Wednesday April 4, 2007
Mujahadeen on the Move?
There are several developments, and provocative articles, that point to a broadening of the _jihadi/Salafist_ network and its increasing reach and sophistication. None of this bodes well for the United States, now locked in a political showdown over Iraq and other domestic scandals and perpetually unable to focus on more than one political war at home and one thing abroad.
The first is this report from the Jamestown Foundation on the second edition of the "Technical Mujahid," an internet magazine released bimonthly to help _jihadist_ improve their technical security and increase their internet presence.
It gives guidance on how to embed messages in pictures, how to encrypt communications and offers a sophisticated encryption program.
The article also lays out how to design and uploading websites, offers advice on what weapons are best for anti-aircraft use and other information.
The objective of the publication, according to its editor, is to "to eradicate the phobia and anxiety suffered by those who refrain from participating in jihad because they erroneously believe that intelligence services are monitoring their every move. Additionally, the publication aims to spread a sense of security, vigilance and self-confidence, in a scientific way, among members of jihadi forums by educating them in jihadi propaganda and enhancing their knowledge of field operations."
A second element is the deteriorating situation in Somalia. As noted by my colleague Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, the international community has utterly failed to keep the entirely-predictable resurgence of the _salafist_ Union of Islamic Courts from emerging.
I disagree with Daveed a bit, and have argued the the Transitional government, lacking all legitimacy to begin with, is not a real vehicle for creating a government there. The transitional government lived down to its expectations immediately by failing to effectively reach out to major clans or seek to really unify the government or country in any meaningful way.
Nonetheless, the UIC is back, more radicalized and angrier than ever, and clearly high on the agenda of the core al Qaeda leadership and its expanding group of affiliates. Its leaders have the added appeal of having delivered fundamental security for a period of time, a matter of very high value to residents of Mogadishu and elsewhere. The TFG's utter and abysmal failure to deliver anything except chaos can only raise the appeal of the UIC in the eyes of most people.
So now we face the main options of a serious external intervention that goes beyond Ethiopia and the insignificant AU forces there to save an ineffective and unpopular government, or cede the territory to the _salafists_ as a toe-hold for the Caliphate. Hardly attractive choices.
This brings me to the third point, another Jamestown publication by my friend Michael Scheuer, the former head of the Alec Station in the CIA, tracking bin Laden.
He argues that, until bin Laden and al Qaeda, almost all Islamist groups had been narrowly focused on issues in their own countries, not on the "far enemy" that is the United States and Europe. Breaking through this mindset has been one of bin Laden's largest and (and least appreciated) successes.
Scheuer found that there are nearly 40 groups _jihadist_ groups who, since 2005, have announced their formation and pledged allegiance to bin Laden.
Scheuer draws three conclusions, two of which I do not dispute at all and the third one worth considering, but I am unsure how fully I concur:
1) The grassroots instigation to _jihad_ by al Qaeda is working,
2) "Central" al Qaeda is not out of business and the movement of training camps and recruitment centers back to Pakistan confirm this, and
3) Bin Laden has been successful in using Iraq as a contiguous territory from which to reach into the Levant, the Arab Peninsula and even Europe.
All of this leads me to conclude that, while we struggle mightily with secondary issues, our enemy is regrouping, rearming and expanding. Not a good trend line on either side.
The first is this report from the Jamestown Foundation on the second edition of the "Technical Mujahid," an internet magazine released bimonthly to help _jihadist_ improve their technical security and increase their internet presence.
It gives guidance on how to embed messages in pictures, how to encrypt communications and offers a sophisticated encryption program.
The article also lays out how to design and uploading websites, offers advice on what weapons are best for anti-aircraft use and other information.
The objective of the publication, according to its editor, is to "to eradicate the phobia and anxiety suffered by those who refrain from participating in jihad because they erroneously believe that intelligence services are monitoring their every move. Additionally, the publication aims to spread a sense of security, vigilance and self-confidence, in a scientific way, among members of jihadi forums by educating them in jihadi propaganda and enhancing their knowledge of field operations."
A second element is the deteriorating situation in Somalia. As noted by my colleague Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, the international community has utterly failed to keep the entirely-predictable resurgence of the _salafist_ Union of Islamic Courts from emerging.
I disagree with Daveed a bit, and have argued the the Transitional government, lacking all legitimacy to begin with, is not a real vehicle for creating a government there. The transitional government lived down to its expectations immediately by failing to effectively reach out to major clans or seek to really unify the government or country in any meaningful way.
Nonetheless, the UIC is back, more radicalized and angrier than ever, and clearly high on the agenda of the core al Qaeda leadership and its expanding group of affiliates. Its leaders have the added appeal of having delivered fundamental security for a period of time, a matter of very high value to residents of Mogadishu and elsewhere. The TFG's utter and abysmal failure to deliver anything except chaos can only raise the appeal of the UIC in the eyes of most people.
So now we face the main options of a serious external intervention that goes beyond Ethiopia and the insignificant AU forces there to save an ineffective and unpopular government, or cede the territory to the _salafists_ as a toe-hold for the Caliphate. Hardly attractive choices.
This brings me to the third point, another Jamestown publication by my friend Michael Scheuer, the former head of the Alec Station in the CIA, tracking bin Laden.
He argues that, until bin Laden and al Qaeda, almost all Islamist groups had been narrowly focused on issues in their own countries, not on the "far enemy" that is the United States and Europe. Breaking through this mindset has been one of bin Laden's largest and (and least appreciated) successes.
Scheuer found that there are nearly 40 groups _jihadist_ groups who, since 2005, have announced their formation and pledged allegiance to bin Laden.
Scheuer draws three conclusions, two of which I do not dispute at all and the third one worth considering, but I am unsure how fully I concur:
1) The grassroots instigation to _jihad_ by al Qaeda is working,
2) "Central" al Qaeda is not out of business and the movement of training camps and recruitment centers back to Pakistan confirm this, and
3) Bin Laden has been successful in using Iraq as a contiguous territory from which to reach into the Levant, the Arab Peninsula and even Europe.
All of this leads me to conclude that, while we struggle mightily with secondary issues, our enemy is regrouping, rearming and expanding. Not a good trend line on either side.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday April 2, 2007
The End of the Line in Pakistan?
The Nixon Center hosted a fascinating discussion on Pakistan's ongoing, dangerous role in fomenting instability in Afghanistan by continuing to arm the Taliban, manage its resurgence and offer its cadres official protection and sanctuary. This extends to a lesser degree to the foreign "Arab" fighters of the old al Qaeda and new foreign fighters.
The new but highly fragmented groups emerging with Pakistani support pose an increasingly-complex challenge, but also opportunities to exploit the divisions and fissures in the movements and different leaders jockey for position and Pakistan's ISI backs different leaders at different times.
The conclusion was that the alliance of necessity and convenience between the United States and Pakistan has reached its useful end. Pakistan's national interests diverge widely from U.S. and European interests in fighting Islamist militants and creating a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. Pakistan is no longer an ally, but takes a direct hand in fomenting the Taliban and al Qaeda, while happily taking the billions of dollars in US aid that continue to flow.
The presenters were Alexis Debat of the Center and Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation. Both have recently spend time on different sides of the Pakistan/Afghan border. Jones has written an article on his finding (subscription required to read more than the summary), where he concludes that "there is significant evidence that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIC), al Qaeda and other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a sanctuary for recruitment and support. In addition, there is virtual unanimity that Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups."
One of the interesting aspects of the Rand research was the attempt to correlate different factors with the insurgent forces' chances of success. In looking at 91 insurgencies since 1945, the study found that in cases where an insurgency faces an incompetent and weak government while receiving external support and sanctuary, the insurgency almost always wins.
No surprise, but it places the chances of success of the Afghan and Iraqi groups in sharper focus, and can give one some ability to predict how and why these groups are likely to win in the mid-term unless conditions supporting them are radically altered. That does not seem to be in the cards.
From the other side of the border, Debat found that there are now about 25 insurgent groups in Waziristan alone, and that the old Saudi/Gulf pipeline of funds, coupled with a significant flow of cash from Malaysia and protection from Pakistan, have allowed these groups to flourish.
He found that the "new" Taliban is often at odds with the old guard Taliban, and the new group is more radical and more sectarian (anti-Shite etc). The same holds true for the new al Qaeda groups. There are tensions among all these groups, and the newer groups are much more active in the use of the Internet and other activities the old guard of the Taliban would not tolerate.
Both reported on the widespread technology transfer from the Iraqi conflict to the Afghan conflict. This flow of knowledge, technology and training is brought by fighters from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
One of the more recent impacts has been the use of suicide bombers and their increasing sophistication in Afghanistan.
In his writing, Jones calls for a fundamental rethinking and altering of the U.S. and European relationship with Pakistan since current policy "does not serve their interests in the 'war on terrorism' or in stabilizing Afghanistan." One can only hope that policy makers are paying attention before the tipping point is reached and it is too late.
The new but highly fragmented groups emerging with Pakistani support pose an increasingly-complex challenge, but also opportunities to exploit the divisions and fissures in the movements and different leaders jockey for position and Pakistan's ISI backs different leaders at different times.
The conclusion was that the alliance of necessity and convenience between the United States and Pakistan has reached its useful end. Pakistan's national interests diverge widely from U.S. and European interests in fighting Islamist militants and creating a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. Pakistan is no longer an ally, but takes a direct hand in fomenting the Taliban and al Qaeda, while happily taking the billions of dollars in US aid that continue to flow.
The presenters were Alexis Debat of the Center and Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation. Both have recently spend time on different sides of the Pakistan/Afghan border. Jones has written an article on his finding (subscription required to read more than the summary), where he concludes that "there is significant evidence that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIC), al Qaeda and other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a sanctuary for recruitment and support. In addition, there is virtual unanimity that Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups."
One of the interesting aspects of the Rand research was the attempt to correlate different factors with the insurgent forces' chances of success. In looking at 91 insurgencies since 1945, the study found that in cases where an insurgency faces an incompetent and weak government while receiving external support and sanctuary, the insurgency almost always wins.
No surprise, but it places the chances of success of the Afghan and Iraqi groups in sharper focus, and can give one some ability to predict how and why these groups are likely to win in the mid-term unless conditions supporting them are radically altered. That does not seem to be in the cards.
From the other side of the border, Debat found that there are now about 25 insurgent groups in Waziristan alone, and that the old Saudi/Gulf pipeline of funds, coupled with a significant flow of cash from Malaysia and protection from Pakistan, have allowed these groups to flourish.
He found that the "new" Taliban is often at odds with the old guard Taliban, and the new group is more radical and more sectarian (anti-Shite etc). The same holds true for the new al Qaeda groups. There are tensions among all these groups, and the newer groups are much more active in the use of the Internet and other activities the old guard of the Taliban would not tolerate.
Both reported on the widespread technology transfer from the Iraqi conflict to the Afghan conflict. This flow of knowledge, technology and training is brought by fighters from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
One of the more recent impacts has been the use of suicide bombers and their increasing sophistication in Afghanistan.
In his writing, Jones calls for a fundamental rethinking and altering of the U.S. and European relationship with Pakistan since current policy "does not serve their interests in the 'war on terrorism' or in stabilizing Afghanistan." One can only hope that policy makers are paying attention before the tipping point is reached and it is too late.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday March 30, 2007
More Small Steps to put Viktor Bout out of Business
Today the U.S. Treasury Department took another step to crimp the style of Russian weapons trafficker Viktor Bout.
The OFAC freezing action of seven companies and three individuals in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) followed yesterday's similar action by the United Nations Security Council and is aimed in part and restricting Bout's ability to continue to illicitly move weapons to African war zones.
The OFAC statement said that "Three of the designated firms have been found to be owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, Viktor Bout, an international arms dealer and war profiteer... This designation continues OFAC's efforts to disrupt the involvement of the Bout network, one of the largest illicit arms-trafficking networks in the world, in conflicts in the DRC and elsewhere."
OFAC has previously publicly noted Bout's role in supplying the Taliban and his support of Liberian warlord Charles Taylor. A small plug-I, along with my co-author Steve Braun, have a book on Bout and the weapons trade coming out in August, titled "Merchant of Death."
The OFAC notice further notes that "Two of the companies designated today, Compagnie Aerienne des Grands Lacs and Great Lakes Business Company, have been identified by the UN and other observers as being suppliers of weapons and ammunition to warring factions in the DRC. Another firm, Cargo Freight International, is included in this designation for its role as a holding company for some of Bout's assets in the region."
This is the second round of designations of Bout and his companies in the DRC. He is also under sanction for his role in Liberia and has an Interpol Red Notice out for his arrest. Of course, that has done little to slow down his illicit runs, and he lives unmolested by the Putin regime in Moscow. But each layer of sanctions is an incremental step toward raising the cost of his doing business. And it just might save a few lives.
This work is a tribute to a small but dedicated group in OFAC and the UN, who, despite layers of official indifference and bureaucratic inertia, manage to keep to ball rolling.
Along with Bout's companies, OFAC and the UN have designated significant gold traffickers who supported the wars in the DRC, as well as Straton Musoni, the First Vice-President of the Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR is a "largely made up of Hutu extremists who participated in the 1993 Rwandan genocide. Musoni is being named because of his role as a leader of the FDLR, which has impeded the disarmament, repatriation, or resettlement of combatants in the DRC," the designation said.
Small steps, but not futile nor useless.
The OFAC freezing action of seven companies and three individuals in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) followed yesterday's similar action by the United Nations Security Council and is aimed in part and restricting Bout's ability to continue to illicitly move weapons to African war zones.
The OFAC statement said that "Three of the designated firms have been found to be owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, Viktor Bout, an international arms dealer and war profiteer... This designation continues OFAC's efforts to disrupt the involvement of the Bout network, one of the largest illicit arms-trafficking networks in the world, in conflicts in the DRC and elsewhere."
OFAC has previously publicly noted Bout's role in supplying the Taliban and his support of Liberian warlord Charles Taylor. A small plug-I, along with my co-author Steve Braun, have a book on Bout and the weapons trade coming out in August, titled "Merchant of Death."
The OFAC notice further notes that "Two of the companies designated today, Compagnie Aerienne des Grands Lacs and Great Lakes Business Company, have been identified by the UN and other observers as being suppliers of weapons and ammunition to warring factions in the DRC. Another firm, Cargo Freight International, is included in this designation for its role as a holding company for some of Bout's assets in the region."
This is the second round of designations of Bout and his companies in the DRC. He is also under sanction for his role in Liberia and has an Interpol Red Notice out for his arrest. Of course, that has done little to slow down his illicit runs, and he lives unmolested by the Putin regime in Moscow. But each layer of sanctions is an incremental step toward raising the cost of his doing business. And it just might save a few lives.
This work is a tribute to a small but dedicated group in OFAC and the UN, who, despite layers of official indifference and bureaucratic inertia, manage to keep to ball rolling.
Along with Bout's companies, OFAC and the UN have designated significant gold traffickers who supported the wars in the DRC, as well as Straton Musoni, the First Vice-President of the Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR is a "largely made up of Hutu extremists who participated in the 1993 Rwandan genocide. Musoni is being named because of his role as a leader of the FDLR, which has impeded the disarmament, repatriation, or resettlement of combatants in the DRC," the designation said.
Small steps, but not futile nor useless.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday March 29, 2007
Saudis Carefully Edging Away from United States
Ties are seriously fraying between the Saudi royals and the Bush administration, largely because the Saudis appear to have abandoned any pretext of confronting terrorism and instead have returned full bore to the long-held tradition of co-opting or buying opponents.
One would hope, albeit in vain, that recent developments would end the happy talk of our Saudi allies in fighting Islamist terrorism and terrorist ideologies and theologies.
As the Washington Post's Jim Hoagland noted, the most obvious sign of the change of heart, which many of us argued was at best skin deep, was King Abdullah's decision to cancel his scheduled April 17 state dinner. Explanations have been vague as to why.
Then yesterday the king lashed out at the U.S. occupation of Iraq, for the first time calling it "illegitimate." While there are many who believe that to be true, the timing of the statement, after several years of saying nothing nearly as strong, is indicative of the change. It is also noteworthy that the king chose to make the attack at a meeting of Arab heads of state, not just to his own people or in a lesser forum, but in forum that would garner the maximum media exposure.
Saudi Arabia has recently reasserted itself by brokering the Fatah-Hamas, hosting the Iranian president and threatening to arm the Sunni insurgents in Iraq.
This seems to me to be a reversion to true Saudi form, as their hearts have never been in the U.S.-led, sporadic efforts to encourage confrontation with _jihadists_ and the _wahhabi_ clergy. The governing system is simply too intertwined with the _wahhabist_ stream of insular, aggressive and violent Islam to make a break and survive.
Saudi Arabia has also apparently moved to rehabilitate even the few terrorist financiers it agreed to designate, notably Wael Julaidan, an al Qaeda founder. He is apparently now under no restrictions at all, and is free to work, speak and write as he sees fit.
I remember a conversation I had with Adel al-Juber, the current Saudi ambassador to the U.S., when Julaidan was designated. He insisted that the Saudi government would take care of terrorist financiers in "culturally appropriate ways," not necessarily trying them or sending them to prison. I guess the culture has a high tolerance for well-connected money raisers for terrorist organizations.
My sources who work there say there is also a concerted Saudi government effort to get several other prominent Saudis such as Yassin Qadi, off the UN and US designation lists. So far, the efforts have been unsuccessful, but the Saudis have deep pockets with which to buy many friends.
All of this should give the Bush administration a chance for a far more realistic Saudi policy than what it has developed to date. The chances of this, like the chances of the Saudis really changing their theology, are minimal.
One would hope, albeit in vain, that recent developments would end the happy talk of our Saudi allies in fighting Islamist terrorism and terrorist ideologies and theologies.
As the Washington Post's Jim Hoagland noted, the most obvious sign of the change of heart, which many of us argued was at best skin deep, was King Abdullah's decision to cancel his scheduled April 17 state dinner. Explanations have been vague as to why.
Then yesterday the king lashed out at the U.S. occupation of Iraq, for the first time calling it "illegitimate." While there are many who believe that to be true, the timing of the statement, after several years of saying nothing nearly as strong, is indicative of the change. It is also noteworthy that the king chose to make the attack at a meeting of Arab heads of state, not just to his own people or in a lesser forum, but in forum that would garner the maximum media exposure.
Saudi Arabia has recently reasserted itself by brokering the Fatah-Hamas, hosting the Iranian president and threatening to arm the Sunni insurgents in Iraq.
This seems to me to be a reversion to true Saudi form, as their hearts have never been in the U.S.-led, sporadic efforts to encourage confrontation with _jihadists_ and the _wahhabi_ clergy. The governing system is simply too intertwined with the _wahhabist_ stream of insular, aggressive and violent Islam to make a break and survive.
Saudi Arabia has also apparently moved to rehabilitate even the few terrorist financiers it agreed to designate, notably Wael Julaidan, an al Qaeda founder. He is apparently now under no restrictions at all, and is free to work, speak and write as he sees fit.
I remember a conversation I had with Adel al-Juber, the current Saudi ambassador to the U.S., when Julaidan was designated. He insisted that the Saudi government would take care of terrorist financiers in "culturally appropriate ways," not necessarily trying them or sending them to prison. I guess the culture has a high tolerance for well-connected money raisers for terrorist organizations.
My sources who work there say there is also a concerted Saudi government effort to get several other prominent Saudis such as Yassin Qadi, off the UN and US designation lists. So far, the efforts have been unsuccessful, but the Saudis have deep pockets with which to buy many friends.
All of this should give the Bush administration a chance for a far more realistic Saudi policy than what it has developed to date. The chances of this, like the chances of the Saudis really changing their theology, are minimal.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday March 27, 2007
As Sudan Crisis Lingers, it is Worth Recalling it is a Brotherhood Government
Last weekend, as today's Washington Post editorial reminds us, the EU again huffed and puffed about doing something about Darfur. The situation is "intolerable" Mr. Blair said, adding that the actions of the Sudanese government were "completely unacceptable." Ms. Merkel chimed in on the need for stronger sanctions. And then they all walked away.
The Bush administration has done much the same thing. Remember "phase two" sanctions that were to go into effect on the first of the year if the government didn't halt the slaughter (and blah blah blah).
The toll remains staggering and the situation is not improving. Some 200,000 dead (on the very low end of estimates), 2 million driven from their homes, etc. etc. etc.
Why? Because the government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, which is made up primarily of members of the Muslim Brotherhood (of which Bashir and Hassan al Turabi, among others, are prominent members) allow it. Turabi may be out of power, but not because of his ties to the Brotherhood, but due to internal rivalries that do not touch the heart of the Brotherhood project there.
Perhaps al Bashir et al missed the new commitment to not supporting _jihad_ and to pluralistic democracy that Mssrs. Leiken and Brooke found compelling in their discussions with the Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Perhaps they believe in ethnic cleansing and doing what the Brotherhood would do elsewhere if it took power. Or perhaps they are not acting on anyone's behalf except their own but their own Brothers do not see that as a problem.
It is striking that the Brotherhood-related groups across Europe and the United States, and the regimes in the Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia) that support them have raised not a single protest over the genocide in Darfur. They have raised hundreds of millions of dollars to build their infrastructure and rally to the cause of Hamas and occassionally Hezbollah. But not one word of condemnation for their regime in Sudan.
Al Turabi opened his country to bin Laden and any other Muslim, precisely because he was implementing the _Ikhwan_ strategy of creating a non-territorial Islamic state that welcomes all Muslims (including crossing the Shia-Sunni divide, and Youssef Nada has made clear in his public statements and the Brotherhood ties to Iran, also unexplored and unexplained in the Leiken/Brooke piece).
Egypt, China and other countries outside the Brotherhood orbit also bear great responsibility in allowing the al Bashir regime to carry on genocide. All of the outside world does, and it is a black mark against every government that continues to deal with Sudan as if it were a member of the international community.
But the greatest responsibility lies with those closest to the regime, who have chosen not to even make the weak gestures of verbal protest and condemnation, and those are the Muslim Brothers and their backers.
The Bush administration has done much the same thing. Remember "phase two" sanctions that were to go into effect on the first of the year if the government didn't halt the slaughter (and blah blah blah).
The toll remains staggering and the situation is not improving. Some 200,000 dead (on the very low end of estimates), 2 million driven from their homes, etc. etc. etc.
Why? Because the government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, which is made up primarily of members of the Muslim Brotherhood (of which Bashir and Hassan al Turabi, among others, are prominent members) allow it. Turabi may be out of power, but not because of his ties to the Brotherhood, but due to internal rivalries that do not touch the heart of the Brotherhood project there.
Perhaps al Bashir et al missed the new commitment to not supporting _jihad_ and to pluralistic democracy that Mssrs. Leiken and Brooke found compelling in their discussions with the Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Perhaps they believe in ethnic cleansing and doing what the Brotherhood would do elsewhere if it took power. Or perhaps they are not acting on anyone's behalf except their own but their own Brothers do not see that as a problem.
It is striking that the Brotherhood-related groups across Europe and the United States, and the regimes in the Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia) that support them have raised not a single protest over the genocide in Darfur. They have raised hundreds of millions of dollars to build their infrastructure and rally to the cause of Hamas and occassionally Hezbollah. But not one word of condemnation for their regime in Sudan.
Al Turabi opened his country to bin Laden and any other Muslim, precisely because he was implementing the _Ikhwan_ strategy of creating a non-territorial Islamic state that welcomes all Muslims (including crossing the Shia-Sunni divide, and Youssef Nada has made clear in his public statements and the Brotherhood ties to Iran, also unexplored and unexplained in the Leiken/Brooke piece).
Egypt, China and other countries outside the Brotherhood orbit also bear great responsibility in allowing the al Bashir regime to carry on genocide. All of the outside world does, and it is a black mark against every government that continues to deal with Sudan as if it were a member of the international community.
But the greatest responsibility lies with those closest to the regime, who have chosen not to even make the weak gestures of verbal protest and condemnation, and those are the Muslim Brothers and their backers.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH