Tuesday December 19, 2006
The Africa Pipeline Expands, The Brotherhood Returns to Sudan
My intelligence contacts are charting an alarming growth of global Islamic jihad groups creating camps in northern West Africa, particularly Mali and Chad. This is coupled with an unusual resurgence of visits of leaders of the international Muslim Brotherhood to Khartoum, Sudan on a regular basis.
The total number of people in the Mali camps are believed to be in the few hundreds, but are drawn from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Mali, Togo, Cameroon and elsewhere. The GSPC seems to be making a concerted effort at recruitment, and after training periods of several weeks, the recruits are dispersed, some to Iraq and some to other areas. Morocco, Algeria and Nigeria seem to be the primary targets for attack in the near to mid term.
It appears the camps that were operating in Sudan may have been shifted south, further out of the small international spotlight that occassionally shines on Sudan. That is not to say Sudan has gone passive in the global jihaidist wars. Contingents of senior leaders of the international Muslim Brotherhood have recently been making frequent trips to Khartoum. It is not entirely clear what the purpose of those meetings are. It comes at a time when the Brotherhood, long the financial lifeline of the jihadist movements, is setting up a whole new structure across Europe and Africa, rebuilding and expanding the structure that served them so well for so many years before 9-11, and has been under some pressure since then.
Not that the Brotherhood is in any danger of disappearing. Its vast offshore structure in Panama, the Bahamas, Liechstenstein and elsewhere has only been nicked occassionally by the increasingly ineffectual efforts the UN, US and EU to understand and cut off the flow of the constantly-shifting flow of resources that benefits the global jihadist movement.
But there appear to be new efforts to set up entirely new structures that could be activated on very short notice if the need arose.
Hamas' victory in the Palestinian elections will pose an interesting policy dilema regarding the Brotherhood. Hamas is a direct offshoot of the Brotherhood, and the Brotherhood has long provided banking and other financial services to the violent group. Can what little pressure there is on the Brotherhood be sustained as Hamas gains electoral legitimacy? Not a question that will be easily answered.
The total number of people in the Mali camps are believed to be in the few hundreds, but are drawn from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Mali, Togo, Cameroon and elsewhere. The GSPC seems to be making a concerted effort at recruitment, and after training periods of several weeks, the recruits are dispersed, some to Iraq and some to other areas. Morocco, Algeria and Nigeria seem to be the primary targets for attack in the near to mid term.
It appears the camps that were operating in Sudan may have been shifted south, further out of the small international spotlight that occassionally shines on Sudan. That is not to say Sudan has gone passive in the global jihaidist wars. Contingents of senior leaders of the international Muslim Brotherhood have recently been making frequent trips to Khartoum. It is not entirely clear what the purpose of those meetings are. It comes at a time when the Brotherhood, long the financial lifeline of the jihadist movements, is setting up a whole new structure across Europe and Africa, rebuilding and expanding the structure that served them so well for so many years before 9-11, and has been under some pressure since then.
Not that the Brotherhood is in any danger of disappearing. Its vast offshore structure in Panama, the Bahamas, Liechstenstein and elsewhere has only been nicked occassionally by the increasingly ineffectual efforts the UN, US and EU to understand and cut off the flow of the constantly-shifting flow of resources that benefits the global jihadist movement.
But there appear to be new efforts to set up entirely new structures that could be activated on very short notice if the need arose.
Hamas' victory in the Palestinian elections will pose an interesting policy dilema regarding the Brotherhood. Hamas is a direct offshoot of the Brotherhood, and the Brotherhood has long provided banking and other financial services to the violent group. Can what little pressure there is on the Brotherhood be sustained as Hamas gains electoral legitimacy? Not a question that will be easily answered.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday September 7, 2009
A Bad Start in Liberia of Johnson-Serlif
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf will become the first elected woman head of state in Africa when she takes office in Liberia today. But she already has several important factors working against her. The first is the election of Edwin Snowe, the former son-in-law and close financial associate of Charles Taylor, as speaker of the house of representatives.
Snowe, who is on the U.N. and U.S. travel ban lists and asset seizure list, has been a financial lifeline to Taylor in exile in Nigeria. During the transition government he was managing director of the state-owned Liberian Petroleum Refining Company, from where he was able so siphon off a $1 per gallon hit to send to Taylor directly. His tenure was singled out by in a recent UN Panel of Experts report for "chronic corruption and incompetence." Yet he is now one of the most powerful figures in Liberia, and can block just about anything Johnson-Sirleaf could try to do on the Taylor front. Of course, it is not yet clear what she plans to do.
Snowe will be aided and abetted by the presence of Jewel Taylor, the forrmer first lady, in the senate, where she and a group of others on the travel ban and asset freezing list now make their home. Among them is the notorious "General Peanut Butter" and other butchers.
Johnson-Sirleaf has asked for time to handle the "delicate" issue of Taylor, and has not publicly committed to any course of action, despite strong, bipartisan Congressional requests for her to take action. She will have her hands full dealing with the merry band of thugs that continue to wield power on Taylor's behalf.
Yet, despite Taylor's ongoing influence in Liberian politics and Johnson-Sirleaf's unclear stand on requesting the extradtion of Taylor to stand trial for crimes against humanity, the US State Department continues to issue baffling statements that have little connection to reality.
Jenday Frazier, the State Department's head of Africa, said last week that Taylor "didn't influence the election (in Liberia) in any way...whether he is trying to influence or not trying to influence, he hasn't been successful in doing so."
She also stressed the commitment of the US to Taylor's extradition, but did not say what was actually being done to expedite it.
So Liberia is faced again with what is likely to be a weak government, hamstrung by Taylor's initiatives and access to corrupt gains, and the US still pretending to believe everything is on track. It is a recipie for disaster.
Snowe, who is on the U.N. and U.S. travel ban lists and asset seizure list, has been a financial lifeline to Taylor in exile in Nigeria. During the transition government he was managing director of the state-owned Liberian Petroleum Refining Company, from where he was able so siphon off a $1 per gallon hit to send to Taylor directly. His tenure was singled out by in a recent UN Panel of Experts report for "chronic corruption and incompetence." Yet he is now one of the most powerful figures in Liberia, and can block just about anything Johnson-Sirleaf could try to do on the Taylor front. Of course, it is not yet clear what she plans to do.
Snowe will be aided and abetted by the presence of Jewel Taylor, the forrmer first lady, in the senate, where she and a group of others on the travel ban and asset freezing list now make their home. Among them is the notorious "General Peanut Butter" and other butchers.
Johnson-Sirleaf has asked for time to handle the "delicate" issue of Taylor, and has not publicly committed to any course of action, despite strong, bipartisan Congressional requests for her to take action. She will have her hands full dealing with the merry band of thugs that continue to wield power on Taylor's behalf.
Yet, despite Taylor's ongoing influence in Liberian politics and Johnson-Sirleaf's unclear stand on requesting the extradtion of Taylor to stand trial for crimes against humanity, the US State Department continues to issue baffling statements that have little connection to reality.
Jenday Frazier, the State Department's head of Africa, said last week that Taylor "didn't influence the election (in Liberia) in any way...whether he is trying to influence or not trying to influence, he hasn't been successful in doing so."
She also stressed the commitment of the US to Taylor's extradition, but did not say what was actually being done to expedite it.
So Liberia is faced again with what is likely to be a weak government, hamstrung by Taylor's initiatives and access to corrupt gains, and the US still pretending to believe everything is on track. It is a recipie for disaster.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
A Waning Interest in Terror Finance
It seems, from my recent converstations with some senior folks in government, that there is a growing sense of dismay -- across party lines -- at the waning interest in serously combatting terror finance, a coherent public diplomacy strategy, cohesive intelligence reform and many other vital issues.
My friends say there is no follow-up on terror finance issues and no comprehensive strategy because the NSC coordinating group on the issue is now a shadow of what it was when it was so actively led by David Aufhauser. Entrenched cultural and analytical habits have made thinking or acting in new ways difficult. What was once a serious attack mode on the issue now appears to be largely paper-shuffling and a holding pattern, and there is no one at the the top driving against the bureaucratic inertia.
Another common theme is that communication across departmental lines is reportedly at least as bad as it was before 9-11, which each agency clinging to scraps of information and engaging in bloody turf wars rather than facing a common enemy. People with expertise in specific matters are routinely pulled off their primary job and thrown into others for weeks or months at a time, cutting down on sustained focus on important issues. In a crisis mode this is necessary, but this seems to be part of a larger pattern of personnel management and priority setting.
On public diplomacy, the Karen Hughes-led effort to reinvigorate the vital portfolio has foundered, with few new initiatives and a crowding out of those with actual field experience in favor of old friends whose primary concern seems to be to make sure the administration does not look bad. This is a far cry from the mission of promoting U.S. values and ideas in a war that everyone, at least publicly, acknowledges is as important as the shooting war. Without an active, vigorous debate and engagement with the Islamic world, in multiple forums and on multiple levels -- not to attack but to dialogue -- the shooting war will be irrelevant. Instead, it seems that, in the war of ideas the U.S. is barely on the playing field.
One senior official, who is a strong Republican told me that "all of us in government are really scared, because it will take another attack to shift the Bush administration's focus back to terrorism. That is the sad truth."
Sad indeed.
My friends say there is no follow-up on terror finance issues and no comprehensive strategy because the NSC coordinating group on the issue is now a shadow of what it was when it was so actively led by David Aufhauser. Entrenched cultural and analytical habits have made thinking or acting in new ways difficult. What was once a serious attack mode on the issue now appears to be largely paper-shuffling and a holding pattern, and there is no one at the the top driving against the bureaucratic inertia.
Another common theme is that communication across departmental lines is reportedly at least as bad as it was before 9-11, which each agency clinging to scraps of information and engaging in bloody turf wars rather than facing a common enemy. People with expertise in specific matters are routinely pulled off their primary job and thrown into others for weeks or months at a time, cutting down on sustained focus on important issues. In a crisis mode this is necessary, but this seems to be part of a larger pattern of personnel management and priority setting.
On public diplomacy, the Karen Hughes-led effort to reinvigorate the vital portfolio has foundered, with few new initiatives and a crowding out of those with actual field experience in favor of old friends whose primary concern seems to be to make sure the administration does not look bad. This is a far cry from the mission of promoting U.S. values and ideas in a war that everyone, at least publicly, acknowledges is as important as the shooting war. Without an active, vigorous debate and engagement with the Islamic world, in multiple forums and on multiple levels -- not to attack but to dialogue -- the shooting war will be irrelevant. Instead, it seems that, in the war of ideas the U.S. is barely on the playing field.
One senior official, who is a strong Republican told me that "all of us in government are really scared, because it will take another attack to shift the Bush administration's focus back to terrorism. That is the sad truth."
Sad indeed.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
More Africa Connections in the New World Mayhem
More bits and pieces are emerging on terrorist operations in sub-Saharan Africa, making the point that those soft, failing or failed states are rich targets for people seeking to move weapons, as well as increasingly fertile ground for recruitment by al Qaeda and affiliated groups, as well as transnational criminal organizations. The porous borders, easily-accessible weapons and lack of law enforcement make much of the vast continent a natural marketplace for weapons, as descriped in this article from Kenya. In this case, the weapons came in from neighboring Somalia, where there is a strong al Qaeda network, into Kenya, which has already been the target of several al Qaeda attacks. As the story makes clear, finding these weapons was an act of luck. The arresting officer had to wait two days before hitching a ride on a UN vehicle to report the incident to his superiors. His unit had no vehicles and no radio.
Another small but disturbing news article in the Ghanaian press says that a 36-year-old Ghanaian, Mohammed Gazali, was arrested by Spanish police in Malaga, where Gazali was serving as the imam of a mosque there. This is a small but important indication of the pipeline that has developed from the salafist groups into the traditionally-tolerant Islam of West Africa.
A few important new studies, including an important one by the International Crisis Group last year, have tried to monitor the growing influence of the salafists in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly West Africa. All have found that the influence, through the building of mosques financed by Saudi Arabia and Islamic charities, is growing. Quantifying such findings is extremely hard to do. But given the number of sub-Saharan African nationals captured in Iraq as part of the Salafist-Zarqawi network, the other arrests of West Africans in the broader al Qaeda-affiliated networks and the growing amounts of visible Saudi money flowing into the region, it seems more than reasonable to assume that the danger is real.
From recent conversations with some in the intelligence community and around it, there seems to still be almost no thought, and certainly no articulated policy, directed at countering this tendency, through either diplomacy, outreach, or increasing intelligence assets on the ground. More than four years after 9-11 the Pentagon has only recently set up a group to study failed and failing states. Little of the existing literature on this seems to have been read nor experts consulted. Rather, it appears the group is going to start from scratch, trying to reinvent much that has already been discovered, rather than moving more quickly toward developing a coherent policy that defines what U.S. interests are, how to protect them and how to counteract the enemy. And, like so much of the counter-terrorism issues outside of Iraq, sustained interested of senior officials is very hard to sustain and many things are left to languish. This should not be one of them.
Another small but disturbing news article in the Ghanaian press says that a 36-year-old Ghanaian, Mohammed Gazali, was arrested by Spanish police in Malaga, where Gazali was serving as the imam of a mosque there. This is a small but important indication of the pipeline that has developed from the salafist groups into the traditionally-tolerant Islam of West Africa.
A few important new studies, including an important one by the International Crisis Group last year, have tried to monitor the growing influence of the salafists in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly West Africa. All have found that the influence, through the building of mosques financed by Saudi Arabia and Islamic charities, is growing. Quantifying such findings is extremely hard to do. But given the number of sub-Saharan African nationals captured in Iraq as part of the Salafist-Zarqawi network, the other arrests of West Africans in the broader al Qaeda-affiliated networks and the growing amounts of visible Saudi money flowing into the region, it seems more than reasonable to assume that the danger is real.
From recent conversations with some in the intelligence community and around it, there seems to still be almost no thought, and certainly no articulated policy, directed at countering this tendency, through either diplomacy, outreach, or increasing intelligence assets on the ground. More than four years after 9-11 the Pentagon has only recently set up a group to study failed and failing states. Little of the existing literature on this seems to have been read nor experts consulted. Rather, it appears the group is going to start from scratch, trying to reinvent much that has already been discovered, rather than moving more quickly toward developing a coherent policy that defines what U.S. interests are, how to protect them and how to counteract the enemy. And, like so much of the counter-terrorism issues outside of Iraq, sustained interested of senior officials is very hard to sustain and many things are left to languish. This should not be one of them.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Some Corrections at Year's End
Michael Grunberg, who has acted as a consultant to Sandline, a Private Military Company, has pointed out some errors of fact in my Dec. 9 posting on Tim Spicer and Aegis. After a surprisingly civil discussion, it is clear I, in fact, made several there and elsewhere, which I would like to correct as the year ends.
1) Tim Spicer did not found Executive Outcomes. Neither did Anthony Buckingham. Both were involved in working with Sandline.
2) Mr Grundberg points out that Sandline's military expedition in Papua New Guinea was not illegal, but signed by an elected government and later held to be valid by several courts. I was unaware of the courts findings.
3) Mr. Grundberg says military services (from Sandline and Executive Outcomes, I presume) were never exchanged for mineral concessions, and that Mr. Sanjivan Ruprah was never associated with Branch Energy. I have documents showing Mr. Ruprah at least held himself out, on letterhead stationary, to be an executive of Branch Energy (Kenya). My inference on the exchange of services was taken from numerous public sources, including the following, from a Dec. 20, 2000 U.N. Panel of Experts Report on Liberia to the U.N. Security Council:
"A Kenyan national named Sanjivan Ruprah plays a key role in Liberia's airline registry and in the arms trade. Before his involvement in Liberia, Sanjivan Ruprah had mining interests in Kenya, and was associated with Branch Energy (Kenya). Branch Energy owned diamond mining rights in Sierra Leone, and introduced the private military company, Executive Outcomes to the government there in 1995. Ruprah is also known as an arms broker. He has worked in South Africa with Roelf van Heerden, a former colleague from Executive Outcomes, and together they have done business in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere. Ruprah was once in charge of an airline in Kenya, Simba Airlines, until investigations into financial irregularities forced the company's closure."
On other issues, errors of commission and omission:
I seem to have been wrong in linking the Nigeria jet crash to possible nefarious activities. No evidence seems to have turned up to substantiate that theory.
Because of other work commitments, I have not followed Africa and terrorism develpments there as well and as often as I had hoped.
I may not have made it clear that, despite the multiple problems in effectively dealing with terror finance issues, there are a remarkable number of good, smart people who have spent their time and talent to cut off the flow of funds. I often criticize the efforts, which, on a macro level, remain woeful. But to those often frustrated and seldom recognized individuals working hard within the system to make us safer, thank you.
Any other thoughts are welcome.
1) Tim Spicer did not found Executive Outcomes. Neither did Anthony Buckingham. Both were involved in working with Sandline.
2) Mr Grundberg points out that Sandline's military expedition in Papua New Guinea was not illegal, but signed by an elected government and later held to be valid by several courts. I was unaware of the courts findings.
3) Mr. Grundberg says military services (from Sandline and Executive Outcomes, I presume) were never exchanged for mineral concessions, and that Mr. Sanjivan Ruprah was never associated with Branch Energy. I have documents showing Mr. Ruprah at least held himself out, on letterhead stationary, to be an executive of Branch Energy (Kenya). My inference on the exchange of services was taken from numerous public sources, including the following, from a Dec. 20, 2000 U.N. Panel of Experts Report on Liberia to the U.N. Security Council:
"A Kenyan national named Sanjivan Ruprah plays a key role in Liberia's airline registry and in the arms trade. Before his involvement in Liberia, Sanjivan Ruprah had mining interests in Kenya, and was associated with Branch Energy (Kenya). Branch Energy owned diamond mining rights in Sierra Leone, and introduced the private military company, Executive Outcomes to the government there in 1995. Ruprah is also known as an arms broker. He has worked in South Africa with Roelf van Heerden, a former colleague from Executive Outcomes, and together they have done business in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere. Ruprah was once in charge of an airline in Kenya, Simba Airlines, until investigations into financial irregularities forced the company's closure."
On other issues, errors of commission and omission:
I seem to have been wrong in linking the Nigeria jet crash to possible nefarious activities. No evidence seems to have turned up to substantiate that theory.
Because of other work commitments, I have not followed Africa and terrorism develpments there as well and as often as I had hoped.
I may not have made it clear that, despite the multiple problems in effectively dealing with terror finance issues, there are a remarkable number of good, smart people who have spent their time and talent to cut off the flow of funds. I often criticize the efforts, which, on a macro level, remain woeful. But to those often frustrated and seldom recognized individuals working hard within the system to make us safer, thank you.
Any other thoughts are welcome.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH