Wednesday September 5, 2007
More Homegrown Jihadists in Germany
It is interesting to note that
two of the three suspects arrested in Germany for a possible plot were homegrown _jihadists,_ not foreigners.
This points to the growing trend before toward self-starting individuals who feel they must act on behalf of al Qaeda, without necessarily ever coming into contact with the mother ship of the organization.
These self-starting groups that come from within their own population are far harder to detect that foreigners who may stand out.
Being converts, they are often more radical than the local population, either because they were recruited in a radical environment, they feel the need to prove they are worthy of their new religion, or any number of reasons.
The arrests also highlight the dangers posed by websites, often in the United States, that offer instruction in how to wage individual strikes against high-profile targets. These sites provide not only instructions but also motivational messages to encourage the person to act.
Self-starting groups offer weaknesses as well as strengths.
While the number of actors and potential actors proliferates, the level of skill is often low and the chances of dealing with the groups rises.
Most of the known homegrown groups have still traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan (now, perhaps Iraq), for spiritual guidance and training. This affords opportunities to follow travel leads that develop.
The German _jihadis_ were initially placed under surveillance because they were spotted casing targets, something that more professional groups would likely do more carefully. They must amass the supplies they need in small groups, making suspicious transactions easier to detect.
In addition, more hierarchical structures can learn lessons, reflect on failed actions and adapt to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Individual groups, however, seldom have a chance to conduct successful "after-action" reports. Either they are dead or they are captured, and in either case are largely neutralized for future actions.
But there is a great strength in the decentralized operations. Creative people can think far outside the box, and devise new methods and areas of attack that an organized structure might not adopt or accept.
There is little communication that can be intercepted because the groups do not need to receive instructions, can finance themselves, and the stopping of one group will not necessarily have any impact in stopping other small groups from acting. The groups can strike whenever they see a target of opportunity, rather than waiting for an order to act.
This is a new world, the world of starfish and not spiders. How we adapt will determine how successful we are in avoiding future attacks like 9-11 or worse.
two of the three suspects arrested in Germany for a possible plot were homegrown _jihadists,_ not foreigners.
This points to the growing trend before toward self-starting individuals who feel they must act on behalf of al Qaeda, without necessarily ever coming into contact with the mother ship of the organization.
These self-starting groups that come from within their own population are far harder to detect that foreigners who may stand out.
Being converts, they are often more radical than the local population, either because they were recruited in a radical environment, they feel the need to prove they are worthy of their new religion, or any number of reasons.
The arrests also highlight the dangers posed by websites, often in the United States, that offer instruction in how to wage individual strikes against high-profile targets. These sites provide not only instructions but also motivational messages to encourage the person to act.
Self-starting groups offer weaknesses as well as strengths.
While the number of actors and potential actors proliferates, the level of skill is often low and the chances of dealing with the groups rises.
Most of the known homegrown groups have still traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan (now, perhaps Iraq), for spiritual guidance and training. This affords opportunities to follow travel leads that develop.
The German _jihadis_ were initially placed under surveillance because they were spotted casing targets, something that more professional groups would likely do more carefully. They must amass the supplies they need in small groups, making suspicious transactions easier to detect.
In addition, more hierarchical structures can learn lessons, reflect on failed actions and adapt to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Individual groups, however, seldom have a chance to conduct successful "after-action" reports. Either they are dead or they are captured, and in either case are largely neutralized for future actions.
But there is a great strength in the decentralized operations. Creative people can think far outside the box, and devise new methods and areas of attack that an organized structure might not adopt or accept.
There is little communication that can be intercepted because the groups do not need to receive instructions, can finance themselves, and the stopping of one group will not necessarily have any impact in stopping other small groups from acting. The groups can strike whenever they see a target of opportunity, rather than waiting for an order to act.
This is a new world, the world of starfish and not spiders. How we adapt will determine how successful we are in avoiding future attacks like 9-11 or worse.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday August 31, 2007
Minnesota-based Website Tells How to Join Al Qaeda, Kill High Value Targest
The Middle East Media Research Institute has a disturbing and interesting new report on an Islamist website hosted in Minnesota telling people how to join al Qaeda, how to attack high value targets and how to form a functioning cell.
As has previously been discussed here and elsewhere, the decentralized nature of the current incarnation of al Qaeda is stressed, including the ability to form a jihad cell wherever one is, without ever meeting anyone from the formal al Qaeda structure. The document is aimed at recruits outside the United States, possibly those seeking to fight in Iraq or Afghanistan.
"You feel that you want to carry a weapon, fight, and kill the occupiers, and that it is our duty to call for jihad as much as to call for prayer... All that is required is a firm personal decision to fulfill this obligation, and participation in jihad and the resistance," the document says.
"I don't have to meet Osama bin Laden to become a jihad fighter. Moreover, there is no need to meet even one jihad fighter to become one. Neither do I need recognition from Al-Qaeda...
"As the first step, imagine that Al-Qaeda does not exist and that you are interested [in waging] jihad - what would you do in this case?
"If you know any young people - whether one, two, or more - in your area, mosque, or university who are as dedicated and enthusiastic about jihad as you are, come to an understanding with them, and together form a cell whose objective is to help Islam and only Islam."
The document suggests setting specific goals, such as killing the U.S. ambassador in the country where one lives.
"Is it so difficult? Is it [indeed] difficult for someone who has already crushed America in her own home?
"What is the difference between you and the hero of the New York attack, Muhammad Atta, who planned an action which even today shakes the world every time it is mentioned? Assassinating the ambassador takes no more than a gun and a bullet. One could disguise oneself as a peddler in order to tail [the target], which shouldn't cost a lot of money..."
The chilling thing is the simplicity of the message and of the potential actions. The call to action plays to the idea that there is a vast array of like-minded individuals all marching to the same drummer.
"You must be aware that you have brothers everywhere, and that they are expecting the actions of you and your friends even if they don't know you in person or by name."
Powerful stuff if you are being told Allah can only save the world through your violent actions, and that, if you die, you are rewarded and feel no pain.
As has previously been discussed here and elsewhere, the decentralized nature of the current incarnation of al Qaeda is stressed, including the ability to form a jihad cell wherever one is, without ever meeting anyone from the formal al Qaeda structure. The document is aimed at recruits outside the United States, possibly those seeking to fight in Iraq or Afghanistan.
"You feel that you want to carry a weapon, fight, and kill the occupiers, and that it is our duty to call for jihad as much as to call for prayer... All that is required is a firm personal decision to fulfill this obligation, and participation in jihad and the resistance," the document says.
"I don't have to meet Osama bin Laden to become a jihad fighter. Moreover, there is no need to meet even one jihad fighter to become one. Neither do I need recognition from Al-Qaeda...
"As the first step, imagine that Al-Qaeda does not exist and that you are interested [in waging] jihad - what would you do in this case?
"If you know any young people - whether one, two, or more - in your area, mosque, or university who are as dedicated and enthusiastic about jihad as you are, come to an understanding with them, and together form a cell whose objective is to help Islam and only Islam."
The document suggests setting specific goals, such as killing the U.S. ambassador in the country where one lives.
"Is it so difficult? Is it [indeed] difficult for someone who has already crushed America in her own home?
"What is the difference between you and the hero of the New York attack, Muhammad Atta, who planned an action which even today shakes the world every time it is mentioned? Assassinating the ambassador takes no more than a gun and a bullet. One could disguise oneself as a peddler in order to tail [the target], which shouldn't cost a lot of money..."
The chilling thing is the simplicity of the message and of the potential actions. The call to action plays to the idea that there is a vast array of like-minded individuals all marching to the same drummer.
"You must be aware that you have brothers everywhere, and that they are expecting the actions of you and your friends even if they don't know you in person or by name."
Powerful stuff if you are being told Allah can only save the world through your violent actions, and that, if you die, you are rewarded and feel no pain.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday August 30, 2007
Yassin Qadi and the International Failure of the Sanctions Regime
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal (available by subscription only) carried an important story on Yassin Qadi, the designated terrorist financier, and his ongoing ability to end-run the international sanctions by investing in Turkey.
Qadi, who denies any ties to funding al Qaeda, has, according to reporting by Glenn Simpson, used his close friendship with Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other founders of the Islamist party, the Justice Development party, for protection and access.
The main allegation against Qadi centers on his donations to Muwafaq Foundation, which the United States and United Nations listed as a terrorist-supporting entity and which the CIA alleges specialized in purchasing and smuggling arms for Islamic radicals.
The weaknesses that allow Qadi to end-run international sanctions are the same ones that allow other designated terrorist financiers such as Yousef Nada and Idriss Nasreddin to continue to flourish.
In these cases, the assets of the designated person are liquidated, restructured and nominal control given to a third party, persons or entities not designated. And then business goes on a usual.
The failures point to several glaring holes in the sanctions regime which must be addressed if there is to be any effectiveness to the sanctions. Or else the sanctions should be scrapped, because as they currently stand they do almost nothing and there is no penalty for the governments and individuals that violate them.
Part of the problem with Qadi, as with other designated individuals living there, is that the government of Saudi Arabia has no interest in even going through the motions of pretending to enforce the internationally-binding agreements to which they are signatories.
Another problem is that these individuals tend to be very well connected, as witnessed by Qadi's close relationship with a senior adviser to the Turkish prime minister.
"Mr. Qadi, whose business empire is based mostly in Saudi Arabia, is a longtime partner of Turkish businessman Cuneyd Zapsu, as well as other key Justice and Development Party figures. Over the past year, Turkish media and opposition
leaders have disclosed that Turkey's financial police investigated the activities of Mr. Qadi and alleged al Qaeda supporters in Turkey. That led them to delve into the relationships of Mr. Qadi and other Saudis with senior Justice
and Development figures, including Mr. Erdogan. "
But, as Simpson reports, the investigations died, the senior investigator was fired and life goes on.
Qadi was also a close business associate of Wa'el Julaidan, one of the two people Saudi Arabia officially asked be placed on the UN sanctions list, and alleged logistics officer and founder of al Qaeda, along with Osama bin Laden. Of course, Julaidan lives in comfort, as the Saudi's have argued that they are dealing with him in a more "culturally appropriate" manner than putting him on trial or actually taking any action against him.
This case also shows how so many strands of the _wahhabi_ groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic banking structures, overlap and intersect through the same group of people. Often they intersect with radical Islamist terrorist structures as well.
Using the blunt instrument of UN sanctions to parse out the nuances of this larger ball of wax is not the best way to go. However, it is currently the only instrument available. Without institutional UN support (there is very little), and a true international commitment to honor the sanctions (there is even less), it might be better just to put the instrument away.
Qadi, who denies any ties to funding al Qaeda, has, according to reporting by Glenn Simpson, used his close friendship with Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other founders of the Islamist party, the Justice Development party, for protection and access.
The main allegation against Qadi centers on his donations to Muwafaq Foundation, which the United States and United Nations listed as a terrorist-supporting entity and which the CIA alleges specialized in purchasing and smuggling arms for Islamic radicals.
The weaknesses that allow Qadi to end-run international sanctions are the same ones that allow other designated terrorist financiers such as Yousef Nada and Idriss Nasreddin to continue to flourish.
In these cases, the assets of the designated person are liquidated, restructured and nominal control given to a third party, persons or entities not designated. And then business goes on a usual.
The failures point to several glaring holes in the sanctions regime which must be addressed if there is to be any effectiveness to the sanctions. Or else the sanctions should be scrapped, because as they currently stand they do almost nothing and there is no penalty for the governments and individuals that violate them.
Part of the problem with Qadi, as with other designated individuals living there, is that the government of Saudi Arabia has no interest in even going through the motions of pretending to enforce the internationally-binding agreements to which they are signatories.
Another problem is that these individuals tend to be very well connected, as witnessed by Qadi's close relationship with a senior adviser to the Turkish prime minister.
"Mr. Qadi, whose business empire is based mostly in Saudi Arabia, is a longtime partner of Turkish businessman Cuneyd Zapsu, as well as other key Justice and Development Party figures. Over the past year, Turkish media and opposition
leaders have disclosed that Turkey's financial police investigated the activities of Mr. Qadi and alleged al Qaeda supporters in Turkey. That led them to delve into the relationships of Mr. Qadi and other Saudis with senior Justice
and Development figures, including Mr. Erdogan. "
But, as Simpson reports, the investigations died, the senior investigator was fired and life goes on.
Qadi was also a close business associate of Wa'el Julaidan, one of the two people Saudi Arabia officially asked be placed on the UN sanctions list, and alleged logistics officer and founder of al Qaeda, along with Osama bin Laden. Of course, Julaidan lives in comfort, as the Saudi's have argued that they are dealing with him in a more "culturally appropriate" manner than putting him on trial or actually taking any action against him.
This case also shows how so many strands of the _wahhabi_ groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic banking structures, overlap and intersect through the same group of people. Often they intersect with radical Islamist terrorist structures as well.
Using the blunt instrument of UN sanctions to parse out the nuances of this larger ball of wax is not the best way to go. However, it is currently the only instrument available. Without institutional UN support (there is very little), and a true international commitment to honor the sanctions (there is even less), it might be better just to put the instrument away.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday August 27, 2007
The Growing Drug-Terrorism Nexus
There is much written on terrorist financing and possible sources of radical Islamist financing. We write about the Saudis (true), commodities (true) and many other parts of the puzzle. But, as the latest U.N. assessment from Afghanistan shows, one of the biggest sources of revenue now available to at least some parts of the Islamist forces is from heroin production and trafficking.
Afghanistan has set a new record on poppy production this year, as it did last year, and the year before. Who protects the poppy, the growers and the transporters? The Taliban, getting a two-for-one hit: enormous amounts of money and the change to help the West rot out from within.
I find it beyond ironic that the two main sources of revenue for those who want to kill us use our own money for the venture. We continue to pour billions of dollars into the Saudi _wahhabi_ structure, unable to seriously move to reduce our energy dependence. We see the results of that-the rapid spread of Islamist hate theology that advocates violence and the destruction of Western civilization (or anything not in tune with their narrow vision).
And our addiction (of course including Europe in the collective we) to drugs provide the Taliban and its allies with an ever-growing war chest with which to fund their fight for the establishment of the Dark Ages in their corner of the world.
Afghanistan now produces about 90 percent of the opium that is refined into heroin and sold in Europe, a trade worth more than $ 3 billion a year. Think that will allow the Taliban to buy a few guns, build a few social programs and buy officials?
Of course, other terrorist groups around the world use drug money, paid for on the streets of the U.S., Paris and Berlin, to fuel their activities. The FARC in Colombia is the most obvious example.
I have covered the failed drug war for 20 years, covered closely the rise and fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia, been nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for covering the Colombian and Mexican cartels and, and hung out with the gangs in Central America moving the product there.
So I have had a good look at the successive failed policies, almost all coming down to two fundamental problems: The massive profits generated by the drug trafficking, kept high by a punitive policy, help the worst and most violent gangs rise to the top and gain incredible power.
The second is that, even though they do not make much money, what peasants can earn growing poppy or cocoa almost always is far beyond the ability of any crop substitution program to replace.
These strategies are almost always begun decades after they would have been effective, and the net result is the spending of millions of dollars for projects that almost always make little difference after a few years.
This is true in Afghanistan, where the Taliban had cut the poppy production by about 80 percent. Now that it is advantageous to them, they gain goodwill by protecting the poppy harvest, and reap the profits. This is in part because no one wanted to take on the drug trade in the early days of the occupation. Now, it is too late. They can't take it on without massive disruption of the economy and society.
This is the reality. Legalization will not fly politically or ethically, although it would cut the profits out of the trade. That leaves waging a costly, dangerous war for marginal gains. Or, as the case of Afghanistan now shows, no gains at all.
If history holds true (see the histories of the FARC and ELN in Colombia), the corroding influence of the drug trafficking will move the Taliban, or at least a portion of them, away from their religious fanaticism and toward more common and predictable criminal behavior.
The results of that are hard to predict. Perhaps less religious zeal will be a boon to those living under Taliban rule. Or perhaps it will simply turn violent religious thugs into even harsher masters.
Afghanistan has set a new record on poppy production this year, as it did last year, and the year before. Who protects the poppy, the growers and the transporters? The Taliban, getting a two-for-one hit: enormous amounts of money and the change to help the West rot out from within.
I find it beyond ironic that the two main sources of revenue for those who want to kill us use our own money for the venture. We continue to pour billions of dollars into the Saudi _wahhabi_ structure, unable to seriously move to reduce our energy dependence. We see the results of that-the rapid spread of Islamist hate theology that advocates violence and the destruction of Western civilization (or anything not in tune with their narrow vision).
And our addiction (of course including Europe in the collective we) to drugs provide the Taliban and its allies with an ever-growing war chest with which to fund their fight for the establishment of the Dark Ages in their corner of the world.
Afghanistan now produces about 90 percent of the opium that is refined into heroin and sold in Europe, a trade worth more than $ 3 billion a year. Think that will allow the Taliban to buy a few guns, build a few social programs and buy officials?
Of course, other terrorist groups around the world use drug money, paid for on the streets of the U.S., Paris and Berlin, to fuel their activities. The FARC in Colombia is the most obvious example.
I have covered the failed drug war for 20 years, covered closely the rise and fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia, been nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for covering the Colombian and Mexican cartels and, and hung out with the gangs in Central America moving the product there.
So I have had a good look at the successive failed policies, almost all coming down to two fundamental problems: The massive profits generated by the drug trafficking, kept high by a punitive policy, help the worst and most violent gangs rise to the top and gain incredible power.
The second is that, even though they do not make much money, what peasants can earn growing poppy or cocoa almost always is far beyond the ability of any crop substitution program to replace.
These strategies are almost always begun decades after they would have been effective, and the net result is the spending of millions of dollars for projects that almost always make little difference after a few years.
This is true in Afghanistan, where the Taliban had cut the poppy production by about 80 percent. Now that it is advantageous to them, they gain goodwill by protecting the poppy harvest, and reap the profits. This is in part because no one wanted to take on the drug trade in the early days of the occupation. Now, it is too late. They can't take it on without massive disruption of the economy and society.
This is the reality. Legalization will not fly politically or ethically, although it would cut the profits out of the trade. That leaves waging a costly, dangerous war for marginal gains. Or, as the case of Afghanistan now shows, no gains at all.
If history holds true (see the histories of the FARC and ELN in Colombia), the corroding influence of the drug trafficking will move the Taliban, or at least a portion of them, away from their religious fanaticism and toward more common and predictable criminal behavior.
The results of that are hard to predict. Perhaps less religious zeal will be a boon to those living under Taliban rule. Or perhaps it will simply turn violent religious thugs into even harsher masters.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday August 23, 2007
New Report Available on the Historic Links Provided by the Holy Land Foundation Trial
A new report is available for download from the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation website, titled
"The Ikhwan in North America", co-authored by NEFA consultant Douglas Farah and NEFA Director of Analysis and Research Ron Sandee.
This report is intended to offer readers a short history of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in the United States-as well as its goals and structure-as revealed by evidence recently presented during the ongoing criminal trial in the Northern District of Texas (Dallas): United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.
It is not new if you are regularly reading this site and the Counterterrorism Blog, but it puts a lot of things together in one place, and, I hope, coherently.
"The Ikhwan in North America", co-authored by NEFA consultant Douglas Farah and NEFA Director of Analysis and Research Ron Sandee.
This report is intended to offer readers a short history of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in the United States-as well as its goals and structure-as revealed by evidence recently presented during the ongoing criminal trial in the Northern District of Texas (Dallas): United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.
It is not new if you are regularly reading this site and the Counterterrorism Blog, but it puts a lot of things together in one place, and, I hope, coherently.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH