Monday December 29, 2008
A Few Parting Shots at the End of the Year
Here are several items that have appeared in recent days that, to me, show just how much work we have to do in the field of combatting terrorism, and particularly Islamist terrorism. It shows what the true goals of these groups are, no matter how much we try to pretend otherwise.
The first is the reference in this New York Times story on radicalization in Bosnia, where it is stated that Saudi Arabia has spent about $700 million in Bosnia since the end of the war, mostly building mosques.
It is noticed in passing that, before this massive investment in the spreading of wahabbism, the Islam practiced in Bosnia was moderate and tolerant, for more than four centuries. Perhaps some cause and effect?
The same article notes that "Two months ago, men in hoods attacked participants at a gay festival in Sarajevo, dragging some people from vehicles and beating others while they chanted, "Kill the gays!" and "Allahu Akbar!" Eight people were injured.
"Muslim religious leaders complained that the event, which coincided with the holy month of Ramadan, was a provocation."
Well, that explains it. Beat them if you don't like them.
Another bit of Islamist sophism comes from the Shabaab al Mujahadeen in Somalia, courtesy of NEFA Foundation, where the group (in response to a glowing letter from a U.S. "sheikh") justifies the recent stoning of a woman, reported by residents of her town to have been 13 at the time of her murder.
The disbelievers have falsely reported that she was 13 years old, unmarried, and was raped. The reality and truth is that
she was over 20 years old, married, and was practicing adultery. This is just one example of how they twist the news, so we would like to take this opportunity to advise our brothers not to
believe any news reported about us except from our official Media Department.
Yes, well, if she was 20, then by all means go ahead! And we should certainly put our trust in the official media outlet of this group, who has a special dispensation to lie to unbelievers as part of their divine mission
The person the group is responding to is Anwar al-Awlaki, and his missive, and background, including his extensive ties to the 9/11 hijackers and work in the United States can be found in this translation by the NEFA Foundation.
Not unrelated is the concern that Somali-U.S. citizens appear to have been migrating to Somalia to join the Islamists, and that a U.S. citizen may have been involved in an October suicide attack in Somalia that left 22 people dead.
Finally, there is this story in the Chicago Tribune about how Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Pakistani charity that allegedly is a front for the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was blamed for last month's terror attacks in Mumbai, India, continues to operate openly The attempts to shut it down were all for show, as so many "charity" closings are.
In short, the Saudis still fund the spread of wahhabism, radical Islamists hate speech and actions still prosper in the name of their religion, and people continue to be recruited to their cause.
While some things have changed in recent times, and some things have gone right, it is easy to forget what the radical Islamist agenda is and what they really stand for. Some things have not changed.
The first is the reference in this New York Times story on radicalization in Bosnia, where it is stated that Saudi Arabia has spent about $700 million in Bosnia since the end of the war, mostly building mosques.
It is noticed in passing that, before this massive investment in the spreading of wahabbism, the Islam practiced in Bosnia was moderate and tolerant, for more than four centuries. Perhaps some cause and effect?
The same article notes that "Two months ago, men in hoods attacked participants at a gay festival in Sarajevo, dragging some people from vehicles and beating others while they chanted, "Kill the gays!" and "Allahu Akbar!" Eight people were injured.
"Muslim religious leaders complained that the event, which coincided with the holy month of Ramadan, was a provocation."
Well, that explains it. Beat them if you don't like them.
Another bit of Islamist sophism comes from the Shabaab al Mujahadeen in Somalia, courtesy of NEFA Foundation, where the group (in response to a glowing letter from a U.S. "sheikh") justifies the recent stoning of a woman, reported by residents of her town to have been 13 at the time of her murder.
The disbelievers have falsely reported that she was 13 years old, unmarried, and was raped. The reality and truth is that
she was over 20 years old, married, and was practicing adultery. This is just one example of how they twist the news, so we would like to take this opportunity to advise our brothers not to
believe any news reported about us except from our official Media Department.
Yes, well, if she was 20, then by all means go ahead! And we should certainly put our trust in the official media outlet of this group, who has a special dispensation to lie to unbelievers as part of their divine mission
The person the group is responding to is Anwar al-Awlaki, and his missive, and background, including his extensive ties to the 9/11 hijackers and work in the United States can be found in this translation by the NEFA Foundation.
Not unrelated is the concern that Somali-U.S. citizens appear to have been migrating to Somalia to join the Islamists, and that a U.S. citizen may have been involved in an October suicide attack in Somalia that left 22 people dead.
Finally, there is this story in the Chicago Tribune about how Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Pakistani charity that allegedly is a front for the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was blamed for last month's terror attacks in Mumbai, India, continues to operate openly The attempts to shut it down were all for show, as so many "charity" closings are.
In short, the Saudis still fund the spread of wahhabism, radical Islamists hate speech and actions still prosper in the name of their religion, and people continue to be recruited to their cause.
While some things have changed in recent times, and some things have gone right, it is easy to forget what the radical Islamist agenda is and what they really stand for. Some things have not changed.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Saturday December 27, 2008
The Taliban-Heroin Connection
The case of Khan Mohammed is drawing wide-spread coverage, and rightly so. He is the first known Taliban to convicted of drug trafficking. He was sentenced yesterday to two life sentences.
It was another (along with Viktor Bout, Monzar al Kassar, and other "shadow facilitators") in a series of successful, aggressive moves by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in tackling not just drugs, but those that use the money to arm those who want to carry out attacks around the globe, particularly aimed at the United States.
As prosecutor Matthew Stiglitz said in court yesterday, Mohammed's "significance ultimately rests with the symbiotic confluence of two worlds: drugs and terrorism. Without him or men like him, there is no effective insurgency in Afghanistan."
The same can be said for numerous insurgent groups that continue to exist because of the money generated from the nexus to organized crime.
I know I have hammered on this point a lot recently, but there is still so little attention focused on this that I think it is necessary, especially when the concept is so strongly reinforced by a tangible case.
This is the future, and we must understand what is coming at us if effective policies are going to be made, and resources allocated, to combat it. There is no doubt states such as Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Russia present a host of challenges. There is also no doubt that these states need and profit from non-state groups that rely on these shadow facilitators and criminal/terrorist organizations to carry out certain policy objectives.
The FARC in Colombia and the resurgent Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru are examples in our own hemisphere of these groups.
The FARC is actively working to sustain armed groups in Latin America (see this paper I did for the NEFA Foundation for details.)
FARC drug trafficking is helping sustain the apparatus around Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. At least 30 percent of Colombian cocaine is now shipped out through Venezuela, which is showing no enforcement capacity at all, and much of the cocaine ends up in West Africa (on Venezuelan ships and airplanes) before being shipped onward to Europe.
The proceeds, as shown by the documents taken from the Reyes computer, provide senior Venezuelan military and intelligence officials with "supplemental" funds, so they don't have to tap into the rapidly-diminishing oil revenue. It is worth noting that Venezuela's budget assumed at least a price of $90 a barrel, and it is now less than $40, meaning the shortfall has to be made up somewhere.
Chavez's continuation in power, in turn, is vital to the pushing the radical Islamist agenda of Iran, as well as the expansionist agenda of Russia (along with the Russian strong economic interest selling weapons in the region, to the tune of $4.5 billion to Venezuela alone.)
Afghanistan has a similar cycle that has implications far beyond Afghanistan. The $400 million a year the Taliban can generate from the opium trade allows it to operate not only in Afghanistan, but to continue to destabilize Pakistan and perhaps aid its brothers in Somalia and elsewhere. It is worth noting that the Somali camps of Al Shabaab are growing increasingly sophisticated.
My point is that drugs, terrorism, organized crime and many of the world's state governments are no longer separate and discreet entities. There is a great deal of common interest and common connectors between them. And if we don't understand this, we will pay a heavy price.
It was another (along with Viktor Bout, Monzar al Kassar, and other "shadow facilitators") in a series of successful, aggressive moves by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in tackling not just drugs, but those that use the money to arm those who want to carry out attacks around the globe, particularly aimed at the United States.
As prosecutor Matthew Stiglitz said in court yesterday, Mohammed's "significance ultimately rests with the symbiotic confluence of two worlds: drugs and terrorism. Without him or men like him, there is no effective insurgency in Afghanistan."
The same can be said for numerous insurgent groups that continue to exist because of the money generated from the nexus to organized crime.
I know I have hammered on this point a lot recently, but there is still so little attention focused on this that I think it is necessary, especially when the concept is so strongly reinforced by a tangible case.
This is the future, and we must understand what is coming at us if effective policies are going to be made, and resources allocated, to combat it. There is no doubt states such as Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Russia present a host of challenges. There is also no doubt that these states need and profit from non-state groups that rely on these shadow facilitators and criminal/terrorist organizations to carry out certain policy objectives.
The FARC in Colombia and the resurgent Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru are examples in our own hemisphere of these groups.
The FARC is actively working to sustain armed groups in Latin America (see this paper I did for the NEFA Foundation for details.)
FARC drug trafficking is helping sustain the apparatus around Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. At least 30 percent of Colombian cocaine is now shipped out through Venezuela, which is showing no enforcement capacity at all, and much of the cocaine ends up in West Africa (on Venezuelan ships and airplanes) before being shipped onward to Europe.
The proceeds, as shown by the documents taken from the Reyes computer, provide senior Venezuelan military and intelligence officials with "supplemental" funds, so they don't have to tap into the rapidly-diminishing oil revenue. It is worth noting that Venezuela's budget assumed at least a price of $90 a barrel, and it is now less than $40, meaning the shortfall has to be made up somewhere.
Chavez's continuation in power, in turn, is vital to the pushing the radical Islamist agenda of Iran, as well as the expansionist agenda of Russia (along with the Russian strong economic interest selling weapons in the region, to the tune of $4.5 billion to Venezuela alone.)
Afghanistan has a similar cycle that has implications far beyond Afghanistan. The $400 million a year the Taliban can generate from the opium trade allows it to operate not only in Afghanistan, but to continue to destabilize Pakistan and perhaps aid its brothers in Somalia and elsewhere. It is worth noting that the Somali camps of Al Shabaab are growing increasingly sophisticated.
My point is that drugs, terrorism, organized crime and many of the world's state governments are no longer separate and discreet entities. There is a great deal of common interest and common connectors between them. And if we don't understand this, we will pay a heavy price.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 22, 2008
An Interesting Look at Why Hezbollah Matters and the Future of Warfare
This interesting study by the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel wars offers some important insights not only into that conflict, but why Hezbollah matters and how their actions can affect how future wars develop.
The study, first brought to public attention by the Haaretz newspaper,concludes that Hezbollah fought the war not as an "information age guerrillas," but as a prototype of a new hybrid force that also relies on conventional tactics and structures.
The report also concludes Hezbollah fought better than any other Arab force to fight with Israel.
The report is worth reading because, whether one agrees or not with everything there, it is thought-provoking. It is particularly important given Hezbollah's growing strength and reach in Latin America, because it shows that the movement has a disciplined, innovative military mind-set.
This discipline and ability to take the long view is why it is so difficult, to my thinking, to dismiss the presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America.
These state and nonstate groups operating in a coordinated fashion, are are exerting a great deal effort and a considerable sum of money in troubled economic times to pursue their agenda. It is hard to believe they would do that for no return, or without an expected strategic payoff.
This combination (state-nonstate) may be an important factor in understanding how Hezbollah as developed over time to look like a more conventional force. Without state support, that would likely not be possible.
As an aside, it also maintains strong ties with other militant groups, such as Hamas and the international Muslim Brotherhood, as this remarkable photograph from the Holy Land trial exhibits show, dug out by the NEFA Foundation.
In the picture, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrahhah is flanked by Hamas leader Khaled Mishal and chief Muslim Brotherhood theologian Yousef al-Qaradawi. That is Qaradawi, who raised funds for the HLF, according to U.S. government documents, and who has issued fatwas favoring the killing of Americans in Iraq; the beating of women and the conquest of the rest of the world in the pursuit of establishing an Islamist caliphate.
But back to the study. It makes the important point that most forces today are neither purely guerrilla nor purely conventional, and that Hezbollah in the 2006 campaign, was closer to the latter, while maintaining important elements of the former.
Hezbollah’s methods were thus somewhere between the popular conceptions of guerrilla and conventional warfare—but so are most military actors’, whether state or nonstate. Few real militaries have ever conformed perfectly to either the "conventional" or the
"guerrilla" extreme. The commonplace tendency to see guerrilla and conventional methods as a stark dichotomy and to associate the former with nonstate actors and the latter with states is a mistake and has been so for at least a century.
In fact, there are profound elements of "guerrilla" methods in the military behavior of almost all state militaries in conventional warfare, from tactics all the way through strategy. And most nonstate guerrilla organizations have long used tactics and strategies that most observers tend to associate with state military behavior. In reality, there is a continuum of methods between the polar extremes of the Maginot Line and the Viet Cong, and most real-world cases have always fallen somewhere in between. The 2006 Lebanon campaign, too, fell somewhere in between. Its placement on this continuum, however, is much further from the Viet Cong end of the scale than many low-tech transformation advocates would expect for a nonstate actor—and, in fact, the biggest divergence between Hezbollah’s methods and those of modern Western militaries may well be Hezbollah’s imperfect proficiency of execution rather than the doctrine they were trying to execute.
The question then is, how should the U.S. military be restructuring its forces for the coming decades? The authors argue that too much change to deal with asymmetrical warfare would be counter-productive. We will likely be facing more of these hybrid organizations, just as we face growing hybrids between criminal and terrorist structures.
The Obama administration will have multiple short-term crises to deal with. But this is one of the longer-range ones that needs to be tackled consistently over time to get it right.
The study, first brought to public attention by the Haaretz newspaper,concludes that Hezbollah fought the war not as an "information age guerrillas," but as a prototype of a new hybrid force that also relies on conventional tactics and structures.
The report also concludes Hezbollah fought better than any other Arab force to fight with Israel.
The report is worth reading because, whether one agrees or not with everything there, it is thought-provoking. It is particularly important given Hezbollah's growing strength and reach in Latin America, because it shows that the movement has a disciplined, innovative military mind-set.
This discipline and ability to take the long view is why it is so difficult, to my thinking, to dismiss the presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America.
These state and nonstate groups operating in a coordinated fashion, are are exerting a great deal effort and a considerable sum of money in troubled economic times to pursue their agenda. It is hard to believe they would do that for no return, or without an expected strategic payoff.
This combination (state-nonstate) may be an important factor in understanding how Hezbollah as developed over time to look like a more conventional force. Without state support, that would likely not be possible.
As an aside, it also maintains strong ties with other militant groups, such as Hamas and the international Muslim Brotherhood, as this remarkable photograph from the Holy Land trial exhibits show, dug out by the NEFA Foundation.
In the picture, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrahhah is flanked by Hamas leader Khaled Mishal and chief Muslim Brotherhood theologian Yousef al-Qaradawi. That is Qaradawi, who raised funds for the HLF, according to U.S. government documents, and who has issued fatwas favoring the killing of Americans in Iraq; the beating of women and the conquest of the rest of the world in the pursuit of establishing an Islamist caliphate.
But back to the study. It makes the important point that most forces today are neither purely guerrilla nor purely conventional, and that Hezbollah in the 2006 campaign, was closer to the latter, while maintaining important elements of the former.
Hezbollah’s methods were thus somewhere between the popular conceptions of guerrilla and conventional warfare—but so are most military actors’, whether state or nonstate. Few real militaries have ever conformed perfectly to either the "conventional" or the
"guerrilla" extreme. The commonplace tendency to see guerrilla and conventional methods as a stark dichotomy and to associate the former with nonstate actors and the latter with states is a mistake and has been so for at least a century.
In fact, there are profound elements of "guerrilla" methods in the military behavior of almost all state militaries in conventional warfare, from tactics all the way through strategy. And most nonstate guerrilla organizations have long used tactics and strategies that most observers tend to associate with state military behavior. In reality, there is a continuum of methods between the polar extremes of the Maginot Line and the Viet Cong, and most real-world cases have always fallen somewhere in between. The 2006 Lebanon campaign, too, fell somewhere in between. Its placement on this continuum, however, is much further from the Viet Cong end of the scale than many low-tech transformation advocates would expect for a nonstate actor—and, in fact, the biggest divergence between Hezbollah’s methods and those of modern Western militaries may well be Hezbollah’s imperfect proficiency of execution rather than the doctrine they were trying to execute.
The question then is, how should the U.S. military be restructuring its forces for the coming decades? The authors argue that too much change to deal with asymmetrical warfare would be counter-productive. We will likely be facing more of these hybrid organizations, just as we face growing hybrids between criminal and terrorist structures.
The Obama administration will have multiple short-term crises to deal with. But this is one of the longer-range ones that needs to be tackled consistently over time to get it right.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 23, 2008
The Only Thing Worse Than No Action is...
While it appears the United Nations took a step forward by authorizing military actions on land to combat Somali pirates, the truth is, it is anther mistake in dealing with the region.
I am not against the sentiment of the UN action. I think hot pursuit into Somali territory to free ships, hostages and combat terrorism are fully warranted, and indeed necessary.
With a portion of the ships' ransom money going to Islamist terrorists and another portion going to leaders of the feckless government, all in the interests of fueling a senseless war that has destroyed a nation beyond repair, one can make a powerful argument that something must be done.
Indeed, the content of Resolution 1851, which I applaud, authorizes for one year states already involved in fighting piracy off Somalia to "take all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia" to suppress "acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea."
Unlike previous resolutions, the current text empowers states combating piracy to conduct operations on land in Somalia.
Secretary of State Rice hailed adoption of the resolution, saying it sent a "strong signal to combat the scourge of piracy" and stressing the need "to end the impunity of Somali pirates."
But it isn't going to happen. And that sets up the UN (and by extension the US and others who pushed the measure) for failure and a show of weakness.
The only thing worse than taking no action when it is required is to promise action, and then fail to deliver. It reveals the weakness to do anything other than talk and threaten. If you have to do that, than you are likely not actually going to act. And I would bet a great deal that there will be little real action resulting from this "strong signal." Who is willing to put boots on the ground in Somalia, even for vital commercial interests? I think the answer will be, no one.
If you have any doubt of the terrible consequences of empowering armed groups, including terrorists, by making hollow threats, just read Stephen Kinzer's book, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man who Dreamed it.
The Rwandan genocide was predicated in part on the belief that the international community (meaning the UN or countries individually) would be too weak and indecisive to intervene. The token UN force sent, with no mandate to act and unwilling to protect civilians, became the catalyst for ever-greater violence against those they were in theory there to protect. They bet right
The Somali pirate gangs, holding several ships and more than 100 hostages, are likely to wonder what the news means. When they figure out it means nothing, they will redouble their activities in an effort to show the world they can operate despite the public promises to stop them.
Until one is ready to act, it is far better to stay silent. Brandishing hollow threats only emboldens those, who, like the Somali pirates, continue to successfully bet that the outside world, for all its threats, has no real intention of doing anything significant.
I am not against the sentiment of the UN action. I think hot pursuit into Somali territory to free ships, hostages and combat terrorism are fully warranted, and indeed necessary.
With a portion of the ships' ransom money going to Islamist terrorists and another portion going to leaders of the feckless government, all in the interests of fueling a senseless war that has destroyed a nation beyond repair, one can make a powerful argument that something must be done.
Indeed, the content of Resolution 1851, which I applaud, authorizes for one year states already involved in fighting piracy off Somalia to "take all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia" to suppress "acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea."
Unlike previous resolutions, the current text empowers states combating piracy to conduct operations on land in Somalia.
Secretary of State Rice hailed adoption of the resolution, saying it sent a "strong signal to combat the scourge of piracy" and stressing the need "to end the impunity of Somali pirates."
But it isn't going to happen. And that sets up the UN (and by extension the US and others who pushed the measure) for failure and a show of weakness.
The only thing worse than taking no action when it is required is to promise action, and then fail to deliver. It reveals the weakness to do anything other than talk and threaten. If you have to do that, than you are likely not actually going to act. And I would bet a great deal that there will be little real action resulting from this "strong signal." Who is willing to put boots on the ground in Somalia, even for vital commercial interests? I think the answer will be, no one.
If you have any doubt of the terrible consequences of empowering armed groups, including terrorists, by making hollow threats, just read Stephen Kinzer's book, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man who Dreamed it.
The Rwandan genocide was predicated in part on the belief that the international community (meaning the UN or countries individually) would be too weak and indecisive to intervene. The token UN force sent, with no mandate to act and unwilling to protect civilians, became the catalyst for ever-greater violence against those they were in theory there to protect. They bet right
The Somali pirate gangs, holding several ships and more than 100 hostages, are likely to wonder what the news means. When they figure out it means nothing, they will redouble their activities in an effort to show the world they can operate despite the public promises to stop them.
Until one is ready to act, it is far better to stay silent. Brandishing hollow threats only emboldens those, who, like the Somali pirates, continue to successfully bet that the outside world, for all its threats, has no real intention of doing anything significant.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 15, 2008
A Look At Why Even Good Plans Fail
We often wonder why, even when armed with the best of intentions and perhaps even sound plans, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts seem futile once the fighting stops. Billions of dollars later (and often a good many deaths of our military personnel and others), things head south.
Two stories today offer a partial answer to that question, and demonstrate vividly that a military victory is only a small part of what counterinsurgency and counterterrorism actually are. There have been victories in both Afghanistan (the U.S. and NATO) and Somalia (Ethiopia with U.S. support).
The first story is a reflection in the Washington Post Outlook section on total failure of the Afghan government to mitigate rampant corruption and abuse. The government has often been aided and abetted by international donors and others who value short-term fixes over true reform.
The point made is that the Taliban is resurgent, and somewhat accepted, because the government offers nothing better, or at least is perceived to be corrupt beyond redemption.
I think this is somewhat simplistic and misses some important issues (the Taliban's ability to finance itself through opium etc.), but people living through the current Afghanistan situation say the current level of corruption and abuse by those in power has made a mockery of the government and stripped it of all legitimacy. Perhaps the difference is that government drug traffickers and warlords work only for themselves while the Taliban sends at least some of its illicit proceeds on upgrading the fighting capabilities of its forces.
If the government we support and pour billions of dollars into, cannot come off in the minds of the vast majority of citizens as clearly better, then the efforts are worth little.
The second story is the astounding news that, although the government controls nothing of importance in Somalia and the radical Islamist extremists are now in the capital again holding press conferences, the president and prime minister are at each other's throats.
One would think that perhaps the president whose country is in mortal danger had better things to do than fire the prime minister, as neither has any real power. The prime minister vows not to leave, and attacks the president. This is the government that enjoys international support and claims to have some legitimacy inside Somalia.
But the weakness, corruption and ineffectiveness, have, against all odds, made the radical Islamists, with their style of a law and order agenda, the more attractive option for most of the people.
While this farce was playing out, the al Shabab Islamists were in Mogadishu, holding a news conference declaring their desire to establish an Islamist caliphate across the world, implement Sharia law and engage in no negotiations with the now-shredded remnants of the government.
People seem to view the end of the violence and horror of their daily lives at the hands of Islamists to be a better option than the ineptness they witness in a government the outside world largely supports. Quite a statement on that government. Perhaps the leaders have that luxury because they do not actually have to live in Somalia, but can stay in foreign capital and squabble while the country goes to hell.
My point is that people are largely rational, and seek the wellbeing of themselves and their families. If we have situations where the better option is perceived to be a force that promises security in exchange for every liberty and advancement made in the past 500 years, then the forces on the other side have erred beyond all redemption.
Two stories today offer a partial answer to that question, and demonstrate vividly that a military victory is only a small part of what counterinsurgency and counterterrorism actually are. There have been victories in both Afghanistan (the U.S. and NATO) and Somalia (Ethiopia with U.S. support).
The first story is a reflection in the Washington Post Outlook section on total failure of the Afghan government to mitigate rampant corruption and abuse. The government has often been aided and abetted by international donors and others who value short-term fixes over true reform.
The point made is that the Taliban is resurgent, and somewhat accepted, because the government offers nothing better, or at least is perceived to be corrupt beyond redemption.
I think this is somewhat simplistic and misses some important issues (the Taliban's ability to finance itself through opium etc.), but people living through the current Afghanistan situation say the current level of corruption and abuse by those in power has made a mockery of the government and stripped it of all legitimacy. Perhaps the difference is that government drug traffickers and warlords work only for themselves while the Taliban sends at least some of its illicit proceeds on upgrading the fighting capabilities of its forces.
If the government we support and pour billions of dollars into, cannot come off in the minds of the vast majority of citizens as clearly better, then the efforts are worth little.
The second story is the astounding news that, although the government controls nothing of importance in Somalia and the radical Islamist extremists are now in the capital again holding press conferences, the president and prime minister are at each other's throats.
One would think that perhaps the president whose country is in mortal danger had better things to do than fire the prime minister, as neither has any real power. The prime minister vows not to leave, and attacks the president. This is the government that enjoys international support and claims to have some legitimacy inside Somalia.
But the weakness, corruption and ineffectiveness, have, against all odds, made the radical Islamists, with their style of a law and order agenda, the more attractive option for most of the people.
While this farce was playing out, the al Shabab Islamists were in Mogadishu, holding a news conference declaring their desire to establish an Islamist caliphate across the world, implement Sharia law and engage in no negotiations with the now-shredded remnants of the government.
People seem to view the end of the violence and horror of their daily lives at the hands of Islamists to be a better option than the ineptness they witness in a government the outside world largely supports. Quite a statement on that government. Perhaps the leaders have that luxury because they do not actually have to live in Somalia, but can stay in foreign capital and squabble while the country goes to hell.
My point is that people are largely rational, and seek the wellbeing of themselves and their families. If we have situations where the better option is perceived to be a force that promises security in exchange for every liberty and advancement made in the past 500 years, then the forces on the other side have erred beyond all redemption.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH