In a recent interview with the al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper Qaradawi demonstrated the continued ambiguity of the _Ikhwan_ toward terrorist events, saying Osama bin Laden might not be responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Because of the uncertainty (despite al Qaeda's public and repeated claims of responsibility), Qaradawi argues, bin Laden should turn himself in to an impartial international tribunal to determine his guilt or innocence. Other al Qaeda leaders could be tried there too, he suggests.
At the same time, he equates U.S. counterterrorism efforts with the attacks of 9/11, a rhetorical tactic that is often used by the Brotherhood to share the blame among the victims and the perpetrators of terrorist acts.
Not an original proposal, and one that has been consistent with the Brotherhood's overall dilema: How to encourage and foment the creation of a global Islamist caliphate while disavoiwing the violence of those seeking the same goal?
And, how to preach _jihad_ as the ultimate aspiration, with all that entails and as the Brotherhood codified in its creed decades ago, while dancing around the reality that _jihad_ is ultimately and largely a call to the violent spread of Islam?
The Brotherhood, particularly the international branch, finds itself in the delicate position of many fellow travelers in many causes-how to stay on board with the overall project while trying to parse out differences in the hopes of keeping some distance from the outcomes of their journey.
The last part of the article sums up the situation nicely:
According to al-Qaradawi jihadi groups are wrong to use only violence because in Islam, "the ends do not justify the means."
Wrong to use "only violence." So there must be a political and theological component to the _jihadi_ struggle rather than just the violent acts. And who are those that provide these missing elements? Could it be theologians like Qaradawi, who, with an astonishing degree of success and dexterity, operate in both worlds?
One of the reasons the DEA held its sting operation that led to Bout's arrest so close to the chest was precisely because the agents understood the high risk of political interference in the case.
There is a strong desire in the State Department, derived partly as a legitimate function of the department's role, to seek to pacify other nations and make sure that they like us.
This institutional tendency is in play in an effort to engage the new Russian government on a variety of issues.
The argument is that there are other, larger issues at stake if the U.S. pushes Bout's extradition to the U.S. and a trial here. Better to suffer the short-term humiliation of finding a way to free him (and likely blame the Thais) than the long-term humiliation of having him expose his ties to numerous governments while carrying out his bloody business.
The counter-argument is that this is a high profile case that has the potential to show America's willingness to end impunity for transnational criminal figures, even if it means the pain of some unsavory revelations.
The Bout case is also a healthy challenge to the expansion of Russia's criminal enterprises that enjoy a high level of government protection.
But ultimately the moral weight of holding accountable someone responsible for fueling wars that left hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of people dead, wounded, maimed beyond repair, abducted and raped, should stand on its own.
The sheer scale of his past operations put him beyond the scope of petty international bickering and fears of embarrassment. At some point, the tradeoffs don't matter.
Will lives be saved by not prosecuting Bout? No. But we will all lose tremendously if he is not.
And, on another note: Russia has decided to extradite another old friend of mine, Yair Klein, an Israeli-Russian mercenary who trained the drug cartels in the use of explosives and sophisticated weapons, back to Colombia.
From Colombia, where the retired lieutenant colonel in the Israeli army was filmed training right-wing paramilitary death squads in sophisticated military tactics and weapons use, Klein moved on to Sierra Leone, where he as arrested and held for 16 months for dealing diamonds with the Revolutionary United Front. He was arrested in Russia.
Now, the Russia courts say he can be sent to Colombia, where he was tried in abstencia and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Let's see where that one ends as well.
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleges the banana company knowingly and willfully provided the FARC with protection money and weapons in the late 1990s.
The case sheds much-needed light on the role that U.S.-based companies (and certainly others) play in fomenting conflicts that cost thousands of lives. Chiquita has admitted to being one of them.
The new suit is part a series of legal battles Chiquita has been fighting since the Cincinnati-based company acknowledged paying armed parties in the Colombia conflict. Last year Chiquita agreed to pay a $25 million fine to settle Justice Department charges in these matters.
It is often forgotten that the FARC has abducted and killed U.S. citizens throughout its history. None except the three U.S. contractors being held now had anything to with the war on drugs or Colombia's internal strife.
For all it Bolivarian rhetoric and calls for a "humanitarian" agreement, the group has a remarkable track record of shedding innocent blood.
And Chiquita, it seems, in the interest of protecting its profits, made several costly deals with numerous devils in the Colombian conflict. Unfortunately for Colombia, it chose the two worst groups to try to pay off so bananas could keep flowing north.
It has been documented that Chiquita paid money to the right-wing United Self Defense Forces (also drug traffickers, and also designated terrorist entity) in the Uraba region. The company acknowledged paying the money.
"Our actions were always motivated to protect the lives of our employees and their families," company spokesman Ed Loyd told the Wall Street Journal. "We are contesting the suits vigorously and believe we have a strong defense."
The missionaries were kidnapped in Panama (another cross-border incursion by the FARC), held, and eventually executed when the New Tribes Mission could not or would not pay the multi-million dollar ransom the FARC demanded.
Here is the gist of what the law suit alleges, making it clear that the company never bothered to tell the grieving families of Chiquita's role in funding the FARC. It may be enough to make you give up bananas, as it was for me:
Although Plaintiffs confirmed years ago that FARC was
the entity or organization that carried out the kidnappings and murders, Plaintiffs did not learnuntil recently about Chiquita’s involvement in funding and providing other material support to
FARC. Indeed, to this day, the full scope, including dollar amounts, timing, mechanisms, andanti-detection methods employed by Chiquita in connection with its FARC-related conduct ismurky, and demands document and testimonial discovery.
It was not until March 19, 2007 thatPlaintiffs learned, through filings made public by the DOJ, in regard to Chiquita’s illegal
payments to another Colombian FTO, that Chiquita had, in prior periods, made illegal and secretpayments to FARC as well.
To conceal its unlawful conduct from both Colombian and U.S. authorities andprevent disclosure of the facts to Plaintiffs, Defendant funneled weapons to FARC (and assisted
FARC in the transport of weapons) through Defendant’s local transportation contractors.
Asalleged above, Chiquita also falsified payroll records used to divert funds from non-existentemployees to FARC, used existing contracts with legitimate organizations to bury and disguise 33 payments, or drew up phony contracts with legitimate vendors as a means of falsifying the payments and booking them as legitimate expenses.
As alleged supra, Chiquita also secretly concealed payments to local labor unionsthat it knew, or consciously avoided knowing, were controlled by FARC and made other clandestine payments through FARC-established fronts and dummy companies.
Wow. And now we have evidence the FARC is kidnapping people, producing cocaine and building front companies. A sad and bloody story that will not end soon, and is dragged on by companies like Chiquita who place their business ventures with terrorists above human life.
My sources involved in the operation said the operation was underway months before, and documents were not analyzed by DEA in relation to the Bout sting.
But the 36 pages of documents now made public by the Colombian government do provide a fascinating window into how the FARC, the oldest insurgency in the hemisphere, thinks, operates and views the world.
They show a rebel group that moves millions of dollars across the border for safe-keeping and sets up businesses, but is constantly under pressure from the Colombian military, making communications among the different commanders difficult. It shows they have problems with desertions and morale, and are desperate to change their international image.
The FARC is clearly (and rightly) counting on Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Correa in Ecuador, to bring new legitimacy to its 43-year struggle.
Among the highlights:
The FARC is desperate to become recognized as a legitimate armed actor in the Colombian conflict and is smarting greatly from its reputation (well-earned) as a criminal enterprise. The priority in their relationship with Venezuelan Hugo Chavez is have him push the recognition of the FARC as a "belligerent force" with a certain status, rather than a terrorist group. Chavez has done this.
The explicitly-stated idea is to establish a process similar to the Central American peace process, known as the Contadora process, where different regional heads of state met with Central American state and non-state groups to work toward a solution.
The plan hinges on the acceptance by the FARC and the Colombian government of handing over prisoners from both sides to Chavez for safe keeping in Venezuelan territory. As the FARC notes, since it is their idea, they will accept, and if Colombian president Uribe does not, they feel they can make him pay politically on a regional level.
While it is not news now, there is constant and direct communication between the FARC high command and Chavez and a few of his trusted aides. It is interesting to note that the Cubans, also allies of Chavez, feel left out in the process and are not kept in the loop on many issues.
Ecuadoran president Correa wanted to get in on the regional action, and is a key player in pushing the "Contadora option" because it requires numerous heads of state to move the process forward.
According to one missive from Reyes to other members of the high command (Jan. 18, 2008), Correa is willing to change the Ecuadoran police and military commanders on the border who are considered hostile to the FARC. This is not a minor concession in any government.
The FARC is attempting to go into business, whose nature is encrypted, through various front companies outside Colombia. Part of the business (Feb. 8, 2008 letter to the high command), was to "receive a shipment of oil to sell on the market, which would earn us a great deal of money."
Another option, the letter said, would be to "sell gasoline in Colombia or Venezuela after creating an investment company in Venezuela."
Finally, it is clear that the case of Ingrid Bentancourt, the Colombian senator held for 6 years now despite a continual international outcry, is wearing on the FARC.
There are numerous references to her, how she should be treated, if she would be sent to Venezuela with prisoners in case of an agreement. They acknowledge that the pressure to get her free is "a black mark against the FARC."
The tactic now is to seek the extradition of Bout, arrested in Thailand in an elaborate sting operation run by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), back to Russia, rather than the United States.
Of course, Bout, who has armed rebels, criminals and terrorists from the Taliban in Afghanistan to the RUF in Sierra Leone to the FARC in Colombia, has always operated under the protection of Russian military intelligence.
Sending him home is setting him free, without ever going to trial. There are no charges against him in Russia and Russia, although a member of Interpol has, since 2002, ignored an Interpol arrest warrant issued at the behest of the Belgians.
Bout is a valuable commodity to the Russian services (as he has been a useful commodity to the U.S. Defense Department, the British military, the United Nations etc. etc.), and know where many, many skeletons are buried.
There must be a degree of panic among parts of the Russian intel structure that Bout could sink them all if he is not brought back home.
As my friend Lee S. Wolosky, a former National Security Council deputy who led the effort against Bout for the Clinton and Bush administrations, told the Los Angeles Times,
Bout "really needs to come into U.S. custody quickly. Otherwise, there's ample opportunity for others to mess around."
There are already rumblings in Washington that some parts of the Bush administration (Secretary Rice and others), anxious to appease the new Russian administration, is not fully committed to backing the Justice Department's extradition request.
This would be a serious mistake.
The arrest of Bout will not stop the illicit arms trade or, perhaps, even put a long term, significant dent in the overall operations.
But it is a powerful symbol of the limits of power, arrogance and impunity. If Bout walks before going to trial, the concept of building a coherent front against transnational organized crime and the growing ties to terrorist networks will be shattered.
The image of impunity will be strengthened and the rule of law will suffer another significant blow.
Congressional leaders across party lines have pushed to put Bout out of business. The same leaders should now push to make sure the Bush administration doesn't cave to the Russians on an issue of such consequence.