Tuesday December 19, 2006
Why Does Rice Continue to Meet With the World's Worst
The Bush administration, while proclaiming its interest in establishing democracy around the world, continues to meet and tacitly support some of the world's most vile dictators. Such was the case last week when a smiling Secretary of State Condi Rice emerged from a meeting with Teodoro Obiang, the manifestly corrupt and brutal dictator who has ruled Equatorial Guinea with a bloody iron fist since seizing power in 1979.
It is not clear why Rice would agree to meet Obiang, who took office after murdering his brutal uncle, Francisco Macias, who ruled the tiny West African nation for the previous decade. Obiang did not take power as a reformer-he had been Macias' police chief and director of the most notorious prison on the island, a place where Macias himself would regularly come to personally torture his arrested enemies. It was just a naked power grab.
Obiang has proved himself to be little better than his uncle. He and his family had $700 million in deposits in the disgraced Riggs Bank, which admitted criminal liabity in helping Obiang stash the money he looted from his country. He has driven more than a third of his nation's 700,000 citizens into exile by torturing and killing the few who tried to stay and right the regime. He is so afraid for his personal security, he does not even trust his own family. He has hired Moroccan bodyguards to protect him.
Perhaps it is the oil that induces Rice to meet with a man her own State Department regularly describes as a despot and systematic violator of human rights. Equatorial Guinea now pumps some 300,000 barrels a day of oil, had has proven resevers of more than 1 billion. It has vast natural gas resources as well.
But that is hard to fathom how much damage such meetings, and the pictures that emerge of tyrants being greeted by smiling U.S. officials, does to nascent democracy movements. It legitimizes the thug while handing him an instrument to blunt international criticism. After all, would Rice meet with him is her were so bad?
The same logic holds true when the White House, FBI, State Department and Pentagon invite front groups for the Muslim Brotherhood to attend their formal sessions. Once one group invites them, they are legitimized and are adept at leveraging that meeting into further meetings. Why wouldn't the White House meet with them if the FBI just did? Obviously, there is nothing wrong.
Just how messed up things are becomes clear when one sees that the State Department dispatched its head of counterterrorism, Ambassador Hank Crumpton, to be the keynote speaker at a conference co-sponsored by one of Sami al-Arian’s former principal funders, the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT). And for good measure, the Defense Department largely paid for the event.
Al Arian is going to plead guilty to material support for terrorists in exchange for time served and deportation. IIIT remains under investigation in the Safa case in Northern Virginia. The left hand truely does not know, or care, what the right hand is doing.
It is not clear why Rice would agree to meet Obiang, who took office after murdering his brutal uncle, Francisco Macias, who ruled the tiny West African nation for the previous decade. Obiang did not take power as a reformer-he had been Macias' police chief and director of the most notorious prison on the island, a place where Macias himself would regularly come to personally torture his arrested enemies. It was just a naked power grab.
Obiang has proved himself to be little better than his uncle. He and his family had $700 million in deposits in the disgraced Riggs Bank, which admitted criminal liabity in helping Obiang stash the money he looted from his country. He has driven more than a third of his nation's 700,000 citizens into exile by torturing and killing the few who tried to stay and right the regime. He is so afraid for his personal security, he does not even trust his own family. He has hired Moroccan bodyguards to protect him.
Perhaps it is the oil that induces Rice to meet with a man her own State Department regularly describes as a despot and systematic violator of human rights. Equatorial Guinea now pumps some 300,000 barrels a day of oil, had has proven resevers of more than 1 billion. It has vast natural gas resources as well.
But that is hard to fathom how much damage such meetings, and the pictures that emerge of tyrants being greeted by smiling U.S. officials, does to nascent democracy movements. It legitimizes the thug while handing him an instrument to blunt international criticism. After all, would Rice meet with him is her were so bad?
The same logic holds true when the White House, FBI, State Department and Pentagon invite front groups for the Muslim Brotherhood to attend their formal sessions. Once one group invites them, they are legitimized and are adept at leveraging that meeting into further meetings. Why wouldn't the White House meet with them if the FBI just did? Obviously, there is nothing wrong.
Just how messed up things are becomes clear when one sees that the State Department dispatched its head of counterterrorism, Ambassador Hank Crumpton, to be the keynote speaker at a conference co-sponsored by one of Sami al-Arian’s former principal funders, the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT). And for good measure, the Defense Department largely paid for the event.
Al Arian is going to plead guilty to material support for terrorists in exchange for time served and deportation. IIIT remains under investigation in the Safa case in Northern Virginia. The left hand truely does not know, or care, what the right hand is doing.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
In War on Islamism, Iran Has Always Been a Danger
The current escalation of tensions with Iran over its potential and desire to produce nuclear weapons obscures an important point-that Iran's Shi'ite leadership has long played a crucial role in aiding and abetting al Qaeda and other violent Sunni movements. This is not to say that the United States can or should engage in another war or that diplomatic efforts on the nuclear issues should not be exhausted before other options are explored.
But Iran has, according to European and U.S. intelligence sources, continued to provide shelter to numerous senior al Qaeda operatives, including a son of Osama bin Laden. The ties go back to those described by al Qaeda defectors after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, when bin Laden and Hezbollah leaders held a series of meetings to exchange training and information. This information, while publicly available from court transcripts and eye-witness accounts, is seldom factored into the equation of what Iran is up to.
Elements of Iranian security forces helped al Qaeda leaders escape from Afghanistan, providing safe haven, travel documents and protection. Among those at least transiting through Iran was one of Osama's wives. Several operational leaders and perhaps Osama's oldest son are still under nominal house arrest in Iran.
The explanation for this collaboration can be found in the international Muslim Brotherhood, which retain strong ties across the Sunni-Shi'ite religious divide. Alain Chouet, a 30-year veteran of the French intelligence services has just written one of the best analysis of the Brotherhood I have seen. He describes the international Brotherhood as "synonymous with exclusion, violence, isolation and confrontation with the rest of the world."
Within the Sunni-Shi'ite bloodletting in Iraq, it appears there is, on the ground level, a great divide among the two groups. But on a macro level, the Brotherhood has helped bridge the gulf in strategic ways, primarily through its financial structure.
There is still a residual cultural aversion to thinking of Sunni and Shi'ite radical groups working together. But it happens all the time, from Africa to Iran. Iran's nuclear program may be a mid-term threat. It's terrorist ties, through Hezbollah and al Qaeda, are of more immediate concern.
But Iran has, according to European and U.S. intelligence sources, continued to provide shelter to numerous senior al Qaeda operatives, including a son of Osama bin Laden. The ties go back to those described by al Qaeda defectors after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, when bin Laden and Hezbollah leaders held a series of meetings to exchange training and information. This information, while publicly available from court transcripts and eye-witness accounts, is seldom factored into the equation of what Iran is up to.
Elements of Iranian security forces helped al Qaeda leaders escape from Afghanistan, providing safe haven, travel documents and protection. Among those at least transiting through Iran was one of Osama's wives. Several operational leaders and perhaps Osama's oldest son are still under nominal house arrest in Iran.
The explanation for this collaboration can be found in the international Muslim Brotherhood, which retain strong ties across the Sunni-Shi'ite religious divide. Alain Chouet, a 30-year veteran of the French intelligence services has just written one of the best analysis of the Brotherhood I have seen. He describes the international Brotherhood as "synonymous with exclusion, violence, isolation and confrontation with the rest of the world."
Within the Sunni-Shi'ite bloodletting in Iraq, it appears there is, on the ground level, a great divide among the two groups. But on a macro level, the Brotherhood has helped bridge the gulf in strategic ways, primarily through its financial structure.
There is still a residual cultural aversion to thinking of Sunni and Shi'ite radical groups working together. But it happens all the time, from Africa to Iran. Iran's nuclear program may be a mid-term threat. It's terrorist ties, through Hezbollah and al Qaeda, are of more immediate concern.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Tri-Border Area Under Increasing Financial Scrutiny
Last week the New York Post reported that Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau had shut down a "massive terror-finance pipeline in which a whopping $3 billon in profits from drug deals and other crimes flowed through a major New York bank to Middle East fanatics." Turns out, according to senior government officials, the bank is the Bank of America. Morgenthau is pursuing possible penalties, but it is not at all clear the bank did anything knowingly wrong. No criminal charges have been filed.
What is clear, however, is that an account in the bank recieved billions of dollars in deposits an unregulated exchange house doing business in South America's Tri-border Area, the relativly lawless region around Iguazu Falls where Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina meet. The money was flowing through New York to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the West Bank. Enough to make one sit up and take notice.
Several law enforcement and intelligence services are struggling to get a real handle on what goes on in the Tri-border Area. It has been clear for decades that the region is awash not only in drug money, but in contraband profits and smuggling profits. It is also known as a haven for Hamas financiers, Hezbollah money men, and a visiting site for leaders of al Qaeda. Like West Africa, Panama and other ethnic enclaves, the region is hard to penetrate because most of the businesses, both legitimate and criminal, are run by families and clans. Reporting requirements are scarce and those that exist are easily circumvented.
As the Colombian and Brazilian cocaine and heroin cartels have sought new ways to avoid detection, they have increasingly routed their money through the unregulated exchange houses and quasi-financial institutions that have flourished in the Tri-border region. None of the countries that have theoretic jurisdiction over the area want to tackle the problem. The economic and policital cost could be high.
Unfortunately, the cost of doing nothing is far higher. There is simply too much money moving through the area's money laundering apparatus to not be doing huge amounts of damage. The international branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the stem of all radical Islamist financial structures, is active there. Drug money flows through unabated, and no one asks any questions.
Fortunately, this is an area where the U.S has great expertise, largely residing in the DEA. The organization, under-utilized in the struggle with terrorists, developed a first-rate understanding of tracking and interdicting money flows. That is one of the reasons the drug groups have moved to the region in the first place. Now, it is time to let the organization in the game in a serious way, re-establish the expertise that once existed, and shut down a dangerous river of money.
What is clear, however, is that an account in the bank recieved billions of dollars in deposits an unregulated exchange house doing business in South America's Tri-border Area, the relativly lawless region around Iguazu Falls where Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina meet. The money was flowing through New York to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the West Bank. Enough to make one sit up and take notice.
Several law enforcement and intelligence services are struggling to get a real handle on what goes on in the Tri-border Area. It has been clear for decades that the region is awash not only in drug money, but in contraband profits and smuggling profits. It is also known as a haven for Hamas financiers, Hezbollah money men, and a visiting site for leaders of al Qaeda. Like West Africa, Panama and other ethnic enclaves, the region is hard to penetrate because most of the businesses, both legitimate and criminal, are run by families and clans. Reporting requirements are scarce and those that exist are easily circumvented.
As the Colombian and Brazilian cocaine and heroin cartels have sought new ways to avoid detection, they have increasingly routed their money through the unregulated exchange houses and quasi-financial institutions that have flourished in the Tri-border region. None of the countries that have theoretic jurisdiction over the area want to tackle the problem. The economic and policital cost could be high.
Unfortunately, the cost of doing nothing is far higher. There is simply too much money moving through the area's money laundering apparatus to not be doing huge amounts of damage. The international branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the stem of all radical Islamist financial structures, is active there. Drug money flows through unabated, and no one asks any questions.
Fortunately, this is an area where the U.S has great expertise, largely residing in the DEA. The organization, under-utilized in the struggle with terrorists, developed a first-rate understanding of tracking and interdicting money flows. That is one of the reasons the drug groups have moved to the region in the first place. Now, it is time to let the organization in the game in a serious way, re-establish the expertise that once existed, and shut down a dangerous river of money.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
China has a Strategic Plan for Africa, while the U.S. Does Not
One of the most interesting shadow games going on in sub-Saharan Africa is China's efforts to buy into the natural resource markets there, while the rest of the world, including the United States, largely sits back watch. The United States, in particular, still has no long-term strategic plan for the region, nor is there likely to be one soon, according to senior officials dealing with the issue.
One senior U.S. official, lamenting how far ahead in planning and thinking the Chinese are than his own government, said the relationship between the United States and China in Africa does not necessarily have to be adversarial. But, he added, the potential for conflict over oil and natural gas and oil is great, in part because the U.S. has no long-term strategic vision for engaging the region. The key potential flash point is the Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon), which currently accounts for roughly 25 percent of China's oil supplies. The region also produces almost 20 percent of the U.S. supplies. With the current imperative to lessen dependence on Middle East oil, this competition could and will get ugly.
China does have a strategic plan. They are locking up oil sales in Nigeria, Sudan and elsewhere and negotiating for iron ore, bauxite and a host of other strategic natural resources. They are willing to build roads, hospitals, schools, stadiums and government palaces in exchange for access.
The Chinese, undoubtedly, bring several advantages to the game. When they enter into economic relationships they are able to offer the entire package of benefits to their partner: cheap, relatively-low tech weapons systems and maintenence packages; protection from criticism in the United Nations Security Council (see Sudan and Darfur); and no rules governing gifts to the leadership of the host countries. Bribes still work.
The Chinese have other advantages. They are not a former colonial power and helped many of the leaders in the "liberation" wars of the 1970s and 1980s. They have few moral qualms about who they deal with or how.
This is not to say the United States should adopt the Chinese model. But policy makers do need to begin to finally define U.S. national strategic interests and take appropriate steps now to insure that the Chinese don't take and hold the best of everything.
One senior U.S. official, lamenting how far ahead in planning and thinking the Chinese are than his own government, said the relationship between the United States and China in Africa does not necessarily have to be adversarial. But, he added, the potential for conflict over oil and natural gas and oil is great, in part because the U.S. has no long-term strategic vision for engaging the region. The key potential flash point is the Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon), which currently accounts for roughly 25 percent of China's oil supplies. The region also produces almost 20 percent of the U.S. supplies. With the current imperative to lessen dependence on Middle East oil, this competition could and will get ugly.
China does have a strategic plan. They are locking up oil sales in Nigeria, Sudan and elsewhere and negotiating for iron ore, bauxite and a host of other strategic natural resources. They are willing to build roads, hospitals, schools, stadiums and government palaces in exchange for access.
The Chinese, undoubtedly, bring several advantages to the game. When they enter into economic relationships they are able to offer the entire package of benefits to their partner: cheap, relatively-low tech weapons systems and maintenence packages; protection from criticism in the United Nations Security Council (see Sudan and Darfur); and no rules governing gifts to the leadership of the host countries. Bribes still work.
The Chinese have other advantages. They are not a former colonial power and helped many of the leaders in the "liberation" wars of the 1970s and 1980s. They have few moral qualms about who they deal with or how.
This is not to say the United States should adopt the Chinese model. But policy makers do need to begin to finally define U.S. national strategic interests and take appropriate steps now to insure that the Chinese don't take and hold the best of everything.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
What Is the Price of Current Intelligence Reform?
John A. Kringen, the CIA's director of intelligence, had an interesting piece Monday in the Washington Post on the steps being taken within the intelligence community to minimize "group think" and find new ways of monitoring and assessing long-term strategic threats. He presents an optimistic view of an agency in rapid transition, and that is without question, important.
But there is one telling phrase in his op-ed that hints at the serious crisis the DI is facing: "The DI is building bench strength with highly qualified recruits to meet the demands of strategic global coverage. We brought in more new analysts in fiscal 2005 than any year in our history."
The truth is the DI has lost decades, if not centuries, of experience as older analysts have fled through the door, many from senior positions. Not all change is bad, but what is left is essentially a group of young and undeniably intelligent people with little real-world experience and little historic knowlege of issues that they must now be analyzing and briefing on.
The new recruits are being taught to "specialize," for brief periods, on subjects often so narrow that they are unable to see or read information on related topics. Then, after a few months or at most a couple of years, they move on, and their brief institutional memory goes with them.
Senior European intelligence analysts who recently visited CIA headquarters to discuss terrorism came away dismayed. Almost all the people the Europeans met with were just out of college and none could answer questions beyond their narrow range of expertise. None could answer broader questions posed about related subjects because it was not what they were assigned to do and they had no prior experience to draw on.
While the European services are far smaller, those in them tend to have a much broader range of knowledge on a variety of issues. People tend to stick with a particular expertise for years at a time, without it affecting their career path.
Growth is good, but much of the bench is already in the starting lineup. Some veteran hands, as any good sports manager knows, is essential to building a successful program. The lose of the years of expertise in the past two years should be truely alarming. There are some things adding more people-no matter how smart and dedicated-cannot solve. The learning curve will be steep as intelligence reform moves ahead.
But there is one telling phrase in his op-ed that hints at the serious crisis the DI is facing: "The DI is building bench strength with highly qualified recruits to meet the demands of strategic global coverage. We brought in more new analysts in fiscal 2005 than any year in our history."
The truth is the DI has lost decades, if not centuries, of experience as older analysts have fled through the door, many from senior positions. Not all change is bad, but what is left is essentially a group of young and undeniably intelligent people with little real-world experience and little historic knowlege of issues that they must now be analyzing and briefing on.
The new recruits are being taught to "specialize," for brief periods, on subjects often so narrow that they are unable to see or read information on related topics. Then, after a few months or at most a couple of years, they move on, and their brief institutional memory goes with them.
Senior European intelligence analysts who recently visited CIA headquarters to discuss terrorism came away dismayed. Almost all the people the Europeans met with were just out of college and none could answer questions beyond their narrow range of expertise. None could answer broader questions posed about related subjects because it was not what they were assigned to do and they had no prior experience to draw on.
While the European services are far smaller, those in them tend to have a much broader range of knowledge on a variety of issues. People tend to stick with a particular expertise for years at a time, without it affecting their career path.
Growth is good, but much of the bench is already in the starting lineup. Some veteran hands, as any good sports manager knows, is essential to building a successful program. The lose of the years of expertise in the past two years should be truely alarming. There are some things adding more people-no matter how smart and dedicated-cannot solve. The learning curve will be steep as intelligence reform moves ahead.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH