Wednesday January 14, 2009
How Seriously Should we Take The Mexican Crisis?
A little-noticed Joint Forces Command study, The Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Forces has some interesting conclusions on Latin America, and particularly Mexico. A tip of the hat to David Holiday of OSI for bringing it to my attention.
While there have been several recent studies looking at future challenges, including the more heralded "Global Trends 2025" Byt he National Intelligence Council, this one actually tackles the issues of transnational crime and stateless areas. The NIC report in particular, was notably silent on the implications of failing states and criminal/terrorist pipelines.
The JOE as the report is called, is a DOD's "perspective
on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field. This document is speculative in nature and does not suppose to predict what will happen in the next twenty-five years. Rather, it is intended to serve as a starting point for discussions
about the future security environment at the operational level of war."
In looking at potential developments, the report concludes:
In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force
and indeed the world, two large and important states bear
consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and
Mexico.
That is an interesting juxtaposition for Mexico, and one that, surprisingly, has not risen to the top of the foreign policy agenda. Although president-elect Obama met with Mexican president Calderón to discuss the drug war, it is unlikely the stark terms of this issue were discussed.
Mexico is at a crucial juncture. The Calderón government has gambled that it can take on the criminal enterprises of drugs, illegal smuggling, extortion and kidnapping while having a non-functional judicial system and without diminishing the culture of impunity that allows the cartel sicarios kill the best and brightest with impunity.
He had no choice, except to accept the future of Mexico as a "narco-state." The lack of serious U.S. commitment to seeking alternatives to the existing policies, including demand reduction and a serious effort to shut down the flow of sophisticated weapons, left Mexico virtually alone.
The Merida Initiative is a step, but it is not clear what that step is toward. More than 5,700 people were killed in drug-related violence in Mexico in 2008. That is a staggering figure, and it includes dozens of policemen, journalists and the few of were willing to take on the terror of the organized criminal gangs.
It is also more than all the U.S. deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan since those conflicts began, a sobering point of reference. Yet it remains unclear how the story will end.
In reference to the collapse of Pakistan, the report concluded:
The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the
government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure
are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs
and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over
the next several years will have a major impact on the stability
of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos
would demand an American response based on the serious
implications for homeland security alone.
The descent into chaos is a real possibility, all the more so because the new administration will struggle to meet the internal economic crisis and will have little time and few resources to look south. Unfortunately, that will only exacerbate the downward spiral there.
It is certainly not just Mexico. With Mexico will go Guatemala, Honduras and much of the rest of Central America. How it will play out in the so-far complacent states of Nicaragua and Venezuela, currently view the cartels as allies in their anti-U.S. coalition, remains to be seen.
The paper should be a starting point for far more serious discussions about a region where we remain largely blind to the threats that loom.
While there have been several recent studies looking at future challenges, including the more heralded "Global Trends 2025" Byt he National Intelligence Council, this one actually tackles the issues of transnational crime and stateless areas. The NIC report in particular, was notably silent on the implications of failing states and criminal/terrorist pipelines.
The JOE as the report is called, is a DOD's "perspective
on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field. This document is speculative in nature and does not suppose to predict what will happen in the next twenty-five years. Rather, it is intended to serve as a starting point for discussions
about the future security environment at the operational level of war."
In looking at potential developments, the report concludes:
In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force
and indeed the world, two large and important states bear
consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and
Mexico.
That is an interesting juxtaposition for Mexico, and one that, surprisingly, has not risen to the top of the foreign policy agenda. Although president-elect Obama met with Mexican president Calderón to discuss the drug war, it is unlikely the stark terms of this issue were discussed.
Mexico is at a crucial juncture. The Calderón government has gambled that it can take on the criminal enterprises of drugs, illegal smuggling, extortion and kidnapping while having a non-functional judicial system and without diminishing the culture of impunity that allows the cartel sicarios kill the best and brightest with impunity.
He had no choice, except to accept the future of Mexico as a "narco-state." The lack of serious U.S. commitment to seeking alternatives to the existing policies, including demand reduction and a serious effort to shut down the flow of sophisticated weapons, left Mexico virtually alone.
The Merida Initiative is a step, but it is not clear what that step is toward. More than 5,700 people were killed in drug-related violence in Mexico in 2008. That is a staggering figure, and it includes dozens of policemen, journalists and the few of were willing to take on the terror of the organized criminal gangs.
It is also more than all the U.S. deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan since those conflicts began, a sobering point of reference. Yet it remains unclear how the story will end.
In reference to the collapse of Pakistan, the report concluded:
The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the
government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure
are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs
and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over
the next several years will have a major impact on the stability
of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos
would demand an American response based on the serious
implications for homeland security alone.
The descent into chaos is a real possibility, all the more so because the new administration will struggle to meet the internal economic crisis and will have little time and few resources to look south. Unfortunately, that will only exacerbate the downward spiral there.
It is certainly not just Mexico. With Mexico will go Guatemala, Honduras and much of the rest of Central America. How it will play out in the so-far complacent states of Nicaragua and Venezuela, currently view the cartels as allies in their anti-U.S. coalition, remains to be seen.
The paper should be a starting point for far more serious discussions about a region where we remain largely blind to the threats that loom.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday January 19, 2009
Iran's Games and the Pipeline
As the saga of Lloyds TBS' involvement in illicit banking to help the Iranian regime continues to broaden and ensnare other banks,it is useful to look back over the circumstances that this unveils.
It must be one heck of a case to generate a $350 million settlement and deferred prosecution agreement, as significant admissions of criminal misconduct in stripping the Iran identifiers from bank transactions.
One thing that stands out is that Dubai, again, is the hub, as it was for A.Q. Khan, Dawood Ibrhaim, Viktor Bout and countless other facilitators of both criminal and terrorist networks. Now, Dubai is a nice city, but these folks are unlikely to be there for the glittering skyscrapers and or camel races.
Rather, they go there because the regulatory regime is so lax that they know the chances of being detected (or, more importantly, anyone wanting to detect their activities) are essentially nil. It is also an ideal physical location, at the crossroads of several key trading routes.
Now, with other banks under investigation, including one for trying to acquire 30,000 metric tons of tungsten, most likely to build missiles, under the guise of building refrigerators. That amount would take care of every refrigerator in the Middle East and then some," Mr Morgenthau (Manhattan DA) told the Financial Times on Sunday.
"It was not being purchased, we think, for domestic consumption . . . Tungsten was not used for making refrigerators but for long-range missiles. That is our supposition."
In none of the above cases did Dubai play a significant role in investigating anything. Dubai turns up in other investigations, which lead there. An interesting circumstance that is not coincidental.
Clearly the banks under investigation for are not the only players in Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities, and learned much from the A.Q. Khan experience in building shell companies, false invoices etc.
As the Washington Post reports, the network was broad and deep.
ran in the past two years has acquired numerous banned items -- including circuit boards, software and Global Positioning System
devices -- that are used to make sophisticated versions of the
improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, that continue to kill U.S.
troops in Iraq, according to documents released by the Justice Department and a new study by a Washington research institute. The deadly trade was briefly disrupted after the moves against Dubai companies in 2006, but it quickly resumed with a few changes in shipping routes and company names, the officials said.
This is the pipeline at its best. One simply has to shift addresses, at least on paper, the companies go again, and the pipeline is unclogged and continues to carry its vital products. The flexibility of the pipeline and its ability to adapt and reroute itself in a very short period of time is one of its greatest strengths.
Iran, with years of experience in the game, is unlikely to be knocked much off its stride in the acquisitions game.
The banking investigations may have more an impact, given the hefty size of the fines and serious investigations, that will give other financial institutions pause before taking such a step. It is bit like the "whack-a-mole" game, where one hits one mole, only to see three more pop up in different holes. Until the price for allowing the holes to grow is raised considerably, the moles will just switch to other holes.
It must be one heck of a case to generate a $350 million settlement and deferred prosecution agreement, as significant admissions of criminal misconduct in stripping the Iran identifiers from bank transactions.
One thing that stands out is that Dubai, again, is the hub, as it was for A.Q. Khan, Dawood Ibrhaim, Viktor Bout and countless other facilitators of both criminal and terrorist networks. Now, Dubai is a nice city, but these folks are unlikely to be there for the glittering skyscrapers and or camel races.
Rather, they go there because the regulatory regime is so lax that they know the chances of being detected (or, more importantly, anyone wanting to detect their activities) are essentially nil. It is also an ideal physical location, at the crossroads of several key trading routes.
Now, with other banks under investigation, including one for trying to acquire 30,000 metric tons of tungsten, most likely to build missiles, under the guise of building refrigerators. That amount would take care of every refrigerator in the Middle East and then some," Mr Morgenthau (Manhattan DA) told the Financial Times on Sunday.
"It was not being purchased, we think, for domestic consumption . . . Tungsten was not used for making refrigerators but for long-range missiles. That is our supposition."
In none of the above cases did Dubai play a significant role in investigating anything. Dubai turns up in other investigations, which lead there. An interesting circumstance that is not coincidental.
Clearly the banks under investigation for are not the only players in Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities, and learned much from the A.Q. Khan experience in building shell companies, false invoices etc.
As the Washington Post reports, the network was broad and deep.
ran in the past two years has acquired numerous banned items -- including circuit boards, software and Global Positioning System
devices -- that are used to make sophisticated versions of the
improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, that continue to kill U.S.
troops in Iraq, according to documents released by the Justice Department and a new study by a Washington research institute. The deadly trade was briefly disrupted after the moves against Dubai companies in 2006, but it quickly resumed with a few changes in shipping routes and company names, the officials said.
This is the pipeline at its best. One simply has to shift addresses, at least on paper, the companies go again, and the pipeline is unclogged and continues to carry its vital products. The flexibility of the pipeline and its ability to adapt and reroute itself in a very short period of time is one of its greatest strengths.
Iran, with years of experience in the game, is unlikely to be knocked much off its stride in the acquisitions game.
The banking investigations may have more an impact, given the hefty size of the fines and serious investigations, that will give other financial institutions pause before taking such a step. It is bit like the "whack-a-mole" game, where one hits one mole, only to see three more pop up in different holes. Until the price for allowing the holes to grow is raised considerably, the moles will just switch to other holes.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday January 9, 2009
The Venezuela-Iran Games
Almost lost in the shuffle of Gaza and the transition is the story of the Turkish interdiction of Iranian arms shipments to Venezuela
The shipment of 22 containers, carried by truck from Iran to Turkey for shipping, was labeled "tractor parts."
Instead, the inspectors halted: a suspicious shipment bound for Venezuela from Iran because it contained lab equipment capable of producing explosives, a customs official said Tuesday. Suleyman Tosun, a customs official at the Mediterranean port of Mersin, said military experts were asked to examine the material, which was seized last month, and decide whether to let the shipment to go to Venezuela.
"Experts from Turkey's Atomic Institute determined there were no traces of radioactive material, but said the equipment was enough to set up an explosives lab," Tosun said. "We have asked the military to send experts to determine whether to resume the shipment."
Doesn't exactly sound like tractor parts, particularly when Some barrels, labeled with "danger" signs, contained chemicals.
As the AQ Khan network showed, it is relatively easy to ship almost anything illicit by ship, because the shipping cargo containers are so seldom actually inspected. Iran, a direct beneficiary of Khan's efforts, helped perfect the hiding of dual us and nuclear equipment.
This is in addition to the weekly Tehran-Damascus-Caracas flights that carry mostly cargo, rather than passengers as promised. And in addition to the wholly-owned Iranian bank granted special license to be created and operate in Venezuela. So it doesn't bode well.
The striking things about the relationships Iran and Venezuela develop across Latin America is that two things almost immediately happen: almost all dealing are opaque, untraceable and carried on outside of normal institutional channels; and the striking retreat in terms of democratic process and human rights.
Among the most obvious recent examples are Ortega's fraudulent election counting in Nicaragua's recent municipal elections, which both the U.S. and EU condemned; and the recent report on Bolivia completing its worst year in decades in terms of press freedom and attacks on journalists.
If the Bolivarian Revolution, joined with the Iranian theocracy were bringing winds of freedom and human rights across the region it would be one thing. But to bring not only economic chaos but a total lack of transparency (not that there was much before) and a sharp return to the worst authoritarian practices of governments of both right and left, marks a sad day.
Venezuela and Iran both dismiss the recent seizure in Turkey as being unimportant. And both decline to explain what the shipment was. It is likely only a speed bump on the road to whatever Iran and Venezuela are trying to do, but shows that attention is warranted.
The shipment of 22 containers, carried by truck from Iran to Turkey for shipping, was labeled "tractor parts."
Instead, the inspectors halted: a suspicious shipment bound for Venezuela from Iran because it contained lab equipment capable of producing explosives, a customs official said Tuesday. Suleyman Tosun, a customs official at the Mediterranean port of Mersin, said military experts were asked to examine the material, which was seized last month, and decide whether to let the shipment to go to Venezuela.
"Experts from Turkey's Atomic Institute determined there were no traces of radioactive material, but said the equipment was enough to set up an explosives lab," Tosun said. "We have asked the military to send experts to determine whether to resume the shipment."
Doesn't exactly sound like tractor parts, particularly when Some barrels, labeled with "danger" signs, contained chemicals.
As the AQ Khan network showed, it is relatively easy to ship almost anything illicit by ship, because the shipping cargo containers are so seldom actually inspected. Iran, a direct beneficiary of Khan's efforts, helped perfect the hiding of dual us and nuclear equipment.
This is in addition to the weekly Tehran-Damascus-Caracas flights that carry mostly cargo, rather than passengers as promised. And in addition to the wholly-owned Iranian bank granted special license to be created and operate in Venezuela. So it doesn't bode well.
The striking things about the relationships Iran and Venezuela develop across Latin America is that two things almost immediately happen: almost all dealing are opaque, untraceable and carried on outside of normal institutional channels; and the striking retreat in terms of democratic process and human rights.
Among the most obvious recent examples are Ortega's fraudulent election counting in Nicaragua's recent municipal elections, which both the U.S. and EU condemned; and the recent report on Bolivia completing its worst year in decades in terms of press freedom and attacks on journalists.
If the Bolivarian Revolution, joined with the Iranian theocracy were bringing winds of freedom and human rights across the region it would be one thing. But to bring not only economic chaos but a total lack of transparency (not that there was much before) and a sharp return to the worst authoritarian practices of governments of both right and left, marks a sad day.
Venezuela and Iran both dismiss the recent seizure in Turkey as being unimportant. And both decline to explain what the shipment was. It is likely only a speed bump on the road to whatever Iran and Venezuela are trying to do, but shows that attention is warranted.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday January 8, 2009
The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood With Hamas and Iran
Former CIA analyst Reuel Marc Gerecht has an important piece in the Wall Street Journal on Iran's Hamas strategy. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) fleshes out the picture even further.
The fundamental truth is that Hamas' road to Iran runs through the international Muslim Brotherhood, and has for two decades.
What is often missing in the discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood is that Hamas, according to its own founding charter, is an integral and armed part of the Ikwhan, not separate from it.
According to Article Two of the Hamas Charter:
"The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and
judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam."
The most open analysis of the relationship of the Brotherhood to Iran comes from the public interviews of Yousef Nada, the self-described foreign minister of international Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately, there is no English language link to the extraordinary series of statements he gave.
In a series of interviews he gave to al Jazeera in late 2001 and 2002, Nada described how the Ikhwan sent a delegation to Tehran immediately after Khommeini assumed power in 1979. He states that the MB delegation was the third plane to land in Tehran after the revolution-the first was Khommeni's, then security from the PLO, and then his.
As the Brother in charge of relations with Iran, he tells how his group worked with the Iranian revolutionary regime, and how he personally tried to mediate an end to the Iran-Iraq war. In these endeavor, he worked extensively with Saddam Hussein and the Iranian leadership.
Perhaps best illustrating the relationship with Iran, Nada said that, to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991, he proposed a Muslim force to occupy Kuwait while the Iraqis withdrew.
In a Sept. 8, 2002 interview with Al Jazeera, where Nada describes his proposal for withdrawal to Saddam:
Youssef Nada: The arrangements were on the basis that it would be Malaysia, Indonesia, Sudan, Iran, under the leadership of Iran, since it was closest, and since . .
Ahmed Mansour: [interrupting] You mean the Iran that was at war with Iraq for six years.
Youssef Nada: This was an extremely important point to me. This was an opportunity to put everything in the past behind them...
Ahmed Mansour: You did all of this before going to him (Saddam-DF)?
Youssef Nada: In regards to Iran, of course, two of them would have sent symbolic units, but the army was going to be from Iran.
Ahmed Mansour: It was impossible that this would be accepted.
Of course, the interviewer was right, but the point was made-the international MB was willing to back the placing of Iranian troops in a Sunni country.
So, Iran's interest and support for Hamas is not new, nor should it be surprising. It is part of the history of the Ikhwan, of which Hamas is a part.
The fundamental truth is that Hamas' road to Iran runs through the international Muslim Brotherhood, and has for two decades.
What is often missing in the discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood is that Hamas, according to its own founding charter, is an integral and armed part of the Ikwhan, not separate from it.
According to Article Two of the Hamas Charter:
"The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and
judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam."
The most open analysis of the relationship of the Brotherhood to Iran comes from the public interviews of Yousef Nada, the self-described foreign minister of international Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately, there is no English language link to the extraordinary series of statements he gave.
In a series of interviews he gave to al Jazeera in late 2001 and 2002, Nada described how the Ikhwan sent a delegation to Tehran immediately after Khommeini assumed power in 1979. He states that the MB delegation was the third plane to land in Tehran after the revolution-the first was Khommeni's, then security from the PLO, and then his.
As the Brother in charge of relations with Iran, he tells how his group worked with the Iranian revolutionary regime, and how he personally tried to mediate an end to the Iran-Iraq war. In these endeavor, he worked extensively with Saddam Hussein and the Iranian leadership.
Perhaps best illustrating the relationship with Iran, Nada said that, to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991, he proposed a Muslim force to occupy Kuwait while the Iraqis withdrew.
In a Sept. 8, 2002 interview with Al Jazeera, where Nada describes his proposal for withdrawal to Saddam:
Youssef Nada: The arrangements were on the basis that it would be Malaysia, Indonesia, Sudan, Iran, under the leadership of Iran, since it was closest, and since . .
Ahmed Mansour: [interrupting] You mean the Iran that was at war with Iraq for six years.
Youssef Nada: This was an extremely important point to me. This was an opportunity to put everything in the past behind them...
Ahmed Mansour: You did all of this before going to him (Saddam-DF)?
Youssef Nada: In regards to Iran, of course, two of them would have sent symbolic units, but the army was going to be from Iran.
Ahmed Mansour: It was impossible that this would be accepted.
Of course, the interviewer was right, but the point was made-the international MB was willing to back the placing of Iranian troops in a Sunni country.
So, Iran's interest and support for Hamas is not new, nor should it be surprising. It is part of the history of the Ikhwan, of which Hamas is a part.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 6, 2009
A Look at the Future of Ungoverned Spaces and Terrorism
Today's Washington Post has an interesting look at one of the growing challenges of statelessness and where much of the world is heading. It also has stark implications for terrorist organizations and their ability to operate.
The story looks at police attempts to take over the Santa Marta favela in Rio de Janeiro, where drug dealers have long been the primary, if not sole, source of authority.
Using tactics similar to the U.S. "surge" strategy in Iraq, police are seeking to build permanent bases among the population, fix broken services, gather intelligence, and stick around so the drug traffickers lose their operational freedom. The story showed that there was much to be done to allay the fears of the civilian population and win them over in some fashion.
What is striking is that, while we often look at ungoverned spaces (generally a misleading term because, while the state does not govern there, some person, criminal organization or militia almost certainly does), we view them as vast swaths of territory with little population and empty territory where one could hide.
In reality, many of the "stateless" areas are in the rapidly-growing mega-urban centers that are growing up around the world. See National Geographic map for a fascinating and terrifying graphic of the trends.
In these urban settings, there are densely-populated sectors where the state has no presence or power. These areas offer an entirely different set of challenges from stateless territories that are both larger and much less densely populated.
There are some parallels between the kind of stateless regions faced in the urban centers of Iraq and those faced by U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
It is these important differences in terrain, population density and types of "ungovernability" that make replicating the surge strategy in Afghanistan so difficult.
The war in Afghanistan is largely a rural insurgency, with a strategic rearguard areas in Pakistan, and with hostile and vast geographic spaces. Iraq, in many places, was a door-to-door urban combat setting, with high population densities, small geographic areas and a host of other challenges.
In a broader context, the stateless urban areas offer series of advantages over more remote areas. These include the ability to hide or go undetected for long periods of time and remain anonymous, the possibility of carrying out attacks with far greater impact, easier access to financial institutions and logistical centers , etc.
From Lagos to Buenos Aires to Los Angeles, it is these areas where the possibility of getting "lost" and blending in are far higher than in remote areas. The ability to connect into the criminal networks that operate in many of these urban areas (often controlling them) is also attractive.
Some cities, like MedellÃn and Bogotá in Colombia have shown a remarkable ability to reassert beneficial state control over urban areas that had recently been lost, so it can be done.
Mega cities is not an area of much study or understanding, and I certainly do not have expertise in it. But we better start developing that expertise and ways of thinking about stateless urban regions, and learning the lessons of others, if we hope to tackle the threats these areas pose.
The story looks at police attempts to take over the Santa Marta favela in Rio de Janeiro, where drug dealers have long been the primary, if not sole, source of authority.
Using tactics similar to the U.S. "surge" strategy in Iraq, police are seeking to build permanent bases among the population, fix broken services, gather intelligence, and stick around so the drug traffickers lose their operational freedom. The story showed that there was much to be done to allay the fears of the civilian population and win them over in some fashion.
What is striking is that, while we often look at ungoverned spaces (generally a misleading term because, while the state does not govern there, some person, criminal organization or militia almost certainly does), we view them as vast swaths of territory with little population and empty territory where one could hide.
In reality, many of the "stateless" areas are in the rapidly-growing mega-urban centers that are growing up around the world. See National Geographic map for a fascinating and terrifying graphic of the trends.
In these urban settings, there are densely-populated sectors where the state has no presence or power. These areas offer an entirely different set of challenges from stateless territories that are both larger and much less densely populated.
There are some parallels between the kind of stateless regions faced in the urban centers of Iraq and those faced by U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
It is these important differences in terrain, population density and types of "ungovernability" that make replicating the surge strategy in Afghanistan so difficult.
The war in Afghanistan is largely a rural insurgency, with a strategic rearguard areas in Pakistan, and with hostile and vast geographic spaces. Iraq, in many places, was a door-to-door urban combat setting, with high population densities, small geographic areas and a host of other challenges.
In a broader context, the stateless urban areas offer series of advantages over more remote areas. These include the ability to hide or go undetected for long periods of time and remain anonymous, the possibility of carrying out attacks with far greater impact, easier access to financial institutions and logistical centers , etc.
From Lagos to Buenos Aires to Los Angeles, it is these areas where the possibility of getting "lost" and blending in are far higher than in remote areas. The ability to connect into the criminal networks that operate in many of these urban areas (often controlling them) is also attractive.
Some cities, like MedellÃn and Bogotá in Colombia have shown a remarkable ability to reassert beneficial state control over urban areas that had recently been lost, so it can be done.
Mega cities is not an area of much study or understanding, and I certainly do not have expertise in it. But we better start developing that expertise and ways of thinking about stateless urban regions, and learning the lessons of others, if we hope to tackle the threats these areas pose.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH