Friday May 8, 2009
The Ongoing Repercussions of the Holy Land case on the U.S. Brotherhood Organizations
The Investigative Project brings news of the first clear official FBI explanation of why the Bureau has cut off its work with CAIR, the premier legacy Muslim Brotherhood organization in the United States.
In an April 28, 2009 letter to Sen. Jon Kyl a senior FBI official formally said what the FBI (and most other US government entities) have been so strangely reluctant to say:
In the Holy Land Foundation trial:
evidence was introduced that demonstrated a relationship among CAIR, individual CAIR founders (including its current President Emeritus and its Executive Director) and the Palestine Committee. Evidence was also introduced that demonstrated a relationship between the Palestine Committee and HAMAS, which was designated as a terrorist organization in 1995. In light of that evidence the FBI has suspended all formal contacts between CAIR and the FBI.
The FBI's decision to suspend formal contacts was not intended to reflect a wholesale judgment of the organization and its entire membership. Nevertheless, until we can resolve whether there continues to be a connection between CAIR or its executives and HAMAS, the FBI does not view CAIR as an appropriate liaison partner. [Emphasis added].
Well, finally!
Now, what about all the other MB legacy organizations that continue the charade of democratic participation and moderation? So far, nothing, which means that CAIR's role may diminish but the group of MB organizations (and it is a SMALL group that occupy all the leadership positions of the affiliated entities) will pick up the slack.
That is the way the front organizations were designed to function. Whack at one mole, and there are other holes and other moles that will instantly pop up.
There was another little-notice judicial victory this week in entities related to the MB: a federal appeals court upheld the legality of the 2002 raids on the web of Herndon properties, businesses and charities.
This is important because the Safa Group, as the cluster is called, has long sought to have the case thrown out on these very grounds. Perhaps this will be the end. Unfortunately, after seven years, no charges have been filed directly related to that cluster. However, as the article notes, the conviction of Abdurahman Alamoudi, once one of the most visible and influential leaders of the MB legacy organizations and other indictments have been forthcoming, based in part on those raids.
One of the reasons the judicial process has ground so slowly in this case is the constant legal wrangling that take months or years to resolve, before being able to move on to the next issue.
For example, Sami al-Arian, a former Florida professor who earlier pleaded guilty to aiding a terror organization, is now charged with refusing to testify before a federal grand jury in the Herndon probe. A federal judge has not ruled on a defense motion to dismiss those charges.
Until that ruling, much of the rest of the case is in limbo.
Still, there is some awakening to the nature of CAIR, and the judicial victories trickle in. Small victories, but important ones.
In an April 28, 2009 letter to Sen. Jon Kyl a senior FBI official formally said what the FBI (and most other US government entities) have been so strangely reluctant to say:
In the Holy Land Foundation trial:
evidence was introduced that demonstrated a relationship among CAIR, individual CAIR founders (including its current President Emeritus and its Executive Director) and the Palestine Committee. Evidence was also introduced that demonstrated a relationship between the Palestine Committee and HAMAS, which was designated as a terrorist organization in 1995. In light of that evidence the FBI has suspended all formal contacts between CAIR and the FBI.
The FBI's decision to suspend formal contacts was not intended to reflect a wholesale judgment of the organization and its entire membership. Nevertheless, until we can resolve whether there continues to be a connection between CAIR or its executives and HAMAS, the FBI does not view CAIR as an appropriate liaison partner. [Emphasis added].
Well, finally!
Now, what about all the other MB legacy organizations that continue the charade of democratic participation and moderation? So far, nothing, which means that CAIR's role may diminish but the group of MB organizations (and it is a SMALL group that occupy all the leadership positions of the affiliated entities) will pick up the slack.
That is the way the front organizations were designed to function. Whack at one mole, and there are other holes and other moles that will instantly pop up.
There was another little-notice judicial victory this week in entities related to the MB: a federal appeals court upheld the legality of the 2002 raids on the web of Herndon properties, businesses and charities.
This is important because the Safa Group, as the cluster is called, has long sought to have the case thrown out on these very grounds. Perhaps this will be the end. Unfortunately, after seven years, no charges have been filed directly related to that cluster. However, as the article notes, the conviction of Abdurahman Alamoudi, once one of the most visible and influential leaders of the MB legacy organizations and other indictments have been forthcoming, based in part on those raids.
One of the reasons the judicial process has ground so slowly in this case is the constant legal wrangling that take months or years to resolve, before being able to move on to the next issue.
For example, Sami al-Arian, a former Florida professor who earlier pleaded guilty to aiding a terror organization, is now charged with refusing to testify before a federal grand jury in the Herndon probe. A federal judge has not ruled on a defense motion to dismiss those charges.
Until that ruling, much of the rest of the case is in limbo.
Still, there is some awakening to the nature of CAIR, and the judicial victories trickle in. Small victories, but important ones.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday May 6, 2009
Ahmadinejad's Abrupt Cancellation of Latin American Trip
Iran's president Ahmadinejad has abruptly postponed his much heralded trip to Brazil, due this week, with neither side anxious to give any explanation.
Ahmadinejad has long tried to visit Brazil, and, until this most recent trip was finally accepted, had been politely rebuffed because of Iran's international pariah states and state sponsorship of terrorism, including attacks carried out in Latin America.
Brazil, Latin America's largest economy by far, and aspiring to be taken seriously as a major player on the world stage, could not be bothered.
When Ahmadinejad was visiting the neighborhood and wanting to drop by, Brazil's president Lula always found that he had no space in his very busy agenda to accomodate the request. But Lula had relented, given Iran's undeniable influence in the region. Until this sudden snafu.
It should be remembered that Brazil has explicitly refused to sell Venezuela nuclear technology because of Venezuela's insistence that Iran be involved in the technology transfer.
Lula has rebuffed Chavez and Iran in other small ways in the past, but seemed prepared for an exchange of state visits, given Iran's growing clout and the seeming inability of the United States or its allies to offer a viable strategy for containment.
The embrace of Ahmadinejad was drawing internal criticism even from Lula supporters. As the article notes, Acceptance by Lula, the leader of the Latin America’s biggest economy, puts Iran on a new diplomatic plane in the region.
"It’s a mistake and inappropriate," said Roberto Abdenur, who was Lula’s ambassador to Washington from 2004 to 2007. "What this man says and represents completely contradict what Brazil stands for, its commitment to peace and its repudiation of anti-Semitism."
It seems, my sources in the region say, that Lula, unlike his counterparts in Venezuela and Bolivia, actually has to pay attention to the electorate, because, unlike them, he is committed to stepping down at the end of his term and allowing free and fair elections to be held.
And many of his constituents are unhappy with the visit by a conservative, homophobic, anti-Semitic theocrat. Somehow that seems to clash with the values of tolerance, freedom and progress that Brazil prides itself on. Following protests in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo last week, Lula apparently pulled the plug.
So, the entourage of more than 100 ministers, businessmen and intelligence operatives decided to cancel the entire trip (which was to have included Venezuela-of course-and Ecuador).
It is hard to know if there is a larger message in this. Maybe the magic of Iran's endless but empty promises of large-scale investment and marketing opportunities are finally wearing thin. Maybe someone realized that they don't have to play with Iran if they find the leadership and its actions unsavory. Maybe Lula just realized it was added freight he did not have to carry.
Whatever it was, it was a setback for Iran in the region. And that is not a bad thing.
Ahmadinejad has long tried to visit Brazil, and, until this most recent trip was finally accepted, had been politely rebuffed because of Iran's international pariah states and state sponsorship of terrorism, including attacks carried out in Latin America.
Brazil, Latin America's largest economy by far, and aspiring to be taken seriously as a major player on the world stage, could not be bothered.
When Ahmadinejad was visiting the neighborhood and wanting to drop by, Brazil's president Lula always found that he had no space in his very busy agenda to accomodate the request. But Lula had relented, given Iran's undeniable influence in the region. Until this sudden snafu.
It should be remembered that Brazil has explicitly refused to sell Venezuela nuclear technology because of Venezuela's insistence that Iran be involved in the technology transfer.
Lula has rebuffed Chavez and Iran in other small ways in the past, but seemed prepared for an exchange of state visits, given Iran's growing clout and the seeming inability of the United States or its allies to offer a viable strategy for containment.
The embrace of Ahmadinejad was drawing internal criticism even from Lula supporters. As the article notes, Acceptance by Lula, the leader of the Latin America’s biggest economy, puts Iran on a new diplomatic plane in the region.
"It’s a mistake and inappropriate," said Roberto Abdenur, who was Lula’s ambassador to Washington from 2004 to 2007. "What this man says and represents completely contradict what Brazil stands for, its commitment to peace and its repudiation of anti-Semitism."
It seems, my sources in the region say, that Lula, unlike his counterparts in Venezuela and Bolivia, actually has to pay attention to the electorate, because, unlike them, he is committed to stepping down at the end of his term and allowing free and fair elections to be held.
And many of his constituents are unhappy with the visit by a conservative, homophobic, anti-Semitic theocrat. Somehow that seems to clash with the values of tolerance, freedom and progress that Brazil prides itself on. Following protests in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo last week, Lula apparently pulled the plug.
So, the entourage of more than 100 ministers, businessmen and intelligence operatives decided to cancel the entire trip (which was to have included Venezuela-of course-and Ecuador).
It is hard to know if there is a larger message in this. Maybe the magic of Iran's endless but empty promises of large-scale investment and marketing opportunities are finally wearing thin. Maybe someone realized that they don't have to play with Iran if they find the leadership and its actions unsavory. Maybe Lula just realized it was added freight he did not have to carry.
Whatever it was, it was a setback for Iran in the region. And that is not a bad thing.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday May 4, 2009
Gemstones and the Terrorist Financial Infrastructure
My CTB colleague Animesh Roul has just published an interesting piece on the Taliban's use of gemstones in its financial structure. This has been, as my other CTB colleague Dennis Lormel and I can both attest, from different points of view, a long time subject of debate in the IC and law enforcement communities.
What is striking about the piece is not just the Taliban's use of emeralds, but the use of gemstones going back many years, to the time of the initial jihad against the Soviets. Not only does the Taliban know how to mine, albeit at a rudimentary level, but it knows how to sell the stones on the market.
This is one of the reasons (and there are many, as Dennis and I have debated) I found the information on the use of diamonds credible was precisely that-the Taliban and radical Islamist groups had a long familiarity with the trade, and how to engage in it successfully. It was not something they were dabbling in with no prior experience or expertise.
One thing of significant importance (and which had not developed at the time of my reporting on diamonds and al Qaeda) is the emergence of both Dubai and Ras al Khaimah (two of the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates, one of only three governments to recognize the Taliban when it was in power the first time) as leading diamond markets and gemstone centers.
This means that Taliban and its friends and allies have a nearby, friendly market for their products, and a way to move them virtually undetected into the world market.
This is no small thing. Prior to this (circa 9/11) the diamonds had to be moved from West Africa to Brussels and, later, Lebanon, in order to be sold. That left more of a traceable trail, and involved intermediaries that were not entirely reliable. Those vulnerabilities are now lessened.
This, to me, one of the greatest dangers of the new world. Self-financing, non-state armed groups that control "honeypots" of resources that make them largely invulnerable to outside influences and pressures.
When a radicalized group becomes financially autonomous it is at is most dangerous. There are no levers of influence that can effectively be pulled. As I often mention in my talks, the Cold War spawned proxy wars, where the superpowers (U.S. and USSR) held considerable sway over the proxies. Why? Because if they did not behave, the superpowers could cut off their weapons, finances, ammunition, uniforms etc.
With the self-financing groups, there is no longer room for more pragmatic or other interests to prevail. The group can do whatever it can afford to pay for. That is the limitation on their actions.
As Roul points out, one of the main strengths of the Taliban in Pakistan (unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan) is that the Pakistani group has a reliable and diversified portfolio of income generating commodities and practices.
If the Taliban in Afghanistan were to lose its heroin/opium production or market (not likely, but it could be squeezed), the financial options, aside from donations from the outside world, would be limited.
But if one is able to exploit emeralds, timber, marble etc., as Roul documents, then the vulnerabilities to enforcement action are greatly lessened. Commodities are notoriously unregulated or under-regulated. Moving products there is one of the least costly and least risky ways of doing business. And the Taliban knows that.
What is striking about the piece is not just the Taliban's use of emeralds, but the use of gemstones going back many years, to the time of the initial jihad against the Soviets. Not only does the Taliban know how to mine, albeit at a rudimentary level, but it knows how to sell the stones on the market.
This is one of the reasons (and there are many, as Dennis and I have debated) I found the information on the use of diamonds credible was precisely that-the Taliban and radical Islamist groups had a long familiarity with the trade, and how to engage in it successfully. It was not something they were dabbling in with no prior experience or expertise.
One thing of significant importance (and which had not developed at the time of my reporting on diamonds and al Qaeda) is the emergence of both Dubai and Ras al Khaimah (two of the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates, one of only three governments to recognize the Taliban when it was in power the first time) as leading diamond markets and gemstone centers.
This means that Taliban and its friends and allies have a nearby, friendly market for their products, and a way to move them virtually undetected into the world market.
This is no small thing. Prior to this (circa 9/11) the diamonds had to be moved from West Africa to Brussels and, later, Lebanon, in order to be sold. That left more of a traceable trail, and involved intermediaries that were not entirely reliable. Those vulnerabilities are now lessened.
This, to me, one of the greatest dangers of the new world. Self-financing, non-state armed groups that control "honeypots" of resources that make them largely invulnerable to outside influences and pressures.
When a radicalized group becomes financially autonomous it is at is most dangerous. There are no levers of influence that can effectively be pulled. As I often mention in my talks, the Cold War spawned proxy wars, where the superpowers (U.S. and USSR) held considerable sway over the proxies. Why? Because if they did not behave, the superpowers could cut off their weapons, finances, ammunition, uniforms etc.
With the self-financing groups, there is no longer room for more pragmatic or other interests to prevail. The group can do whatever it can afford to pay for. That is the limitation on their actions.
As Roul points out, one of the main strengths of the Taliban in Pakistan (unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan) is that the Pakistani group has a reliable and diversified portfolio of income generating commodities and practices.
If the Taliban in Afghanistan were to lose its heroin/opium production or market (not likely, but it could be squeezed), the financial options, aside from donations from the outside world, would be limited.
But if one is able to exploit emeralds, timber, marble etc., as Roul documents, then the vulnerabilities to enforcement action are greatly lessened. Commodities are notoriously unregulated or under-regulated. Moving products there is one of the least costly and least risky ways of doing business. And the Taliban knows that.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday May 7, 2009
The Iran-Venezuela Military Relationship Rolls On
Two related items that should give the Obama administration pause as it seeks ways to engage Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and other countries in Venezuela's sphere of influence (Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador primarily).
The first is the new Memorandum of Understanding signed between the militaries of Venezuela and Iran. According to the official FARS News Agency, Iran's defense minister, in a visit to Caracas, "underlined Tehran's all-out efforts to help Venezuela promote its defense capabilities and bolster its power of deterrence through bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on military cooperation."
Chávez, for his part, stated that "The Bolivarian and the Islamic Revolutions have a lot in common and these commonalities have consolidated the two countries' bonds."
Stressing that Iran has a special place in Venezuela's foreign policy, Chavez referred to the two countries' armies, and underlined that armed forces of the two countries should be reinforced in a bid to help strengthen sustainable security.
Secretary of State Clinton, as the Washington Post recently noted, has been talking about improving relations with Venezuela while remaining studiously silent on Chávez's increasingly bold attacks on the legitimate opposition (something Bolivia's Evo Morales is imitating).
It should be quite clear that Chávez values the ties to Iran far more than he does potential ties to Washington, and the recent MOU with Iran makes that clear.
At the same time, 17 people were arrested in the small Caribbean island (and Dutch territory) of Curacao on charges of transporting several tons of cocaine and sending some of the money to Hezbollah.
"We have been able to establish that this group has relations with international criminal organizations that have connections with the Hezbollah," prosecutor Ludmila Vicento said.
Island officials said the US and the Netherlands are helping them to investigate the alleged Hezbollah connection.
Two shipments of cocaine totaling 2,000 kilograms (4,400 pounds) have been seized from the ring in Curacao since the beginning of last year. The traffickers used cargo ships and speed boats to import the drugs from Colombia and Venezuela for shipment to Africa and beyond to Europe, according to Curacao authorities.
Since Venezuela has become a no-go zone for virtually any type of international counter-narcotics efforts and seems to tolerate a great deal of cocaine traffic to Africa, one has wonder how this all ties together. This AFP story provides more details from the Dutch investigators.
"The group shipped containers with cocaine from Curacao to the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Jordan," it said. "From Venezuela, containers with drugs went to West Africa and then to the Netherlands, Lebanon and Spain. Carriers smuggled the cocaine as airline passengers from Curacao and Aruba into the Netherlands."
The proceeds were allegedly invested in several countries, said the statement. "The organisation had international contacts with other criminal networks that financially supported Hezbollah in the Middle East. Large sums of drug money flooded into Lebanon, from where orders were placed for weapons that were to have been delivered from South America."
Since Venezuela's blooming relationship with Iran has grown closer, the amount of cocaine coming through Venezuela has skyrocketed and the documented cases of Hezbollah activities have soared. It is hard to imagine, as many seem to, that this is all some big, unhappy coincidence.
The military relationship will bring with it a formal role for the Quds Force, which will bring in greater cover for Hezbollah's activities. Weaning Venezuela away from Iran by being nice to Chávez, as Secretary Clinton proposes, is neither realistic nor wise.
The first is the new Memorandum of Understanding signed between the militaries of Venezuela and Iran. According to the official FARS News Agency, Iran's defense minister, in a visit to Caracas, "underlined Tehran's all-out efforts to help Venezuela promote its defense capabilities and bolster its power of deterrence through bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on military cooperation."
Chávez, for his part, stated that "The Bolivarian and the Islamic Revolutions have a lot in common and these commonalities have consolidated the two countries' bonds."
Stressing that Iran has a special place in Venezuela's foreign policy, Chavez referred to the two countries' armies, and underlined that armed forces of the two countries should be reinforced in a bid to help strengthen sustainable security.
Secretary of State Clinton, as the Washington Post recently noted, has been talking about improving relations with Venezuela while remaining studiously silent on Chávez's increasingly bold attacks on the legitimate opposition (something Bolivia's Evo Morales is imitating).
It should be quite clear that Chávez values the ties to Iran far more than he does potential ties to Washington, and the recent MOU with Iran makes that clear.
At the same time, 17 people were arrested in the small Caribbean island (and Dutch territory) of Curacao on charges of transporting several tons of cocaine and sending some of the money to Hezbollah.
"We have been able to establish that this group has relations with international criminal organizations that have connections with the Hezbollah," prosecutor Ludmila Vicento said.
Island officials said the US and the Netherlands are helping them to investigate the alleged Hezbollah connection.
Two shipments of cocaine totaling 2,000 kilograms (4,400 pounds) have been seized from the ring in Curacao since the beginning of last year. The traffickers used cargo ships and speed boats to import the drugs from Colombia and Venezuela for shipment to Africa and beyond to Europe, according to Curacao authorities.
Since Venezuela has become a no-go zone for virtually any type of international counter-narcotics efforts and seems to tolerate a great deal of cocaine traffic to Africa, one has wonder how this all ties together. This AFP story provides more details from the Dutch investigators.
"The group shipped containers with cocaine from Curacao to the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Jordan," it said. "From Venezuela, containers with drugs went to West Africa and then to the Netherlands, Lebanon and Spain. Carriers smuggled the cocaine as airline passengers from Curacao and Aruba into the Netherlands."
The proceeds were allegedly invested in several countries, said the statement. "The organisation had international contacts with other criminal networks that financially supported Hezbollah in the Middle East. Large sums of drug money flooded into Lebanon, from where orders were placed for weapons that were to have been delivered from South America."
Since Venezuela's blooming relationship with Iran has grown closer, the amount of cocaine coming through Venezuela has skyrocketed and the documented cases of Hezbollah activities have soared. It is hard to imagine, as many seem to, that this is all some big, unhappy coincidence.
The military relationship will bring with it a formal role for the Quds Force, which will bring in greater cover for Hezbollah's activities. Weaning Venezuela away from Iran by being nice to Chávez, as Secretary Clinton proposes, is neither realistic nor wise.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday April 28, 2009
The Islamist Move Toward East Africa
On of the most important parts of the growth of al Qaeda related groups or other armed and like-minded organizations, is the transfer of knowledge and technologies. It is something at which al Qaeda has excelled, both in the transfer of "lessons learned" in fighting U.S. and European troops, and in adapting and sharing what works. This is true with the IEDs, suicide bombing technology and other areas.
So the Associated Press story on the move to transfer technology from the Pakistani border regions to Africa is worrisome, particularly given the ties that already exist with the al Shaab movements and al Qaeda's infrastructure in Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa.
Africom, struggling to find a home and a mission that is viable in the region, is handicapped by a severe lack of intelligence resources on the ground.
The cluster of militants now believed to be operating inside East Africa could pass on sophisticated training and attack techniques gleaned from seven years at war against the U.S. and allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. officials said.
"There is a level of activity that is troubling, disturbing," Gen. William "Kip" Ward, head of U.S. Africa Command, told The Associated Press. "When you have these vast spaces that are just not governed it provides a haven for support activities, for training to occur."
I personally don't like the use of ungoverned spaces as a definition of areas where the state is not present. Almost all of those spaces are, in fact governed, just not by state actors that we recognize. But the pirate clans certainly govern some parts of the Somali coast, al Shaabab other parts, and the fragile government a few others.
But the point is correct. The groups need safe spaces in which to train, teach and practice. Those with years of experience in Afghanistan know not only certain types of technology, but how US forces operate, what the vulnerabilities are and what the strengths are. They know security arrangements for high-value targets, and they know how to penetrate many of those perimeters.
This is invaluable knowledge for future confrontations, and the expectation they will be meeting US troops and other foreign, infidel forces along the way. It also helps transmit the most lethal and successful tactics in an area like Somalia where internet access is far more limited than much of the rest of the world.
So the training is valuable and likely will improve the operational capabilities of the different militant groups in Somalia and elsewhere in East Africa. Already, as the story notes, there are signs of increasing sophistication, particularly in the use of simultaneous suicide bombings, one of the al Qaeda signature methodologies.
It is likely also a highly valuable motivational tool. There is no disputing the Taliban in Pakistan, and the Taliban and its Arab fighter allies in Afghanistan have made significant strides.
In the narrative of their struggle (largely a cosmic struggle between good and evil played out on earth), such advances are vital to validating the central thesis that Allah is on the move and success will be his through his jihadists on earth.
This affords an opportunity not only to add to the narrative, but to shape the theology of a group where many members have shallower theological roots than the Afghan fighters.
This is fundamental in the long-term motivation and retention of the fighters, many who join initially for economic reasons rather than religious belief. The challenge is keeping them engaged in cosmic war for ends other than material gain, and narrative is the way to maximize that potential.
So the Associated Press story on the move to transfer technology from the Pakistani border regions to Africa is worrisome, particularly given the ties that already exist with the al Shaab movements and al Qaeda's infrastructure in Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa.
Africom, struggling to find a home and a mission that is viable in the region, is handicapped by a severe lack of intelligence resources on the ground.
The cluster of militants now believed to be operating inside East Africa could pass on sophisticated training and attack techniques gleaned from seven years at war against the U.S. and allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. officials said.
"There is a level of activity that is troubling, disturbing," Gen. William "Kip" Ward, head of U.S. Africa Command, told The Associated Press. "When you have these vast spaces that are just not governed it provides a haven for support activities, for training to occur."
I personally don't like the use of ungoverned spaces as a definition of areas where the state is not present. Almost all of those spaces are, in fact governed, just not by state actors that we recognize. But the pirate clans certainly govern some parts of the Somali coast, al Shaabab other parts, and the fragile government a few others.
But the point is correct. The groups need safe spaces in which to train, teach and practice. Those with years of experience in Afghanistan know not only certain types of technology, but how US forces operate, what the vulnerabilities are and what the strengths are. They know security arrangements for high-value targets, and they know how to penetrate many of those perimeters.
This is invaluable knowledge for future confrontations, and the expectation they will be meeting US troops and other foreign, infidel forces along the way. It also helps transmit the most lethal and successful tactics in an area like Somalia where internet access is far more limited than much of the rest of the world.
So the training is valuable and likely will improve the operational capabilities of the different militant groups in Somalia and elsewhere in East Africa. Already, as the story notes, there are signs of increasing sophistication, particularly in the use of simultaneous suicide bombings, one of the al Qaeda signature methodologies.
It is likely also a highly valuable motivational tool. There is no disputing the Taliban in Pakistan, and the Taliban and its Arab fighter allies in Afghanistan have made significant strides.
In the narrative of their struggle (largely a cosmic struggle between good and evil played out on earth), such advances are vital to validating the central thesis that Allah is on the move and success will be his through his jihadists on earth.
This affords an opportunity not only to add to the narrative, but to shape the theology of a group where many members have shallower theological roots than the Afghan fighters.
This is fundamental in the long-term motivation and retention of the fighters, many who join initially for economic reasons rather than religious belief. The challenge is keeping them engaged in cosmic war for ends other than material gain, and narrative is the way to maximize that potential.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH