Monday December 18, 2006
What is Russia's Real Game (Again-With Viktor Bout)
What is Russia's real role in the efforts to combat terrorism? While the Bush administration seems to cling to the notion that Russia is an ally, there are several developments that point in the opposite direction.
The first, of course, is the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko, where the foul play of the Russian security apparatus, closely tied to Mr. Putin, is the prime suspect. The fact that the murder was committed in London and dismissed out of hand as unimportant by Mr. Putin show both a new boldness and the lack of any pretense of accountability by the Russians.
There is also the arming of Iran and help with the Iranian nuclear program, and the close intelligence ties to Hezbollah.
But there is another, barely noticed development in the United States that should be extremely worrisome. A small sporting goods store in rural Pennsylvania was just busted for selling telescopic rifle scopes, binoculars and optics, which need State Department export authorization, to a Russian company that did not have such a license.
As the my colleauge and co-author Stephen Braun write in the Los Angeles Times, the affidavit for carrying out the search states that the Russian company is "Tactica Ltd., a Moscow firm that was described by investigators as 'a member of the 'Vympel Group,' which is a known identifier for an elite counter-terrorism unit that is controlled by the Russian Federal Security Service [formerly the KGB].'"
So, we have Russian intelligence agents illegally buying restricted items in the United States. But it gets better.
A good chunk of the money for the purchases, according to federal officials, came from (hold on Bout fans) Rockman Ltd, a Bulgarian firm owned by Sergei Bout, who has often run Bout companies involved in weapons transactions. As one U.S official told the Times, "Sergei and Viktor's companies are all under the same umbrella."
The rest of the money came from Haji Ibrahim, a Pakistani man wanted on federal charges of heroin trafficking. Nice bunch!
But the United States, despite the publicly-available affidavit, has said nothing about the case. It was unsealed just as Bush was preparing for his sit-down with Putin on his way to Southeast Asia.
Another factor: The Russian weapons used by Hezbollah in the July fighting with Israel were new and routed through Syria. Intelligence sources say Bout was spotted in Beirut during the fighting, shortly before the sophisticated armor-piercing Fagot and Kornet anti-tank missiles were discovered. Interesting coincidence. When the Israelis presented the Russians with overwhelming evidence of the armament, it was publicly dismissed, but a senior official in the Russian arms export enterprise was reportedly dismissed to placate the outside world.
Finally, there are Bout's actions in the Horn of Africa where, again with official Russian support, his aircraft have been spotted delivering weapons to the Islamic Court militias in Somalia and arming the Islamist allies in Eritrea.
If Putin in our ally we sure don't need any enemies.
The first, of course, is the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko, where the foul play of the Russian security apparatus, closely tied to Mr. Putin, is the prime suspect. The fact that the murder was committed in London and dismissed out of hand as unimportant by Mr. Putin show both a new boldness and the lack of any pretense of accountability by the Russians.
There is also the arming of Iran and help with the Iranian nuclear program, and the close intelligence ties to Hezbollah.
But there is another, barely noticed development in the United States that should be extremely worrisome. A small sporting goods store in rural Pennsylvania was just busted for selling telescopic rifle scopes, binoculars and optics, which need State Department export authorization, to a Russian company that did not have such a license.
As the my colleauge and co-author Stephen Braun write in the Los Angeles Times, the affidavit for carrying out the search states that the Russian company is "Tactica Ltd., a Moscow firm that was described by investigators as 'a member of the 'Vympel Group,' which is a known identifier for an elite counter-terrorism unit that is controlled by the Russian Federal Security Service [formerly the KGB].'"
So, we have Russian intelligence agents illegally buying restricted items in the United States. But it gets better.
A good chunk of the money for the purchases, according to federal officials, came from (hold on Bout fans) Rockman Ltd, a Bulgarian firm owned by Sergei Bout, who has often run Bout companies involved in weapons transactions. As one U.S official told the Times, "Sergei and Viktor's companies are all under the same umbrella."
The rest of the money came from Haji Ibrahim, a Pakistani man wanted on federal charges of heroin trafficking. Nice bunch!
But the United States, despite the publicly-available affidavit, has said nothing about the case. It was unsealed just as Bush was preparing for his sit-down with Putin on his way to Southeast Asia.
Another factor: The Russian weapons used by Hezbollah in the July fighting with Israel were new and routed through Syria. Intelligence sources say Bout was spotted in Beirut during the fighting, shortly before the sophisticated armor-piercing Fagot and Kornet anti-tank missiles were discovered. Interesting coincidence. When the Israelis presented the Russians with overwhelming evidence of the armament, it was publicly dismissed, but a senior official in the Russian arms export enterprise was reportedly dismissed to placate the outside world.
Finally, there are Bout's actions in the Horn of Africa where, again with official Russian support, his aircraft have been spotted delivering weapons to the Islamic Court militias in Somalia and arming the Islamist allies in Eritrea.
If Putin in our ally we sure don't need any enemies.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Long-Awaited Africa Command Would be Valuable Step
With Somalia largely in the hands of fundamentalist Islamist groups, the Democratic Republic of Congo reeling in the efforts to hold free and fair elections, the Darfur crisis and its spillover to other countries, and reports of increased activity of both al Qaeda-affiliated Salafist groups and Iranian/Hezbollah affiliated Shi'ite groups, the United States can no longer afford to leave the vast African continent on the bottom rung of international priorities.
After several years of internal debate, the Pentagon is finally recognizing this reality and is moving to fast-track the creation of an "Africa Command," on par with the Southern Command (South America), European Command etc.
As an unfortunate relic of the Cold War, Africa is currently divided among three different commands: European, Central and, for the islands off the east coast, the Pacific Command. This means no single unit has responsibility, accumulates historic knowledge or expertise, or looks at the entire package of inter-related issues, from terrorism to organized criminal structures to HIV/AIDs.
Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), one of Congress' most knowledgeable Africa hands and prime mover of the restructuring, outlined the difficulties this approach has brought in a Nov. 14 op-ed in the Christian Science Monitor:
"The core function of a combatant command is to plan for military contingencies in the region. Yet Central Command has its hands full fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan-and watching Iran. While the European Command has been increasing its Africa activities, its key focus has followed the eastward expansion of NATO. The Pacific Command, meanwhile, is headquartered more than 10,000 miles from Madagascar. These commands are challenged to closely monitor Africa's troubled states and vast ungoverned areas."
The Pentagon is now in the final phase of preparing different options for how the command would operate-as a full-fledged regional command or as a sub-command.
I think, given the vast and complex nature of the multiple Africa conflicts, the looming challenge of competing with the Chinese over commerce and natural resources, a command is fully warranted.
In addition to the terrorism issues that are scattered throughout the continent, having a unified command would allow a closer relationship with the armies we are trying to deal with, and a chance to gain more than a smattering of knowledge on each of the major issues and countries. And, as Royce wrote: "Why concede Africa to Beijing, which undermines democracy, human rights and transparency?"
A recent Nixon Center conference on Terrorism in Africa, in which I particpated, laid out some of the dangers now facing Africa: growing al Qaeda networks in eastern and southern Africa; Iran's growing influence; the destabilization forces in the northeast presented by the United Islamic Courts, with the growing threat of wars across Ethiopia, and the increasing reliance of the United States on energy from the continent.
All of these factors, to me, argue for a strong command that can dedicate itself to the continent that will be on our worry list for the next decade and beyond.
After several years of internal debate, the Pentagon is finally recognizing this reality and is moving to fast-track the creation of an "Africa Command," on par with the Southern Command (South America), European Command etc.
As an unfortunate relic of the Cold War, Africa is currently divided among three different commands: European, Central and, for the islands off the east coast, the Pacific Command. This means no single unit has responsibility, accumulates historic knowledge or expertise, or looks at the entire package of inter-related issues, from terrorism to organized criminal structures to HIV/AIDs.
Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), one of Congress' most knowledgeable Africa hands and prime mover of the restructuring, outlined the difficulties this approach has brought in a Nov. 14 op-ed in the Christian Science Monitor:
"The core function of a combatant command is to plan for military contingencies in the region. Yet Central Command has its hands full fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan-and watching Iran. While the European Command has been increasing its Africa activities, its key focus has followed the eastward expansion of NATO. The Pacific Command, meanwhile, is headquartered more than 10,000 miles from Madagascar. These commands are challenged to closely monitor Africa's troubled states and vast ungoverned areas."
The Pentagon is now in the final phase of preparing different options for how the command would operate-as a full-fledged regional command or as a sub-command.
I think, given the vast and complex nature of the multiple Africa conflicts, the looming challenge of competing with the Chinese over commerce and natural resources, a command is fully warranted.
In addition to the terrorism issues that are scattered throughout the continent, having a unified command would allow a closer relationship with the armies we are trying to deal with, and a chance to gain more than a smattering of knowledge on each of the major issues and countries. And, as Royce wrote: "Why concede Africa to Beijing, which undermines democracy, human rights and transparency?"
A recent Nixon Center conference on Terrorism in Africa, in which I particpated, laid out some of the dangers now facing Africa: growing al Qaeda networks in eastern and southern Africa; Iran's growing influence; the destabilization forces in the northeast presented by the United Islamic Courts, with the growing threat of wars across Ethiopia, and the increasing reliance of the United States on energy from the continent.
All of these factors, to me, argue for a strong command that can dedicate itself to the continent that will be on our worry list for the next decade and beyond.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 9, 2007
The Danger of Dealing With Terrorist States
The assassination of Lebanese Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, a vocal opponent of Syrian involvement in the country and a leader of the country's Maronite Christian minority, shows the dangers of engaging terrorist states in dialogue as if they were not rational actors, as James Baker and other proponents of the "realist" world view seem to believe.
It seems fairly certain that Syria and its allies in Hezbollah, smarting at the loss of influence in Lebanon and wanting to halt the investigation into the Hariri by whatever means necessary, had a hand in what was correctly labeled a terrorist attack. Hezbollah and its allies in Amal are actively working to destabilize the current government in hopes of extracting more power. Syria and Iran are among the most powerful forces moving the Lebanese drama.
The timing of the attack on Gemayel is interesting. With the Baker Commisson clearly leaning toward recommending a U.S. dialogue with Iran and Syria on Iraq, the two terrorist sponsors are now the new power players in the region. The Bush administration will need them to implement the recommended changes on its Iraq policy, and, since the mid-term elections, is already operating from a position of weakness.
But the price of seriously engaging Syria and Iran will be enormously high. It may be viewed as necessary, but ultimately it will be extremely high.
Hezbollah, according to recent intelligence estimates, receives some $200 million a year in combined revenue from Iran, Syria, and _diasporas_ in West Africa and Latin America, particularly the Tri-Border Area. That is a significant amount of money that enables it to be a political force far beyond its natural constituency. It has shown its willingness to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and against other countries at the behest of Iran (the Buenos Aires bombing in the mid 1990s).
Giving Iran and Syria-and their allies in Lebanon-a favored seat at the negotiating table, and before negotiations have even begun, to give them the upper hand, is a dangerous proposition.
I cannot say it more clearly than Michael Young, the opinion editor of the Daily Star in Beirut, who wrote this in the Wall Street Journa today _before_ Gamayel was killed:
"It is not clear to many in Washington that asking Syria and Iran for help in Iraq, if that's what the Iraq Study Group advises, will drastically limit the administration's ability to deny both countries' gains in Lebanon. For Syria and Iran, Lebanon is vital in their broader quest for power in the Middle East. They will collect there on whatever is offered to the Americans in Iraq, and the retreating administration already has far fewer means to prevent this.
"Mr. Baker and his fellow realists, custodians of stalemate in their own way, want the U.S. to return to its previous approach to the region, where interests defined behavior more than values -- particularly democracy. But if engagement with Syria, or even Iran, is on the cards, then the U.S. might have to surrender the one genuine triumph it can point to after Mr. Bush formulated a democratic project for the Middle East: the peaceful, popular overthrow by the Lebanese of Syria's debilitating domination. The U.S. might also find itself having to relinquish that all-too-rare happening in the region: a vigorous international legal process that promises to punish a state-sponsored crime. Yielding on Lebanon will not advance American interests; it will only damage them more, turning the severe setbacks in Iraq into a full-scale regional rout."
It seems fairly certain that Syria and its allies in Hezbollah, smarting at the loss of influence in Lebanon and wanting to halt the investigation into the Hariri by whatever means necessary, had a hand in what was correctly labeled a terrorist attack. Hezbollah and its allies in Amal are actively working to destabilize the current government in hopes of extracting more power. Syria and Iran are among the most powerful forces moving the Lebanese drama.
The timing of the attack on Gemayel is interesting. With the Baker Commisson clearly leaning toward recommending a U.S. dialogue with Iran and Syria on Iraq, the two terrorist sponsors are now the new power players in the region. The Bush administration will need them to implement the recommended changes on its Iraq policy, and, since the mid-term elections, is already operating from a position of weakness.
But the price of seriously engaging Syria and Iran will be enormously high. It may be viewed as necessary, but ultimately it will be extremely high.
Hezbollah, according to recent intelligence estimates, receives some $200 million a year in combined revenue from Iran, Syria, and _diasporas_ in West Africa and Latin America, particularly the Tri-Border Area. That is a significant amount of money that enables it to be a political force far beyond its natural constituency. It has shown its willingness to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and against other countries at the behest of Iran (the Buenos Aires bombing in the mid 1990s).
Giving Iran and Syria-and their allies in Lebanon-a favored seat at the negotiating table, and before negotiations have even begun, to give them the upper hand, is a dangerous proposition.
I cannot say it more clearly than Michael Young, the opinion editor of the Daily Star in Beirut, who wrote this in the Wall Street Journa today _before_ Gamayel was killed:
"It is not clear to many in Washington that asking Syria and Iran for help in Iraq, if that's what the Iraq Study Group advises, will drastically limit the administration's ability to deny both countries' gains in Lebanon. For Syria and Iran, Lebanon is vital in their broader quest for power in the Middle East. They will collect there on whatever is offered to the Americans in Iraq, and the retreating administration already has far fewer means to prevent this.
"Mr. Baker and his fellow realists, custodians of stalemate in their own way, want the U.S. to return to its previous approach to the region, where interests defined behavior more than values -- particularly democracy. But if engagement with Syria, or even Iran, is on the cards, then the U.S. might have to surrender the one genuine triumph it can point to after Mr. Bush formulated a democratic project for the Middle East: the peaceful, popular overthrow by the Lebanese of Syria's debilitating domination. The U.S. might also find itself having to relinquish that all-too-rare happening in the region: a vigorous international legal process that promises to punish a state-sponsored crime. Yielding on Lebanon will not advance American interests; it will only damage them more, turning the severe setbacks in Iraq into a full-scale regional rout."
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
The Iraq-Afghanistan Network Grows, Posing Acute Danger
Al Qaeda and related groups are increasingly able to coordinate forces and training among groups fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, forming a dangerous and growing nexus on two fronts.
While the al Qaeda contingent in Iraq is not dominant in Iraq's Sunni insurgency, its combatants are gaining valuable experience there and helping breathe new life into the Islamist/jihadist forces in Afghanistan that is now spreading and gaining strength.
For some time now many of us have written about the evidence of transmission of knowledge and tactics from one theater of operation to the other, with groups in each area learning and improving on tactics originated with the other.
This use of trained networks with the facility of movement that these groups have poses a long-term threat, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the countries of origin of the combatants.
One can trace the Arab networks that began in Afghanistan to Bosnia, then on to Sudan, Somalia, back to Afghanistan and elsewhere. These are made of cadres of trusted individuals who know each other, have access to different valuable resources and skills who can reach each other.
At hearings earlier this week Gen. Hayden, the director of central intelligence, raised the issue of cross-pollination between Iraq and Afghanistan several times.
"The direct tissue between Iraq and Afghanistan is al-Qaeda," said Hayden, who visited both countries recently. "The lessons learned in Iraq are being applied to Afghanistan."
Al Qaeda is openly discussing these lessons now in documents and on web sites. A recent al Qaeda/Taliban document released in Afghanistan explains some of "lessons learned."
"One of the Taliban commanders, Mullah Dadullah, says that they have learned from the Iraqi experience; that as Afghanistan used to be the training ground for Mujahedin to go to Iraq, it is now the reverse: they are picking up the tactics that they use in Iraq - like suicide bombings - and applying those to Afghanistan, which is something different than what was happening before."
The "direct tissue," as Hayden says, is now the core of a movement that will, in a few years, be the core of armed movements that we will likely see spring up around different part of the world. While many will likely be low-level conflicts, they will be destabilizing and resource-intensive to combat.
There is an equally dangerous flip side to the Sunni jihadist movements, and that is the Shi'ite groups. The same type of networks, now spreading from Iraqi Shi'ite militias to Iran, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere are seldom mentioned in looking at the radical jihad movements.
What they share with their Sunni counterparts is the desire to destory the West. And, while the groups likely have little love for each other, they are clearly capable (as in the case of the diamond trade) of using each other's infrastructure when necessary.
This, to me, is one of the great dangers that is least easy to combat: Overlapping and competing networks of radical Islamists from different branches, with experienced operatives and amble financing, sent back to countries and regions that they know well and where small groups can have an amplified effect.
The creation of these networks is well under way. With the constant need to put out fires, and the lack of time and resources to dedicate to tracking and understanding networks, it is likely we will be dealing with them for many more years.
While the al Qaeda contingent in Iraq is not dominant in Iraq's Sunni insurgency, its combatants are gaining valuable experience there and helping breathe new life into the Islamist/jihadist forces in Afghanistan that is now spreading and gaining strength.
For some time now many of us have written about the evidence of transmission of knowledge and tactics from one theater of operation to the other, with groups in each area learning and improving on tactics originated with the other.
This use of trained networks with the facility of movement that these groups have poses a long-term threat, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the countries of origin of the combatants.
One can trace the Arab networks that began in Afghanistan to Bosnia, then on to Sudan, Somalia, back to Afghanistan and elsewhere. These are made of cadres of trusted individuals who know each other, have access to different valuable resources and skills who can reach each other.
At hearings earlier this week Gen. Hayden, the director of central intelligence, raised the issue of cross-pollination between Iraq and Afghanistan several times.
"The direct tissue between Iraq and Afghanistan is al-Qaeda," said Hayden, who visited both countries recently. "The lessons learned in Iraq are being applied to Afghanistan."
Al Qaeda is openly discussing these lessons now in documents and on web sites. A recent al Qaeda/Taliban document released in Afghanistan explains some of "lessons learned."
"One of the Taliban commanders, Mullah Dadullah, says that they have learned from the Iraqi experience; that as Afghanistan used to be the training ground for Mujahedin to go to Iraq, it is now the reverse: they are picking up the tactics that they use in Iraq - like suicide bombings - and applying those to Afghanistan, which is something different than what was happening before."
The "direct tissue," as Hayden says, is now the core of a movement that will, in a few years, be the core of armed movements that we will likely see spring up around different part of the world. While many will likely be low-level conflicts, they will be destabilizing and resource-intensive to combat.
There is an equally dangerous flip side to the Sunni jihadist movements, and that is the Shi'ite groups. The same type of networks, now spreading from Iraqi Shi'ite militias to Iran, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere are seldom mentioned in looking at the radical jihad movements.
What they share with their Sunni counterparts is the desire to destory the West. And, while the groups likely have little love for each other, they are clearly capable (as in the case of the diamond trade) of using each other's infrastructure when necessary.
This, to me, is one of the great dangers that is least easy to combat: Overlapping and competing networks of radical Islamists from different branches, with experienced operatives and amble financing, sent back to countries and regions that they know well and where small groups can have an amplified effect.
The creation of these networks is well under way. With the constant need to put out fires, and the lack of time and resources to dedicate to tracking and understanding networks, it is likely we will be dealing with them for many more years.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
New Study Brings Light to Islamist Thinking
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has just released a study of _jihadi_ literature, analyzing who the most influential thinkers in the movement are, based on a year of mining the most influential texts and web writings. The New York Times did a piece on it, but it deserves much broader attention.
The study is a valuable addition, because it includes a summary of many of the most influential _jihadi_ texts, biographies of many of the author, and thinking about the way forward in combatting the theological and theoretical basis for the struggle. It is available online here.
As I have said repeatedly, it is vitally important to read what the enemy says about itself, and what the rationale is for their actions. Far too often I have been in meetings where the architects of the _jihad_ struggle is dismissed as stupid, unsophisticated, and totally unknowable. This study helps make them knowable, and that is the only way to begin to develop a more comprehensive long-term strategy that might actually have some impact.
Within their belief system, what they do is both rational and to a degree predictable. Knowing what drives them-particularly their unshakable belief that there is only one truth and anyone who deviates from that is the enemy-is also a great opening for exploiting the schism that inevitably arise. This was true between bin Laden and Azzam, and is likely true among different current groups.
The Executive Summary offers, I think, one nugget that should give pause to both Democrats who embrace the Islamist groups like CAIR in the mistaken belief this is a replay of the civil rights struggle, as well as Republican who continually meet-and allow law enforcement and intelligence officials to meet-with these Islamist groups as part of their "outreach."
"Finally, a word about "moderate" Muslims. The measure of moderation depends on what type of standard you use. If by "moderate" one means the renouncement of violence in the
achievement of political goals, then the majority of Salafis are moderate.
"But if by "moderate" one means an acceptance of secularism, capitalism, democracy, gender equality,
and a commitment to religious pluralism, then Salafis would be extremists on all counts. Then again, there are not many Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East that would qualify as moderates according to the second definition."
I am not sure the first statement is true-that most Salafis renounce violence. But I am quite sure the second statement is absolutely true, and a lesson that badly needs to be learned and understood.
The study is a valuable addition, because it includes a summary of many of the most influential _jihadi_ texts, biographies of many of the author, and thinking about the way forward in combatting the theological and theoretical basis for the struggle. It is available online here.
As I have said repeatedly, it is vitally important to read what the enemy says about itself, and what the rationale is for their actions. Far too often I have been in meetings where the architects of the _jihad_ struggle is dismissed as stupid, unsophisticated, and totally unknowable. This study helps make them knowable, and that is the only way to begin to develop a more comprehensive long-term strategy that might actually have some impact.
Within their belief system, what they do is both rational and to a degree predictable. Knowing what drives them-particularly their unshakable belief that there is only one truth and anyone who deviates from that is the enemy-is also a great opening for exploiting the schism that inevitably arise. This was true between bin Laden and Azzam, and is likely true among different current groups.
The Executive Summary offers, I think, one nugget that should give pause to both Democrats who embrace the Islamist groups like CAIR in the mistaken belief this is a replay of the civil rights struggle, as well as Republican who continually meet-and allow law enforcement and intelligence officials to meet-with these Islamist groups as part of their "outreach."
"Finally, a word about "moderate" Muslims. The measure of moderation depends on what type of standard you use. If by "moderate" one means the renouncement of violence in the
achievement of political goals, then the majority of Salafis are moderate.
"But if by "moderate" one means an acceptance of secularism, capitalism, democracy, gender equality,
and a commitment to religious pluralism, then Salafis would be extremists on all counts. Then again, there are not many Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East that would qualify as moderates according to the second definition."
I am not sure the first statement is true-that most Salafis renounce violence. But I am quite sure the second statement is absolutely true, and a lesson that badly needs to be learned and understood.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH