Thursday October 1, 2009
Drugs, Terrorists, Pipelines and Afghanistan
Today I testified in the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on the interconnectedness of terrorist and criminal organizations, especially the truly transnational groups. (You can access the testimony of the rest of the panel here.)
The central point we all drove home, from different perspectives, was that of the pipeline, or recombinant chains that increasingly allow criminal to co-mingle different types of activity while merging with terrorist organizations that are becoming more criminalized.
At the root of many of the reasons for this is the absence, ineffectiveness or grossly corrupt governments in the regions where these pipelines operate. Without some ability of the government-usually after decades or centuries of absence-to convince people there is a reason to support it, the insurgencies/drug traffickers/non-state actors win by default.
The timing was interesting because the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was reiterating the need to significantly increase the number of troops in Afghanistan to fight the growing Taliban-led insurgency. The Obama administration is in the beginning of a crucial debate on Afghanistan policy.
What McChrystal's strategy cannot address is the mass corruption that has so thoroughly discredited the Karzai government and turned hope to dispair in much of Afghanistan. The perception of massive fraud (even if the fraud was only significant) in the elections may have been the final straw in the ability to generate the necessary trust in the government to make any difference.
As my fellow panelist David Mansfield noted in the hearing, while the Taliban is undoubtedly heavily involved in opium trafficking, so is the government. People expect the Taliban or other non-state actors to engage in criminal activity, in part because they are not the government.
But when the government acts as the enemy while claiming legitimacy for its actions, the population is not fooled. Rebuilding lost credibility is an enormous and time consuming enterprise.
I remember in the late 1980s, when the war in El Salvador was in full bloom, spending time on patrol with an army unit in northeastern Morazan province. The colonel in charge said the biggest change, after 10 years of war and intense efforts to rein in the official abuses of the civilian population, was that, finally, the people had lost their fear of the military.
Not that they loved the government forces, which had for decades carried out summary executions and other abuses. But, after a decade of modified behavior, people were just beginning to move away from their fear.
In Afghanistan, the process of rebuilding that trust has not yet begun, and government behavior is getting worse, not better. Trying to build a serious counterinsurgency effort in those circumstances is simply not viable, no matter how attractive or necessary such an effort seems to be.
One thing is clear. The United States cannot and will not stay in Afghanistan forever. Our troops, even with significant civilian support to help in the nation building process and deployed at the levels McChrystal asks, can still only have a limited impact if the country's own government is viewed by the enemy by much of the population.
I am not arguing that McChrystal's request should be dismissed. I am arguing that, unless we significantly work on the non-military side with credible allies in the government of Afghanistan there is little reason to think that strategy can be successful.
Gen. McChrystal knows what he needs militarily to take on the military side of the Taliban. The other half of the equation is beyond his control, and perhaps the control of the NATO alliance. Unless we think through what we can realistically expect as a counterpart from Afghanistan's government, the military action will be ephemeral at best.
The central point we all drove home, from different perspectives, was that of the pipeline, or recombinant chains that increasingly allow criminal to co-mingle different types of activity while merging with terrorist organizations that are becoming more criminalized.
At the root of many of the reasons for this is the absence, ineffectiveness or grossly corrupt governments in the regions where these pipelines operate. Without some ability of the government-usually after decades or centuries of absence-to convince people there is a reason to support it, the insurgencies/drug traffickers/non-state actors win by default.
The timing was interesting because the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was reiterating the need to significantly increase the number of troops in Afghanistan to fight the growing Taliban-led insurgency. The Obama administration is in the beginning of a crucial debate on Afghanistan policy.
What McChrystal's strategy cannot address is the mass corruption that has so thoroughly discredited the Karzai government and turned hope to dispair in much of Afghanistan. The perception of massive fraud (even if the fraud was only significant) in the elections may have been the final straw in the ability to generate the necessary trust in the government to make any difference.
As my fellow panelist David Mansfield noted in the hearing, while the Taliban is undoubtedly heavily involved in opium trafficking, so is the government. People expect the Taliban or other non-state actors to engage in criminal activity, in part because they are not the government.
But when the government acts as the enemy while claiming legitimacy for its actions, the population is not fooled. Rebuilding lost credibility is an enormous and time consuming enterprise.
I remember in the late 1980s, when the war in El Salvador was in full bloom, spending time on patrol with an army unit in northeastern Morazan province. The colonel in charge said the biggest change, after 10 years of war and intense efforts to rein in the official abuses of the civilian population, was that, finally, the people had lost their fear of the military.
Not that they loved the government forces, which had for decades carried out summary executions and other abuses. But, after a decade of modified behavior, people were just beginning to move away from their fear.
In Afghanistan, the process of rebuilding that trust has not yet begun, and government behavior is getting worse, not better. Trying to build a serious counterinsurgency effort in those circumstances is simply not viable, no matter how attractive or necessary such an effort seems to be.
One thing is clear. The United States cannot and will not stay in Afghanistan forever. Our troops, even with significant civilian support to help in the nation building process and deployed at the levels McChrystal asks, can still only have a limited impact if the country's own government is viewed by the enemy by much of the population.
I am not arguing that McChrystal's request should be dismissed. I am arguing that, unless we significantly work on the non-military side with credible allies in the government of Afghanistan there is little reason to think that strategy can be successful.
Gen. McChrystal knows what he needs militarily to take on the military side of the Taliban. The other half of the equation is beyond his control, and perhaps the control of the NATO alliance. Unless we think through what we can realistically expect as a counterpart from Afghanistan's government, the military action will be ephemeral at best.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday September 29, 2009
Iran (and its Latin American Ambitions) Move to the Forefront
Iran's somewhat outsized global ambitions are finally getting some of the scrutiny they deserve. The decision to test fire its most advanced mid-range missile as pressure mounts because of hidden nuclear facilities is the most visible action.
But less noticed was Venezuela's surprise acknowledgment that Iran is helping it find uranium, of which Venezuela may have a good deal. Such help from Iran had previously been announced as possible, but not recognized as currently underway.
Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz said Iran has been assisting Venezuela with geophysical survey flights and geochemical analysis of the deposits, and that evaluations "indicate the existence of uranium in western parts of the country and in Santa Elena de Uairen," in southeastern Bolivar state.
"We could have important reserves of uranium," Sanz told reporters upon arrival on Venezuela's Margarita Island for a weekend Africa-South America summit. He added that efforts to certify the reserves could begin within the next three years.
The announcement came as revelations that Iran has secretly been building a uranium-enrichment plant provoke concerns among countries including the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, Germany and China.
The announcement comes as Venezuela, which had been rebuffed at several turns (particularly by Brazil and Argentina) in trying to get nuclear technology because of its insistence of including Iran in any deal, has undertaken to build a nuclear village with Iran. Russia is willing to work with the rogue coaltion.
Brazil and Argentina rebuffed Venezuelan overtures in 2005 because of the insistence of Chávez that Iran be allowed to participate, despite international sanctions.
This is hardly the repudiation by an anti-Chavista bloc. After all, Chávez helped finance the successful election of the president of Argentina and Lula has more credible credentials with the Latin American left than Chávez ever could or should.
But they realized that any help of to Iran's nuclear program would be a violation of UN sanctions. In addition, Venezuela, although Venezuela is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, has refused to sign the Additional Protocol, which would give the agency broader inspection powers and obligate Venezuela to provide "the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines."
An expansion of Iran-Venezuela ties are necessary "given their common interests, friends and foes," Ahmadinejad said after a meeting with Chávez last month in Tehran, according to Iran's semiofficial FARS news agency.
Unfortunately, their common interests are the destruction of the United States, Israel, Colombia and other, their common foes are the same and their common friends are Hezbollah and other non-state terrorist and criminal organizations such as the FARC.
Given that Iran has lied at every step on its nuclear program and Chávez has gone out of his way to avoid any semblance of transparency in his dealing with Iran, one cannot assume that this is simply an alliance for the good of humanity, or for the peoples of either nation. Venezuela does not have an energy deficit, nor the ability to easily build nuclear power plants.
It can, with Iranian help and oil money, acquire nuclear technology. But it is among the least economically viable methods for generating power, as Chávez claims.
Which leads one to wonder why the insistence on spending scarce resources for the least viable option. Or could it be there is something Chávez is not disclosing? I would be shocked, shocked I say.
However, the Wall Street Journal-available here for a limited time only) has a story today which shows the limits of such an alliance, at least for now.
It is clear that, unless the deal is directly related to the diplomatic recognition of Iran and the building of mechanisms to bypass international sanctions, Iran is hard pressed to fulfill its obligations.
Its bicycle plants don't receive needed parts, a car factory produces only 20 cars in three months, rather than several thousand. Angry Nicaraguan's drive visiting Iranian dignitaries away etc.
The vast promises of Venezuelan aid (unless it is to the FARC) are also largely only in the imagination of Chávez. Yet Iran is able to make functional missiles and Venezuela is able to purchase sophisticated weapons, trainers and training. When the system chooses to be efficient and productive, it can be. And that is the danger.
But less noticed was Venezuela's surprise acknowledgment that Iran is helping it find uranium, of which Venezuela may have a good deal. Such help from Iran had previously been announced as possible, but not recognized as currently underway.
Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz said Iran has been assisting Venezuela with geophysical survey flights and geochemical analysis of the deposits, and that evaluations "indicate the existence of uranium in western parts of the country and in Santa Elena de Uairen," in southeastern Bolivar state.
"We could have important reserves of uranium," Sanz told reporters upon arrival on Venezuela's Margarita Island for a weekend Africa-South America summit. He added that efforts to certify the reserves could begin within the next three years.
The announcement came as revelations that Iran has secretly been building a uranium-enrichment plant provoke concerns among countries including the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, Germany and China.
The announcement comes as Venezuela, which had been rebuffed at several turns (particularly by Brazil and Argentina) in trying to get nuclear technology because of its insistence of including Iran in any deal, has undertaken to build a nuclear village with Iran. Russia is willing to work with the rogue coaltion.
Brazil and Argentina rebuffed Venezuelan overtures in 2005 because of the insistence of Chávez that Iran be allowed to participate, despite international sanctions.
This is hardly the repudiation by an anti-Chavista bloc. After all, Chávez helped finance the successful election of the president of Argentina and Lula has more credible credentials with the Latin American left than Chávez ever could or should.
But they realized that any help of to Iran's nuclear program would be a violation of UN sanctions. In addition, Venezuela, although Venezuela is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, has refused to sign the Additional Protocol, which would give the agency broader inspection powers and obligate Venezuela to provide "the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines."
An expansion of Iran-Venezuela ties are necessary "given their common interests, friends and foes," Ahmadinejad said after a meeting with Chávez last month in Tehran, according to Iran's semiofficial FARS news agency.
Unfortunately, their common interests are the destruction of the United States, Israel, Colombia and other, their common foes are the same and their common friends are Hezbollah and other non-state terrorist and criminal organizations such as the FARC.
Given that Iran has lied at every step on its nuclear program and Chávez has gone out of his way to avoid any semblance of transparency in his dealing with Iran, one cannot assume that this is simply an alliance for the good of humanity, or for the peoples of either nation. Venezuela does not have an energy deficit, nor the ability to easily build nuclear power plants.
It can, with Iranian help and oil money, acquire nuclear technology. But it is among the least economically viable methods for generating power, as Chávez claims.
Which leads one to wonder why the insistence on spending scarce resources for the least viable option. Or could it be there is something Chávez is not disclosing? I would be shocked, shocked I say.
However, the Wall Street Journal-available here for a limited time only) has a story today which shows the limits of such an alliance, at least for now.
It is clear that, unless the deal is directly related to the diplomatic recognition of Iran and the building of mechanisms to bypass international sanctions, Iran is hard pressed to fulfill its obligations.
Its bicycle plants don't receive needed parts, a car factory produces only 20 cars in three months, rather than several thousand. Angry Nicaraguan's drive visiting Iranian dignitaries away etc.
The vast promises of Venezuelan aid (unless it is to the FARC) are also largely only in the imagination of Chávez. Yet Iran is able to make functional missiles and Venezuela is able to purchase sophisticated weapons, trainers and training. When the system chooses to be efficient and productive, it can be. And that is the danger.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday September 23, 2009
Why McChrystal Should be Listened To On Afghanistan
The bleak assessment by NATO and U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, of the Afghanistan conflict is strikingly similar to a bleak assessment given by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Colombia conflict in 1998.
While one must be careful not to overdue comparisons of conflicts that have significant differences, I think the parallel shows two things in conflicts where the non-state actors receive haven in neighboring countries and derive much of their funding from the drug trade: 1) One should listen carefully to Gen. McChrystal, particularly on the loss of legitimacy of the Afghan government and 2) the situation is not irreversible, as Colombia has shown.
As a reporter for the Washington Post at the time, I was given access to the report, which predicted the Marxist FARC rebels could take over the country within five years. At the time this is what I wrote, and see if it sounds vaguely familiar:
The Colombian military has proved to be inept, ill-trained and poorly
equipped. Of the 120,000 armed forces members, only 20,000 are equipped and prepared for combat, according to U.S. intelligence sources. Standard military doctrine holds that a regular army needs a 10-to-1 advantage in size to defeat a well-equipped and steadfast insurgency.
The pessimistic assessment of the situation in Colombia, which
produces 80 percent of the world's cocaine and a growing share of
the heroin consumed in the United States, was echoed by Gen.
Charles Wilhelm, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, which is
responsible for U.S. security in Latin America.
"The primary vulnerability of the Colombian armed forces is their
inability to see threats, followed closely by their lack of competence
in assessing and engaging them," Wilhelm told a congressional
hearing on March 31.
At the time, Colombia's electoral campaign had been badly tainted by the fact that the victor, Ernesto Samper, had taken $6 million from the Cali cartel for his electoral campaign. The government had lost much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the middle class, and had already lost it in much of the rural areas where the FARC was strongest.
McChyrstal, in his assessment, echoes the weakness of the local forces and the lack of credibility of the the Karzi government.
"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says.
If there is not a government worth fighting for, people will not fight. It is a basic fact of counterinsurgency and of life. The corrupted electoral process in Afghanistan has, as has been noted, one clear victor: the Taliban. Those who run such systems do their country a deep disservice for the unforgivable goal of perpetrating themselves in power.
Colombia survived because of timely and well-directed US aid in addition to a radical restructuring of the Colombian armed forces. The senior officer corps at the time, many with ties to violent and illegal paramilitary groups, were swept aside and a new group of radical thinking officers emerged. What was important about that effort, in addition to the results, is that it was led from within the Colombian military and was an internal process which the United States had little to do with.
That is what must happen in Afghanistan, or the war will be lost. The tainted government must regain a modicum of legitimacy or perish. The armed forces must decide it is their fight, not the fight of NATO or the US, and lead their reforms themselves. If not, they will lose, no matter how much money and blood outsiders pour in there.
Colombia had the political will to move back from the precipice. Afghanistan may not. Gen. McChrystal is right. Without a legitimate government people are willing to fight for, there is simply no way to win.
While one must be careful not to overdue comparisons of conflicts that have significant differences, I think the parallel shows two things in conflicts where the non-state actors receive haven in neighboring countries and derive much of their funding from the drug trade: 1) One should listen carefully to Gen. McChrystal, particularly on the loss of legitimacy of the Afghan government and 2) the situation is not irreversible, as Colombia has shown.
As a reporter for the Washington Post at the time, I was given access to the report, which predicted the Marxist FARC rebels could take over the country within five years. At the time this is what I wrote, and see if it sounds vaguely familiar:
The Colombian military has proved to be inept, ill-trained and poorly
equipped. Of the 120,000 armed forces members, only 20,000 are equipped and prepared for combat, according to U.S. intelligence sources. Standard military doctrine holds that a regular army needs a 10-to-1 advantage in size to defeat a well-equipped and steadfast insurgency.
The pessimistic assessment of the situation in Colombia, which
produces 80 percent of the world's cocaine and a growing share of
the heroin consumed in the United States, was echoed by Gen.
Charles Wilhelm, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, which is
responsible for U.S. security in Latin America.
"The primary vulnerability of the Colombian armed forces is their
inability to see threats, followed closely by their lack of competence
in assessing and engaging them," Wilhelm told a congressional
hearing on March 31.
At the time, Colombia's electoral campaign had been badly tainted by the fact that the victor, Ernesto Samper, had taken $6 million from the Cali cartel for his electoral campaign. The government had lost much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the middle class, and had already lost it in much of the rural areas where the FARC was strongest.
McChyrstal, in his assessment, echoes the weakness of the local forces and the lack of credibility of the the Karzi government.
"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says.
If there is not a government worth fighting for, people will not fight. It is a basic fact of counterinsurgency and of life. The corrupted electoral process in Afghanistan has, as has been noted, one clear victor: the Taliban. Those who run such systems do their country a deep disservice for the unforgivable goal of perpetrating themselves in power.
Colombia survived because of timely and well-directed US aid in addition to a radical restructuring of the Colombian armed forces. The senior officer corps at the time, many with ties to violent and illegal paramilitary groups, were swept aside and a new group of radical thinking officers emerged. What was important about that effort, in addition to the results, is that it was led from within the Colombian military and was an internal process which the United States had little to do with.
That is what must happen in Afghanistan, or the war will be lost. The tainted government must regain a modicum of legitimacy or perish. The armed forces must decide it is their fight, not the fight of NATO or the US, and lead their reforms themselves. If not, they will lose, no matter how much money and blood outsiders pour in there.
Colombia had the political will to move back from the precipice. Afghanistan may not. Gen. McChrystal is right. Without a legitimate government people are willing to fight for, there is simply no way to win.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday September 29, 2009
Physical Safe Havens for Terrorists
Paul Pillar, former deputy CIA counter-terrorism chief, has an interesting op-ed in today's Washington Post posing an important question regarding the Afghanistan conflict:
Whether preventing a safe haven in Afghanistan would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.
Clearly Pillar is arguing that the answer is Afghanistan is not worth the price, given those terms of debate. One of his main points is that The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.
Here is where I disagree. Clearly training camps are not of paramount importance to terrorist groups, and the Internet provides a fluid and almost risk free way to communicate both ideologically and personally, and physical safe havens are not as vital to many aspects of the terrorist threat as they were before 9/11. But it misses a key point to dismiss their importance to the degree Pillar does.
Almost all the personal ties and connections that were formed among those who have carried out different terrorist attacks took place because the actors had a place where they meet each other, understand they were not alone in their vision of jihad, and build relationships of trust.
This is fundamental to any cadre, and something that virtual exchanges simply cannot replace. The meetings in the hotel rooms and apartments were possible because of the bond of trust forged in a broader common experience.
People are seldom motivated to act based on the Internet alone. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Ramsey Yousef, the 1998 Embassy bombers, Bali bombers and the current group of foreign recruits in Somalia all share a tie that could never be forged outside of being in a battlefield and fighting the infidel.
Those who undergo the same experiences (training, combat, deprivation, communal living etc.), even if they do not do it together, share a bond that cyberspace simply cannot bridge. It is the building of community that is vital in moving someone from interest in jihad to actual involvement.
It is also worth remembering the cross-training and learning experiences that safe havens provide. Hezbollah and al Qaeda exchanged "lessons learned" and technology when bin Laden was in Sudan.
Sudan itself was the great mixing bowl for all radical Islamist groups, under the guidance of al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing Hamas and Hezbollah, PIJ and al Qaeda a safe meeting ground that enhanced the operational capacities of each and forged the bonds that still are relevant today.
I think the analysis also overlooks the importance, in jihadist theology, of a physical caliphate or space that is considered a true Muslim nation or divine kingdom on earth. Hence the fight in Somalia, Afghanistan etc. It is not so much about conquering space to create safe havens as it is to establish the rule of Allah on earth, and eventually, spreading that rule over the entire earth.
Safe havens make jihadists stronger. The cost of denying them is high, and Pillar is right that the case has not yet been publicly made for that in Afghanistan. It is time to seriously consider whether it can be made.
Whether preventing a safe haven in Afghanistan would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.
Clearly Pillar is arguing that the answer is Afghanistan is not worth the price, given those terms of debate. One of his main points is that The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.
Here is where I disagree. Clearly training camps are not of paramount importance to terrorist groups, and the Internet provides a fluid and almost risk free way to communicate both ideologically and personally, and physical safe havens are not as vital to many aspects of the terrorist threat as they were before 9/11. But it misses a key point to dismiss their importance to the degree Pillar does.
Almost all the personal ties and connections that were formed among those who have carried out different terrorist attacks took place because the actors had a place where they meet each other, understand they were not alone in their vision of jihad, and build relationships of trust.
This is fundamental to any cadre, and something that virtual exchanges simply cannot replace. The meetings in the hotel rooms and apartments were possible because of the bond of trust forged in a broader common experience.
People are seldom motivated to act based on the Internet alone. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Ramsey Yousef, the 1998 Embassy bombers, Bali bombers and the current group of foreign recruits in Somalia all share a tie that could never be forged outside of being in a battlefield and fighting the infidel.
Those who undergo the same experiences (training, combat, deprivation, communal living etc.), even if they do not do it together, share a bond that cyberspace simply cannot bridge. It is the building of community that is vital in moving someone from interest in jihad to actual involvement.
It is also worth remembering the cross-training and learning experiences that safe havens provide. Hezbollah and al Qaeda exchanged "lessons learned" and technology when bin Laden was in Sudan.
Sudan itself was the great mixing bowl for all radical Islamist groups, under the guidance of al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing Hamas and Hezbollah, PIJ and al Qaeda a safe meeting ground that enhanced the operational capacities of each and forged the bonds that still are relevant today.
I think the analysis also overlooks the importance, in jihadist theology, of a physical caliphate or space that is considered a true Muslim nation or divine kingdom on earth. Hence the fight in Somalia, Afghanistan etc. It is not so much about conquering space to create safe havens as it is to establish the rule of Allah on earth, and eventually, spreading that rule over the entire earth.
Safe havens make jihadists stronger. The cost of denying them is high, and Pillar is right that the case has not yet been publicly made for that in Afghanistan. It is time to seriously consider whether it can be made.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday September 16, 2009
Latin America's Arms Race: Chávez Leads the Way
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has added another $2.2 billion to his shopping spree of Russian weapons, buying 92 new tanks and sophisticated anti-aircraft systems.
Chávez's buying spree (he is up to some $6 billion in the past three years) has helped fuel a destructive arms race in the region. While Colombia has spent more, and received more from the United States, it is fighting not only a narco-Marxist insurgency (the FARC) but a host of other armed criminal drug trafficking, narco-paramilitary gangs that threaten the state.
No other country is facing anything similar, yet as Andres Oppenheimer notes in the Miami Herald,the region is now engaged in an arms race that is wasting precious resources as the continent gets poorer.
What is particularly interesting about Chávez's purchases is that they focus on anti-aircraft capabilities, the very thing the FARC has asked Venezuela to provide, and a capability the rebels are desperately seeking. As multiple reports show, (and the Reyes computer documents clearly outline) the FARC has grown desperate for surface-to-air capacity because the military helicopters have been so lethally effective in the government's counter-insurgency campaigns.
A few downed helicopters would force the Colombians to radically rethink and redesign their strategy. One of the FARC documents, a letter from Raul Reyes to Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega (before Ortega was president) asks for $100 million, to be obtained from Libya, in order to purchase the weapons. The recent sting operation in Honduras against a retired Syrian military officer was centered on the acquiring of the weapons.
Chávez, in his seemingly firm belief that the primary threat to his existence is a U.S.-led aerial assault on Venezuela, seems to be doing all he can to insure that he protects himself.
Unfortunately, again as the Reyes documents show, he views the FARC as part of his rear-guard, able to help him wage an asymmetrical campaign against the invader when the fighting comes.
That means, but his logic, backed by his actions, that arming anyone, even terrorist organizations for which he has a strong affinity, is the best defense. That he is spending his nation into a serious hole in pursuit of that goal is a dangerous thing indeed.
Chávez's buying spree (he is up to some $6 billion in the past three years) has helped fuel a destructive arms race in the region. While Colombia has spent more, and received more from the United States, it is fighting not only a narco-Marxist insurgency (the FARC) but a host of other armed criminal drug trafficking, narco-paramilitary gangs that threaten the state.
No other country is facing anything similar, yet as Andres Oppenheimer notes in the Miami Herald,the region is now engaged in an arms race that is wasting precious resources as the continent gets poorer.
What is particularly interesting about Chávez's purchases is that they focus on anti-aircraft capabilities, the very thing the FARC has asked Venezuela to provide, and a capability the rebels are desperately seeking. As multiple reports show, (and the Reyes computer documents clearly outline) the FARC has grown desperate for surface-to-air capacity because the military helicopters have been so lethally effective in the government's counter-insurgency campaigns.
A few downed helicopters would force the Colombians to radically rethink and redesign their strategy. One of the FARC documents, a letter from Raul Reyes to Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega (before Ortega was president) asks for $100 million, to be obtained from Libya, in order to purchase the weapons. The recent sting operation in Honduras against a retired Syrian military officer was centered on the acquiring of the weapons.
Chávez, in his seemingly firm belief that the primary threat to his existence is a U.S.-led aerial assault on Venezuela, seems to be doing all he can to insure that he protects himself.
Unfortunately, again as the Reyes documents show, he views the FARC as part of his rear-guard, able to help him wage an asymmetrical campaign against the invader when the fighting comes.
That means, but his logic, backed by his actions, that arming anyone, even terrorist organizations for which he has a strong affinity, is the best defense. That he is spending his nation into a serious hole in pursuit of that goal is a dangerous thing indeed.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH