Thursday February 12, 2009
Congress Moves to Keep the Pressure on for Bout's Extradition
A large, bipartisan group of Congressmen, led by Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) is seeking to insure the the extradition of Viktor "Merchant of Death" Bout from Thailand remains a high priority for the incoming administration.
In a letter to new AG Holder and Secretary of State Clinton signed by 27 House members, the group asked that Bout's extradition "remain a top priority for your departments and the United States government."
Bout was arrested in Bangkok in March 2008 in an elaborate sting operation set up by the DEA. Bout left his safe haven in Moscow to sell large quantities of sophisticated weapons to a group he thought represented the FARC of Colombia, a designated terrorist organization and one of the largest drug trafficking entities in the world. The undercover agents made it clear they wanted weapons that could be used to target U.S. personnel and radar installations, something Bout eagerly agreed to.
Bout, who armed the FARC before, as well as the Taliban, Libya and a host of unsavory warlords and thugs in Africa, has been held in Thailand for almost a year as his extradition case wends its way through Thai courts. A preliminary hearing is expected in early March. He is the prototype of the facilitator that crosses among the worlds of terrorists, organized criminals and criminal states, procuring whatever they need for a price.
The Russian government, through public and private means, have been working overtime to insure its favorite weapons dealer-who often in recent years operated under Russian government protection-is not extradited, but gets a free pass back to Moscow. A lot of Russian money of unknown origin has been sprinkled through the Thai judicial system-to the tune of several million dollars-in an effort to persuade the Thai authorities to let the case go away.
As the Congressional letter noted, "reports suggesting the Russian government is attempting to negatively influence this process only heighten our concern. Indeed, the Russian Duma recently passed a resolution calling for Bout to be returned to Russia."
As Mr. Bout's actions have threatened the security of many countries and regions and destroyed the lives of thousands of innocent individuals, the United States Congress is following his case closely, the letter noted.
Let's hope the Thais, mired in their own political chaos, do the right thing.
In a letter to new AG Holder and Secretary of State Clinton signed by 27 House members, the group asked that Bout's extradition "remain a top priority for your departments and the United States government."
Bout was arrested in Bangkok in March 2008 in an elaborate sting operation set up by the DEA. Bout left his safe haven in Moscow to sell large quantities of sophisticated weapons to a group he thought represented the FARC of Colombia, a designated terrorist organization and one of the largest drug trafficking entities in the world. The undercover agents made it clear they wanted weapons that could be used to target U.S. personnel and radar installations, something Bout eagerly agreed to.
Bout, who armed the FARC before, as well as the Taliban, Libya and a host of unsavory warlords and thugs in Africa, has been held in Thailand for almost a year as his extradition case wends its way through Thai courts. A preliminary hearing is expected in early March. He is the prototype of the facilitator that crosses among the worlds of terrorists, organized criminals and criminal states, procuring whatever they need for a price.
The Russian government, through public and private means, have been working overtime to insure its favorite weapons dealer-who often in recent years operated under Russian government protection-is not extradited, but gets a free pass back to Moscow. A lot of Russian money of unknown origin has been sprinkled through the Thai judicial system-to the tune of several million dollars-in an effort to persuade the Thai authorities to let the case go away.
As the Congressional letter noted, "reports suggesting the Russian government is attempting to negatively influence this process only heighten our concern. Indeed, the Russian Duma recently passed a resolution calling for Bout to be returned to Russia."
As Mr. Bout's actions have threatened the security of many countries and regions and destroyed the lives of thousands of innocent individuals, the United States Congress is following his case closely, the letter noted.
Let's hope the Thais, mired in their own political chaos, do the right thing.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 11, 2009
Encircling Kabul, Taliban Gaining Ground
Today's coordinated Taliban attacks inside Kabul, and the length of time it took to eliminate the perpetrators, is an important indication of two things: the growing strength of the Taliban, and the rapid decay of the Karzai government.
It is no secret that the rampant corruption, tolerance for many years now of abusive (and extremist) warlord governors and lack of focus by the outside world have worn out the civilian population and convinced many that democracy holds few benefits.
The Taliban, in response, has been following two tracks: using drug money to recreate themselves from a defeated force immediately after 9/11 to a force controlling much of the country-and now able to carry out attacks in the heart of the capital, the last government stronghold; and spreading terror among the population, knowing the government cannot protect them.
The attacks are important for several reasons: it shows the Taliban has good intelligence within Kabul, as well as an infrastructure of safe houses and access routes for combatants. It shows the ability to select specific targets and coordinate several different groups.
By targeting the Justice ministry, the Education ministry and prisons, the Taliban have shown their priorities. Anything resembling a modern educational system is an anathema, particularly the education of women or girls. If the justice system remains crippled, there is no hope of building a system under the rule of law. And the jails house Taliban combatants that are valuable when let free.
Those of us who have lived through serious guerrilla offensives in nation's capitals (mine was San Salvador 1989) know the huge psychological impact these types of attacks have. They both demoralize the government and citizens, while reinforcing the insurgent's view that they are on the cusp of victory.
The third element, which the Obama administration is clearly wrestling with, is the fact that the Taliban is not an Afghan force, but a multi-national force that enjoys extraterritorial support from neighboring states. Any study of insurgencies and counterinsurgency shows the vital role these types of extraterritorial state support are to an insurgency's success.
One cannot pretend Pakistan is not a major player, or that the border itself is not a major area of concern. The traditional notions of sovereignty, which states embrace, have little or no meaning for non-state actors except as tools to use for their cause. Pakistan offers refuge and resupply lines. Other border areas offer access to drug pipelines, and still others offer access to the weapons supply chains.
The Taliban cannot be understood as a single actor acting within a single state. It is multi-level actor, with criminal, political and religious aspects, all of reach far beyond the borders of Afghanistan.
Karzai has allowed corruption to the highest levels. Nothing makes a government less defensible by its own people than betraying so completely the trust of a desperate population already brutalized by years of war. It may be too late to save it from itself.
It is no secret that the rampant corruption, tolerance for many years now of abusive (and extremist) warlord governors and lack of focus by the outside world have worn out the civilian population and convinced many that democracy holds few benefits.
The Taliban, in response, has been following two tracks: using drug money to recreate themselves from a defeated force immediately after 9/11 to a force controlling much of the country-and now able to carry out attacks in the heart of the capital, the last government stronghold; and spreading terror among the population, knowing the government cannot protect them.
The attacks are important for several reasons: it shows the Taliban has good intelligence within Kabul, as well as an infrastructure of safe houses and access routes for combatants. It shows the ability to select specific targets and coordinate several different groups.
By targeting the Justice ministry, the Education ministry and prisons, the Taliban have shown their priorities. Anything resembling a modern educational system is an anathema, particularly the education of women or girls. If the justice system remains crippled, there is no hope of building a system under the rule of law. And the jails house Taliban combatants that are valuable when let free.
Those of us who have lived through serious guerrilla offensives in nation's capitals (mine was San Salvador 1989) know the huge psychological impact these types of attacks have. They both demoralize the government and citizens, while reinforcing the insurgent's view that they are on the cusp of victory.
The third element, which the Obama administration is clearly wrestling with, is the fact that the Taliban is not an Afghan force, but a multi-national force that enjoys extraterritorial support from neighboring states. Any study of insurgencies and counterinsurgency shows the vital role these types of extraterritorial state support are to an insurgency's success.
One cannot pretend Pakistan is not a major player, or that the border itself is not a major area of concern. The traditional notions of sovereignty, which states embrace, have little or no meaning for non-state actors except as tools to use for their cause. Pakistan offers refuge and resupply lines. Other border areas offer access to drug pipelines, and still others offer access to the weapons supply chains.
The Taliban cannot be understood as a single actor acting within a single state. It is multi-level actor, with criminal, political and religious aspects, all of reach far beyond the borders of Afghanistan.
Karzai has allowed corruption to the highest levels. Nothing makes a government less defensible by its own people than betraying so completely the trust of a desperate population already brutalized by years of war. It may be too late to save it from itself.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday February 13, 2009
Counterintelligence Still Secondary as Our Secrets Are Taken
A vitally important description of one of the nation's vulnerabilities-the failure of counterintelligence- was buried in the Washington Post's Outlook section yesterday. It is worth revisiting.
The author, Michelle Van Cleave, headed the Bush administration's first congressionally mandated national counterintelligence executive, a vital mission, she writes that today, "is on life support."
It is a problem that spans the recent administrations, and one the Obama administration should address forcefully as it looks to reshape the intelligence community. The litany of reasons for the current situation, however, are familiar, including:
-lack of centralized thinking and action on the issue
-stovepiping of information
-lack of coherent policy
The lack of attention is borne out by the fact that Van Cleave was the FIRST national head of counterintelligence, appointed only in 2003.
Counterintelligence has to have true national leadership, and is too important to be left to the hodgepodge of agencies that currently carry out bits and pieces of the policy.
Why? As Van Cleave correctly notes, the Chinese have managed to steal EVERY nuclear weapons design the U.S. has, allowing them not only to leapfrog generations and billions of dollars in development, but also to identify every vulnerability in the current systems.
Russia no longer needs to rely solely on KGB thugs to carry out much of its espionage. It simply carries out the best business intelligence gathering operations through front companies, and hires lobbyists to collect other information of interest.
Most tellingly, the Islamist world is heavily invested in the United States through shell corporations and the governments that host and sponsor terrorists, from Hezbollah and al Qaeda.
As Van Cleave wrote:
But in America today, there are thousands of foreign-owned commercial establishments, hundreds of thousands of exchange students and visiting academicians, and countless routine trade and financial interactions. Hidden beneath these open and legitimate activities can be darker purposes. With our open, rich society as cover, intelligence officers and their agents can move about freely, develop contacts and operate in the shadows -- a point no more lost on foreign spies than it was on the 19 hijackers that September morning in 2001.
This is dangerous on many levels. The fact is that our counterintelligence is not close to where it should be. Some of the best counterintelligence is carried out by private firms protecting themselves in the absence of government capabilities, and the public and private sector will have to work together to make any significant dent.
But first the problem has to be acknowledged and defined. Only then can the new administration begin to take remedial action.
The author, Michelle Van Cleave, headed the Bush administration's first congressionally mandated national counterintelligence executive, a vital mission, she writes that today, "is on life support."
It is a problem that spans the recent administrations, and one the Obama administration should address forcefully as it looks to reshape the intelligence community. The litany of reasons for the current situation, however, are familiar, including:
-lack of centralized thinking and action on the issue
-stovepiping of information
-lack of coherent policy
The lack of attention is borne out by the fact that Van Cleave was the FIRST national head of counterintelligence, appointed only in 2003.
Counterintelligence has to have true national leadership, and is too important to be left to the hodgepodge of agencies that currently carry out bits and pieces of the policy.
Why? As Van Cleave correctly notes, the Chinese have managed to steal EVERY nuclear weapons design the U.S. has, allowing them not only to leapfrog generations and billions of dollars in development, but also to identify every vulnerability in the current systems.
Russia no longer needs to rely solely on KGB thugs to carry out much of its espionage. It simply carries out the best business intelligence gathering operations through front companies, and hires lobbyists to collect other information of interest.
Most tellingly, the Islamist world is heavily invested in the United States through shell corporations and the governments that host and sponsor terrorists, from Hezbollah and al Qaeda.
As Van Cleave wrote:
But in America today, there are thousands of foreign-owned commercial establishments, hundreds of thousands of exchange students and visiting academicians, and countless routine trade and financial interactions. Hidden beneath these open and legitimate activities can be darker purposes. With our open, rich society as cover, intelligence officers and their agents can move about freely, develop contacts and operate in the shadows -- a point no more lost on foreign spies than it was on the 19 hijackers that September morning in 2001.
This is dangerous on many levels. The fact is that our counterintelligence is not close to where it should be. Some of the best counterintelligence is carried out by private firms protecting themselves in the absence of government capabilities, and the public and private sector will have to work together to make any significant dent.
But first the problem has to be acknowledged and defined. Only then can the new administration begin to take remedial action.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 4, 2009
Afghanistan Gets Harder and Harder
The prospect of building a successful strategy in Afghanistan is getting more and more complicated. The government of Kyrgyzstan is going to close a key resupply center, the Manas Air base-largely, it seems, at the instigation of the Russians. (Guess whose side Russia is on?)
The broad policy reassessment underway seems to point to retreat on governance issues and an emphasis on the military hunt for the Taliban.
Obama said Tuesday night in an interview with NBC News' Brian Williams that there is already "convergence between myself and the Joint Chiefs and my national security team about what we have to do." Obama added that "there's a shared view that Afghanistan is getting worse, not getting better."
"Afghanistan is really hard," Obama told NBC. "And we're going to have to bring all the elements of American power to bear in order to solve the problems."
The Joint Chiefs' plan reflects growing worries that the U.S. military was taking on more than it could handle in Afghanistan by pursuing the Bush administration's broad goal of nurturing a thriving democratic government.
This could be recognition of reality-we do not have the time and resources to do a multi-pronged approach.
But it would be shortsighted, because the Karzai government as made such a hash of things through its tolerance of and participation in mass corruption and abuse. The Taliban, my sources there say, is not popular at all. But the situation is bad enough that they are actually viewed as the lesser of the two evils available to govern. And that is damning indeed.
Plans to roll out U.S.-armed tribal militias also appears to be foundering, with little popular support. The one indication it is a good idea is that the Taliban seem to be so opposed to it.
It is clear, as my colleague Daveed Gartenstein-Ross noted that the groups would depend on strong leadership, perceived to be fair and non-abusive to the local population, not on a leadership picked by the outside world. For much of the time since 2001 the U.S. has gone along with Karzai's decision to appoint some of the country's worst thugs and warlords as leaders around the country, feeding the cycle of violence.
And the Swat Valley in Pakistan remains in Taliban hands despite Pakistani government efforts to retake the region.
Swat is not the tribal backlands.
Until two years ago, Swat was a jewel in the crown of Pakistani tourism, frequented by foreign and local holiday-makers escaping to the mountains for skiing in winter or more refreshing climes in the punishing heat of summer.
But the area descended into chaos in mid-2007 after radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah embarked on a terrifying campaign to enforce a Taliban-style Sharia law, prompting thousands of people to flee.
With all the other things going on in the world and all the resource demands that exist, it is not at all clear the new administration will have the time and focus to deal with the situation, which is in a downward spiral.
But one thing is clear. If we don't get Afghanistan (and Pakistan) right, we will pay a heavy price, although not as heavy as the Afghan people.
The broad policy reassessment underway seems to point to retreat on governance issues and an emphasis on the military hunt for the Taliban.
Obama said Tuesday night in an interview with NBC News' Brian Williams that there is already "convergence between myself and the Joint Chiefs and my national security team about what we have to do." Obama added that "there's a shared view that Afghanistan is getting worse, not getting better."
"Afghanistan is really hard," Obama told NBC. "And we're going to have to bring all the elements of American power to bear in order to solve the problems."
The Joint Chiefs' plan reflects growing worries that the U.S. military was taking on more than it could handle in Afghanistan by pursuing the Bush administration's broad goal of nurturing a thriving democratic government.
This could be recognition of reality-we do not have the time and resources to do a multi-pronged approach.
But it would be shortsighted, because the Karzai government as made such a hash of things through its tolerance of and participation in mass corruption and abuse. The Taliban, my sources there say, is not popular at all. But the situation is bad enough that they are actually viewed as the lesser of the two evils available to govern. And that is damning indeed.
Plans to roll out U.S.-armed tribal militias also appears to be foundering, with little popular support. The one indication it is a good idea is that the Taliban seem to be so opposed to it.
It is clear, as my colleague Daveed Gartenstein-Ross noted that the groups would depend on strong leadership, perceived to be fair and non-abusive to the local population, not on a leadership picked by the outside world. For much of the time since 2001 the U.S. has gone along with Karzai's decision to appoint some of the country's worst thugs and warlords as leaders around the country, feeding the cycle of violence.
And the Swat Valley in Pakistan remains in Taliban hands despite Pakistani government efforts to retake the region.
Swat is not the tribal backlands.
Until two years ago, Swat was a jewel in the crown of Pakistani tourism, frequented by foreign and local holiday-makers escaping to the mountains for skiing in winter or more refreshing climes in the punishing heat of summer.
But the area descended into chaos in mid-2007 after radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah embarked on a terrifying campaign to enforce a Taliban-style Sharia law, prompting thousands of people to flee.
With all the other things going on in the world and all the resource demands that exist, it is not at all clear the new administration will have the time and focus to deal with the situation, which is in a downward spiral.
But one thing is clear. If we don't get Afghanistan (and Pakistan) right, we will pay a heavy price, although not as heavy as the Afghan people.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday February 5, 2009
Understanding the Islamist Agenda and Negotiations
There are many good reasons for wanting to talk directly to one's enemies, particularly states that pose a direct threat to one's security. The Obama administration, facing a host of domestic problems and inheriting the ineffective policies of the previous administration in dealing with Iran's nuclear program, has incentives to want to get the Iran issue contained, at a minimum.
The same can be said for the Afghanistan crisis, which is lurching from bad to worse. The Taliban, flush with opium money, is making inroads while the corrupt and ineffective government fiddles, and Kabul is close to burning.
But one has to be clear that the other side wants some sort of serious back and forth. This is what is missing in both cases.
One must start from a recognition of what it is Iran wants: the abolition of Israel, the unimpeded sponsorship of armed non-state actors (Hezbollah and Hamas, with the dalliance with al Qaeda when convenient), and imposition of a global theocracy. None of these issues is negotiable.
From this Wall Street Journal piece, it is quite clear that Iran sees nothing to be gained by talks, and much to be gained by trying to humiliate the incoming administration. Perhaps they are simply recognizing the reality that their basic goals leave little room for substantive negotiations.
It seems to me that Fareed Zakaria makes serious mistake in his assessment of Afghanistan policy in calling for talks with the Taliban.
This is largely for the same reason: the lack of a understanding of what the Taliban want and what they are.
Like the Iranians (yes, the Taliban is Sunni and wahhabist, and yes the Iranians are Shi'ite and they have much disdain for each other on many issues) the Taliban has as its bottom line the establishment of a global Islamist caliphate that starts in Afghanistan and from there, the world.
The differences with al Qaeda are cultural clashes and discomfort with the way the Arab forces treat the Taliban, but not over fundamental beliefs, tactics or strategy. A world under Sharia law, as understood by both groups, is a divine mandate and therefore not negotiable.
Zakaria writes that:
The United States is properly and unalterably
opposed to al-Qaeda. We have significant differences with the Taliban on many issues -- democracy and the treatment of women being the most serious. But we do not wage war on other Islamist groups with which we similarly disagree (the Saudi monarchy, for example). Were elements of the Taliban to abandon al-Qaeda, we would not have a pressing national security interest in waging war against them.
That is simply not true. As he notes later, al Qaeda (the old guard, perhaps less relevant than ever) is essentially a parasite, living off host groups and nations. But in the case of the Taliban, the host has welcomed the parasite, fed it, clothed it, protected it and embraced it.
The idea that the Taliban would, in a verifiable way, renounce and cut ties to al Qaeda, is simply not realistic. The idea that we should stand by and deal with-and likely assure the ascent to power of-a group whose basic philosophy is to return everything they can back to the Middle Ages is an abandonment of everything we claim to stand for. The fact that we tolerate Saudi Arabia's abysmal behavior is no reason to watch another country fall under the worst kind of enslavement and barbarism.
Finally, the line about having no pressing national security interest in the Taliban repeats exactly the misguided analysis that led the Taliban to facilitate the execution of the 9/11 attacks. Every major attack (1998 East Africa bombings, USS Cole, 9/11) were carried out by non-state actors (al Qaeda) operating from a "failed" state or sympathetic state (Taliban and Sudan).
Dialogue is a useful, vital tool in international relations. But it is only useful when the bottom lines of both sides are understood and the areas of overlap can be discussed. Otherwise, it is a waste of precious time and resources.
The same can be said for the Afghanistan crisis, which is lurching from bad to worse. The Taliban, flush with opium money, is making inroads while the corrupt and ineffective government fiddles, and Kabul is close to burning.
But one has to be clear that the other side wants some sort of serious back and forth. This is what is missing in both cases.
One must start from a recognition of what it is Iran wants: the abolition of Israel, the unimpeded sponsorship of armed non-state actors (Hezbollah and Hamas, with the dalliance with al Qaeda when convenient), and imposition of a global theocracy. None of these issues is negotiable.
From this Wall Street Journal piece, it is quite clear that Iran sees nothing to be gained by talks, and much to be gained by trying to humiliate the incoming administration. Perhaps they are simply recognizing the reality that their basic goals leave little room for substantive negotiations.
It seems to me that Fareed Zakaria makes serious mistake in his assessment of Afghanistan policy in calling for talks with the Taliban.
This is largely for the same reason: the lack of a understanding of what the Taliban want and what they are.
Like the Iranians (yes, the Taliban is Sunni and wahhabist, and yes the Iranians are Shi'ite and they have much disdain for each other on many issues) the Taliban has as its bottom line the establishment of a global Islamist caliphate that starts in Afghanistan and from there, the world.
The differences with al Qaeda are cultural clashes and discomfort with the way the Arab forces treat the Taliban, but not over fundamental beliefs, tactics or strategy. A world under Sharia law, as understood by both groups, is a divine mandate and therefore not negotiable.
Zakaria writes that:
The United States is properly and unalterably
opposed to al-Qaeda. We have significant differences with the Taliban on many issues -- democracy and the treatment of women being the most serious. But we do not wage war on other Islamist groups with which we similarly disagree (the Saudi monarchy, for example). Were elements of the Taliban to abandon al-Qaeda, we would not have a pressing national security interest in waging war against them.
That is simply not true. As he notes later, al Qaeda (the old guard, perhaps less relevant than ever) is essentially a parasite, living off host groups and nations. But in the case of the Taliban, the host has welcomed the parasite, fed it, clothed it, protected it and embraced it.
The idea that the Taliban would, in a verifiable way, renounce and cut ties to al Qaeda, is simply not realistic. The idea that we should stand by and deal with-and likely assure the ascent to power of-a group whose basic philosophy is to return everything they can back to the Middle Ages is an abandonment of everything we claim to stand for. The fact that we tolerate Saudi Arabia's abysmal behavior is no reason to watch another country fall under the worst kind of enslavement and barbarism.
Finally, the line about having no pressing national security interest in the Taliban repeats exactly the misguided analysis that led the Taliban to facilitate the execution of the 9/11 attacks. Every major attack (1998 East Africa bombings, USS Cole, 9/11) were carried out by non-state actors (al Qaeda) operating from a "failed" state or sympathetic state (Taliban and Sudan).
Dialogue is a useful, vital tool in international relations. But it is only useful when the bottom lines of both sides are understood and the areas of overlap can be discussed. Otherwise, it is a waste of precious time and resources.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH