Thursday September 4, 2008
The War on Drugs Hits Serious Snags
The almost-forgotten war on drugs has taken some serious hits recently, particularly in Latin America. This cyclical war waxes and wanes with the political will of each country involved and the consumption habits of drug users.
I take it seriously in large part because drug money is rapidly replacing state sponsorship for terrorist organizations that have reaches far beyond the world of drug trafficking. As I have written earlier, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) links 19 of the 43 designated terrorist organizations to drug trafficking activities at various levels.
These include Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, Tamil Tigers, ETA, as well as the FARC and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
A Washington Post story yesterday captured the paradox of the drug war, a paradox I have been pondering since my recent trip to Colombia.
It is this: The law enforcement community (particularly the DEA and Colombian National Police, along with the Colombian military) has made unprecedented strides in both dismantling drug trafficking organizations (in the case of Colombia, these include two designated terrorist organizations, the AUC and FARC rebels).
For the first time in 25 years there are no clearly identifiable drug kingpins running the cocaine trade from Colombia. The FARC and AUC are both seriously degraded.
Yet, production has not diminished, and, according to Colombian and U.S. officials, the amount of cocaine moving out of the Andean region (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) has showed almost no variation despite the tactical successes against the organizations.
This shows two things. The first is that good police work, combined with political will and support from the military, can successfully defeat large criminal/political structures financed by the drug trade and other illicit activities when those groups challenge the nation-state's existence. Until recent blows against the FARC, that was not a given.
The second is that, with the resources at stake, and atomized (some call it democratized) drug trafficking network will ensure that the product continues to flow, that supply will surge to meet demand. The trafficking groups cannot challenge the state openly, and each small unit makes far less than the grand capos did, but each groups receives enough to outweigh the risk of being caught.
From the law enforcement/military standpoint, these groups are much harder targets than the big cartels or defined structures like the FARC. And taking out one group yields, in relative terms, few results because, like an army of ants, there is always a replacement waiting and only a small portion of the market is disturbed.
That is why the strategy of targeting "shadow facilitators" working for several criminal/terrorist networks, as the DEA, Mexican and Colombian police have focused on, is so important. That is one of the few ways to disrupt more than one organization at a time.
Another striking facet is how little the governments of Latin America,after almost 30 years, view the fight against drugs as their own. The Washington Post reports today on the closing of the Manta drug base in Ecuador,the latest sign that the U.S. efforts there have little regional support.
The primary exception, of course, is Colombia, pushed to the brink of complete collapse by several different groups, all funded by the cocaine trade. Peru and Brazil are moderately interested in tackling the issue. The rest of the region is not.
So, after 30 years, on a political level there is no consensus that combatting drug trafficking is in the interest of most nations. Given the level of corruption, violence and social disintegration the criminal activities inevitably bring, such a conclusion by national leaders (backed, it seems, by the large majority of the population) is not easily understood.
What is clear to me is that there is a tremendous group of highly committed individuals in every country, often working together, who have radically changed the face of drug trafficking, and they have done so at great personal risk and often great cost.
This (again, with the exception of Colombia) has been largely ignored by the political leadership, meaning that one side of equation (law enforcement and military) has had successful buy-ins to the program while the other (political) side has failed completely. The next administration should give some serious thought as to why that is.
I take it seriously in large part because drug money is rapidly replacing state sponsorship for terrorist organizations that have reaches far beyond the world of drug trafficking. As I have written earlier, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) links 19 of the 43 designated terrorist organizations to drug trafficking activities at various levels.
These include Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, Tamil Tigers, ETA, as well as the FARC and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
A Washington Post story yesterday captured the paradox of the drug war, a paradox I have been pondering since my recent trip to Colombia.
It is this: The law enforcement community (particularly the DEA and Colombian National Police, along with the Colombian military) has made unprecedented strides in both dismantling drug trafficking organizations (in the case of Colombia, these include two designated terrorist organizations, the AUC and FARC rebels).
For the first time in 25 years there are no clearly identifiable drug kingpins running the cocaine trade from Colombia. The FARC and AUC are both seriously degraded.
Yet, production has not diminished, and, according to Colombian and U.S. officials, the amount of cocaine moving out of the Andean region (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) has showed almost no variation despite the tactical successes against the organizations.
This shows two things. The first is that good police work, combined with political will and support from the military, can successfully defeat large criminal/political structures financed by the drug trade and other illicit activities when those groups challenge the nation-state's existence. Until recent blows against the FARC, that was not a given.
The second is that, with the resources at stake, and atomized (some call it democratized) drug trafficking network will ensure that the product continues to flow, that supply will surge to meet demand. The trafficking groups cannot challenge the state openly, and each small unit makes far less than the grand capos did, but each groups receives enough to outweigh the risk of being caught.
From the law enforcement/military standpoint, these groups are much harder targets than the big cartels or defined structures like the FARC. And taking out one group yields, in relative terms, few results because, like an army of ants, there is always a replacement waiting and only a small portion of the market is disturbed.
That is why the strategy of targeting "shadow facilitators" working for several criminal/terrorist networks, as the DEA, Mexican and Colombian police have focused on, is so important. That is one of the few ways to disrupt more than one organization at a time.
Another striking facet is how little the governments of Latin America,after almost 30 years, view the fight against drugs as their own. The Washington Post reports today on the closing of the Manta drug base in Ecuador,the latest sign that the U.S. efforts there have little regional support.
The primary exception, of course, is Colombia, pushed to the brink of complete collapse by several different groups, all funded by the cocaine trade. Peru and Brazil are moderately interested in tackling the issue. The rest of the region is not.
So, after 30 years, on a political level there is no consensus that combatting drug trafficking is in the interest of most nations. Given the level of corruption, violence and social disintegration the criminal activities inevitably bring, such a conclusion by national leaders (backed, it seems, by the large majority of the population) is not easily understood.
What is clear to me is that there is a tremendous group of highly committed individuals in every country, often working together, who have radically changed the face of drug trafficking, and they have done so at great personal risk and often great cost.
This (again, with the exception of Colombia) has been largely ignored by the political leadership, meaning that one side of equation (law enforcement and military) has had successful buy-ins to the program while the other (political) side has failed completely. The next administration should give some serious thought as to why that is.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday September 1, 2008
A Hidden Grain of Truth that Should Resonate
The Los Angeles Times has an interesting feature on the late Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah and his rather mysterious death on Feb. 12 in Damascus.
Mughniyah, of course, was one of the true pioneers in the use of terrorist tactics by radical Islamists against the West. Among the interesting details the report has is that, on the night his car blew up, incinerating him inside, Mughniyah was on his way to meet Syrian president Bashar Assad.
But there was one Mughniyah quote buried deep in the story that I thought was perhaps the most important in looking at what Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are up to. This should particularly resonate for those looking at Hezbollah in Latin America.
In an interview that he gave just before his death, and which was published afterward, Mughniyah was quoted as saying the following:
"The Americans are making up stories about me and hold me responsible for a lot of attacks against them that happened around the world," he told Ibrahim al-Amine of Lebanon's Al-Akhbar. "Sometimes they think of me as if I have the key to the universe. It is difficult for them to understand that I am part of an institution that patiently plans and designs its moves."
Yes, that is what is particularly difficult for U.S. policy makers to understand.
The several billion dollars of promised Iranian investment in Latin America, the careful cultivation of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the outreach to Bolivia, whose president, Evo Morales, arrived in Tehran yesterday, the opening of embassies across a region where it has no historical and few commercial ties, is not just a random desire by Iran to spend money.
There is a carefully thought-out plan, visible in the intelligence training Iran is offering, the banks opening in Venezuela to bypass international sanctions, and promises (often empty) of massive aid.
It is easier to personalize a problem and demonize an individual than it is to try to look for the broader, and more dangerous issues in terrorism and other security-related topics. This was true in the drug war in Colombia.
The thinking in the 1980s was that if Pablo Escobar were eliminated, the cocaine empire would crumble. When it didn't, the mantra was that the trade would collapse when the Cali cartel was eliminated. Then, the Northern Valley cartel, the the FARC.
Now, the Northern Valley folks are in US prisons, as are most of the Cali people. The FARC is in disarray. What has not changed is the amount of cocaine being produced in Colombia. An interesting conundrum we would rather not examine.
Because of this tendency to personalize a problem, the wider issues are often missed.
I have sat in discussions with senior government officials on the security threats from Latin America where neither Venezuela nor Iran is ever mentioned. Where Daniel Ortega, the gatekeeper to much of the Central American criminal/terrorist pipeline, is not mentioned.
The reason, according to a friend who has been in meeting where Latin American issues are discussed, is that it is an article of faith, believed zealously by many policy makers that 1) there is nothing unusual going on in Latin America; 2) if it is going on, it isn't serious; and 3) if it is serious, we can handle it.
In other words, mutually reinforcing, false assumptions, and one that Mughniyah, among many others, understood and exploited.
Mughniyah, of course, was one of the true pioneers in the use of terrorist tactics by radical Islamists against the West. Among the interesting details the report has is that, on the night his car blew up, incinerating him inside, Mughniyah was on his way to meet Syrian president Bashar Assad.
But there was one Mughniyah quote buried deep in the story that I thought was perhaps the most important in looking at what Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are up to. This should particularly resonate for those looking at Hezbollah in Latin America.
In an interview that he gave just before his death, and which was published afterward, Mughniyah was quoted as saying the following:
"The Americans are making up stories about me and hold me responsible for a lot of attacks against them that happened around the world," he told Ibrahim al-Amine of Lebanon's Al-Akhbar. "Sometimes they think of me as if I have the key to the universe. It is difficult for them to understand that I am part of an institution that patiently plans and designs its moves."
Yes, that is what is particularly difficult for U.S. policy makers to understand.
The several billion dollars of promised Iranian investment in Latin America, the careful cultivation of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the outreach to Bolivia, whose president, Evo Morales, arrived in Tehran yesterday, the opening of embassies across a region where it has no historical and few commercial ties, is not just a random desire by Iran to spend money.
There is a carefully thought-out plan, visible in the intelligence training Iran is offering, the banks opening in Venezuela to bypass international sanctions, and promises (often empty) of massive aid.
It is easier to personalize a problem and demonize an individual than it is to try to look for the broader, and more dangerous issues in terrorism and other security-related topics. This was true in the drug war in Colombia.
The thinking in the 1980s was that if Pablo Escobar were eliminated, the cocaine empire would crumble. When it didn't, the mantra was that the trade would collapse when the Cali cartel was eliminated. Then, the Northern Valley cartel, the the FARC.
Now, the Northern Valley folks are in US prisons, as are most of the Cali people. The FARC is in disarray. What has not changed is the amount of cocaine being produced in Colombia. An interesting conundrum we would rather not examine.
Because of this tendency to personalize a problem, the wider issues are often missed.
I have sat in discussions with senior government officials on the security threats from Latin America where neither Venezuela nor Iran is ever mentioned. Where Daniel Ortega, the gatekeeper to much of the Central American criminal/terrorist pipeline, is not mentioned.
The reason, according to a friend who has been in meeting where Latin American issues are discussed, is that it is an article of faith, believed zealously by many policy makers that 1) there is nothing unusual going on in Latin America; 2) if it is going on, it isn't serious; and 3) if it is serious, we can handle it.
In other words, mutually reinforcing, false assumptions, and one that Mughniyah, among many others, understood and exploited.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday August 27, 2008
The Dangers of Hezbollah in Latin America
The Los Angeles Timestoday carries an interesting story on the growing ties of Hezbollah in Venezuela.
As the article points out, such ties are not new, but what is more worrisome is the vast amount of cocaine being moved through Venezuela that passes through areas where the Hezbollah presence is most pronounced.
The issue is, of course, Iran's growing presence in the region, something the administration has paid surprising little attention to as the Iranian diplomatic and intelligence presence has mushroomed, not only in Venezuela, but in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.
Even Colombia, one of the few countries that is a strong U.S. ally in the region, has felt the need to allow the Iranians to open an embassy in Bogotá, in large part to have some idea of what that country is up to in the region.
It is passing strange that a socialist revolutionary (Hugo Chavez) and a radical Shite leader (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have become such fast strategic allies.
It is more strange that Iran is investing billions of dollars and expanding its diplomatic presence throughout Latin America, a region where it has almost no economic ties, no national interest and no historic presence.
This growth, not just in Iranian presence but in the availability of the diplomatic infrastructure to give immunity to activities of Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard, will be a destabilizing factor in the region for years to come.
As the story noted:
In June, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas A. Shannon said Iran "has a history of terror in this hemisphere, and its linkages to the bombings in Buenos Aires are pretty well established."
"One of our broader concerns is what Iran is doing elsewhere in this hemisphere and what it could do if we were to find ourselves in some kind of confrontation with Iran," Shannon said.
Hezbollah has a long history of two things that thrive in Venezuela, often in conjunction with the FARC in neighboring Colombia: kidnapping and drug trafficking. The FARC is on the ropes and looking for allies, and, according to senior Colombian officials. Chavez, while publicly distancing himself from the FARC, still allows their leadership movement and access in Venezuela.
Ecuador, on the other side of Colombia, remains an important military rearguard area for the rebels. It is not hard to see how these groups, with a common set of enemies (Colombia and the United States) can form tactical alliances that are useful to all.
There are other causes for concern, on all these fronts, as the story pointed out:
In March 2007, the intensified ties between Venezuela and Iran led to the start of weekly IranAir flights from Tehran to Caracas, the Venezuelan capital, that stop in Damascus.
The flights were highlighted in the State Department's annual assessment of global terrorism, which noted in April of this year that Venezuelan border officials at the Caracas airport often neglected to enter the arriving passengers into their immigration database and did not stamp passports. The Venezuelans have since tightened up on their procedures, informed sources say.
Despite those improvements, the IranAir flights also feature in recent intelligence gathered by Western anti-terrorism officials. Agents of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah have allegedly set up a special force to attempt to kidnap Jewish businesspeople in Latin America and spirit them away to Lebanon, according to the Western anti-terrorism official. Iranian and Hezbollah operatives traveling in and out of Venezuela have recruited Venezuelan informants working at the Caracas airport to gather intelligence on Jewish travelers as potential targets for abduction, the Western anti-terrorism official said.
The region is volatile, and yet receives almost no attention from policy makers in either party. I believe in a short time we will be forced to pay attention, whether we want to or not.
As the article points out, such ties are not new, but what is more worrisome is the vast amount of cocaine being moved through Venezuela that passes through areas where the Hezbollah presence is most pronounced.
The issue is, of course, Iran's growing presence in the region, something the administration has paid surprising little attention to as the Iranian diplomatic and intelligence presence has mushroomed, not only in Venezuela, but in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.
Even Colombia, one of the few countries that is a strong U.S. ally in the region, has felt the need to allow the Iranians to open an embassy in Bogotá, in large part to have some idea of what that country is up to in the region.
It is passing strange that a socialist revolutionary (Hugo Chavez) and a radical Shite leader (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have become such fast strategic allies.
It is more strange that Iran is investing billions of dollars and expanding its diplomatic presence throughout Latin America, a region where it has almost no economic ties, no national interest and no historic presence.
This growth, not just in Iranian presence but in the availability of the diplomatic infrastructure to give immunity to activities of Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard, will be a destabilizing factor in the region for years to come.
As the story noted:
In June, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas A. Shannon said Iran "has a history of terror in this hemisphere, and its linkages to the bombings in Buenos Aires are pretty well established."
"One of our broader concerns is what Iran is doing elsewhere in this hemisphere and what it could do if we were to find ourselves in some kind of confrontation with Iran," Shannon said.
Hezbollah has a long history of two things that thrive in Venezuela, often in conjunction with the FARC in neighboring Colombia: kidnapping and drug trafficking. The FARC is on the ropes and looking for allies, and, according to senior Colombian officials. Chavez, while publicly distancing himself from the FARC, still allows their leadership movement and access in Venezuela.
Ecuador, on the other side of Colombia, remains an important military rearguard area for the rebels. It is not hard to see how these groups, with a common set of enemies (Colombia and the United States) can form tactical alliances that are useful to all.
There are other causes for concern, on all these fronts, as the story pointed out:
In March 2007, the intensified ties between Venezuela and Iran led to the start of weekly IranAir flights from Tehran to Caracas, the Venezuelan capital, that stop in Damascus.
The flights were highlighted in the State Department's annual assessment of global terrorism, which noted in April of this year that Venezuelan border officials at the Caracas airport often neglected to enter the arriving passengers into their immigration database and did not stamp passports. The Venezuelans have since tightened up on their procedures, informed sources say.
Despite those improvements, the IranAir flights also feature in recent intelligence gathered by Western anti-terrorism officials. Agents of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah have allegedly set up a special force to attempt to kidnap Jewish businesspeople in Latin America and spirit them away to Lebanon, according to the Western anti-terrorism official. Iranian and Hezbollah operatives traveling in and out of Venezuela have recruited Venezuelan informants working at the Caracas airport to gather intelligence on Jewish travelers as potential targets for abduction, the Western anti-terrorism official said.
The region is volatile, and yet receives almost no attention from policy makers in either party. I believe in a short time we will be forced to pay attention, whether we want to or not.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday August 25, 2008
The Ties That Bind Grow More Difficult to Deny
There is a fascinating interview with Mohammed Habib, the deputy supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood where he acknowledges that the Brotherhood has a presence inside the United States.
As I have repeatedly stated, there is nothing illegal about the Muslim Brotherhood being here. What makes the groups that grew out of the _Ikhwan_ so interesting and perplexing is their unwillingness to admit that relationship, despite the fact there is no sanction against belonging to the organization. Why act as a covert front group when you could legally exist?
Habib also defends Sudanese president Omar Bashir against the international arrest warrant issued for him, and has various other statements of interest, particularly naming Hamas (again) as a branch of the MB.
But let's start at the beginning, the ties to U.S. organizations that those organizations have vigorously denied. It is not that this was not known. See this report for the NEFA Foundation I co-authored for a more complete picture of what the evidence is.
The Daily Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) also has an archive of information on the subject.
Here is the extended key passage of the interview on this issue, so nothing is taken out of context. Read carefully, it gives an interesting and disturbing view of the MB agenda in the United States, one much more accurate than it's legacy groups present:
SM: The image of the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. and in other western countries — while we aren’t going to say it’s a bad one — is not the image you would like to portray for yourselves.
Mohamed Habib: That’s true!
SM: Why do you think that is?
Mohamed Habib: There are two parts to that. The first part is related to the tyrannical and oppressive regimes in our countries, that try to project a mental image (a really scary and horrifying image) in the minds of the western world that we are against democracy, and freedom, and human rights in general. The other part is the Zionist-American project that upholds double standards and has a special agenda that contradict the interests of our Ummah, and thus finds in the Muslim Brotherhood an obstacle in the way of executing that agenda. Therefore, they unfortunately promote a very wrong and negative image of us. This forces us to act and try to communicate with think tanks and research centers, academics in universities, the people, and the media, whether the local or the international one.
SM: Fine, but we can claim that the Egyptian media is controlled by the Egyptian government, while the western media is not controlled by the western governments. What’s stopping the right image of you to reach the world then? Are they conspiring against you?
Mohamed Habib: No, but naturally there are centers in the U.S. and Europe that carry out the agenda of the U.S. government. But there is also an independent media that has a role in educating the populace, and thus improve our image in their minds.
SM: Is there a Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S.?
Mohamed Habib: I would say yes. There are Muslim Brotherhood members there.
SM: Then what are they doing there?
Mohamed Habib: No, there are already existing institutions; there are laws and a constitution that they operate under in order to have a role in serving the American society. They are part of the American society and they want to an active positive role in it, and a part of that is to spread a positive image of Islam along with its values, culture, history and teachings.
SM: This is naturally very important. Who represents you in the US?
Mohamed Habib: Well, there are there those who do represent us, who do that role.
SM: But it’s not CAIR, right? The Council for American Islamic Relations? Many people say that they are your front. Other people say that its ISNA. But back to CAIR, some people from the Muslim Brotherhood have denied having a connection with CAIR. Do they really represent you?
Mohamed Habib: Ehh, this is a sensitive subject, and it’s kind of problematic, especially after 9/11 …
SM: For them to say that there is a relationship between you two?
Mohamed Habib: Yes. You can say that.
One might ask who "those who do represent us, who do that role" are and why it is "sensitive subject, kind of problematic" to name them if its agenda were above board and transparent.
It is interesting to note, as the GDMBR did, that less than two weeks ago, the Egyptian MB officially denied any relationship at all with any U.S. organization. Someone seems not have received the message to continue this denial.
The MB has repeatedly denied it has any representation in the U.S., nor does it maintain any links with any of the Islamic or charitable organizations in the U.S. We have previously clarified that moderate and pragmatic Islamic thought is not exclusive of the MB, however, there are many other Islamic movements and organizations throughout the world that have the same mainstream principles as the MB but not necessarily part of its organizational structure.
In this regard, the MB confirmed that it absolutely has no organizational links, ties, or associations with any of the Islamic organizations in the U.S., including but not limited to: The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), and the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).
There are however, ideological similarities between the MB and most of above mentioned Islamic organizations for the fact that these ideologies represent mainstream moderate Islamic thinking. However, some of the founders or members of these organizations were at some point in their lives either members or sympathizers of the MB in their native countries before they migrate to the U.S. or other countries.
Regarding Hamas, Mr. Habib is equally straightforward:
What kind of relationship does the Muslim Brotherhood have with Hamas? Do you offer them support of any kind?
Mohamed Habib: Hamas, like any Muslim Brotherhood entity, is not related to the other entities. But we do support them. We support them with ideas. We support them with advice and vision. We incite the people — in Egypt for example — to donate money and care and understand about the Palestinian cause. Then the civil society institutions carry out the role of facilitators of our support.
Thank you, Mr. Habib.
As I have repeatedly stated, there is nothing illegal about the Muslim Brotherhood being here. What makes the groups that grew out of the _Ikhwan_ so interesting and perplexing is their unwillingness to admit that relationship, despite the fact there is no sanction against belonging to the organization. Why act as a covert front group when you could legally exist?
Habib also defends Sudanese president Omar Bashir against the international arrest warrant issued for him, and has various other statements of interest, particularly naming Hamas (again) as a branch of the MB.
But let's start at the beginning, the ties to U.S. organizations that those organizations have vigorously denied. It is not that this was not known. See this report for the NEFA Foundation I co-authored for a more complete picture of what the evidence is.
The Daily Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) also has an archive of information on the subject.
Here is the extended key passage of the interview on this issue, so nothing is taken out of context. Read carefully, it gives an interesting and disturbing view of the MB agenda in the United States, one much more accurate than it's legacy groups present:
SM: The image of the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. and in other western countries — while we aren’t going to say it’s a bad one — is not the image you would like to portray for yourselves.
Mohamed Habib: That’s true!
SM: Why do you think that is?
Mohamed Habib: There are two parts to that. The first part is related to the tyrannical and oppressive regimes in our countries, that try to project a mental image (a really scary and horrifying image) in the minds of the western world that we are against democracy, and freedom, and human rights in general. The other part is the Zionist-American project that upholds double standards and has a special agenda that contradict the interests of our Ummah, and thus finds in the Muslim Brotherhood an obstacle in the way of executing that agenda. Therefore, they unfortunately promote a very wrong and negative image of us. This forces us to act and try to communicate with think tanks and research centers, academics in universities, the people, and the media, whether the local or the international one.
SM: Fine, but we can claim that the Egyptian media is controlled by the Egyptian government, while the western media is not controlled by the western governments. What’s stopping the right image of you to reach the world then? Are they conspiring against you?
Mohamed Habib: No, but naturally there are centers in the U.S. and Europe that carry out the agenda of the U.S. government. But there is also an independent media that has a role in educating the populace, and thus improve our image in their minds.
SM: Is there a Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S.?
Mohamed Habib: I would say yes. There are Muslim Brotherhood members there.
SM: Then what are they doing there?
Mohamed Habib: No, there are already existing institutions; there are laws and a constitution that they operate under in order to have a role in serving the American society. They are part of the American society and they want to an active positive role in it, and a part of that is to spread a positive image of Islam along with its values, culture, history and teachings.
SM: This is naturally very important. Who represents you in the US?
Mohamed Habib: Well, there are there those who do represent us, who do that role.
SM: But it’s not CAIR, right? The Council for American Islamic Relations? Many people say that they are your front. Other people say that its ISNA. But back to CAIR, some people from the Muslim Brotherhood have denied having a connection with CAIR. Do they really represent you?
Mohamed Habib: Ehh, this is a sensitive subject, and it’s kind of problematic, especially after 9/11 …
SM: For them to say that there is a relationship between you two?
Mohamed Habib: Yes. You can say that.
One might ask who "those who do represent us, who do that role" are and why it is "sensitive subject, kind of problematic" to name them if its agenda were above board and transparent.
It is interesting to note, as the GDMBR did, that less than two weeks ago, the Egyptian MB officially denied any relationship at all with any U.S. organization. Someone seems not have received the message to continue this denial.
The MB has repeatedly denied it has any representation in the U.S., nor does it maintain any links with any of the Islamic or charitable organizations in the U.S. We have previously clarified that moderate and pragmatic Islamic thought is not exclusive of the MB, however, there are many other Islamic movements and organizations throughout the world that have the same mainstream principles as the MB but not necessarily part of its organizational structure.
In this regard, the MB confirmed that it absolutely has no organizational links, ties, or associations with any of the Islamic organizations in the U.S., including but not limited to: The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), and the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).
There are however, ideological similarities between the MB and most of above mentioned Islamic organizations for the fact that these ideologies represent mainstream moderate Islamic thinking. However, some of the founders or members of these organizations were at some point in their lives either members or sympathizers of the MB in their native countries before they migrate to the U.S. or other countries.
Regarding Hamas, Mr. Habib is equally straightforward:
What kind of relationship does the Muslim Brotherhood have with Hamas? Do you offer them support of any kind?
Mohamed Habib: Hamas, like any Muslim Brotherhood entity, is not related to the other entities. But we do support them. We support them with ideas. We support them with advice and vision. We incite the people — in Egypt for example — to donate money and care and understand about the Palestinian cause. Then the civil society institutions carry out the role of facilitators of our support.
Thank you, Mr. Habib.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday August 20, 2008
The Power of the Criminal-Terror Network in Afghanistan
The increasingly sophisticated attacks by the Taliban against U.S. and NATO troops, including the recent coordinated strikes that left 10 French soldiers dead shows how the Taliban has evolved over the past year.
What is clear is that, whatever the strategy there is, it is not working. I would argue that the almost exponential growth rate of opium cultivation in recent years is the vital component in allowing the Taliban to obtain the resources to replenish its fighting capabilities, which were almost destroyed in the wake of 9/11.
This source of income to the Taliban is free from any controls a state sponsor would be able to impose on the use of donated funds. The commodity can be easily exchanged for weapons, or turned into cash to pay for new recruits, training, protection and logistics. A consequence, in addition to the sophisticated frontal attacks, is the rapid growth of increasingly sophisticated road side bombs, now causing the most casualties of any weapon in Afghanistan.
Given that the cash pipeline is not being attacked in any way that is making a significant difference, the plans for a mini surge there, with additional U.S. troops is unlikely to make a key difference.
As US News reported, Some U.S. military officials express skepticism, however, about the impact more U.S. troops can make seven years into the war, in a large country that has grown increasingly violent—with citizens, they add, who are increasingly disillusioned. "I don't know if it's too late," says a senior military official. "But it's going to be much, much harder to turn things around at this point."
In fact, what is alarming in the discussions of the surge in Afghanistan is the almost-total lack of focus on opium revenues as a key component.
If one looks at two recent cases where there has been measurable and important successes against non-state armed groups (Al Qaeda in Iraq and the FARC in Colombia), one of the key components is the shutting off of financial revenues.
In the case of AIA, this has been largely accomplished by going after the money couriers, individual donors and charities that were moving the money through Syria and Jordan. Intelligence gathering operations specifically targeted the financial movements, which over time let to significant choking off of funds arriving from the outside.
In the case of the FARC, which is more similar to that of the Taliban, the key was not the erradication of coca plants. As in Afghanistan and poppy, coca cultivation in Colombia has been growing.
What has been targeted are the bulk cash shipments and the routes that move the product (cocaine) to the market. This, over time, created significant cash flow problems for the FARC, which has gradually forced to reduce the rations to its troops, limit its use of vehicles and expose its network to greater risk in efforts to move cash.
This strategy, again built over a period of years of targeted intelligence gathering, has the added benefit of not directly attacking the farmers-a sensitive political problem in both situations, where illicit crops offer a far higher return to peasant farmers than do traditional crops. Attacking the farmers creates hostility to any counter-insurgency program.
What is clear is that the inability to shut off the flow of millions of dollars of resources to the Taliban not only makes the Afghanistan mission impossible to complete, but the money will flow into the tribal areas and strengthen the most radical groups there as well.
The _mujahadeen_ in Afghanistan showed a great resourcefulness in the war against the Soviet Union, and won the war when (largely U.S.) resources flowed to them. These people know how to fight. Unless their money flow is cut off, adding 12,000 or 50,000 troops will not be enough to achieve the goal of a stable Afghanistan free of the Taliban as a force that can directly challenge the government.
What is clear is that, whatever the strategy there is, it is not working. I would argue that the almost exponential growth rate of opium cultivation in recent years is the vital component in allowing the Taliban to obtain the resources to replenish its fighting capabilities, which were almost destroyed in the wake of 9/11.
This source of income to the Taliban is free from any controls a state sponsor would be able to impose on the use of donated funds. The commodity can be easily exchanged for weapons, or turned into cash to pay for new recruits, training, protection and logistics. A consequence, in addition to the sophisticated frontal attacks, is the rapid growth of increasingly sophisticated road side bombs, now causing the most casualties of any weapon in Afghanistan.
Given that the cash pipeline is not being attacked in any way that is making a significant difference, the plans for a mini surge there, with additional U.S. troops is unlikely to make a key difference.
As US News reported, Some U.S. military officials express skepticism, however, about the impact more U.S. troops can make seven years into the war, in a large country that has grown increasingly violent—with citizens, they add, who are increasingly disillusioned. "I don't know if it's too late," says a senior military official. "But it's going to be much, much harder to turn things around at this point."
In fact, what is alarming in the discussions of the surge in Afghanistan is the almost-total lack of focus on opium revenues as a key component.
If one looks at two recent cases where there has been measurable and important successes against non-state armed groups (Al Qaeda in Iraq and the FARC in Colombia), one of the key components is the shutting off of financial revenues.
In the case of AIA, this has been largely accomplished by going after the money couriers, individual donors and charities that were moving the money through Syria and Jordan. Intelligence gathering operations specifically targeted the financial movements, which over time let to significant choking off of funds arriving from the outside.
In the case of the FARC, which is more similar to that of the Taliban, the key was not the erradication of coca plants. As in Afghanistan and poppy, coca cultivation in Colombia has been growing.
What has been targeted are the bulk cash shipments and the routes that move the product (cocaine) to the market. This, over time, created significant cash flow problems for the FARC, which has gradually forced to reduce the rations to its troops, limit its use of vehicles and expose its network to greater risk in efforts to move cash.
This strategy, again built over a period of years of targeted intelligence gathering, has the added benefit of not directly attacking the farmers-a sensitive political problem in both situations, where illicit crops offer a far higher return to peasant farmers than do traditional crops. Attacking the farmers creates hostility to any counter-insurgency program.
What is clear is that the inability to shut off the flow of millions of dollars of resources to the Taliban not only makes the Afghanistan mission impossible to complete, but the money will flow into the tribal areas and strengthen the most radical groups there as well.
The _mujahadeen_ in Afghanistan showed a great resourcefulness in the war against the Soviet Union, and won the war when (largely U.S.) resources flowed to them. These people know how to fight. Unless their money flow is cut off, adding 12,000 or 50,000 troops will not be enough to achieve the goal of a stable Afghanistan free of the Taliban as a force that can directly challenge the government.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH