being attacked while causing less trauma and harm to the small farmers who will do whatever it takes to survive economically in very difficult times. And that is clearly better than the alternative of going after the local growers who, in the end, profit very little from the poppy, because the real value added is when the poppy is transformed to opium then heroin and sold on the European market.
Unfortunately, no drug eradication/interdiction/alternative crop strategy has ever produced the desired results.
Officials maintain that the new Afghan plan differs from unsuccessful "alternative" plans because it is an integral part of a military-development strategy that includes tens of thousands of U.S. troops to keep the Taliban and traffickers at bay while Afghan security forces are being trained. Plans call for hundreds of U.S. and international aid experts to work directly with farmers and local officials until the Afghan government has matured.
"The way [the assistance] is offered is important," said the senior U.S. military official, one of several who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the program on the record. "We are not providing subsidies . . . we are not just handing out cash." Farmers will have a "stake" in the program, he said, buying vouchers for seeds and fertilizers for about 10 percent of their value. Cash will be distributed only as credit or for work performed, the official added.
This dual strategy is certainly better than the strategy that has been so ineffectual over the past many years. One key question is whether it is too late. The Taliban has so much surplus opium on its hands that it can afford to continue to sell for many months, and the lack of new poppies would likely drive up the cost of opium in the short term next year.
That means that we need a sustained, focused policy that can be maintained for enough time to give the shift a real chance. And that is not the strong point of part of the U.S. government. As prices rise there will be tremendous pressure to go back to the eradication strategy. Let's hope we can see far enough down the road to see if the new approach-coupled with the elimination of some of the super fixers of the drug trade works. Otherwise we will simply have had another costly and demoralizing turn in the drug wars.
The first is the New York Times piece on the addition of 50 drug lords to the list of Afghanis on the Pentagon's target list to kill or capture. This is recognition of the symbiotic and devastating link between the drug trade financing the Taliban (and al Qaeda). The 50 are what the DEA would call "shadow facilitators," those who are able to deal across criminal-terrorist-tribal-ethnic lines to buy opium, sell heroin, import surface-to-air missiles etc.
Lt. Col. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman...said that "there is a positive, well-known connection between the drug trade and financing for the insurgency and terrorism." Without directly addressing the existence of the target list, he said that it was "important to clarify that we are targeting terrorists with links to the drug trade, rather than targeting drug traffickers with links to terrorism."
That may be a distinction without a difference in the Af/Pak region, and one that has been made for years as the U.S. military resisted efforts to get drawn into counterdrug operations. But the fact remains that, unless the vast pool of resources flowing from the drug trade is dried up, there is no hope of defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda.
One reason is that the corruption from the opium/heroin trade has also almost completely corrupted the current government, making it both more difficult to combat and more corrosive within society. Never mind the money is used to sustain an army that has few other revenue streams.
But an equally-important part of the new strategy was laid out by the Washington Post in describing the new efforts to wean the local population off of the poppy harvest.
Rather than trying to forcibly eradicate the poppy harvest-a tactic that has been shown repeatedly not only to fail but to deeply alienate the local populations and have little overall impact, the new strategy calls for using basic economics to try to stop the poppy cultivation.
Given that many of the poppy growers survive the winters by taking out advance loans from the drug traffickers against the coming year's poppy harvest, the idea is to give the poppy farmers several alternatives to that credit market and labor market.
By selling wheat seeds and fruit saplings to farmers at token prices, offering cheap credit, and paying poppy-farm laborers to work on roads and irrigation ditches, U.S. and British officials hope to provide alternatives before the planting season begins in early October...We need a way to get money in [farmers'] hands right away," said a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan.
So in theory the upper echelons of the drug-terrorist (and corruption) network are being attacked while causing less trauma and harm to the small farmers who will do whatever it takes to survive economically in very difficult times. And that is clearly better than the alternative of going after the local growers who, in the end, profit very little from the poppy, because the real value added is when the poppy is transformed to opium then heroin and sold on the European market.
Unfortunately, no drug eradication/interdiction/alternative crop strategy has ever produced the desired results.
Officials maintain that the new Afghan plan differs from unsuccessful "alternative" plans because it is an integral part of a military-development strategy that includes tens of thousands of U.S. troops to keep the Taliban and traffickers at bay while Afghan security forces are being trained. Plans call for hundreds of U.S. and international aid experts to work directly with farmers and local officials until the Afghan government has matured.
"The way [the assistance] is offered is important," said the senior U.S. military official, one of several who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the program on the record. "We are not providing subsidies . . . we are not just handing out cash." Farmers will have a "stake" in the program, he said, buying vouchers for seeds and fertilizers for about 10 percent of their value. Cash will be distributed only as credit or for work performed, the official added.
This dual strategy is certainly better than the strategy that has been so ineffectual over the past many years. One key question is whether it is too late. The Taliban has so much surplus opium on its hands that it can afford to continue to sell for many months, and the lack of new poppies would likely drive up the cost of opium in the short term next year.
That means that we need a sustained, focused policy that can be maintained for enough time to give the shift a real chance. And that is not the strong point of part of the U.S. government. As prices rise there will be tremendous pressure to go back to the eradication strategy. Let's hope we can see far enough down the road to see if the new approach-coupled with the elimination of some of the super fixers of the drug trade works. Otherwise we will simply have had another costly and demoralizing turn in the drug wars.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Sunday August 9, 2009
The Changing Language on Terrorism and the Challenges Ahead
Today's Washington Post gives an interesting look at how the Obama administration will be redefining the fight against terrorism, as well as changing the language used.
Two things seem clear. One is that the "war on terror" designation, never very useful in my opinion, has been retired. The other is that there will be much less identifying of terrorism with radical Islam, and more generic phrases like "violent extremists" will be much more in use.
Identifying who the enemy is by a name that identifies his/her reason for action is more useful. Certainly not all Muslims are terrorists nor is all terrorism driven by an interpretation of Islam. But Islamists justify their actions in a particular, theologically coherent way that makes them identifiable. That group has carried out most of the worst attacks on the United States in the past decade, and so is an identifiable cohort of actors.
Regardless of how one identifies terrorists, the idea is to use more tools in the U.S. government tool box to combat terrorism, something that is important going forward. What seems to be lacking at this point is a clear articulation of what U.S. strategic interests are and how these multiple tools will be used. Maybe that will be forthcoming when the policy itself is unveiled.
"It needs to be much more than a kinetic effort, an intelligence, law enforcement effort. It has to be much more comprehensive," said John Brennan, Obama's chief counterterrorism adviser, who will address the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Thursday. "This is not a 'war on terror.' . . . We cannot let the terror prism guide how we're going to interact and be involved in different parts of the world."
That is true, but it is hard to decipher what that will mean. One of the key places where the new strategy will be tested is in Somalia, where Secretary Clinton has met with the provisional leadership and promised increased support. But so far the promises seem to involve only ammunition and logistical support and somewhat vague and unfulfillable promises to sanction Eritrea for support of al Shabaab in Somalia.
So, what would the new policy change in Somalia? To me, that is a key question because it would force the administration to really articulate what it means. How would the other tools beyond military support be deployed, and to what end? That is the question that needs to be asked all across Africa, particularly, but also Latin America. The idea sounds good (and is good) but the implementation is what will actually define it.
The current discussion is not taking place in a vacuum. I have long told U.S. military audiences that the military has been pushed into too many new jobs for which it is not the best qualified, a premise that many active duty officers agree with.
But the problem has been that few other government agencies can and will go to the places the military will, either with J-Cets or other types of deployments. Given that, the resources have shifted to the military, making it harder for other parts of the government (State, USAID etc.) to do more because their resource base has not grown. So there is a downward cycle. Without resources they cannot or will not participate, and without participation they cannot get resources allocated.
How that resource allocation piece is redesigned will be key. But there has to be an over-arching policy architecture that guides the resource allocation, the types of engagement and to what end. The Bush administration struggled mightily with this with little success and only at the end of its time. For Obama to move beyond that, he will need more than a new vocabulary. He will have to find where the tools fit and what they can be used for, and that is a much harder task.
Two things seem clear. One is that the "war on terror" designation, never very useful in my opinion, has been retired. The other is that there will be much less identifying of terrorism with radical Islam, and more generic phrases like "violent extremists" will be much more in use.
Identifying who the enemy is by a name that identifies his/her reason for action is more useful. Certainly not all Muslims are terrorists nor is all terrorism driven by an interpretation of Islam. But Islamists justify their actions in a particular, theologically coherent way that makes them identifiable. That group has carried out most of the worst attacks on the United States in the past decade, and so is an identifiable cohort of actors.
Regardless of how one identifies terrorists, the idea is to use more tools in the U.S. government tool box to combat terrorism, something that is important going forward. What seems to be lacking at this point is a clear articulation of what U.S. strategic interests are and how these multiple tools will be used. Maybe that will be forthcoming when the policy itself is unveiled.
"It needs to be much more than a kinetic effort, an intelligence, law enforcement effort. It has to be much more comprehensive," said John Brennan, Obama's chief counterterrorism adviser, who will address the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Thursday. "This is not a 'war on terror.' . . . We cannot let the terror prism guide how we're going to interact and be involved in different parts of the world."
That is true, but it is hard to decipher what that will mean. One of the key places where the new strategy will be tested is in Somalia, where Secretary Clinton has met with the provisional leadership and promised increased support. But so far the promises seem to involve only ammunition and logistical support and somewhat vague and unfulfillable promises to sanction Eritrea for support of al Shabaab in Somalia.
So, what would the new policy change in Somalia? To me, that is a key question because it would force the administration to really articulate what it means. How would the other tools beyond military support be deployed, and to what end? That is the question that needs to be asked all across Africa, particularly, but also Latin America. The idea sounds good (and is good) but the implementation is what will actually define it.
