Monday February 18, 2008
Finally, Some Needed Congressional Oversight
The Investigative Project has just reproduced an important letter from Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va) requesting information from the Saudi-funded Center For Muslim Christian Understanding of Georgetown University.
It is worth recalling that Saudi prince Alaweed bin Talal donated $20 million to the center, led by Dr. John Esposito, a long-time supporter of the international Muslim Brotherhood. Esposito has served on the boards of numerous Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations (USAR in the United States, IIPT in Great Britain, run by open Hamas supporter Azzam Tamimi, etc.) while defending Sami al Arian, Yousef al Qaradawi, and on and on.
HRH bin Talal also late last year donated $1.48 million to the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA),one of the principle Muslim Brotherhood organizations operating in the United States.
Wolf's letter is important because it asks all the right questions, noting that "no changes have been made to the underlying legal authority relationg to non-Muslim worship that the Saudis have relied on to enforce these (restrictions on civil society and religious freedom) rules."
Given the Georgetown Center's role in training U.S. foreign service personnel, Wolf asks if the Center has "produced any analysis critical of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example in fields of human rights, religious freedom, freedom of expression, women's rights, minority rights, protections of foreign workers, due process and the rule of law.
"It is also important to know if the center has examined Saudi links to extremism and terrorism, including the relationship between Saudi public education and the Kingdom-supported clerical establishment on the one hand and the rise of anti-American attitudes, extremism and violence in the Muslim world o the other."
There it is in a nutshell. Why are academic institutions taking gifts that leave them beholden to a regime that abuses human rights, stifles dissent, bans any form of religious tolerance and preaches hatred-providing the theological and political infrastructure to the most radical and violent versions of Islam?
As Nina Shea, the director of the Center for Religious Freedom at Freedom House documented in 2006, and wrote about in the Washington Post op-ed, the Saudi educational system systematically teaches hate and intolerance, despite the Kingdom's expensive campaign to portray itself as having modernized.
Would we let any other narrow-minded, thuggish country throw that kind of money around and not only not question it, but send our foreign service officers there to study? Perhaps the Charles Taylor Center on Human Rights, if he coughed up the money? The Iranian Center on Nuclear Non-Proliferation? The Saudi situation is just as absurd.
So, a tip of the hat to Rep. Wolf, who for years has been a true champion of human rights, focusing on Africa and its often-forgotten wars and abuses. Someone is finally asking the right questions.
It is worth recalling that Saudi prince Alaweed bin Talal donated $20 million to the center, led by Dr. John Esposito, a long-time supporter of the international Muslim Brotherhood. Esposito has served on the boards of numerous Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations (USAR in the United States, IIPT in Great Britain, run by open Hamas supporter Azzam Tamimi, etc.) while defending Sami al Arian, Yousef al Qaradawi, and on and on.
HRH bin Talal also late last year donated $1.48 million to the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA),one of the principle Muslim Brotherhood organizations operating in the United States.
Wolf's letter is important because it asks all the right questions, noting that "no changes have been made to the underlying legal authority relationg to non-Muslim worship that the Saudis have relied on to enforce these (restrictions on civil society and religious freedom) rules."
Given the Georgetown Center's role in training U.S. foreign service personnel, Wolf asks if the Center has "produced any analysis critical of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example in fields of human rights, religious freedom, freedom of expression, women's rights, minority rights, protections of foreign workers, due process and the rule of law.
"It is also important to know if the center has examined Saudi links to extremism and terrorism, including the relationship between Saudi public education and the Kingdom-supported clerical establishment on the one hand and the rise of anti-American attitudes, extremism and violence in the Muslim world o the other."
There it is in a nutshell. Why are academic institutions taking gifts that leave them beholden to a regime that abuses human rights, stifles dissent, bans any form of religious tolerance and preaches hatred-providing the theological and political infrastructure to the most radical and violent versions of Islam?
As Nina Shea, the director of the Center for Religious Freedom at Freedom House documented in 2006, and wrote about in the Washington Post op-ed, the Saudi educational system systematically teaches hate and intolerance, despite the Kingdom's expensive campaign to portray itself as having modernized.
Would we let any other narrow-minded, thuggish country throw that kind of money around and not only not question it, but send our foreign service officers there to study? Perhaps the Charles Taylor Center on Human Rights, if he coughed up the money? The Iranian Center on Nuclear Non-Proliferation? The Saudi situation is just as absurd.
So, a tip of the hat to Rep. Wolf, who for years has been a true champion of human rights, focusing on Africa and its often-forgotten wars and abuses. Someone is finally asking the right questions.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday February 15, 2008
Qaradawi's Luke Warm Statement on Violent Jihad Consistent with Muslim Brotherhood Position
In a recent appearance al Jazeera, Muslim Brotherhood theologian Yousef al-Qaradawi took an interesting, but not unusual line on violent jihad-it is not wrong, but it is ineffective.
In the midst of a discourse on the Caliphate, the need to rotate leaders out of power (and why the Muslim Brotherhood does not, by his own admission, despite the preference of four to six year terms for the leader), al-Qaradawi turns his attention to violent jihad and armed revolution, which I put here as a lengthy excerpt, so that the full context is available. Each can choose their interpretation.
It is interesting that armed revolt is not accepted primarily because it will lead to instability and pave the way for foreign intervention. However, as al-Qaradawi himself has made amply clear in blessing suicide bombings as "martyrdom" operations, if there interference in an area, then violent jihad is accepted.
There is no indication that armed revolt against corrupt leadership would be considered morally wrong. Only that, at this point, it is ineffective.
This is, to me, the fundamental difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist/jihadists. The theological and political architecture and underpinning to support the final objective (in this case, the creation of the Caliphate) are virtually the same.
Where the groups differ is in the effective tactics one should use to achieve that goal.
Al-Qaradawi and other Brotherhood leaders, while supporting "defensive" jihad, argue that the most effective way to create a pan-Islamist union is through sustained political action to hollow out host government from within. One need look no farther than the Holy Land Foundation trial documents for a clear statement of this principle.
This includes the slow, deliberate process of carving out small but ever-growing areas under sharia law, and outside the national laws. Al-Qaradawi has publicly outlined the plan of moving sharia law from neighborhoods to municipalities to local government and on to national government.
Hence, when Rowan Williams, archbishop of Canterbury, said that the imposition of sharia law on some parts of British society was inevitable it was a tremendously important concession.
The Islamists view the demographic trends and softening of civil society in Europe as making terrorist attacks unnecessary. But, in the end, all will be worshipping Allah or dead if the Brotherhood has its way.
In the midst of a discourse on the Caliphate, the need to rotate leaders out of power (and why the Muslim Brotherhood does not, by his own admission, despite the preference of four to six year terms for the leader), al-Qaradawi turns his attention to violent jihad and armed revolution, which I put here as a lengthy excerpt, so that the full context is available. Each can choose their interpretation.
Al-Qaradawi says that "all the rules and laws of Islam contain all that is in favour of people in this life and the hereafter." He adds: "The Islamic shari'ah serves the interests of mankind in their life and religion." He says: "Among these are the political interests. What God decreed in the political field in terms of laws is aimed at establishing the truth and justice, safeguarding dignity, and taking care of people's rights. This is why it was very strict on the issue of revolting against the ruler. By revolting here I mean armed revolt. This is because this will pave the way for sedition and indiscipline. As a result, perhaps blood might be shed, people might be killed, and houses and property might be destroyed."
Al-Qaradawi adds: "The issue is not that if anyone becomes angry at a ruler he then should brandish his sword and revolt against him. No. It is true that Islam does not accept the culture of submissiveness and humiliation by the rulers, but it is also does not accept that if anyone becomes angry at another one he then should carry out an armed revolution, especially since this will lead to instability and pave the way for interference by others and foreigners in the country's affairs." Al-Qaradawi then gives examples of revolts against rulers from the Islamic history.
Al-Qaradawi says: "In our age, we have seen the violence used by the Islamic groups which hold all modern rulers to be infidels and therefore they should be fought. To achieve their objectives, these groups resorted to violence and used weapons to shed blood and to confront these rulers, such as the Jihad Group in Egypt, Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah [Islamic Group], the Salafi Jihadist Movement, Al-Qa'idah, and the like. However, have they achieved what they wanted? They have not achieved anything.
It is interesting that armed revolt is not accepted primarily because it will lead to instability and pave the way for foreign intervention. However, as al-Qaradawi himself has made amply clear in blessing suicide bombings as "martyrdom" operations, if there interference in an area, then violent jihad is accepted.
There is no indication that armed revolt against corrupt leadership would be considered morally wrong. Only that, at this point, it is ineffective.
This is, to me, the fundamental difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist/jihadists. The theological and political architecture and underpinning to support the final objective (in this case, the creation of the Caliphate) are virtually the same.
Where the groups differ is in the effective tactics one should use to achieve that goal.
Al-Qaradawi and other Brotherhood leaders, while supporting "defensive" jihad, argue that the most effective way to create a pan-Islamist union is through sustained political action to hollow out host government from within. One need look no farther than the Holy Land Foundation trial documents for a clear statement of this principle.
This includes the slow, deliberate process of carving out small but ever-growing areas under sharia law, and outside the national laws. Al-Qaradawi has publicly outlined the plan of moving sharia law from neighborhoods to municipalities to local government and on to national government.
Hence, when Rowan Williams, archbishop of Canterbury, said that the imposition of sharia law on some parts of British society was inevitable it was a tremendously important concession.
The Islamists view the demographic trends and softening of civil society in Europe as making terrorist attacks unnecessary. But, in the end, all will be worshipping Allah or dead if the Brotherhood has its way.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 13, 2008
The Importance of Imad Mughniyeh
The assassination of top Shite militant Imad Mughniyeh is important for many reasons, not the least of which was his long-standing ties to Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network and his crucial role as a link between the Iranian special forces and Hezbollah.
It is also interesting to note that Hezbollah, where Mughniyeh was a top strategist for many years, claimed him as their own immediately upon his death, despite denying responsibility in several of the actions for which he is most famous.
As Rohan Gunaratna wrote in his seminal book Inside al Qaeda, it was Mughniyeh's pioneering use of suicide truck bombs used in Lebanon in 1983 to bomb the Marine barracks and inflict mass casualties, was the model Osama bin Laden most wanted to emulate.
"It was Mughniyeh who inspired Osama to develop coordinated, simultaneous attacks as a regular modus operandi, and this has been the hallmark of most subsequent al Qaeda operations, including 9/11 and the East Africa bombings...," Gunaratna wrote. "Mughniyeh, who was especially close to the Iranians, helped al Qaeda develop its agent-handling system, having specialized in conducting long range operations."
According to Gunaratna and the court testimony of Jamal al Fadl and others, Mugniyah and bin Laden met numerous times in Sudan, when bin Laden and al Qaeda were based there under the protection of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government.
In addition, Mugniyah authorized the visit of an al Qaeda delegation to Lebanon for training, and help al Qaeda acquire explosives from Iran that were used in the 1998 East African embassy bombings.
This period of close Hezbollah-al Qaeda cooperation appears to have ended in the late 1990s, although Iran's well-documented protection of senior al Qaeda leaders after the 9/11 attacks shows that all ties were not severed. Mughniyeh, who operated both for Hezbollah and more directly for Iran's special forces, most likely brokered that cooperation.
The cause of the cooling of relations is not clear. The flirtation with a pan-Islamist movement that crossed the Sunni-Shite divide, was never fully realized.
But what is clear is that al Qaeda owes a great deal to the help, vision and training of Mungniyah. The use of suicide bombers in vehicles (cars, trucks, aircraft) was a revolutionary step in the _jihadist_ terms of warfare in the modern age.
In addition to these and other well-documented activities, Mugniyah has been, for more than a decade, one of the chief Hezbollah overseers of that group's involvement in the "blood diamond" trade in West and Central Africa.
He was a visitor to Ivory Coast, long an R&R destination for Hezbollah leaders, and may have helped al Qaeda establish it presence in the diamond trade centered in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
So, Mughniyeh may be gone, but we are seeing his legacy daily in Iraq, Afghanistan and other _jihadist_ struggles. He died violently as he lived violently. So do many others because of his work.
It is also interesting to note that Hezbollah, where Mughniyeh was a top strategist for many years, claimed him as their own immediately upon his death, despite denying responsibility in several of the actions for which he is most famous.
As Rohan Gunaratna wrote in his seminal book Inside al Qaeda, it was Mughniyeh's pioneering use of suicide truck bombs used in Lebanon in 1983 to bomb the Marine barracks and inflict mass casualties, was the model Osama bin Laden most wanted to emulate.
"It was Mughniyeh who inspired Osama to develop coordinated, simultaneous attacks as a regular modus operandi, and this has been the hallmark of most subsequent al Qaeda operations, including 9/11 and the East Africa bombings...," Gunaratna wrote. "Mughniyeh, who was especially close to the Iranians, helped al Qaeda develop its agent-handling system, having specialized in conducting long range operations."
According to Gunaratna and the court testimony of Jamal al Fadl and others, Mugniyah and bin Laden met numerous times in Sudan, when bin Laden and al Qaeda were based there under the protection of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government.
In addition, Mugniyah authorized the visit of an al Qaeda delegation to Lebanon for training, and help al Qaeda acquire explosives from Iran that were used in the 1998 East African embassy bombings.
This period of close Hezbollah-al Qaeda cooperation appears to have ended in the late 1990s, although Iran's well-documented protection of senior al Qaeda leaders after the 9/11 attacks shows that all ties were not severed. Mughniyeh, who operated both for Hezbollah and more directly for Iran's special forces, most likely brokered that cooperation.
The cause of the cooling of relations is not clear. The flirtation with a pan-Islamist movement that crossed the Sunni-Shite divide, was never fully realized.
But what is clear is that al Qaeda owes a great deal to the help, vision and training of Mungniyah. The use of suicide bombers in vehicles (cars, trucks, aircraft) was a revolutionary step in the _jihadist_ terms of warfare in the modern age.
In addition to these and other well-documented activities, Mugniyah has been, for more than a decade, one of the chief Hezbollah overseers of that group's involvement in the "blood diamond" trade in West and Central Africa.
He was a visitor to Ivory Coast, long an R&R destination for Hezbollah leaders, and may have helped al Qaeda establish it presence in the diamond trade centered in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
So, Mughniyeh may be gone, but we are seeing his legacy daily in Iraq, Afghanistan and other _jihadist_ struggles. He died violently as he lived violently. So do many others because of his work.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday February 12, 2008
The Morphing War Against Al Qaeda in Iraq
One of the fundamental truths of dealing with networks, terrorist or otherwise, is that they will morph quickly to survive and adapt as the environment around them changes.
This seems to be the case in Iraq, where, as we know from captured documents that al Qaeda linked groups there have been badly hurt in recent months.
The strategy may now be to move outside Iraq and wage a different type of war from surrounding countries.
The indicators, as outlined by Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, are leaders leaving with cash and seeking refuge outside of areas of intense U.S. pressure.
If anyone remembers the drug wars in the Andes in the 1980s and 1990s (which I covered intensely for more than a decade), one will remember the great joy at the felling of the individual cartel leaders (Rodriguez Gacha, Pablo Escobar, the arrest of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers etc.), and the inevitable statements that these actions would have a significant impact on the amount of cocaine entering the United States.
Of course, the flow of cocaine was never dented at all. The organizations simply regrouped, decentralized, became much more difficult to attack frontally, and business went on.
The point is that, while there seems to be little doubt that the al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq are hurt, the next iteration of the groups may make them even harder to get at.
We seldom think down the road or red team scenarios adequately to be able to predict what a network will morph into when under extreme duress. Often, because we view success as a one-time achievement rather than an ongoing process that needs to constantly be redefined and reassessed, when one outcome is achieved, we view the conflict as having been won.
However, in conflicts where small numbers of people, not only willing but seeking to kill themselves for the cause, are able to wreak havoc, success will never be fully achieved.
Predictive capacity as to where they will land, how they will regroup in the face of what they now know their weaknesses to be and how that will affect their operational capacities, are all vital questions.
The military leadership in Iraq has shown a high level of adaptability in recent times. It is imperative that the flexible mind set predominate.
This seems to be the case in Iraq, where, as we know from captured documents that al Qaeda linked groups there have been badly hurt in recent months.
The strategy may now be to move outside Iraq and wage a different type of war from surrounding countries.
The indicators, as outlined by Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, are leaders leaving with cash and seeking refuge outside of areas of intense U.S. pressure.
If anyone remembers the drug wars in the Andes in the 1980s and 1990s (which I covered intensely for more than a decade), one will remember the great joy at the felling of the individual cartel leaders (Rodriguez Gacha, Pablo Escobar, the arrest of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers etc.), and the inevitable statements that these actions would have a significant impact on the amount of cocaine entering the United States.
Of course, the flow of cocaine was never dented at all. The organizations simply regrouped, decentralized, became much more difficult to attack frontally, and business went on.
The point is that, while there seems to be little doubt that the al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq are hurt, the next iteration of the groups may make them even harder to get at.
We seldom think down the road or red team scenarios adequately to be able to predict what a network will morph into when under extreme duress. Often, because we view success as a one-time achievement rather than an ongoing process that needs to constantly be redefined and reassessed, when one outcome is achieved, we view the conflict as having been won.
However, in conflicts where small numbers of people, not only willing but seeking to kill themselves for the cause, are able to wreak havoc, success will never be fully achieved.
Predictive capacity as to where they will land, how they will regroup in the face of what they now know their weaknesses to be and how that will affect their operational capacities, are all vital questions.
The military leadership in Iraq has shown a high level of adaptability in recent times. It is imperative that the flexible mind set predominate.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday February 8, 2008
Acting in One's Own Self Interest
One thing about extremist groups, particularly those that are based on religion, is that their members so believe that they are the exclusive possessors of the truth that they almost inevitably go to far, especially if they have power.
The alienation of the civilian population they are supposed to be converting or saving eventually grows so great that the groups' existence is threatened.
This seem to be the case of Al Qaeda-linked forces in Iraq. An extraordinary Washington Post story today provides a look into the disarray among the groups, who are now trying to soften their bloody image in order to regain a modicum of popular support.
Without that support, the ability of these groups to operate in virtually any populated area is considerably diminished. Terrorizing people by killing people they love is a useful tactic for a period of time, but only until people lose their fear. That clearly happened when the Anbar chiefs and others broke from the Islamists and accepted U.S. money and weapons to change sides.
While not calling for the end of killing Shiite Muslims, the groups are seeking to win back some level of support among the Sunni chiefs, who in effect switched sides when the abuses by the insurgents grew to be too much.
The result of the abuses (and why one of the principal goals of the new commanders in Iraq was to reduce civilian deaths), the Islamists have been very badly hurt. One can only hope that their efforts to adapt do not lead long to their survival.
In reporting in El Salvador in the 1980s, one of the most important decisions the Marxist FMLN took was to end forced recruitment of combatants and to let those who wanted to leave their ranks go home without retribution.
The level of hostility generated by abusing the civilian population through pressing the young people into combat duty was so high that the FMLN understood that they would lose the war if they did not radically alter their strategy.
The FMLN did live to fight several more years, and so may al Qaeda in Iraq. But it would be tremendous mistake to let the opportunity to cripple them even further slip away.
The groups are not only having a much more difficult time in Iraq, but also in the broaderIslamic world.
Again, the level of violent attacks against Sunni Muslims perpetrated by the Islamist Sunni groups is proving too much for many people to accept. The result is that the level of financial support for al Qaeda in Iraq appears to be dropping.
These are the moments where the news is encouraging and the advantage must be pressed. These groups will not leave voluntarily. They must be driven out. And that can only happen if people perceive that taking the Islamists on is in their own self interest, not in the interest of the United States or anyone else.
The alienation of the civilian population they are supposed to be converting or saving eventually grows so great that the groups' existence is threatened.
This seem to be the case of Al Qaeda-linked forces in Iraq. An extraordinary Washington Post story today provides a look into the disarray among the groups, who are now trying to soften their bloody image in order to regain a modicum of popular support.
Without that support, the ability of these groups to operate in virtually any populated area is considerably diminished. Terrorizing people by killing people they love is a useful tactic for a period of time, but only until people lose their fear. That clearly happened when the Anbar chiefs and others broke from the Islamists and accepted U.S. money and weapons to change sides.
While not calling for the end of killing Shiite Muslims, the groups are seeking to win back some level of support among the Sunni chiefs, who in effect switched sides when the abuses by the insurgents grew to be too much.
The result of the abuses (and why one of the principal goals of the new commanders in Iraq was to reduce civilian deaths), the Islamists have been very badly hurt. One can only hope that their efforts to adapt do not lead long to their survival.
In reporting in El Salvador in the 1980s, one of the most important decisions the Marxist FMLN took was to end forced recruitment of combatants and to let those who wanted to leave their ranks go home without retribution.
The level of hostility generated by abusing the civilian population through pressing the young people into combat duty was so high that the FMLN understood that they would lose the war if they did not radically alter their strategy.
The FMLN did live to fight several more years, and so may al Qaeda in Iraq. But it would be tremendous mistake to let the opportunity to cripple them even further slip away.
The groups are not only having a much more difficult time in Iraq, but also in the broaderIslamic world.
Again, the level of violent attacks against Sunni Muslims perpetrated by the Islamist Sunni groups is proving too much for many people to accept. The result is that the level of financial support for al Qaeda in Iraq appears to be dropping.
These are the moments where the news is encouraging and the advantage must be pressed. These groups will not leave voluntarily. They must be driven out. And that can only happen if people perceive that taking the Islamists on is in their own self interest, not in the interest of the United States or anyone else.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH