Friday February 9, 2007
The UAE and Viktor Bout
One way to determine how a person or entity will act in the future is to see how they have acted in the past. As the debate over the UAE ownership of ports heats up, it is worth looking at how the leaders there have handled another important security issue related to radical Islamic terrorism--Viktor Bout. The response is deeply troubling.
Viktor Bout, the world's largest illegal weapons dealer, made $50 million selling weapons to the Taliban, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. He continues to feed murder and mayhem across Africa by selling weapons to rogue regimes and nonstate actors. And he continues to maintain several dozen aircraft, registered to different and constantly changing companies, IN THE UAE--one of only three countries in the world to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Bout and 30 of his companies are designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and the United Nations Sanctions, meaning every country is bound to freeze the assets of those companies and individuals. Yet the UAE has made no move to go after Bout's aircraft, even though one of his designated companies, IRBIS, continues to fly openly, and has not even bothered to change its name. His aircraft sit on the runways of Sharjah, and his pilots continue to fly daily from there, including recent flights for the U.S. military and its contractors.
The United States, for the past EIGHT YEARS has been asking the UAE to crack down on Bout's illicit activities there, with no results. The latest high-level U.S. delegation was in UAE last week, asking the rulers to please shut down IRBIS, as required by UN charter. The answer was that the rulers would continue to study the issue.
Not a very auspicious way of handling a know aider and abettor of terrorist organizations, one with an outstanding Interpol red notice and one designated by the United Nations. It does not build confidence in the ability of UAE rulers to handle future problems.
One of the reasons is that Bout has a partnership with a member of the UAE's ruling family, a prince who ran an airline with him and has reportedly helped insure that Bout's operations are untouchable. If it happens with Bout, one can only imagine other terrorists with business or family connections receiving the same kind of protection, perhaps with deadlier results.
Viktor Bout, the world's largest illegal weapons dealer, made $50 million selling weapons to the Taliban, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. He continues to feed murder and mayhem across Africa by selling weapons to rogue regimes and nonstate actors. And he continues to maintain several dozen aircraft, registered to different and constantly changing companies, IN THE UAE--one of only three countries in the world to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Bout and 30 of his companies are designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and the United Nations Sanctions, meaning every country is bound to freeze the assets of those companies and individuals. Yet the UAE has made no move to go after Bout's aircraft, even though one of his designated companies, IRBIS, continues to fly openly, and has not even bothered to change its name. His aircraft sit on the runways of Sharjah, and his pilots continue to fly daily from there, including recent flights for the U.S. military and its contractors.
The United States, for the past EIGHT YEARS has been asking the UAE to crack down on Bout's illicit activities there, with no results. The latest high-level U.S. delegation was in UAE last week, asking the rulers to please shut down IRBIS, as required by UN charter. The answer was that the rulers would continue to study the issue.
Not a very auspicious way of handling a know aider and abettor of terrorist organizations, one with an outstanding Interpol red notice and one designated by the United Nations. It does not build confidence in the ability of UAE rulers to handle future problems.
One of the reasons is that Bout has a partnership with a member of the UAE's ruling family, a prince who ran an airline with him and has reportedly helped insure that Bout's operations are untouchable. If it happens with Bout, one can only imagine other terrorists with business or family connections receiving the same kind of protection, perhaps with deadlier results.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Nigeria on the Edge, Again
With the recent hostage-takings by armed militants in the Niger Delta, the disruption of key oil supplies, and the simmering religious tensions in the north where 17 people have been killed and 30 Christian churches burned, Nigeria is again teetering on the edge of chaos. About 20 percent of Nigeria's oil production has been shut down, sending jitters through the market. More troubling is the fact that there is no end is sight or realistic solution for the current crisis.
Saturday's abduction of nine foreign oil workers, including three Americans, is the latest sign of the growing militancy of the well-armed militias that now control much of the Delta. Many of their stated grievances are legitimate. The international oil companies have left vast swaths of the once-pristine Delta an environmental wasteland. The burning of gas, the oil spills and other pollution have ruined the water, killed the fishing and spoiled the hunting there. The history of abuse and misuse of the oil companies is appalling.
But the real concern of the militias is unlikely to be the legitimate problems. The real interest is in protecting the criminal networks that steal or "bunker" oil before it gets put into the official oil network. While Nigeria officially pumps 2.6 million barrels a day, the real number is more like 3.3 million barrels. Almost 750,000 barrels a day are taken before it enters the production line and sold illegally, generating huge, illicit revenues. Much of the crude is sold to China and North Korea at discounted prices. If the selling price of the stolen oil is $35 a barrel, as it is now, that yields $184 million a week in illicit proceeds, or $9.6 billion a year. If that kind of flow of illicit money does not scare you, then nothing will.
That is why the militias can out-gun the military and carry out their program of disruption and chaos. Much of the illicit money filters back up through the food chain of corrupt and brutal military leaders and their friends, who began the massive bunkering operations under president Abacha. He died of a viagra overdose, but his system keeps ticking like the energizer bunny. Many of the leaders of these criminal organizations are from the north, and would dearly love to do away with even the flimsy form of democracy that now exists
But that is not the only difficulty facing Nigeria. Muslim protests against the Danish cartoons has led to the killing of 17 people and the burning of 30 churches over the weekend in the town of Maiduguri. In an area rife with ethnic and religious unrest, this is a bad omen. The Muslim-Christian violence has flared for decades, but given the new emergence of militant, Salafist Islam and the targetting of norther Nigeria by al Qaeda operatives, it is a possible sign of a long and dangerous road ahead.
It does not help that into this mix, Charles Taylor continues to operate. Given his access to money, weapons and armed groups across West Africa, the picture looks even more complicated that the one Nigeria normally presents.
Saturday's abduction of nine foreign oil workers, including three Americans, is the latest sign of the growing militancy of the well-armed militias that now control much of the Delta. Many of their stated grievances are legitimate. The international oil companies have left vast swaths of the once-pristine Delta an environmental wasteland. The burning of gas, the oil spills and other pollution have ruined the water, killed the fishing and spoiled the hunting there. The history of abuse and misuse of the oil companies is appalling.
But the real concern of the militias is unlikely to be the legitimate problems. The real interest is in protecting the criminal networks that steal or "bunker" oil before it gets put into the official oil network. While Nigeria officially pumps 2.6 million barrels a day, the real number is more like 3.3 million barrels. Almost 750,000 barrels a day are taken before it enters the production line and sold illegally, generating huge, illicit revenues. Much of the crude is sold to China and North Korea at discounted prices. If the selling price of the stolen oil is $35 a barrel, as it is now, that yields $184 million a week in illicit proceeds, or $9.6 billion a year. If that kind of flow of illicit money does not scare you, then nothing will.
That is why the militias can out-gun the military and carry out their program of disruption and chaos. Much of the illicit money filters back up through the food chain of corrupt and brutal military leaders and their friends, who began the massive bunkering operations under president Abacha. He died of a viagra overdose, but his system keeps ticking like the energizer bunny. Many of the leaders of these criminal organizations are from the north, and would dearly love to do away with even the flimsy form of democracy that now exists
But that is not the only difficulty facing Nigeria. Muslim protests against the Danish cartoons has led to the killing of 17 people and the burning of 30 churches over the weekend in the town of Maiduguri. In an area rife with ethnic and religious unrest, this is a bad omen. The Muslim-Christian violence has flared for decades, but given the new emergence of militant, Salafist Islam and the targetting of norther Nigeria by al Qaeda operatives, it is a possible sign of a long and dangerous road ahead.
It does not help that into this mix, Charles Taylor continues to operate. Given his access to money, weapons and armed groups across West Africa, the picture looks even more complicated that the one Nigeria normally presents.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
The Case of Louai Sakka Shows That AQ Still has Financial Lifeline
The Washington Post today has a fascinating story on al Qaeda operative Louai Sakka, a would-be bomber who accidentally set off the bomb in his own apartment in Antalya, Turkey. What is interesting is not just that Sekka has been active for years, learned how to make bombs in Iraq, provided dozens of Salafist jihadi with fake documents, and had big plans for blowing up Israeli and U.S. targets.
What is really interesting is that he had money to burn. He had undergone plastic surgery on his face to alter his appearance, put down $60,000 on a luxery apartement near the beach, owned a 27-foot yacht and lived a life of luxery. He had been traveling widely in Europe, was able to pay cash for expensive bomb components, and worked with a companion.
This clearly shows that, when they need to, al Qaeda operatives can gather the cash to carry out expensive, long-term plans to inflict damage. The cash pipeline, while perhaps not as freeflowing as before, exists and is able to pump out the money when needed.
The total cost of the operation, had Sakka been a better student in Iraq, would have only registered at a few thousand dollars. The real cost of setting him up, allowing him to live and gather the specific information he needed from visiting Israeli tourists, was far higher. This is the argument for keeping the heat on the terror finance front, despite resistence and lack of attention in much of the intelligence community. Sakka is a sleeper who was only caught because he set the bomb off in his living room rather than on his yacht. It is clear from his travels he was part of a much broader network across Europe, one intent on carrying out attacks large and small. He was not identified through intelligence work.
It is also clear that Osama bin Laden and the core of the original al Qaeda are planning another major attack. European and U.S. sources say the level of chatter is high again, and bin Laden's recent specific references to upcoming attatcks seem to point to some specific plan. He is unlikely to put his reputation on the line if he does not have something well underway and has confidence it will be pulled off successfully. Not a happy thought.
What is really interesting is that he had money to burn. He had undergone plastic surgery on his face to alter his appearance, put down $60,000 on a luxery apartement near the beach, owned a 27-foot yacht and lived a life of luxery. He had been traveling widely in Europe, was able to pay cash for expensive bomb components, and worked with a companion.
This clearly shows that, when they need to, al Qaeda operatives can gather the cash to carry out expensive, long-term plans to inflict damage. The cash pipeline, while perhaps not as freeflowing as before, exists and is able to pump out the money when needed.
The total cost of the operation, had Sakka been a better student in Iraq, would have only registered at a few thousand dollars. The real cost of setting him up, allowing him to live and gather the specific information he needed from visiting Israeli tourists, was far higher. This is the argument for keeping the heat on the terror finance front, despite resistence and lack of attention in much of the intelligence community. Sakka is a sleeper who was only caught because he set the bomb off in his living room rather than on his yacht. It is clear from his travels he was part of a much broader network across Europe, one intent on carrying out attacks large and small. He was not identified through intelligence work.
It is also clear that Osama bin Laden and the core of the original al Qaeda are planning another major attack. European and U.S. sources say the level of chatter is high again, and bin Laden's recent specific references to upcoming attatcks seem to point to some specific plan. He is unlikely to put his reputation on the line if he does not have something well underway and has confidence it will be pulled off successfully. Not a happy thought.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
What the Harmony Papers Show, and Lessons for Counterinsurgency
It is encouraging to see new signs that the military intelligence community is actively pursuing new, critical analysis both of al Qaeda's operational structure and ways of improving counterinsurgency stategies, particularly in Iraq. Given the recent British intelligence assessment that al Qaeda has a 50-year plan of attack, these developments are important.
The West Point CTC project called "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al Qaeda's Organizational Vulnerabilities"-written about by Andrew Cochran earlier-analyzing documents seized from al Qaeda and declassified from the Harmony database, is particularly enlightening on al Qaeda thinking. It shows the new trend in U.S. intelligence-finding exploitable vulnerabilities in the enemy structure. Prior to 1999 there was no overall assessment of al Qaeda's organizational or financial infrastructure. In the post-9/11 world, survival and insurance against another attack led to little real emphasis being placed on al Qaeda's internal organization, and even less was known about ways to excert pressure on the organization because vulnerabilities were not clearly identified.
Now it is clear that al Qaeda is a decentralized organization that spends considerable time, perhaps more time than our own intelligence community and armed forces, on studying "lessons learned" from unsuccessful operations, both of itself and others (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood experience in Syria). It has, or at least has had, a coroporate structure that deals with everything from salaries to vacation schedules. It has internal discrepanies over tactics, targets and resource allocation.
The recommendations are thoughtful and largely foreseeable, but there is some rather striking new thinking: Providing an exit option for (al Qaeda) members other than indefinite detention or death; Deny jihadi groups the benefit of security vacuums they seek to exploit and create (my favorite). The paper notes that "Policymakers are correctly concerned about the existence of ungoverned spaces as being potential safe-havens for terrorist groups. The Harmony documents demonstrate that al-Qa’ida has been thinking about the necessity to exploit such spaces since their
organizational founding"; conduct an aggressive study of jihadi strategy and foreign policy; begin to understand al Qaeda as a social movement rather than a military one.
I hope some of these recommendations have already been implemented inside the community long ago. It would be striking if there were not already groups looking at al Qaeda as a social movement or studying jihadi strategy and foreign policy. Still, the report is an extraordinary, open assessment of the enemy and one we should pay attention to.
The West Point CTC project called "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al Qaeda's Organizational Vulnerabilities"-written about by Andrew Cochran earlier-analyzing documents seized from al Qaeda and declassified from the Harmony database, is particularly enlightening on al Qaeda thinking. It shows the new trend in U.S. intelligence-finding exploitable vulnerabilities in the enemy structure. Prior to 1999 there was no overall assessment of al Qaeda's organizational or financial infrastructure. In the post-9/11 world, survival and insurance against another attack led to little real emphasis being placed on al Qaeda's internal organization, and even less was known about ways to excert pressure on the organization because vulnerabilities were not clearly identified.
Now it is clear that al Qaeda is a decentralized organization that spends considerable time, perhaps more time than our own intelligence community and armed forces, on studying "lessons learned" from unsuccessful operations, both of itself and others (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood experience in Syria). It has, or at least has had, a coroporate structure that deals with everything from salaries to vacation schedules. It has internal discrepanies over tactics, targets and resource allocation.
The recommendations are thoughtful and largely foreseeable, but there is some rather striking new thinking: Providing an exit option for (al Qaeda) members other than indefinite detention or death; Deny jihadi groups the benefit of security vacuums they seek to exploit and create (my favorite). The paper notes that "Policymakers are correctly concerned about the existence of ungoverned spaces as being potential safe-havens for terrorist groups. The Harmony documents demonstrate that al-Qa’ida has been thinking about the necessity to exploit such spaces since their
organizational founding"; conduct an aggressive study of jihadi strategy and foreign policy; begin to understand al Qaeda as a social movement rather than a military one.
I hope some of these recommendations have already been implemented inside the community long ago. It would be striking if there were not already groups looking at al Qaeda as a social movement or studying jihadi strategy and foreign policy. Still, the report is an extraordinary, open assessment of the enemy and one we should pay attention to.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Is Rumsfeld's Optimism on North Africa Warranted?
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is upbeat on on North Africa elminating terrorist havens. In recent comments, Rumsfeld said there was an "extremely low" possibility of al Qaeda or its affiliates establishing themselves in Northern Africa, in large part because Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have taken significant steps to make sure the region is not fertile ground.
However, that optimism may be premature. Algerian-led al Qaeda affiliates operate both inside Algeria and across Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Sudan. There are many other groups that inter-mingle with the self-proclaimed al Qaeda affiliates in the region, from disgruntled soldiers from Chad to bandits, organized smuggling rings and those that rape and pillage across southern Sudan. All of these factors make hiding and working in the region much easier than it would be without these factors.
The states Rumsfeld visited and praised are also authoritarian, where dissent is not tolerated and where Islamic extremism appeals for precisely that reason. While the countries have been successful, perhaps, in keeping Islamic Salafists from gaining a permanent presence inside their countries, the potential threat has simply been pushed a bit to the south, where it is being nurtured and growing.
This is not to say no progress has been made, and Rumsfeld is right to encourage nations to acknowledge and deal with the threat before it takes hold. These countries have done that, unlike Nigeria and others, where Salafist influence is growing and the governments have their heads hidden in the sand.
But it seems to me to be excessively optimistic to think there is an "extremely low" possibility of a resourceful enemy making inroads in repressive regimes, where militant Islam is preached and where volunteers have already mobilized extensively for jihads.
However, that optimism may be premature. Algerian-led al Qaeda affiliates operate both inside Algeria and across Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Sudan. There are many other groups that inter-mingle with the self-proclaimed al Qaeda affiliates in the region, from disgruntled soldiers from Chad to bandits, organized smuggling rings and those that rape and pillage across southern Sudan. All of these factors make hiding and working in the region much easier than it would be without these factors.
The states Rumsfeld visited and praised are also authoritarian, where dissent is not tolerated and where Islamic extremism appeals for precisely that reason. While the countries have been successful, perhaps, in keeping Islamic Salafists from gaining a permanent presence inside their countries, the potential threat has simply been pushed a bit to the south, where it is being nurtured and growing.
This is not to say no progress has been made, and Rumsfeld is right to encourage nations to acknowledge and deal with the threat before it takes hold. These countries have done that, unlike Nigeria and others, where Salafist influence is growing and the governments have their heads hidden in the sand.
But it seems to me to be excessively optimistic to think there is an "extremely low" possibility of a resourceful enemy making inroads in repressive regimes, where militant Islam is preached and where volunteers have already mobilized extensively for jihads.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH