These public documents, collected by the NEFA Foundation give a pretty clear picture of the Muslim Brotherhood structure, motives and aims in the United States and more broadly.
The first thing the exhibits lay out is the organic, granular link of the Brotherhood to the organizations in the United States such as MSA, NAIT, ICNA and others (CAIR was not founded when most of these were written, but is an unindicted co-conspirator in the case as well, and named as a Brotherhood entity).
A second is that there is a military component and strict security measures to keep the Brotherhood out from government scrutiny.
In Exhibit 003-0089, a Brotherhood leader, Zeid Al-Noman of the Executive Office, gives a brief history of the Brotherhood in America to a gathering of Ikhwan, and then takes questions.
One questioner asks; "By 'securing the group' do you mean military securing? And, if it is that, would you explain to us a little bit the means to achieve it?"
Answer: "No. Military work is listed under 'Special Work.' 'Special Work' means military work. 'Securing the group' is the Groups' (Muslim Brotherhood) security, the Group's security against outside dangers. For instance, to monitor the suspicious events which exist on the American front such as Zionism, Masonry etc. Monitoring the suspicious movements or the sides, the government bodies such as the CIA, FBI etc., so that we find out if they are monitoring us, are we not being monitored, how can we get rid of them. That is what is meant by 'securing the group.'"
A third is the clear concept of establishing front groups and deny or hide the link of these groups to the Brotherhood.
In the same presentation, al-Nomanis asked about the use of front groups. His response:
"By God, fronts are one method for grouping and are one method for communicating Ikhwan thought. They are one method the Ikhwan's point of view. A front is not formed until after a study and after exhaustive study. I mean, the last front formed by the Group is the Islamic Association of Palestine (author note, the seminal Ikhwan group in which Sami Al Arian and so many others participated in). So, Ikhwans, this did not come out overnight, or it was not like the Ikhwans who are in charge went to sleep, dreamed about it and met the next day and decided to do it. Not at all, by God. This went through lengthy meetings and took long discussions."
The internal documents on display show the group's primary function was to support Hamas, which is stated clearly. In Exhibit 003-0078 is an impassioned plea against any type of dialogue or normalization of relations with the "Zionist entity," not deeming to say the state of Israel.
Exhibit 003-0010, an internal document written in December 1990 titled "Lessons and Morals From the Reality of the Intifada Work", begins by stating: "1) Hamas is a Godly gift to Palestinian people, the Muslim nation and the International Islamic Movement:
-like the gift of the Afghani Jihad
-and the establishment of the nation of Islam in Sudan
-and the triumph of Islam and the Muslims in several places (Algeria, Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey)
-the fall of Communism and the liberation of the Islamic states
-the endurance the International Movement in the face of many shocks (the Gulf crisis, the internal conflicts)"
More as I have a chance to digest the mountain of paper. But it is clear we have a secret organization, with its own internal bylaws, security and military structure that views the United States as a vital field for penetration. At the same time a premium is placed on escaping the notice of the authorities through front groups.
Not a surprise, but nice to see it in their own words and writing.
In fact, the number is likely far larger than the 190,000 mentioned in the story. And as the story notes, many of those missing weapons have likely been used against U.S. forces in Iraq, having been acquired by the insurgents.
This incredible lack of control, and the deadly blow back such negligence has on U.S. troops fighting under already-harsh circumstances, is one of the main themes (pardon the promotion, but it is valid, I think) of our new book, Merchant of Death.
While the GAO report on which the Post based its story is useful, in fact the problem is far larger, as we show. Viktor Bout's aircraft, we found, transported at least 200,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Bosnia arsenals, supposedly to Iraq in 2004, although there was no record of the weapons ever having arrived in Iraq.
Our reporting was triggered by this Amnesty International report from August 2006. The report shows that "Large quantities of small arms and light weapons from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) war-time stockpiles and tens of millions of rounds of ammunition were exported and supposedly shipped to Iraq by a chain of private brokers and transport contractors under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) between July 31, 2004 and June 31, 2005."
Our reporting verified this, and that many of the weapons were flown by one of Bout's flagship carriers, Aerocom, in four flights on Aug. 7, 8, 21, and 22, 2004. The flights were allowed fly despite the fact that the IL-76 carrying the weapons, had its Moldovan Air Operating Certificate revoked the day before the flights began.
So, to recap, we have a person known to have flown for the Taliban, FARC and Gadaffi transporting weapons with End User Certificates issued by the US Department of Defense, on aircraft that should not be flying, with weapons that appear to never have reached their destination.
"They really have no idea where they (the weapons) are," Rachel Stohl, a senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information who has studied small-arms trade and received Pentagon briefings on the issue, told the Post. "It likely means that the United States is unintentionally providing weapons to bad actors."
So, we hire bad actors to take weapons that end up in the hands of bad actors, pay good money for the privilege of having the weapons likely turned against U.S. troops fighting an insurgency.
Just as banks are finally recognizing the need to "know your customer," air freight contractors must learn to know their companies. The argument many U.S. officials have made in justifying using Bout companies to fly things is that he is a secondary contractor, so it is not their responsibility.
But if that contractor is known to fly weapons for Hezbollah and the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia, is there really a good reason not track him and cut him off from receiving U.S. taxpayer dollars? I can't think of one.
The best summary of the importance, questioned by some, can be found in this post on the Counterterrorism Blog, as well as the additional information on Mohamed Akram contained there, including his past and current ties to the Hamas leadership.
Yes, it may suggest a hugely optimistic assessment of what is possible, but this is not a simple note by a random person, but a consensus document of the U.S. leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.
One has only to look at how they have set about to implement it to see that it is a real document and plan of action. ISNA, CAIR, NAIT, and all the other Ikhwan-related groups are carrying out parts of the plan outlined. Look at the penetration of the chaplain training in the Pentagon, the White House meetings, the constant meetings with the FBI, DHS and other security arms of the U.S. government, and the clear, planned penetration operations are clearly discerable.
Will they succeed? I doubt it. Most people will not like what they see once they actually see it. But the further they advance before they are stopped, the more damage they do.
The point is not so much that they will or can win, the point is that there is a real plan, by real people, being faithfully executed. As I have said numerous times in the past, if, based on a realistic assessment of who the Muslim Brotherhood is and its true designs, one can perhaps make a rational case for engaging with them.
It is engaging with them on their terms, that they represent nothing but a peaceful group of democrats wanting to make the world a happy place, that is blind and wrong.
It is easy to say they will not win. But then, 15 years ago few would have thought that CAIR, ISNA, NAIT and others would have moved to dominate the discourse on Islam in the United States, achieved the significant political victories and access they have and arrived at where they are.
Overconfidence leads to dismissive underestimating of a formidable foe.
The most interesting exhibit is a Muslim Brotherhood memorandum by Mohamed Akram, dated May 22, 1991, where he outlines the Ikhwan vision of the future. He leaves no ambiguity as to the nature of the Ikhwan calling. (The exhibits will be posted and written about more completely in the NEFA website in coming days).
Under the heading "Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America," he writes:
"The process of settlement is a 'Civilization-Jihadist Process' with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and 'sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated ad God's religion is made victorious over all other religions."
But wait, there is more:
"Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack."
Akram then spells out in some detail the role of the Brotherhood in moving the project forward: "As for the role of the Ikhwan, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction (the Jihadist process). They are then able to employ, direct, and unify Muslims' efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a master of the art of 'coalitions,' the art of 'absorption' and the principles of 'cooperation.'"
The document then gives rationale for setting up Ikhwan organizations across the country: "We must say that we are in a country which understands no language other than the language of the organizations, and one which does not respect or give weight to any group without effective, functional and strong organizations."
The document also deals with the criticism among the Brothers that the focus on the United States will drain support for the establishment of the global caliphate. The response is two-fold:
1) "The success of the Movement in America in establishing an observant Islamic base with power and effectiveness will be the the best support and aid to the global Movement project."
2) The global (Ikhwan) movement has not "succeeded yet in distributing roles to is branches, stating that what is needed from them as one of the participants or contributors to the project to establish the global Islamic state. The day this happens, the children of the American Ikhwani branch will have a far-reaching impact and positions that make the ancestors proud."
The document ends with a list of Ikhwan groups trying to coordinate, including all the usual (ISNA, ICNA, IIIT etc.)
What is so interesting about the document is the breadth of ambition, the conviction of ultimate success and the care with which the campaign we see today was being thought about 16 years ago. So is the the clarity of the ultimate objective of ending our years as a functioning democracy, built on the rule of secular law, minority rights and freedom of religion, press etc.
The infiltration of the government by members and sympathizers, the coordinated role of the organizations in pursuing specific objectives, the recruitment of the best and the brightest into the movement, and other objectives are far advanced, perhaps further than the author could have imagined in so short a time.
The rationale, for those like Lieken et al who want play footsie with these groups bent on our destruction, is truly mindboggling. I don't think the Brothers who have been on the cusp of the new PR campaign, from Ramadan to Akef, have bothered to spell this out like the Brothers do for themselves.
But here we have it, in their own words, written by their own hands. There is much more to say, and I will revisit the topic as more information comes in.
Will anyone pay attention?
For a brief refresher, the FMLN, Marixist-led and backed by the Sandinistas and Cuba, fought the US-backed government and army there for 10 years (although the rebel movements actually started several years earlier). The US was putting in $1.5 billon a year at the peak, not much by today's standards, but a significant amount in a country that is the size of Massachusetts.
The war ended with a negotiated settlement that fundamentally altered the political landscape, enfranchised the rebels as a political party and brought about basic reforms, but nothing like a revolution.
What I found striking were two things that ought to be kept in mind in the current irregular conflicts.
The first is that almost every one of the combatants on the different sides of the conflict took up weapons because someone they cared about was killed by the other side.
The leadership on both sides had clearly defined political agendas and strategies, but particularly the FMLN would never have gained the strength to almost win the war in the years if the civilian deaths had not driven thousands of people into their arms. There, they fought for revenge or self protection, far more than ideology.
The ranks of the military and paramilitary groups likewise grew when the FMLN began its campaign of selective assassination and the indiscriminate use of land mines. Again, the driving force is not the ideological decision to support the government or army, but the decision to strike back at people who had hurt one's family.
The point is that collateral damage by either side significantly strengthens the other. The continuous reports of unintentional but real civilian casualties racked up in both conflicts, I would argue then, exact a far higher cost in most cases than the simple numbers indicate. It seems to me that to make any progress at all, the lowering of civilians casualties has to be a high priority.
It also seems that one huge lever in fighting the armed groups, particularly in Iraq, is that the insurgents inflict the great bulk of the civilian casualties. Perhaps the people perceive the state and US forces as being responsible for not stopping the attacks, I don't know. But it does seem like the ability to recruit in those circumstances would be great.
Perhaps it is a motivating factor in the decision of tribal groups to fight al Qaeda in Iraq and other nascent alliances the U.S. seems to be trying to forge.
The second is that El Salvador underwent a "surge strategy" in 1984.
It is not an exactly analogous situation, granted. But in 1984, when the rebels were controlling large amounts of territory, gaining strength and preparing to wage a more conventional war against the state.
In response the United States upped its military commitment and provided the army with many thing, including the one resource that tipped the balance of power back in its favor-a large fleet of helicopters.
The helicopters were not only extremely useful in hunting the FMLN, but greatly increased the army's mobility and ability to stay in the field for longer periods of time.
Seven years later, however, the FMLN was not defeated, but was unable to defeat the government. Political considerations in Washington, battle fatigue and other factors came into play.
But one of the main reasons was the FMLN. Its members adapted their communications equipment, strategy and weapons to the new tactics. The stories of their innovation are really amazing.
This, it seems, is exactly what is happening in Iraq. There is now enough firepower to insure the insurgents cannot win while the US troops are there. But the insurgents, as one can see through their constant modification to their explosive devices, tactics and use of the internet, are going to adapt and, largely unchained from the risk-aversion of the state forces, will likely survive.
What does that mean? I don't know for sure. But the surge, absent significant other measures to move people away from the insurgents, is unlikely to lead to a basic change in the correlation of forces in the war.