The current discussion is not taking place in a vacuum. I have long told U.S. military audiences that the military has been pushed into too many new jobs for which it is not the best qualified, a premise that many active duty officers agree with.
But the problem has been that few other government agencies can and will go to the places the military will, either with J-Cets or other types of deployments. Given that, the resources have shifted to the military, making it harder for other parts of the government (State, USAID etc.) to do more because their resource base has not grown. So there is a downward cycle. Without resources they cannot or will not participate, and without participation they cannot get resources allocated.
How that resource allocation piece is redesigned will be key. But there has to be an over-arching policy architecture that guides the resource allocation, the types of engagement and to what end. The Bush administration struggled mightily with this with little success and only at the end of its time. For Obama to move beyond that, he will need more than a new vocabulary. He will have to find where the tools fit and what they can be used for, and that is a much harder task.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday August 3, 2009
Al Qaeda Under Pressure and Changing Tactics
Several seemingly-unrelated events seem to me to be important and pointing toward important new directions in the struggle against radical Islamist groups. The first is the optimistic report by CBS News that al Qaeda is publicly acknowledging the damage to its cadres caused by drone-fired Hellfire missiles.
In the communique posted online, al Qaeda leaders say "the harm is alarming, the matter is very grave," due to the drone attacks. "So many brave commanders have been snatched away by the hands of the enemies. So many homes have been leveled with their people inside them by planes that are unheard, unseen and unknown."
That pressure on core al Qaeda may be one of the reasons its affiliated groups have been ratcheting up their activities in other parts of the world, to show the organization is still alive and well and able to carry out attacks. Or perhaps the original core AQ strategy of spinning of large numbers of autonomous but sympathetic groups is gaining more traction.
What is clear is that the focus of attention for the new Islamist groups-either because they targeted the region or simply found room to operate there in regions that are sympathetic to Islamists and have little state control-is Sub-Saharan Africa.
The most notable resurgence of Islamist activities have been in Nigeria, where up to 700 people were killed in fighting in several northern states as the army fought the Islamist Boko Haram-the name means "Western education is sacrilege"-in a bid to eradicate the radical movement.
At the same time, Yemen is becoming a more active hub for violent Islamist activities. As the NEFA Foundation reports, U.S. citizen Anwar al Awlaki in Yemen has issued a triumphalist statement about recent fighting between the mujahadeen and Yemeni army, claiming a great victory.
In January the Christian Science Moniotor reported that the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al Qaeda officially merged, prompting the US Director of National Intelligence to say that Yemen was "reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda."
Somali, too, continues to bubble along, with the al Shabaab movements seeking to complete its takeover of power. And Sudan, despite the ill considered and harmful statements by Air Force Maj. Gen. Scott Gration (ret) that Sudan is now going swimmingly remains a radical Islamist state bent on genocide inside its country and spreading chaos in the region.
So, while core al Qaeda may be, as Juan Zarate told CBS news, badly hurt and in worse shape than any time since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the cancer has spread to a broad range of regions outside the Af/Pak border, and is far from eradicated.
In the communique posted online, al Qaeda leaders say "the harm is alarming, the matter is very grave," due to the drone attacks. "So many brave commanders have been snatched away by the hands of the enemies. So many homes have been leveled with their people inside them by planes that are unheard, unseen and unknown."
That pressure on core al Qaeda may be one of the reasons its affiliated groups have been ratcheting up their activities in other parts of the world, to show the organization is still alive and well and able to carry out attacks. Or perhaps the original core AQ strategy of spinning of large numbers of autonomous but sympathetic groups is gaining more traction.
What is clear is that the focus of attention for the new Islamist groups-either because they targeted the region or simply found room to operate there in regions that are sympathetic to Islamists and have little state control-is Sub-Saharan Africa.
The most notable resurgence of Islamist activities have been in Nigeria, where up to 700 people were killed in fighting in several northern states as the army fought the Islamist Boko Haram-the name means "Western education is sacrilege"-in a bid to eradicate the radical movement.
At the same time, Yemen is becoming a more active hub for violent Islamist activities. As the NEFA Foundation reports, U.S. citizen Anwar al Awlaki in Yemen has issued a triumphalist statement about recent fighting between the mujahadeen and Yemeni army, claiming a great victory.
In January the Christian Science Moniotor reported that the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al Qaeda officially merged, prompting the US Director of National Intelligence to say that Yemen was "reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda."
Somali, too, continues to bubble along, with the al Shabaab movements seeking to complete its takeover of power. And Sudan, despite the ill considered and harmful statements by Air Force Maj. Gen. Scott Gration (ret) that Sudan is now going swimmingly remains a radical Islamist state bent on genocide inside its country and spreading chaos in the region.
So, while core al Qaeda may be, as Juan Zarate told CBS news, badly hurt and in worse shape than any time since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the cancer has spread to a broad range of regions outside the Af/Pak border, and is far from eradicated.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH