Thursday February 5, 2009
The Importance of the FBI's CAIR Cut Off
Mary Jacoby of The Investigative Project brings the important news that the FBI, after years of legitimizing CAIR as a mainstream Muslim organization, has finally cut of their dealings with the organization.
This is the first time a part of the government has publicly linked the presence of CAIR in meetings to the government entity's refusal to attend the meeting. This stand is long overdue, and one that should be followed by other government agencies. The FBI has said it won't deal with CAIR until "certain issues" are addressed to the FBI's satisfaction, and must be addressed by the national FBI, not local field offices.
Why? Because CAIR, as has now been amply documented, was formed to support Hamas and has organic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Holy Land Foundation documents show this clearly. (For a look at how the package ties together from what is now public evidence, see this NEFA Foundation piece I co-authored.
It is worth recalling how CAIR came into existence, is historical relationships, and what its group of organizations actually said, in their own words, about what they are doing here. These are some of the issues the FBI wisely would like explained by the CAIR leadership. The full citations can be found in the NEFA paper.
It is important to note that the authenticity of the documents and their content were not disputed during the trial, but were accepted as legitimate. This should be borne in mind as CAIR and its allies launch an intensive lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to get rehabilitated.
Rather than actually address any of these issues, it is a fair bet that CAIR will focus on claims that the FBI action is a result of "islamophobia," "intolerance," and present themselves as victims of a campaign to deprive them of civil rights. They should not be allowed to get away with less than a full explanation of their own actions and words.
CAIR does not speak for all Muslims in this country, or even most. Its membership has plummeted in recent years and it thrives because of is access to the FBI and other government institutions.
First, the MB is not al Qaeda, but it is Hamas, and Hamas is the MB. Article 2 of the Hamas founding charter:
"The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep
understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and
conversion to Islam."
The parent organization of CAIR advocated internally for the use of front groups:
"[Fronts groups are] one method to communicate the Ikhwan’s point of view. A front is not formed until after a study and after an exhaustive study. I mean, the last front formed by the Group is the Islamic Association for Palestine. So, Ikhwans, this did not come out
over night, or it was not the Ikhwnans who are in charge went to sleep, dreamed about it and met the next day and decided to do it. Not at all, by God. This went through lengthy meetings and took long discussions."
And, most damagingly, the HLF trial documents show the Muslim Brotherhood agenda in this country to be something other than simple co-existence and integration into society.
In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the live of its
society and has firmly established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as
a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and – on top of them – the Muslim Brotherhood in this country…
Then, the heart of the matter:
The process of settlement is a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up
to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal."
As for the role of the Ikhwan, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims’ efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a
mastery of the art of "coalitions", the art of "absorption" and the principles of "cooperation"
I hope the FBI and other parts of the government stand firm in their rejection of CAIR as a valid interlocutor for the Islamic community.
This is the first time a part of the government has publicly linked the presence of CAIR in meetings to the government entity's refusal to attend the meeting. This stand is long overdue, and one that should be followed by other government agencies. The FBI has said it won't deal with CAIR until "certain issues" are addressed to the FBI's satisfaction, and must be addressed by the national FBI, not local field offices.
Why? Because CAIR, as has now been amply documented, was formed to support Hamas and has organic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Holy Land Foundation documents show this clearly. (For a look at how the package ties together from what is now public evidence, see this NEFA Foundation piece I co-authored.
It is worth recalling how CAIR came into existence, is historical relationships, and what its group of organizations actually said, in their own words, about what they are doing here. These are some of the issues the FBI wisely would like explained by the CAIR leadership. The full citations can be found in the NEFA paper.
It is important to note that the authenticity of the documents and their content were not disputed during the trial, but were accepted as legitimate. This should be borne in mind as CAIR and its allies launch an intensive lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to get rehabilitated.
Rather than actually address any of these issues, it is a fair bet that CAIR will focus on claims that the FBI action is a result of "islamophobia," "intolerance," and present themselves as victims of a campaign to deprive them of civil rights. They should not be allowed to get away with less than a full explanation of their own actions and words.
CAIR does not speak for all Muslims in this country, or even most. Its membership has plummeted in recent years and it thrives because of is access to the FBI and other government institutions.
First, the MB is not al Qaeda, but it is Hamas, and Hamas is the MB. Article 2 of the Hamas founding charter:
"The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep
understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and
conversion to Islam."
The parent organization of CAIR advocated internally for the use of front groups:
"[Fronts groups are] one method to communicate the Ikhwan’s point of view. A front is not formed until after a study and after an exhaustive study. I mean, the last front formed by the Group is the Islamic Association for Palestine. So, Ikhwans, this did not come out
over night, or it was not the Ikhwnans who are in charge went to sleep, dreamed about it and met the next day and decided to do it. Not at all, by God. This went through lengthy meetings and took long discussions."
And, most damagingly, the HLF trial documents show the Muslim Brotherhood agenda in this country to be something other than simple co-existence and integration into society.
In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the live of its
society and has firmly established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as
a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and – on top of them – the Muslim Brotherhood in this country…
Then, the heart of the matter:
The process of settlement is a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up
to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal."
As for the role of the Ikhwan, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims’ efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a
mastery of the art of "coalitions", the art of "absorption" and the principles of "cooperation"
I hope the FBI and other parts of the government stand firm in their rejection of CAIR as a valid interlocutor for the Islamic community.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday January 30, 2009
The Afghanistan Question and Force Restructuring
The Toronto Globe and Mail has an interesting look at how increasingly complex the Taliban's attacks in Afghanistan are, belying the notion that the group is somehow in retreat there.
This is, of course, due in no small measure, to the Taliban's enormous revenue stream from opium and heroin, a pipeline that insures the groups is not only well armed, but able to expand its arsenal, training and capabilities. It is also due, in part, to the Afghan government's dismal performance in corruption and development, giving people little reason NOT to side with the rebel forces.
At the same time, the Obama administration is carefully considering how to define victory in Afghanistan in a way that will make it more attainable.
"One of the concepts we embraced in Iraq was recognition that you can't kill or capture your way out of a complex, industrial-strength insurgency," Petraeus said in an interview this month with Foreign Policy magazine. "The challenge in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq, is to figure out how to reduce substantially the numbers of those who have to be killed or captured."
This debate is closely tied to the debate over the future of the military as we know-that is, what kind of military do we need to fight the wars of the future?
The Wall Street Journal has an interesting column by Mackubin Thomas Owens looking at this question. While the answer he gives is the most obvious-one equipped to fight several different kinds of war, both conventional and and small wars and insurgencies-he does remind us of some of the basic questions that need to be asked by advocates of the different camps.
As he points out, the idea that our technological advantages will allow us to fight wars remotely and at low human cost, has been largely discredited by Iraq and Afghanistan.
Clearly, small, irregular wars do have a direct security importance to the United States (every major terrorist attack by Islamists-the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the 2000 Cole attack, and 9/11) were carried out by non-state actors operating out of stateless areas or failed states.
Yet, as Owens notes, others "fear that the Long War school's focus on small wars and insurgencies will transform the Army into a constabulary force, whose enhanced capability for conducting stability operations and nation-building would be purchased at a high cost: the ability to conduct large-scale conventional war."
The Obama administration will have to grapple with this balance, and Afghanistan will be a key forging ground that will have repercussions far into the future.
How deeply do U.S. forces get involved in counter-drug operations, given that the fund directly fund the enemy? How much responsible is the military for development projects and other non-traditional roles, when carrying them out will weaken the Taliban? Or do such activities lessen the military's ability to carry out its core mission?
The Cold War has been over for almost two decades. We have had time to see the results of myriad conflicts, both conventional (Iraq I) and non-conventional. The world is what it is, not what we wish or imagine it is.
Our future rides on getting this right, and we have had time to learn. The threats are multi-faceted. The turns Russia has taken clearly show that state actors can increase their threat posture. But Afghanistan and Iraq show how important the asymmetrical threat remains. It can never be an either-or proposition.
This is, of course, due in no small measure, to the Taliban's enormous revenue stream from opium and heroin, a pipeline that insures the groups is not only well armed, but able to expand its arsenal, training and capabilities. It is also due, in part, to the Afghan government's dismal performance in corruption and development, giving people little reason NOT to side with the rebel forces.
At the same time, the Obama administration is carefully considering how to define victory in Afghanistan in a way that will make it more attainable.
"One of the concepts we embraced in Iraq was recognition that you can't kill or capture your way out of a complex, industrial-strength insurgency," Petraeus said in an interview this month with Foreign Policy magazine. "The challenge in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq, is to figure out how to reduce substantially the numbers of those who have to be killed or captured."
This debate is closely tied to the debate over the future of the military as we know-that is, what kind of military do we need to fight the wars of the future?
The Wall Street Journal has an interesting column by Mackubin Thomas Owens looking at this question. While the answer he gives is the most obvious-one equipped to fight several different kinds of war, both conventional and and small wars and insurgencies-he does remind us of some of the basic questions that need to be asked by advocates of the different camps.
As he points out, the idea that our technological advantages will allow us to fight wars remotely and at low human cost, has been largely discredited by Iraq and Afghanistan.
Clearly, small, irregular wars do have a direct security importance to the United States (every major terrorist attack by Islamists-the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the 2000 Cole attack, and 9/11) were carried out by non-state actors operating out of stateless areas or failed states.
Yet, as Owens notes, others "fear that the Long War school's focus on small wars and insurgencies will transform the Army into a constabulary force, whose enhanced capability for conducting stability operations and nation-building would be purchased at a high cost: the ability to conduct large-scale conventional war."
The Obama administration will have to grapple with this balance, and Afghanistan will be a key forging ground that will have repercussions far into the future.
How deeply do U.S. forces get involved in counter-drug operations, given that the fund directly fund the enemy? How much responsible is the military for development projects and other non-traditional roles, when carrying them out will weaken the Taliban? Or do such activities lessen the military's ability to carry out its core mission?
The Cold War has been over for almost two decades. We have had time to see the results of myriad conflicts, both conventional (Iraq I) and non-conventional. The world is what it is, not what we wish or imagine it is.
Our future rides on getting this right, and we have had time to learn. The threats are multi-faceted. The turns Russia has taken clearly show that state actors can increase their threat posture. But Afghanistan and Iraq show how important the asymmetrical threat remains. It can never be an either-or proposition.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 27, 2009
Worth Reading: A Report on Drug Trafficking and Gangs That Terrifies
If you want a fairly complete, and completely terrifying view of the power of organized criminal activity in the United States, take some time to read the National Drug Threat Assessment of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
Yet as good and comprehensive as it is, it reflects one of the fundamental weaknesses and walls that still exist.
The entire report mentions the overlap with terrorist activities exactly ONE time, and that, in a footnote relating to prison radicalization.
While different law enforcement agencies (the DEA in particular) have made drug cases leading directly to Hezbollah, the FARC and the Taliban, this is not mentioned. The FARC is the primary trafficking organization in Colombia, while the Taliban controls most of the heroin heading to Europe. Hezbollah skims from illicit drug laundering from Venezuela to Colombia to Maracaibo and Panama. At least 19 of the 43 designated terrorist organizations have been shown to have direct ties to drug trafficking.
Yet the NDIC is kept completely separate from terrorist analysis, just as terrorist analysts are still largely segregated from anything to do with drug trafficking and organized crime. It is called stovepiping information, as the 9/11 Commission made famous.
This, despite the fact that there is an undeniable and growing link between terrorist organizations and the organized criminal pipeline.
I understand the report was on the threat of drugs in the United States. But, given the existing case precedent and stated desire of different terrorist organizations to attack the United States, I cannot help reading things like the following and wondering what it portends in terms of terrorism.
Mexican DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States; they control most of the U.S. drug market and have established varied transportation routes, advanced communications capabilities, and strong affiliations with gangs in the United States. Mexican DTOs control a greater portion of drug production, transportation, and distribution than any other criminal group or DTO.
Their extensive drug trafficking activities in the United States generate billions of dollars in illicit proceeds annually. Law enforcement reporting indicates that Mexican DTOs maintain drug distribution networks or supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities.
So, we have groups that can cross our border virtually at will and have access to at least 230 cities. How do they manage to coordinate their activities? By using technology that law enforcement and the intelligence can only dream of acquiring.
Mexico- and U.S.-based Mexican drug traffickers employ advanced communication technology and techniques to coordinate their illicit drug trafficking activities. Law enforcement reporting indicates that several Mexican DTOs maintain crossborder communication centers in Mexico near the U.S.–Mexico border to facilitate coordinated cross-border smuggling operations. These centers are staffed by DTO members who use an array of communication methods, such as Voice over Internet Protocol, satellite technology (broadband satellite instant messaging), encrypted messaging, cell phone technology, two-way radios, scanner devices, and text messaging, to communicate with members. In some cases DTO members use high frequency radios with encryption and rolling codes
to communicate during cross-border operations.
So, while setting up shop in 230 cities, these organizations can cross our borders and communicate at will to coordinate actions on both sides of the border. Accessing this pipeline would the the ultimate dream of any terrorist organization seeking to attack the United States or any place along the way.
It is striking to me how much good reporting is available, but from the USG and private sources, and still how few of the dots are connected in a way that gives a picture of the whole.
Yet as good and comprehensive as it is, it reflects one of the fundamental weaknesses and walls that still exist.
The entire report mentions the overlap with terrorist activities exactly ONE time, and that, in a footnote relating to prison radicalization.
While different law enforcement agencies (the DEA in particular) have made drug cases leading directly to Hezbollah, the FARC and the Taliban, this is not mentioned. The FARC is the primary trafficking organization in Colombia, while the Taliban controls most of the heroin heading to Europe. Hezbollah skims from illicit drug laundering from Venezuela to Colombia to Maracaibo and Panama. At least 19 of the 43 designated terrorist organizations have been shown to have direct ties to drug trafficking.
Yet the NDIC is kept completely separate from terrorist analysis, just as terrorist analysts are still largely segregated from anything to do with drug trafficking and organized crime. It is called stovepiping information, as the 9/11 Commission made famous.
This, despite the fact that there is an undeniable and growing link between terrorist organizations and the organized criminal pipeline.
I understand the report was on the threat of drugs in the United States. But, given the existing case precedent and stated desire of different terrorist organizations to attack the United States, I cannot help reading things like the following and wondering what it portends in terms of terrorism.
Mexican DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States; they control most of the U.S. drug market and have established varied transportation routes, advanced communications capabilities, and strong affiliations with gangs in the United States. Mexican DTOs control a greater portion of drug production, transportation, and distribution than any other criminal group or DTO.
Their extensive drug trafficking activities in the United States generate billions of dollars in illicit proceeds annually. Law enforcement reporting indicates that Mexican DTOs maintain drug distribution networks or supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities.
So, we have groups that can cross our border virtually at will and have access to at least 230 cities. How do they manage to coordinate their activities? By using technology that law enforcement and the intelligence can only dream of acquiring.
Mexico- and U.S.-based Mexican drug traffickers employ advanced communication technology and techniques to coordinate their illicit drug trafficking activities. Law enforcement reporting indicates that several Mexican DTOs maintain crossborder communication centers in Mexico near the U.S.–Mexico border to facilitate coordinated cross-border smuggling operations. These centers are staffed by DTO members who use an array of communication methods, such as Voice over Internet Protocol, satellite technology (broadband satellite instant messaging), encrypted messaging, cell phone technology, two-way radios, scanner devices, and text messaging, to communicate with members. In some cases DTO members use high frequency radios with encryption and rolling codes
to communicate during cross-border operations.
So, while setting up shop in 230 cities, these organizations can cross our borders and communicate at will to coordinate actions on both sides of the border. Accessing this pipeline would the the ultimate dream of any terrorist organization seeking to attack the United States or any place along the way.
It is striking to me how much good reporting is available, but from the USG and private sources, and still how few of the dots are connected in a way that gives a picture of the whole.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday January 26, 2009
The Iran-al Qaeda Connection
My CTB colleague Andrew Cochran has written about the Treasury Department's designations of various al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden's son, Sa'ad. The designation order ties several of those identified, including Sa'ad, to Iran.
The designation, taken literally, has little meaning. None of those named have any assets in the United States than can be frozen, and likely do not do business under their own names abroad, nor are they likely to have bank accounts.
But as a symbolic measure it is important because it highlights he history of the Iran-al Qaeda relationship, and how wrong the conventional wisdom in the intelligence community was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. There still exists a strong resistance to seeing how thing work, rather than how we like to imagine they might work.
The thinking (which I ran up against repeatedly in the hostility to my al Qaeda-diamonds reporting) was that Shi'ia and Sunni groups cannot and do not collaborate. Therefore, Hezbollah supporters in Liberia smuggling diamonds would never help al Qaeda operatives move their stones. And Iran would not help al Qaeda on a broader level.
Yet Iran, as the Treasury statement notes, provided vital logistical support for senior al Qaeda leaders and the families of the very senior leadership (Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri) to escape from Afghanistan. They kept some senior leaders under "house arrest" but allowed them to remain operational.
It took the European intelligence services a considerable amount of time and effort to convince most of their U.S. counterparts that this was the case.
But it is a mistake to think Iran and al Qaeda are allies. And, in some cases, such as when Zarqawi was slaughtering Shi'ias in Iraq rather than primarily targeting the foreign infidel troops, the conventional wisdom proved correct.
What is often underestimated is the flexibility of these groups in the temporary alliances they form, and hence the importance of understanding the strategic interest each group has in not killing the other at a specific time.
It seems clear that the overriding goal of al Qaeda's central leadership has not been the elimination of the Shi'ia theocracy in Iran, but rather the United States, then the Sunni regimes in the Middle East.
Iran's primary objective is destabilizing the United States and obtaining nuclear capabilities, not the destruction of Sunni group that shares the same goals and hates the Saudi and other Gulf regimes as much as the Shi'ia do. So there is common ground.
I don't know what Iran's calculations were in giving safe haven to al Qaeda leaders and families. Most of the families simply transited through to other safe havens, although a few, like Sa'ad were kept or allowed to stay for a considerably longer period of time. Perhaps they were bargaining chips in negotiations that never happened. The designation makes it clear that several al Qaeda operatives were arrested or detained after they had been in Iran for some time. What brought the change in status?
And why did al Qaeda think they could trust the Iranians with the lives of some of their most important people? It was, after all, a significant risk to turn over senior people and family members to a regime that has no love for Sunnis or wahhabism.
Here, I think, the answer lies in the ties that al Qaeda operatives and both Hezbollah and Iran's IRGC formed when bin Laden was living in Sudan.
Publicly available court documents from the trial of Wadih el Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary, currently serving a life sentence in the United States, discuss this relationship in some detail. Sa'ad bin Laden was with his father in Sudan, as were others al Qaeda operatives who later ended up in Iran.
This is one of the great dangers of safe havens for terrorist operatives, such as we are witnessing in Somali, Yemen, parts of Sudan etc. They provide not only the terrain and time to share lessons learned and new methods and technologies, they allow personal relationships to develop that can and often do override theological or political dogma.
Clearly Iran received something in return from al Qaeda for the favor of granting safe harbor to vulnerable family members on the lam. It is highly unlikely the ayatollahs were acting out of humanitarian concern or simple solidarity. The question is, what?
And it is not entirely clear Iran proved, in the long term, to be a reliable partner. Several of those named, including Sa'ad, appear to have been detained by Iranian forces, then eventually freed.
What is clear that groups that seem like (and often are) mortal enemies can ally in the face of a shared objective. It is a lesson worth remembering.
The designation, taken literally, has little meaning. None of those named have any assets in the United States than can be frozen, and likely do not do business under their own names abroad, nor are they likely to have bank accounts.
But as a symbolic measure it is important because it highlights he history of the Iran-al Qaeda relationship, and how wrong the conventional wisdom in the intelligence community was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. There still exists a strong resistance to seeing how thing work, rather than how we like to imagine they might work.
The thinking (which I ran up against repeatedly in the hostility to my al Qaeda-diamonds reporting) was that Shi'ia and Sunni groups cannot and do not collaborate. Therefore, Hezbollah supporters in Liberia smuggling diamonds would never help al Qaeda operatives move their stones. And Iran would not help al Qaeda on a broader level.
Yet Iran, as the Treasury statement notes, provided vital logistical support for senior al Qaeda leaders and the families of the very senior leadership (Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri) to escape from Afghanistan. They kept some senior leaders under "house arrest" but allowed them to remain operational.
It took the European intelligence services a considerable amount of time and effort to convince most of their U.S. counterparts that this was the case.
But it is a mistake to think Iran and al Qaeda are allies. And, in some cases, such as when Zarqawi was slaughtering Shi'ias in Iraq rather than primarily targeting the foreign infidel troops, the conventional wisdom proved correct.
What is often underestimated is the flexibility of these groups in the temporary alliances they form, and hence the importance of understanding the strategic interest each group has in not killing the other at a specific time.
It seems clear that the overriding goal of al Qaeda's central leadership has not been the elimination of the Shi'ia theocracy in Iran, but rather the United States, then the Sunni regimes in the Middle East.
Iran's primary objective is destabilizing the United States and obtaining nuclear capabilities, not the destruction of Sunni group that shares the same goals and hates the Saudi and other Gulf regimes as much as the Shi'ia do. So there is common ground.
I don't know what Iran's calculations were in giving safe haven to al Qaeda leaders and families. Most of the families simply transited through to other safe havens, although a few, like Sa'ad were kept or allowed to stay for a considerably longer period of time. Perhaps they were bargaining chips in negotiations that never happened. The designation makes it clear that several al Qaeda operatives were arrested or detained after they had been in Iran for some time. What brought the change in status?
And why did al Qaeda think they could trust the Iranians with the lives of some of their most important people? It was, after all, a significant risk to turn over senior people and family members to a regime that has no love for Sunnis or wahhabism.
Here, I think, the answer lies in the ties that al Qaeda operatives and both Hezbollah and Iran's IRGC formed when bin Laden was living in Sudan.
Publicly available court documents from the trial of Wadih el Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary, currently serving a life sentence in the United States, discuss this relationship in some detail. Sa'ad bin Laden was with his father in Sudan, as were others al Qaeda operatives who later ended up in Iran.
This is one of the great dangers of safe havens for terrorist operatives, such as we are witnessing in Somali, Yemen, parts of Sudan etc. They provide not only the terrain and time to share lessons learned and new methods and technologies, they allow personal relationships to develop that can and often do override theological or political dogma.
Clearly Iran received something in return from al Qaeda for the favor of granting safe harbor to vulnerable family members on the lam. It is highly unlikely the ayatollahs were acting out of humanitarian concern or simple solidarity. The question is, what?
And it is not entirely clear Iran proved, in the long term, to be a reliable partner. Several of those named, including Sa'ad, appear to have been detained by Iranian forces, then eventually freed.
What is clear that groups that seem like (and often are) mortal enemies can ally in the face of a shared objective. It is a lesson worth remembering.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday January 16, 2009
The Islamist (MB) Takeover of Al Jazeera?
The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) has an interesting look at the growing Islamist agenda of the al Jazeera TV station, and the roots of the shift in the Muslim Brotherhood.
It is an important observation since so much of the Arab world-as well as the Western media-look to the station to portray and interpret events, particularly the Hamas-Israeli conflict.
It is easy to forget (and shockingly seldom reported) that Hamas is an organic part of the global Muslim Brotherhood, according to article 2 of its own charter. So that the Ikhwan would seek to control the main medium for the outside world to interpret the conflict is not at all unusual.
The report looks at Wadah Khanfar (aka Waddah Khanfar), the station’s General Manager, as the driving force behind al Jazeera's move toward embracing the Islamist agent, while marginalizing other voices in the station that once had a significant role.
In October 2006, one of Al Jazeera’s own correspondents stated that Mr. Khanfar had a Muslim Brotherhood background and asked him about it directly, receiving a non-denial and evasive reply:
Mr. Waddah, you have and Islamic background, specifically Muslim Brotherhood, don’t you think that this is conflicting with your position as a head of the biggest Arab media organization now?
In fact, I do not classify myself as belonging to a certain political ideological movement, this is firstly an important issue which is very ..
(interrupting) ..Or you were belonging ..
I think that firstly I belong to this Nation including its collective legacy and mind, and that this something I value and am keen on it, but I tell you clearly and frankly, Aljazeera taught us always that our affiliation to Aljazeera- as an administration or press- is an affiliation to an institution with deep-rooted rules and with a clear identity based primarily on proficiency and respecting the opinion and the other opinion, and it isn’t absolutely based on differentiating between people on ideological, intellectual or party bases.
Interestingly, it was the Nation Magazine article from 2007 that first reported on the growing Islamist agenda of the TV station.
Whether it’s reporting the Hamas perspective from the occupied territories without mention of the Palestinian Authority’s version of events, or the fawning depiction elsewhere of Islamist parties and militias as the grassroots reflection of Arab sentiment, Al Jazeera has moved away from its ideologically diverse origins to a more populist/Islamist approach. After the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Al Jazeera replaced its longtime secular bureau chief in Baghdad, Faisal Yasiri, with Wadah Khanfar, who had reported from Afghanistan after the American invasion in 2001 and then Kurdish-controlled territory as the war with Iraq was launched in 2003. Shortly thereafter, the secular head of Al Jazeera, Mohammed Jassem Ali, was ousted and replaced by Khanfar, whom nine current and former employees of the station interviewed for this article characterize as an Islamist. It was around this time that Jazeera’s Iraq bureau "became a platform for [Sunni] extremists," says Shaker Hamid, a secular Jazeera correspondent in Baghdad from 1997 to 2000, who left to work at another Arab satellite station after getting what he says was a better offer. "I can’t say that Jazeera’s rhetoric is completely against Shiites," Hamid says. "The Americans introduced this, but the media should not make it worse, and Jazeera did."
I am all for freedom of expression and the rights of others to get their message out. But I am also in favor of full disclosure of ownership and interests. Al-Jazeera is losing its right to claim to represent different voices, because the Islamist agenda has made it increasingly difficult for any other voices to be heard.
It is an important observation since so much of the Arab world-as well as the Western media-look to the station to portray and interpret events, particularly the Hamas-Israeli conflict.
It is easy to forget (and shockingly seldom reported) that Hamas is an organic part of the global Muslim Brotherhood, according to article 2 of its own charter. So that the Ikhwan would seek to control the main medium for the outside world to interpret the conflict is not at all unusual.
The report looks at Wadah Khanfar (aka Waddah Khanfar), the station’s General Manager, as the driving force behind al Jazeera's move toward embracing the Islamist agent, while marginalizing other voices in the station that once had a significant role.
In October 2006, one of Al Jazeera’s own correspondents stated that Mr. Khanfar had a Muslim Brotherhood background and asked him about it directly, receiving a non-denial and evasive reply:
Mr. Waddah, you have and Islamic background, specifically Muslim Brotherhood, don’t you think that this is conflicting with your position as a head of the biggest Arab media organization now?
In fact, I do not classify myself as belonging to a certain political ideological movement, this is firstly an important issue which is very ..
(interrupting) ..Or you were belonging ..
I think that firstly I belong to this Nation including its collective legacy and mind, and that this something I value and am keen on it, but I tell you clearly and frankly, Aljazeera taught us always that our affiliation to Aljazeera- as an administration or press- is an affiliation to an institution with deep-rooted rules and with a clear identity based primarily on proficiency and respecting the opinion and the other opinion, and it isn’t absolutely based on differentiating between people on ideological, intellectual or party bases.
Interestingly, it was the Nation Magazine article from 2007 that first reported on the growing Islamist agenda of the TV station.
Whether it’s reporting the Hamas perspective from the occupied territories without mention of the Palestinian Authority’s version of events, or the fawning depiction elsewhere of Islamist parties and militias as the grassroots reflection of Arab sentiment, Al Jazeera has moved away from its ideologically diverse origins to a more populist/Islamist approach. After the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Al Jazeera replaced its longtime secular bureau chief in Baghdad, Faisal Yasiri, with Wadah Khanfar, who had reported from Afghanistan after the American invasion in 2001 and then Kurdish-controlled territory as the war with Iraq was launched in 2003. Shortly thereafter, the secular head of Al Jazeera, Mohammed Jassem Ali, was ousted and replaced by Khanfar, whom nine current and former employees of the station interviewed for this article characterize as an Islamist. It was around this time that Jazeera’s Iraq bureau "became a platform for [Sunni] extremists," says Shaker Hamid, a secular Jazeera correspondent in Baghdad from 1997 to 2000, who left to work at another Arab satellite station after getting what he says was a better offer. "I can’t say that Jazeera’s rhetoric is completely against Shiites," Hamid says. "The Americans introduced this, but the media should not make it worse, and Jazeera did."
I am all for freedom of expression and the rights of others to get their message out. But I am also in favor of full disclosure of ownership and interests. Al-Jazeera is losing its right to claim to represent different voices, because the Islamist agenda has made it increasingly difficult for any other voices to be heard.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH