Wednesday May 27, 2009
The Collateral Damage From the West Africa Drug Trade
I have heard recently in discussions with people on the Hill and in policy making circles that the exploding drug trafficking phenomenon in West Africa is not really a U.S. security concern because most of the cocaine that transits through that region is bound for Europe and not the United States.
There are several thing wrong with that perspective, I believe. The first is that the traffickers will (and already have) attack the fragile institutions and rule of law where they exist, and they are already incredibly weak. But in countries like Ghana and Mali, where notable progress has been made, and Liberia and Sierra Leone, struggling after years of punishing civil wars, some progress has been made.
Drug trafficking, which must rely on corruption and coercion because it is illegal, will make the possibility of establishing the rule of law in the region virtually impossible. That will translate into another round of instability and carnage in an area that has already suffered a great deal. But what will get broader attention is the fact that the region at stake produces close to 20 percent of the oil we use, and the production will plummet as the chaos spreads.
There are also other reasons to care about the massive inflow of illicit cash. Remember that Hezbollah, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have funded themselves from illicit drugs, diamonds and timber, including activities in West Africa.
For a fascinating glimpse at the scope of the illicit money activities of Hezbollah in West Africa, see this OFAC announcement released today on the targeting of Hezbollah fundraisers in West Africa.
Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi is a Cote d'Ivoire-based Hizballah supporter and is the personal representative of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Qubaysi communicates with Hizballah leaders and has hosted senior Hizballah officials traveling to Cote d'Ivoire and other parts of Africa to raise money for Hizballah. Qubaysi plays a visible role in Hizballah activities in Cote d'Ivoire, including speaking at Hizballah fundraising events and sponsoring meetings with high-ranking members of the terrorist organization.
Qubaysi also helped establish an official Hizballah foundation in Cote d'Ivoire which has been used to recruit new members for Hizballah's military ranks in Lebanon.
Because the Lebanese expat community controls much of the import and export economy and access to the region's financial structure, it seems highly likely that the South American drug cartels moving into West Africa will have to either buy or kill its Lebanese rivals. There is little likelihood that the violence will erupt, meaning the Hezbollah-dominated illicit networks will reap a windfall profit. And the extra cash is unlikely to be kept in Cote d'Ivoire!
A third element is that the worst non-state actors (RUF, UNITA etc.) thrive on resource exploitation, which enabled them to buy the weapons that fed their wars. Cocaine will become another commodity that will provide earnings far beyond that of diamonds and timber. The wars will likely rage even more fiercely than before. The millions of unemployed, combat-hardened veterans are still there, and ready-made army for whoever will pay them.
Drug trafficking through a region always leaves a growing addict population. Brazil, once a transshipment point primarily, is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world, after the United States. Traffickers will pay in kind rather than in cash if they can, and the trail that follows is not pretty.
So, the arc of instability, war, and humanitarian disaster is likely to follow. The risks are enormous. The other side of the equation is not pretty either. Most of the coke entering West Africa comes from Venezuela and Brazil. The FARC benefits from the Venezuelan trafficking, and the Bolivian and Peruvian cartels from the Brazil trafficking. The destabilizing effect of these routes in Latin America will be immense.
There are several thing wrong with that perspective, I believe. The first is that the traffickers will (and already have) attack the fragile institutions and rule of law where they exist, and they are already incredibly weak. But in countries like Ghana and Mali, where notable progress has been made, and Liberia and Sierra Leone, struggling after years of punishing civil wars, some progress has been made.
Drug trafficking, which must rely on corruption and coercion because it is illegal, will make the possibility of establishing the rule of law in the region virtually impossible. That will translate into another round of instability and carnage in an area that has already suffered a great deal. But what will get broader attention is the fact that the region at stake produces close to 20 percent of the oil we use, and the production will plummet as the chaos spreads.
There are also other reasons to care about the massive inflow of illicit cash. Remember that Hezbollah, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have funded themselves from illicit drugs, diamonds and timber, including activities in West Africa.
For a fascinating glimpse at the scope of the illicit money activities of Hezbollah in West Africa, see this OFAC announcement released today on the targeting of Hezbollah fundraisers in West Africa.
Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi is a Cote d'Ivoire-based Hizballah supporter and is the personal representative of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Qubaysi communicates with Hizballah leaders and has hosted senior Hizballah officials traveling to Cote d'Ivoire and other parts of Africa to raise money for Hizballah. Qubaysi plays a visible role in Hizballah activities in Cote d'Ivoire, including speaking at Hizballah fundraising events and sponsoring meetings with high-ranking members of the terrorist organization.
Qubaysi also helped establish an official Hizballah foundation in Cote d'Ivoire which has been used to recruit new members for Hizballah's military ranks in Lebanon.
Because the Lebanese expat community controls much of the import and export economy and access to the region's financial structure, it seems highly likely that the South American drug cartels moving into West Africa will have to either buy or kill its Lebanese rivals. There is little likelihood that the violence will erupt, meaning the Hezbollah-dominated illicit networks will reap a windfall profit. And the extra cash is unlikely to be kept in Cote d'Ivoire!
A third element is that the worst non-state actors (RUF, UNITA etc.) thrive on resource exploitation, which enabled them to buy the weapons that fed their wars. Cocaine will become another commodity that will provide earnings far beyond that of diamonds and timber. The wars will likely rage even more fiercely than before. The millions of unemployed, combat-hardened veterans are still there, and ready-made army for whoever will pay them.
Drug trafficking through a region always leaves a growing addict population. Brazil, once a transshipment point primarily, is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world, after the United States. Traffickers will pay in kind rather than in cash if they can, and the trail that follows is not pretty.
So, the arc of instability, war, and humanitarian disaster is likely to follow. The risks are enormous. The other side of the equation is not pretty either. Most of the coke entering West Africa comes from Venezuela and Brazil. The FARC benefits from the Venezuelan trafficking, and the Bolivian and Peruvian cartels from the Brazil trafficking. The destabilizing effect of these routes in Latin America will be immense.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday May 22, 2009
Specks of Light in Dealing with Drug Crops?
Yesterday I had the opportunity to comment at the New America Foundation on the new book Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda, by Gretchen Peters.
What was interesting in the counter-terrorism context was what it would take to wean the poppy growers, or coca growers or other producers of illicit crops, to move toward alternatives.
We agreed on two basic points: There is little that can replace the real money the illicit crops generate; and most of the farmers engaged in the trade would rather not be in it because of the hassle, religious concerns in the case of the Muslim community, or other concerns. So the question becomes, what is the tipping point to move people to other activities.
The problem is that in order to find that tipping point, the government (or external forces) must be willing, and have the capacity, to step into the breach immediately to meet the felt needs of the community that is being affected. The measure of success is not the amount of crops eradicated, but the number of people and farmland that move to other activities because it is viable.
That means that, even if, from a macro-economic point of view building a hydro-electric project makes sense, what is really needed are the soccer fields, schools and public spaces that the community wants.
Of course, in order to do that, there has to be a sufficient level of security so that the projects can be built without being immediately destroyed, and the population can use them without fear of retaliation. In other words, the clear and hold model has to work.
So the Washington Post story on a new approach in Colombia is of interest because it is trying this approach, with some at least temporary success.
Under the Integrated Consolidation Plan for the Macarena, named after a national park west of here, the military first drove out guerrillas and other armed groups. In quick sequence, engineers and work crews, technicians, prosecutors, social workers and policy types arrived, working in concert to transform a lawless backwater into something resembling a functioning part of Colombia. All of it is coordinated from a compound, called the fusion center, on the edge of Vista Hermosa.
"We had to find a way to solve the security problem and the coca problem at the same time because they feed off each other," said Sergio Jaramillo, vice minister of defense and an architect of the project. "It's all one problem, and it needs a joint solution."
It is a tricky business, with many moving parts. One could argue that such an approach is not yet feasible in Afghanistan because the Taliban, unlike the FARC, is not in retreat or badly weakened. This is true, and the clear and hold model has proved incredibly resource intensive and time consuming, and often fails if the insurgents mass a concerted effort to defeat it.
But, as Ms. Peters said yesterday, a recent study shows that the tipping point for many Afghan farmers (one assumes that this would be in a fairly secure area where the Taliban cannot strike with impunity) to move out of poppy and opium production, is $4 a day. That isn't much.
Others at the event suggested buying the entire crop to avoid eradication efforts that often anger and radicalize the population, would be an option to consider.
What is true is that almost all of the alternative development programs have failed, in part because of policy flaws and design flaws, but most importantly the inability or unwillingness of the state to take immediate, visible action and provide protection.
Maybe the Colombians, as they have with many areas of fighting the criminal-terrorist nexus, can teach us a lesson in state building as well.
What was interesting in the counter-terrorism context was what it would take to wean the poppy growers, or coca growers or other producers of illicit crops, to move toward alternatives.
We agreed on two basic points: There is little that can replace the real money the illicit crops generate; and most of the farmers engaged in the trade would rather not be in it because of the hassle, religious concerns in the case of the Muslim community, or other concerns. So the question becomes, what is the tipping point to move people to other activities.
The problem is that in order to find that tipping point, the government (or external forces) must be willing, and have the capacity, to step into the breach immediately to meet the felt needs of the community that is being affected. The measure of success is not the amount of crops eradicated, but the number of people and farmland that move to other activities because it is viable.
That means that, even if, from a macro-economic point of view building a hydro-electric project makes sense, what is really needed are the soccer fields, schools and public spaces that the community wants.
Of course, in order to do that, there has to be a sufficient level of security so that the projects can be built without being immediately destroyed, and the population can use them without fear of retaliation. In other words, the clear and hold model has to work.
So the Washington Post story on a new approach in Colombia is of interest because it is trying this approach, with some at least temporary success.
Under the Integrated Consolidation Plan for the Macarena, named after a national park west of here, the military first drove out guerrillas and other armed groups. In quick sequence, engineers and work crews, technicians, prosecutors, social workers and policy types arrived, working in concert to transform a lawless backwater into something resembling a functioning part of Colombia. All of it is coordinated from a compound, called the fusion center, on the edge of Vista Hermosa.
"We had to find a way to solve the security problem and the coca problem at the same time because they feed off each other," said Sergio Jaramillo, vice minister of defense and an architect of the project. "It's all one problem, and it needs a joint solution."
It is a tricky business, with many moving parts. One could argue that such an approach is not yet feasible in Afghanistan because the Taliban, unlike the FARC, is not in retreat or badly weakened. This is true, and the clear and hold model has proved incredibly resource intensive and time consuming, and often fails if the insurgents mass a concerted effort to defeat it.
But, as Ms. Peters said yesterday, a recent study shows that the tipping point for many Afghan farmers (one assumes that this would be in a fairly secure area where the Taliban cannot strike with impunity) to move out of poppy and opium production, is $4 a day. That isn't much.
Others at the event suggested buying the entire crop to avoid eradication efforts that often anger and radicalize the population, would be an option to consider.
What is true is that almost all of the alternative development programs have failed, in part because of policy flaws and design flaws, but most importantly the inability or unwillingness of the state to take immediate, visible action and provide protection.
Maybe the Colombians, as they have with many areas of fighting the criminal-terrorist nexus, can teach us a lesson in state building as well.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday May 20, 2009
The Defeat of the Tamil Tigers and Waning Insurgencies
We are facing an unusual time in recent history. Two of the oldest and most successful insurgencies in recent times, the FARC in Colombia and the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka, are on the brink of complete military defeat.
Both have lost their most senior and charismatic leader and much of the top command structure, both suffered the effects of top level defections and morale, and both suffered the catastrophic loss of geographic space in which to operate. Both have existed for several decades.
Although neither is completely destroyed (and the FARC retains the capacity to launch military strikes and controls some territory), both will leave lasting legacies for non-state actors, whose repercussions are being felt today and likely will be for years to come.
My assumption is that remnants of the FARC will survive, and not be crushed in a total military defeat like the LTTE. However, more and more combatants will drift away other types of armed activities, and the movement as a Marxist, ideologically-driven movement, will disappear almost as completely.
I hope there are some serious studies going on regarding the lessons learned in these two cases, as well as comparative looks at the factors that let to the sudden reversal of fortunes for these two groups.
Even without benefit of extensive hindsight, one can look at the groups' legacies.
For the LTTE, the lasting legacy is pioneering the use of suicide bombers and suicide belts, which have widely been adopted by radical Islamist groups and others. The specially trained and selected Black Tigers, the mystique surrounding them within the organization and the belief in the validity of the tactic have now been widely transferred to other terrorist organizations.
It is, as some theorists like to say, the "atomic weapon of the poor," and a weapon that is tremendously difficult to defend against, especially when any constraints on killing the civilian population is lifted, as it was for the LTTE, as well as al Qaeda, Hamas and others who learned the lesson well.
The FARC has been a pioneer in turning an armed, ideological group into a transnational criminal organization. The adaptability of the group in the face of the loss of funding, particularly the ability to move beyond petty crime into serious and lucrative illegal activities, is no small thing. Again, it is something that is already being copied on a wide scale, from the Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Islamist groups.
There is still a chance to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in both the case of the LTTE and the FARC, and history shows (see Sendero Luminoso etc.) that armed movements, in the absence of a negotiated end, are almost never over until they are over.
My CTB colleague Zach Abuza points out some of the dangers that remain from the LTTE, which are largely the same for the FARC.
In referring to the LTTE's spokesman Selvarasa Pathmanathan often referred as Kumaran Padmanadan, Abuza noted that:
Pathmanathan continues to head the Tiger’s global operations and is often described in the media as the LTTE spokesman. But he was more importantly the Tiger's chief arms procurement agent. While the LTTE political and military organization in Sri Lankan has been decimated, the international network of the LTTE remains fully in tact. And to be clear, what set the LTTE apart from other terrorist organizations, was the sophistication and breadth of its international operations. Pathmanathan was known to have procured weapons from Bulgaria, China, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic, to name but a few. Pathmanathan also oversaw the organizations international fundraising, which included the notorious "Tamil Tax" as well as a plethora of legal businesses and criminal enterprises, including large human smuggling operations. In short, Pathmanathan oversaw a multi-million dollar a year operation, whose network of agents spanned the globe.
One should not expect Pathmanathan to fade quietly into retirement, and gently accept the Sri Lankan rout of the LTTE. He was Prabhakaran's closest lieutenant. He will remain committed to the Tamil cause. It will take time to rebuild even a small organization. But, in the mean time, there is a new gun (merchant) for hire.
The same issue faces the Colombian government with the FARC. It has much to do to undermine the legitimate social grievances that have allowed the FARC to survive for more than 40 years, and without that, the risk of rebirth is serious.
The second issue is, as it is with the LTTE, that the financial and international structure is likely to remain relatively intact even as the FARC as an organization disintegrates. As long as there is the money coming in, someone will use that money for fighting the state, whether for economic profit or ideology.
So, success in the field of militarily defeating an insurgency is rare. We will see if either one of these situations can shed light on how to truly end the wars.
Both have lost their most senior and charismatic leader and much of the top command structure, both suffered the effects of top level defections and morale, and both suffered the catastrophic loss of geographic space in which to operate. Both have existed for several decades.
Although neither is completely destroyed (and the FARC retains the capacity to launch military strikes and controls some territory), both will leave lasting legacies for non-state actors, whose repercussions are being felt today and likely will be for years to come.
My assumption is that remnants of the FARC will survive, and not be crushed in a total military defeat like the LTTE. However, more and more combatants will drift away other types of armed activities, and the movement as a Marxist, ideologically-driven movement, will disappear almost as completely.
I hope there are some serious studies going on regarding the lessons learned in these two cases, as well as comparative looks at the factors that let to the sudden reversal of fortunes for these two groups.
Even without benefit of extensive hindsight, one can look at the groups' legacies.
For the LTTE, the lasting legacy is pioneering the use of suicide bombers and suicide belts, which have widely been adopted by radical Islamist groups and others. The specially trained and selected Black Tigers, the mystique surrounding them within the organization and the belief in the validity of the tactic have now been widely transferred to other terrorist organizations.
It is, as some theorists like to say, the "atomic weapon of the poor," and a weapon that is tremendously difficult to defend against, especially when any constraints on killing the civilian population is lifted, as it was for the LTTE, as well as al Qaeda, Hamas and others who learned the lesson well.
The FARC has been a pioneer in turning an armed, ideological group into a transnational criminal organization. The adaptability of the group in the face of the loss of funding, particularly the ability to move beyond petty crime into serious and lucrative illegal activities, is no small thing. Again, it is something that is already being copied on a wide scale, from the Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Islamist groups.
There is still a chance to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in both the case of the LTTE and the FARC, and history shows (see Sendero Luminoso etc.) that armed movements, in the absence of a negotiated end, are almost never over until they are over.
My CTB colleague Zach Abuza points out some of the dangers that remain from the LTTE, which are largely the same for the FARC.
In referring to the LTTE's spokesman Selvarasa Pathmanathan often referred as Kumaran Padmanadan, Abuza noted that:
Pathmanathan continues to head the Tiger’s global operations and is often described in the media as the LTTE spokesman. But he was more importantly the Tiger's chief arms procurement agent. While the LTTE political and military organization in Sri Lankan has been decimated, the international network of the LTTE remains fully in tact. And to be clear, what set the LTTE apart from other terrorist organizations, was the sophistication and breadth of its international operations. Pathmanathan was known to have procured weapons from Bulgaria, China, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic, to name but a few. Pathmanathan also oversaw the organizations international fundraising, which included the notorious "Tamil Tax" as well as a plethora of legal businesses and criminal enterprises, including large human smuggling operations. In short, Pathmanathan oversaw a multi-million dollar a year operation, whose network of agents spanned the globe.
One should not expect Pathmanathan to fade quietly into retirement, and gently accept the Sri Lankan rout of the LTTE. He was Prabhakaran's closest lieutenant. He will remain committed to the Tamil cause. It will take time to rebuild even a small organization. But, in the mean time, there is a new gun (merchant) for hire.
The same issue faces the Colombian government with the FARC. It has much to do to undermine the legitimate social grievances that have allowed the FARC to survive for more than 40 years, and without that, the risk of rebirth is serious.
The second issue is, as it is with the LTTE, that the financial and international structure is likely to remain relatively intact even as the FARC as an organization disintegrates. As long as there is the money coming in, someone will use that money for fighting the state, whether for economic profit or ideology.
So, success in the field of militarily defeating an insurgency is rare. We will see if either one of these situations can shed light on how to truly end the wars.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday May 19, 2009
Hezbollah, Hamas-and the Muslim Brotherhood?
A senior Hezbollah official has now stated publicly for the first time that his organization has been providing Hamas with "every type of support" for a long period of time.
"We have always said that we supported the resistance in Palestine, but we have not mentioned how or given details of such support," Naim Qassem, the deputy leader of the Lebanese organization, said in an interview published by the Financial Times on Wednesday.
"But Egypt has now revealed that we have given military support to Palestine. We have done so for a while, but we have not talked about it," he continued.
It is one of the secrets of the resistance that we don't talk about the details of our support, but suffice to say that we are giving them every type of support that could help the Palestinian resistance. Every type that is possible," he said.
The statements are the clearest yet of the ability and desirability of Shiite Muslim armed groups (Hezbollah) to tactically ally themselves with armed Sunni groups (Hamas). This means the transfer of technology, lessons learned, tactics, intelligence etc. is well advanced among groups that have long and valuable experience in terrorism and irregular warfare.
While the intelligence community for years denied such alliances were possible, they have long been operative. One of the key bridges between the Sunni and Shiite world has been the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood has mediated or attempted to mediate a host of disputes between Shiite and Sunnis, including the unsuccessful efforts by the International Muslim Brotherhood's Yousef Nada to negotiate an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
One of the biggest bones on contention between the MB in Iraq and the al Qaeda groups of Zarqawi was the latter's insistence on targeting Shiite groups, while the MB units viewed that as a far lower priority than targeting the Americans.
The understanding of the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has often been misunderstood in the United States, where it is often viewed as Egyptian organization. The international structure is largely ignored. It is also worth remembering (although it seldom is) that Hamas is, according to its own statutes-article 2-an organic part of the Muslim Brotherhood.
That means that Hamas cannot be acting in this regard without the knowledge of its "mother ship," the MB.
The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required)
has an interesting piece on the recent and rare public acknowledgement by a senior Brotherhood leader that such an international structure exists.
According to the GMBDR:
In a recent interview with London Al-Quds al-Arabi Online, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef provided some new details about the composition of it’s so-called "International Organization." In the interview, Mr. Akef discusses the International Shura Council as well as the International Guidance Bureau:
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Murshid-General (Guide), Muhammad Mahdi Akif, said that it is likely that his successor would be a non-Egyptian, but that depends on the internal elections in the Shura Council of the International Organization of the Brotherhood. He added in exclusive statement to Al-Quds al-Arabi that "the International Shura Council consists of 90 members from inside Egypt and 40 from outside, and it is they who elect the ‘murshid-general’." As to whether the future ‘murshid-general’ can be a non-Egyptian, he said: "The brothers abroad have always preferred an Egyptian candidate out of politeness and love of Egypt."With regard to the MB’s ‘international guidance bureau’, he said: "it consists of eight Egyptians and five non-Egyptians; whereas the Egyptian guidance bureau consists of 17 members, all of whom are Egyptians."…With regard to the international organization, Dr Al-Halabawi said: "Representation on the Shura Council is for the countries with more members such as Jordan, Syria, the Gulf, Malaysia, Indonesia and Europe, and the candidate should be a prominent person."
It is important to note that Sunni-Shiite interests diverge and the alliance is tactical, and likely not long term. Still, it shows how networks and pipelines connect when the circumstances are right, and that is dangerous.
"We have always said that we supported the resistance in Palestine, but we have not mentioned how or given details of such support," Naim Qassem, the deputy leader of the Lebanese organization, said in an interview published by the Financial Times on Wednesday.
"But Egypt has now revealed that we have given military support to Palestine. We have done so for a while, but we have not talked about it," he continued.
It is one of the secrets of the resistance that we don't talk about the details of our support, but suffice to say that we are giving them every type of support that could help the Palestinian resistance. Every type that is possible," he said.
The statements are the clearest yet of the ability and desirability of Shiite Muslim armed groups (Hezbollah) to tactically ally themselves with armed Sunni groups (Hamas). This means the transfer of technology, lessons learned, tactics, intelligence etc. is well advanced among groups that have long and valuable experience in terrorism and irregular warfare.
While the intelligence community for years denied such alliances were possible, they have long been operative. One of the key bridges between the Sunni and Shiite world has been the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood has mediated or attempted to mediate a host of disputes between Shiite and Sunnis, including the unsuccessful efforts by the International Muslim Brotherhood's Yousef Nada to negotiate an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
One of the biggest bones on contention between the MB in Iraq and the al Qaeda groups of Zarqawi was the latter's insistence on targeting Shiite groups, while the MB units viewed that as a far lower priority than targeting the Americans.
The understanding of the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has often been misunderstood in the United States, where it is often viewed as Egyptian organization. The international structure is largely ignored. It is also worth remembering (although it seldom is) that Hamas is, according to its own statutes-article 2-an organic part of the Muslim Brotherhood.
That means that Hamas cannot be acting in this regard without the knowledge of its "mother ship," the MB.
The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required)
has an interesting piece on the recent and rare public acknowledgement by a senior Brotherhood leader that such an international structure exists.
According to the GMBDR:
In a recent interview with London Al-Quds al-Arabi Online, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef provided some new details about the composition of it’s so-called "International Organization." In the interview, Mr. Akef discusses the International Shura Council as well as the International Guidance Bureau:
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Murshid-General (Guide), Muhammad Mahdi Akif, said that it is likely that his successor would be a non-Egyptian, but that depends on the internal elections in the Shura Council of the International Organization of the Brotherhood. He added in exclusive statement to Al-Quds al-Arabi that "the International Shura Council consists of 90 members from inside Egypt and 40 from outside, and it is they who elect the ‘murshid-general’." As to whether the future ‘murshid-general’ can be a non-Egyptian, he said: "The brothers abroad have always preferred an Egyptian candidate out of politeness and love of Egypt."With regard to the MB’s ‘international guidance bureau’, he said: "it consists of eight Egyptians and five non-Egyptians; whereas the Egyptian guidance bureau consists of 17 members, all of whom are Egyptians."…With regard to the international organization, Dr Al-Halabawi said: "Representation on the Shura Council is for the countries with more members such as Jordan, Syria, the Gulf, Malaysia, Indonesia and Europe, and the candidate should be a prominent person."
It is important to note that Sunni-Shiite interests diverge and the alliance is tactical, and likely not long term. Still, it shows how networks and pipelines connect when the circumstances are right, and that is dangerous.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday May 11, 2009
A New Look at the AF/Pak Crisis
Now that the Afghan/Pakistan crisis if front and center, and the ties between organized crime and the funding of radical Islamist movements are clear, it would be well to understand the origins of this emerging threat and the magnitude of the danger.
One of the best at doing that is a new book by Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling The Taliban and al Qaeda.
I have mentioned the book before, but it is hitting stores this week and provides a clear-eyed view of how we got to this point, and how international heroin trafficking is at the root of the new wave of Taliban advances.
Ms. Peters is a journalist, not an ideologue, and uses her 10 years of experience on the ground in the region to walk readers through myriad ties between the Taliban, al Qaeda and the heroin trade that has allowed the resurgence and spread of a group that was on the verge of complete defeat by the end of 2001. Now they are knocking on the doors of the capital of nuclear state.
It is the best case study to date of the criminal-terrorist nexus that is still so often dismissed in intelligence and senior policy making circles.
The result is not a pretty picture, particularly of the corruption in the Karzai administration, the lack of real progress in dealing with the deep seated social issues and poverty and the overall attractiveness of the drug trade in such dire conditions.
At the same time, the Jamestown Foundation notes the Europol report on the growing connection between the Afghanistan/Pakistan region and the Islamist terrorist threat in Europe.
Indeed, as the report states, "Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have replaced Iraq as preferred destinations for volunteers wishing to engage in armed conflicts." These recruits pose a threat to European troops deployed in Afghanistan. Germany, for instance, is particularly worried about the presence of several of its citizens (most notably Eric Breininger) in the region who are allegedly plotting operations against German troops (see Terrorism Focus, January 28).
When fighters return – such as members of the Belgian cell, or members of the Sauerland cell in Germany – they pose a direct threat to European security. As expressed by U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, "the primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al-Qaeda and Sunni affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the United States."
The threat is not just that radical Islamists will take over a nuclear power (and there are signs that the majority of Pakistanis, who are finally understanding the brutality and retrograde nature of this interpretation of Islam) but that the successes in Pakistan and Afghanistan help build the jihadist narrative.
Just as the narrative of divine intervention was central to success of the jihadist efforts against the Soviet Union, the devastating military loss of the Taliban in 2001 offered a chance for a new narrative to be written.
Now, with success on the battlefield again, the jihadists will not thank Western drug consumers for their resurgence. Rather, they will again weave the story of Allah's blessing on the movement as a powerful recruitment tool in jihadi circles around the world.
The question is how to move at this late date. And no policy option offers anything like a silver bullet. Ms. Peters' book makes that clear, as well as clarifying how late in the game we really are.
One of the best at doing that is a new book by Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling The Taliban and al Qaeda.
I have mentioned the book before, but it is hitting stores this week and provides a clear-eyed view of how we got to this point, and how international heroin trafficking is at the root of the new wave of Taliban advances.
Ms. Peters is a journalist, not an ideologue, and uses her 10 years of experience on the ground in the region to walk readers through myriad ties between the Taliban, al Qaeda and the heroin trade that has allowed the resurgence and spread of a group that was on the verge of complete defeat by the end of 2001. Now they are knocking on the doors of the capital of nuclear state.
It is the best case study to date of the criminal-terrorist nexus that is still so often dismissed in intelligence and senior policy making circles.
The result is not a pretty picture, particularly of the corruption in the Karzai administration, the lack of real progress in dealing with the deep seated social issues and poverty and the overall attractiveness of the drug trade in such dire conditions.
At the same time, the Jamestown Foundation notes the Europol report on the growing connection between the Afghanistan/Pakistan region and the Islamist terrorist threat in Europe.
Indeed, as the report states, "Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have replaced Iraq as preferred destinations for volunteers wishing to engage in armed conflicts." These recruits pose a threat to European troops deployed in Afghanistan. Germany, for instance, is particularly worried about the presence of several of its citizens (most notably Eric Breininger) in the region who are allegedly plotting operations against German troops (see Terrorism Focus, January 28).
When fighters return – such as members of the Belgian cell, or members of the Sauerland cell in Germany – they pose a direct threat to European security. As expressed by U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, "the primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al-Qaeda and Sunni affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the United States."
The threat is not just that radical Islamists will take over a nuclear power (and there are signs that the majority of Pakistanis, who are finally understanding the brutality and retrograde nature of this interpretation of Islam) but that the successes in Pakistan and Afghanistan help build the jihadist narrative.
Just as the narrative of divine intervention was central to success of the jihadist efforts against the Soviet Union, the devastating military loss of the Taliban in 2001 offered a chance for a new narrative to be written.
Now, with success on the battlefield again, the jihadists will not thank Western drug consumers for their resurgence. Rather, they will again weave the story of Allah's blessing on the movement as a powerful recruitment tool in jihadi circles around the world.
The question is how to move at this late date. And no policy option offers anything like a silver bullet. Ms. Peters' book makes that clear, as well as clarifying how late in the game we really are.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH