Monday October 13, 2008
The Hearts and Minds Issue
One of the striking things about several of today's military engagements with Islamist radicals is the inability to improve people's lives, even after several years on the ground.
The most obvious example is Afghanistan, where Gen. David McKiernan warns that better governance and economic progress are vital.
"It is true that in many places of this country we don't have an acceptable level of security. We don't have good governance. We don't have socio-economic progress. We don't have people that are able to grow their produce and get it to market. We don't have freedom of movement," he told a news conference in Kabul.
One of the great lessons of the Taliban's first takeover was not that their theology and ideology were loved and supported by all or even most Afghanis. It was that the Taliban promised-and delivered-stability and security.
The same is true in Somalia, where chaos now reigns, despite the presence of foreign troops and AU peacekeepers. The biggest failing of the effort is the failure to deliver on the promises to make Mogadishu and other areas safe and secure. The Islamists did when they controlled Mogadishu, the international forces have not.
My point is that much is made over the idea of winning people's hearts and minds, and that is often interpreted as getting people to love us, or at least really, really like us, or whatever anti-Islamist group is fighting.
But, in my years of covering insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, that is a fanciful notion. What people do want, especially in situations where chaos and fear have been the norm for years, is to live a somewhat normal and secure life. The relative success in Iraq, I would argue, is due as much to that as any other factor. That is the danger of the Iraqi government's inability to press forward on the political side, for real improvement, while the military creates a climate of normalcy.
People want to go to the movies and get ice cream with their children without fear of being blown up. They want basic medical services to function, and for the constant worry about being kidnapped to cease. They want the fear to cease. They don't want to love us, and they probably won't. But if these basic needs are met, the appeal of the Islamists withers.
There is one caveat. If the anti-Islamist forces, whether US or others, inflict civilian casualties, the war is essentially lost. Every civilian killed turns an entire family, sub-clan and perhaps clan, away from us and into the arms of the Islamists. Those people cannot be won over, no matter what the inducements to change are.
I have seen in this in many wars. The FMLN in El Salvador grew exponentially as the military repression increased and innocent people were targeted by death squads. The Contras prospered when the Sandinistas started their internal repression. The RUF in Sierra Leone was the most reviled rebel movement I have ever seen, because of what they did to civilians on the ground.
I find it striking that so much effort is put into telling victims of atrocities that they are, in fact, victims of atrocities. They already know that. They understand the abuses of the Taliban or the ICU in Somalia far better than we do. The RUF victims did not need to be told what had happened. They had the stumps of their arms or legs to show they understood.
All they need and want is to have a portion of their lives back. Whoever can give that to them will win. That is why the corruption endemic in Afghanistan, touching the president's brother and fed by drug profits, is so corrosive. Because people know it, and feel the effects every day in the humiliation of trying to get a broken system to work in some fashion, to deliver some basic service.
Secretary Gates and the military command have moved a long way toward understanding this in Iraq. The question is whether these basic lessons and principles will be applied elsewhere.
The most obvious example is Afghanistan, where Gen. David McKiernan warns that better governance and economic progress are vital.
"It is true that in many places of this country we don't have an acceptable level of security. We don't have good governance. We don't have socio-economic progress. We don't have people that are able to grow their produce and get it to market. We don't have freedom of movement," he told a news conference in Kabul.
One of the great lessons of the Taliban's first takeover was not that their theology and ideology were loved and supported by all or even most Afghanis. It was that the Taliban promised-and delivered-stability and security.
The same is true in Somalia, where chaos now reigns, despite the presence of foreign troops and AU peacekeepers. The biggest failing of the effort is the failure to deliver on the promises to make Mogadishu and other areas safe and secure. The Islamists did when they controlled Mogadishu, the international forces have not.
My point is that much is made over the idea of winning people's hearts and minds, and that is often interpreted as getting people to love us, or at least really, really like us, or whatever anti-Islamist group is fighting.
But, in my years of covering insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, that is a fanciful notion. What people do want, especially in situations where chaos and fear have been the norm for years, is to live a somewhat normal and secure life. The relative success in Iraq, I would argue, is due as much to that as any other factor. That is the danger of the Iraqi government's inability to press forward on the political side, for real improvement, while the military creates a climate of normalcy.
People want to go to the movies and get ice cream with their children without fear of being blown up. They want basic medical services to function, and for the constant worry about being kidnapped to cease. They want the fear to cease. They don't want to love us, and they probably won't. But if these basic needs are met, the appeal of the Islamists withers.
There is one caveat. If the anti-Islamist forces, whether US or others, inflict civilian casualties, the war is essentially lost. Every civilian killed turns an entire family, sub-clan and perhaps clan, away from us and into the arms of the Islamists. Those people cannot be won over, no matter what the inducements to change are.
I have seen in this in many wars. The FMLN in El Salvador grew exponentially as the military repression increased and innocent people were targeted by death squads. The Contras prospered when the Sandinistas started their internal repression. The RUF in Sierra Leone was the most reviled rebel movement I have ever seen, because of what they did to civilians on the ground.
I find it striking that so much effort is put into telling victims of atrocities that they are, in fact, victims of atrocities. They already know that. They understand the abuses of the Taliban or the ICU in Somalia far better than we do. The RUF victims did not need to be told what had happened. They had the stumps of their arms or legs to show they understood.
All they need and want is to have a portion of their lives back. Whoever can give that to them will win. That is why the corruption endemic in Afghanistan, touching the president's brother and fed by drug profits, is so corrosive. Because people know it, and feel the effects every day in the humiliation of trying to get a broken system to work in some fashion, to deliver some basic service.
Secretary Gates and the military command have moved a long way toward understanding this in Iraq. The question is whether these basic lessons and principles will be applied elsewhere.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday October 9, 2008
A Slow Recognition of the Criminal-Terrorist Pipeline
Slowly, it seems, the criminal-terrorist nexus is coming into a sharper focus for policy makers. The head of DHS intelligence analysis
This may not seem like much, but until now, there has been only passing comments by U.S. Southern Command commanders and the DEA on the linkages between drug trafficking organizations and Islamist radicals. In this case, the threat is primarily from Iran and the Shiite Hezbollah organization rather than the Sunni-al Qaeda linked groups.
DEA Chief of Operations Mike Braun, at the same conference, aptly noted that drug traffickers and terrorist organizations often have much in common: ""They use the same money launderers, the same document forgers," he said. "You are naturally going to bump up against terrorist organizations."
Much of the discussion of these matters takes place in the context of these linkages being hypothetical, something to watch out for down the road.
Allen said the possibility of cooperation between terrorists and drug trafficking organizations was a "low probability" and would be "unprecedented," but that it was feasible.
I have a somewhat different take on this because, while each piece of the puzzle presents a fragmentary picture, all the pieces together show this would be, I think, a far higher probability.
The alliances among drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations have already taken place in Colombia (The FARC and AUC). The FARC has demonstrated an ability to reach out to other terrorist groups-even those who have little in common with the FARC's Marxist ideology-for technology sharing, information sharing and weapons (see paper I did for the NEFA Foundation for details).
The FARC is transnational and wants specific things, in exchange for money. Right now that something is surface-to-air capability, in order to down U.S. and Colombian aircraft. It does not care who provides them
The FARC, in turn, is backed by not only president Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, but by his intelligence apparatus, and his military leadership, who profit now directly from the drug trade.
In turn, Chavez's closest ally, the ones providing him (along with Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega and Evo Morales in Bolivia) intelligence training, equipment and advisers, is Iran. And Iran runs Hezbollah, and Hezbollah's fairly widespread presence in Venezuela, Panama, Colombia and the Tri-Border Area has been well-documented.
I also have a different take on the issue of terrorists using the illicit pipelines of drug traffickers and coyotes to enter the United States. I do not think you can discount that now.
However, with Nicaragua and Venezuela willing to issue passports to allies (and Ortega with a long history of issuing them to terrorists) my greater fear is that terrorists will simply be able to travel about freely on valid, legitimate travel documents from Chavez or Ortega. These would be far harder to detect because, in reality, there is nothing illegal to detect.
But it is heartening to see these issues coming to the forefront of the policy debate, at least from time to time.
This may not seem like much, but until now, there has been only passing comments by U.S. Southern Command commanders and the DEA on the linkages between drug trafficking organizations and Islamist radicals. In this case, the threat is primarily from Iran and the Shiite Hezbollah organization rather than the Sunni-al Qaeda linked groups.
DEA Chief of Operations Mike Braun, at the same conference, aptly noted that drug traffickers and terrorist organizations often have much in common: ""They use the same money launderers, the same document forgers," he said. "You are naturally going to bump up against terrorist organizations."
Much of the discussion of these matters takes place in the context of these linkages being hypothetical, something to watch out for down the road.
Allen said the possibility of cooperation between terrorists and drug trafficking organizations was a "low probability" and would be "unprecedented," but that it was feasible.
I have a somewhat different take on this because, while each piece of the puzzle presents a fragmentary picture, all the pieces together show this would be, I think, a far higher probability.
The alliances among drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations have already taken place in Colombia (The FARC and AUC). The FARC has demonstrated an ability to reach out to other terrorist groups-even those who have little in common with the FARC's Marxist ideology-for technology sharing, information sharing and weapons (see paper I did for the NEFA Foundation for details).
The FARC is transnational and wants specific things, in exchange for money. Right now that something is surface-to-air capability, in order to down U.S. and Colombian aircraft. It does not care who provides them
The FARC, in turn, is backed by not only president Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, but by his intelligence apparatus, and his military leadership, who profit now directly from the drug trade.
In turn, Chavez's closest ally, the ones providing him (along with Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega and Evo Morales in Bolivia) intelligence training, equipment and advisers, is Iran. And Iran runs Hezbollah, and Hezbollah's fairly widespread presence in Venezuela, Panama, Colombia and the Tri-Border Area has been well-documented.
I also have a different take on the issue of terrorists using the illicit pipelines of drug traffickers and coyotes to enter the United States. I do not think you can discount that now.
However, with Nicaragua and Venezuela willing to issue passports to allies (and Ortega with a long history of issuing them to terrorists) my greater fear is that terrorists will simply be able to travel about freely on valid, legitimate travel documents from Chavez or Ortega. These would be far harder to detect because, in reality, there is nothing illegal to detect.
But it is heartening to see these issues coming to the forefront of the policy debate, at least from time to time.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday October 6, 2008
Aghanistan Hits the Tipping Point
Seems like things in Afghanistan, at least in the world of perceptions, is going south as fast as Dow Jones. While circumstances on the ground have not changed radically in recent months, the Taliban have scored significant success simply by starting the current debate on whether the war in Afghanistan is winnable at all.
The opening salvo was fired in a leaked French diplomatic cable, which quoted the British ambassador in Kabul as saying the war couldn't be won.
According to the New York Times version:
"The current situation is bad, the security situation is getting worse, so is corruption, and the government has lost all trust," the British envoy, Sherard Cowper-Coles, was quoted as saying by the author of the cable, François Fitou, the French deputy ambassador to Kabul.
"The presence of the coalition, in particular its military presence, is part of the problem, not part of its solution," Cowper-Coles was quoted as saying. "Foreign forces are the lifeline of a regime that would rapidly collapse without them. As such, they slow down and complicate a possible emergence from the crisis."
Then, in one of the first stories on what all of Kabul knows, the NYT took on the issue of the possible involvement of President Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali, to the booming heroin trade. This, of course, only serves to reinforce the ambassador's fears about the growing corruption and the complete loss of faith in the Karzai government.
The latest estimate, according to my friend James Meeks is that the Taliban get at least $100 million a year from the very same dope trade. That is confidence inspiring.
And finally, the growing exasperation among the NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan about what to do about any of this.
As Reuters reported, Gen. John Craddock is fed up with the lack of support to take on the drug trade.
NATO's top operations commander hit out on Monday at allies resisting his call for the alliance to use more aggressive tactics against Afghan drug production.
"We still have a handful of nations...who have not listened to the argument but are countering with questions that have been answered over and over and over again," NATO Supreme Commander for Europe General John Craddock told a seminar in Brussels.
"This is not about eradication. The fear that this will make the Taliban more mad-ass? Give me a break!" he said.
"What are these suicide bombs and IEDs, these terrorist attacks, all about? How can it be any worse?"
While it clearly can get worse, and may very quickly, the statement sums up just how far the Taliban has come in setting the mindset on the ground, almost, at this point, unconnected from the combat realities. They have established a debate, and a very serious one by serious people, over whether they can lose. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, that is quite an achievement.
The opening salvo was fired in a leaked French diplomatic cable, which quoted the British ambassador in Kabul as saying the war couldn't be won.
According to the New York Times version:
"The current situation is bad, the security situation is getting worse, so is corruption, and the government has lost all trust," the British envoy, Sherard Cowper-Coles, was quoted as saying by the author of the cable, François Fitou, the French deputy ambassador to Kabul.
"The presence of the coalition, in particular its military presence, is part of the problem, not part of its solution," Cowper-Coles was quoted as saying. "Foreign forces are the lifeline of a regime that would rapidly collapse without them. As such, they slow down and complicate a possible emergence from the crisis."
Then, in one of the first stories on what all of Kabul knows, the NYT took on the issue of the possible involvement of President Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali, to the booming heroin trade. This, of course, only serves to reinforce the ambassador's fears about the growing corruption and the complete loss of faith in the Karzai government.
The latest estimate, according to my friend James Meeks is that the Taliban get at least $100 million a year from the very same dope trade. That is confidence inspiring.
And finally, the growing exasperation among the NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan about what to do about any of this.
As Reuters reported, Gen. John Craddock is fed up with the lack of support to take on the drug trade.
NATO's top operations commander hit out on Monday at allies resisting his call for the alliance to use more aggressive tactics against Afghan drug production.
"We still have a handful of nations...who have not listened to the argument but are countering with questions that have been answered over and over and over again," NATO Supreme Commander for Europe General John Craddock told a seminar in Brussels.
"This is not about eradication. The fear that this will make the Taliban more mad-ass? Give me a break!" he said.
"What are these suicide bombs and IEDs, these terrorist attacks, all about? How can it be any worse?"
While it clearly can get worse, and may very quickly, the statement sums up just how far the Taliban has come in setting the mindset on the ground, almost, at this point, unconnected from the combat realities. They have established a debate, and a very serious one by serious people, over whether they can lose. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, that is quite an achievement.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday October 3, 2008
The CIA and The Looming Threats for the Next President
CIA director Mike Hayden gave an an interesting interview to Fox News identifying the the greatest security challenges to the next administration.
One of the identified threats (after the increasingly unstable but nuclear-armed North Korea) is what Hayden dubbed the "Axis of Oil," that dangerous mix of petro-fueled dollars giving Russia, Iran and Venezuela the economic means to become increasingly reckless militarily.
This is correct, and, I believe, a healthy recognition that there are serious threats outside the Iraq and radical Sunni Islamist threat. The alliance of a radical Shiite Islamist state, a radical populist government and a nation correctly described as one that is reversing democratic gains and ruled by officially sanctioned organized crime, indeed poses a threat.
What gives that Axis its power is the money we pay for foreign oil. What binds them together is this money and their avowed and public desire to go after not just the United States, but Western democracies in other places.
None of them would be able to retain their oppressive state structures and fuel instability abroad (particularly aimed at Latin America) if they didn't have the billions of petro-dollars to do it.
Unfortunately, a full transcript of Hayden's remarks has not been posted, so all we have is a snippet of Hayden noting that oil prices, which are still hovering around $100 per barrel, have emboldened these oil-rich nations. "Oil, at its current price ... gives the Russian state a degree of influence and power that it would have not otherwise had," he said.
He noted that Russia's invasion of Georgian territory in August and Iran's continued work on acquiring nuclear weapons only compound the threat.
While this threat matrix seems obvious looking at it from the Latin American context, it is not a widely voice priority in the intelligence community. I have been to numerous events recently, hosted by an array of U.S. government agencies and departments, and have been baffled by the failure to look at the very matrix Hayden names.
Two of the countries, Iran and Venezuela, openly support terrorist groups that have a long history of striking at Americans. Russia has a long history (and now a rapidly-quickening pace) of arming both nations. Russia has nuclear weapons, Iran is working hard to get them, and Venezuela has the type of leader who would like to use one.
So it is heartening to see someone finally, if only briefly, acknowledging this threat exists and needs to be a priority for whomever wins in November.
One of the identified threats (after the increasingly unstable but nuclear-armed North Korea) is what Hayden dubbed the "Axis of Oil," that dangerous mix of petro-fueled dollars giving Russia, Iran and Venezuela the economic means to become increasingly reckless militarily.
This is correct, and, I believe, a healthy recognition that there are serious threats outside the Iraq and radical Sunni Islamist threat. The alliance of a radical Shiite Islamist state, a radical populist government and a nation correctly described as one that is reversing democratic gains and ruled by officially sanctioned organized crime, indeed poses a threat.
What gives that Axis its power is the money we pay for foreign oil. What binds them together is this money and their avowed and public desire to go after not just the United States, but Western democracies in other places.
None of them would be able to retain their oppressive state structures and fuel instability abroad (particularly aimed at Latin America) if they didn't have the billions of petro-dollars to do it.
Unfortunately, a full transcript of Hayden's remarks has not been posted, so all we have is a snippet of Hayden noting that oil prices, which are still hovering around $100 per barrel, have emboldened these oil-rich nations. "Oil, at its current price ... gives the Russian state a degree of influence and power that it would have not otherwise had," he said.
He noted that Russia's invasion of Georgian territory in August and Iran's continued work on acquiring nuclear weapons only compound the threat.
While this threat matrix seems obvious looking at it from the Latin American context, it is not a widely voice priority in the intelligence community. I have been to numerous events recently, hosted by an array of U.S. government agencies and departments, and have been baffled by the failure to look at the very matrix Hayden names.
Two of the countries, Iran and Venezuela, openly support terrorist groups that have a long history of striking at Americans. Russia has a long history (and now a rapidly-quickening pace) of arming both nations. Russia has nuclear weapons, Iran is working hard to get them, and Venezuela has the type of leader who would like to use one.
So it is heartening to see someone finally, if only briefly, acknowledging this threat exists and needs to be a priority for whomever wins in November.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday October 1, 2008
The FARC's World is Shrinking
The concerted effort by the United States and most of the European Union, along with a few countries in Latin America, are gradually cutting off the operational areas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Yesterday's OFAC designation of eight members of the FARC's international delegation is another step in that direction. The FARC is a designated terrorist organization by the U.S. and the EU.
These International Commission members represent the FARC in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, and Canada.
As I wrote in this paper for the NEFA Foundation, the FARC's international structure has been one of the most underestimated elements of support for the terrorist organization.
Until recently the conventional wisdom was that the FARC, historically a rural-based insurgency with little regard for international opinion, had not successfully developed an international support network. The computer documents taken from the camp of Raúl Reyes, the senior FARC commander killed in Ecuador March 1, show a far different reality.
Not only is there a structure that was being nurtured and financed by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, able to reach out to weapons traffickers in Australia and Belarus, but the FARC has successfully set up front groups across Latin America and has established a significant presence in Europe.
In addition, there has been a fairly close relationship between the FARC and the ETA of Spain and the Provisional IRA (P-IRA). The relationship included an extensive exchange of information and technology transfers, particularly in the area of homemade explosives.
It ironic to note that many of the children of senior FARC commanders live and work in Europe, and at least one of them, the son for the now-deceased Reyes, act on behalf of the FARC. Many went to the best universities, paid for by funds for the revolution.
The Reyes documents make clear that the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB), a multi-national umbrella organization composed of different national organizations, is funded and directed by the FARC, and used a a recruitment and fundraising instrument. The CCB leadership, founded with Chávez's assistance and encouragement, takes pains not to disclose the links except to select cadres.
None of this is new as tactics for revolutionary or clandestine movements. But it is now clear that following the collapse of the FARC used its ceasefire and peace talks with the government (1999-2002) to turn its attention to generating international support.
Now that structure is under severe stress, but can be rebuilt with the support of Chávez, Ortega in Nicaragua, Morales in Bolivia etc. But at least now people will know who they are dealing with, and a piece of the mask is chipped away.
Yesterday's OFAC designation of eight members of the FARC's international delegation is another step in that direction. The FARC is a designated terrorist organization by the U.S. and the EU.
These International Commission members represent the FARC in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, and Canada.
As I wrote in this paper for the NEFA Foundation, the FARC's international structure has been one of the most underestimated elements of support for the terrorist organization.
Until recently the conventional wisdom was that the FARC, historically a rural-based insurgency with little regard for international opinion, had not successfully developed an international support network. The computer documents taken from the camp of Raúl Reyes, the senior FARC commander killed in Ecuador March 1, show a far different reality.
Not only is there a structure that was being nurtured and financed by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, able to reach out to weapons traffickers in Australia and Belarus, but the FARC has successfully set up front groups across Latin America and has established a significant presence in Europe.
In addition, there has been a fairly close relationship between the FARC and the ETA of Spain and the Provisional IRA (P-IRA). The relationship included an extensive exchange of information and technology transfers, particularly in the area of homemade explosives.
It ironic to note that many of the children of senior FARC commanders live and work in Europe, and at least one of them, the son for the now-deceased Reyes, act on behalf of the FARC. Many went to the best universities, paid for by funds for the revolution.
The Reyes documents make clear that the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB), a multi-national umbrella organization composed of different national organizations, is funded and directed by the FARC, and used a a recruitment and fundraising instrument. The CCB leadership, founded with Chávez's assistance and encouragement, takes pains not to disclose the links except to select cadres.
None of this is new as tactics for revolutionary or clandestine movements. But it is now clear that following the collapse of the FARC used its ceasefire and peace talks with the government (1999-2002) to turn its attention to generating international support.
Now that structure is under severe stress, but can be rebuilt with the support of Chávez, Ortega in Nicaragua, Morales in Bolivia etc. But at least now people will know who they are dealing with, and a piece of the mask is chipped away.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH