Monday August 18, 2008
Al Qaeda at 20-Some thoughts
I think Peter Bergen's Outlook section piece in the Washington Post was very useful in looking at al Qaeda at 20. It is hard to believe they have been around that long.
Of particular to me is his discussion of the deep differences between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman on the future of al Qaeda. After two decades the nature of the enemy, and how different parts relate to each other, are still in dispute.
Bergen got it right in explaining why the two views, although often presented as such, are not mutually exclusive. As with so much of how we view the new world and its complex and shifting networks and alliances, many in the policy community and intelligence communities want things to be one way or the other. Usually they are not.
This is true in large part because the enemy is constantly moving, realigning and reconfiguring, both in response to the internal dynamics within the groups, and to external pressures. Their Darwinian ability to adapt to survive, and the elimination of their weakest and least careful members, make the task of tracing them ever harder.
The groups will also undergo tests of trial and error (the biggest error, as Bergen points out, being al Qaeda in Iraq's impressive loss of support among the Sunni population because of its increasingly brutal tactics) that will lead to shifting behavior and thinking over time.
While al Qaeda Central, as Bergen and others call the old guard, no longer can exercise the direct command and control that had before, the demise of Al Qaeda in Iraq is largely a boon for bin Laden.
He now has foreign fighters flocking to areas where he exercises the most direct control, again making the core al Qaeda a vital reference point-personally, ideologically and theologically-to those movements.
This is ironic, as al Qaeda in a general sense has lost a great deal of sympathy around the world, as has the Taliban. State sponsorship, such as the Taliban received from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan prior to 9/11, is now considerably less and considerably more muted.
This lack of state sponsorship is one of the driving forces behind the growing ties of these groups to criminal activity. Only resources on the scale gleaned from drug trafficking can fund a significant army for any length of time. This is one of the reasons I feel so strongly that the alliance is both inevitable and incredibly dangerous.
I do not share Bergen's assessment that the probability of an attack on the U.S. in the next five years is slim. Given the resources and pipelines available once al Qaeda and its groups make alliances across criminal networks, I think such a prediction is premature. If anything, I would argue that the possibility of an al Qaeda-related groups acquiring and successfully moving some sort of nuclear or chemical weapon to the United States, will increase as the criminal ties increase.
So the threat remains, although not in the form it was at 9/11, or even last year. The challenge is moving beyond being able to describe the changes after they happen to anticipating the changes that will allow a strategy that will weaken the enemy before it moves up the evolutionary chain.
Of particular to me is his discussion of the deep differences between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman on the future of al Qaeda. After two decades the nature of the enemy, and how different parts relate to each other, are still in dispute.
Bergen got it right in explaining why the two views, although often presented as such, are not mutually exclusive. As with so much of how we view the new world and its complex and shifting networks and alliances, many in the policy community and intelligence communities want things to be one way or the other. Usually they are not.
This is true in large part because the enemy is constantly moving, realigning and reconfiguring, both in response to the internal dynamics within the groups, and to external pressures. Their Darwinian ability to adapt to survive, and the elimination of their weakest and least careful members, make the task of tracing them ever harder.
The groups will also undergo tests of trial and error (the biggest error, as Bergen points out, being al Qaeda in Iraq's impressive loss of support among the Sunni population because of its increasingly brutal tactics) that will lead to shifting behavior and thinking over time.
While al Qaeda Central, as Bergen and others call the old guard, no longer can exercise the direct command and control that had before, the demise of Al Qaeda in Iraq is largely a boon for bin Laden.
He now has foreign fighters flocking to areas where he exercises the most direct control, again making the core al Qaeda a vital reference point-personally, ideologically and theologically-to those movements.
This is ironic, as al Qaeda in a general sense has lost a great deal of sympathy around the world, as has the Taliban. State sponsorship, such as the Taliban received from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan prior to 9/11, is now considerably less and considerably more muted.
This lack of state sponsorship is one of the driving forces behind the growing ties of these groups to criminal activity. Only resources on the scale gleaned from drug trafficking can fund a significant army for any length of time. This is one of the reasons I feel so strongly that the alliance is both inevitable and incredibly dangerous.
I do not share Bergen's assessment that the probability of an attack on the U.S. in the next five years is slim. Given the resources and pipelines available once al Qaeda and its groups make alliances across criminal networks, I think such a prediction is premature. If anything, I would argue that the possibility of an al Qaeda-related groups acquiring and successfully moving some sort of nuclear or chemical weapon to the United States, will increase as the criminal ties increase.
So the threat remains, although not in the form it was at 9/11, or even last year. The challenge is moving beyond being able to describe the changes after they happen to anticipating the changes that will allow a strategy that will weaken the enemy before it moves up the evolutionary chain.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday August 15, 2008
The Dangers Of Forgoing Long-Term Assessments
I was taken by the Washington Post's Anne Applebaum's recent column on the lack of attention that led to the current situation in Georgia.
She points out, rightly, that:
The time to deal with this conflict is not now but was two, or even four, years ago. For a very long time it has been clear that there was a security vacuum in the Caucasus; that this vacuum was dangerous; that war was likely; that Georgia, an eager ally of the United States, would not emerge well from a confrontation; and that a successful invasion of Georgia, a country with U.S. troops on its soil, would reflect badly on the West.
Cowardice, weakness, lack of ideas and, above all, the distraction of other events prevented any deeper engagement. And now it may be too late.
The truth is there is virtually no effort to develop an understanding not just of the world as it is-and the Caucasus, like much of the rest of the world, is not really known in policy and intelligence circles now-but what it may look like in a decade or two.
This has to do with many issues, including the criminal structures, their overlap with terrorist group, the reach these groups have into governments and weapons supplies, what supplies remain available, and what is the present and likely future presence of radical Islam and other violent non-state actors.
There are multiple states that now operate as criminal enterprises (and Russia seems well on its way to joining their ranks) that offer the key havens for the growing criminal-terrorist nexus. For a broader look at these issues, see this paper I did for the NEFA Foundation.
These are different advantages from those offered by truly failed states or regions. Criminal states provide weapons, end-user certificates, travel documents, aircraft registries, banking facilities and much more to groups-including radical Islamist groups-who can buy or talk their way into the game in these havens.
There are much broader questions that are also going unaddressed:
What are the regional, ethnic and factional strains, the impact of population shifts, resource flows and other cross-cutting dynamics that will drive the behavior of people and states.
I don't know if Ms. Applebaum is correct when she says that "Islamic terrorism may one day be considered the least of our problems." I doubt that is true, but I agree that, in its present form, that may be the case.
What we will be facing in the future (and already face in some places, such as Afghanistan and Colombia) is the hybrid terrorist-criminal organization, where the revenues are derived from lucrative illicit activities, freeing the groups almost completely from state control. Yet these organizations and affiliations will prosper in criminal states because of the mutual need of these states and non-state actors.
The resources from drugs, human trafficking, black market commodity deals and countless other criminal enterprises will feed the coffers of terrorist/criminal groups. And then we will really have our hands full, in part because we are not even trying to figure out what is coming at us.
She points out, rightly, that:
The time to deal with this conflict is not now but was two, or even four, years ago. For a very long time it has been clear that there was a security vacuum in the Caucasus; that this vacuum was dangerous; that war was likely; that Georgia, an eager ally of the United States, would not emerge well from a confrontation; and that a successful invasion of Georgia, a country with U.S. troops on its soil, would reflect badly on the West.
Cowardice, weakness, lack of ideas and, above all, the distraction of other events prevented any deeper engagement. And now it may be too late.
The truth is there is virtually no effort to develop an understanding not just of the world as it is-and the Caucasus, like much of the rest of the world, is not really known in policy and intelligence circles now-but what it may look like in a decade or two.
This has to do with many issues, including the criminal structures, their overlap with terrorist group, the reach these groups have into governments and weapons supplies, what supplies remain available, and what is the present and likely future presence of radical Islam and other violent non-state actors.
There are multiple states that now operate as criminal enterprises (and Russia seems well on its way to joining their ranks) that offer the key havens for the growing criminal-terrorist nexus. For a broader look at these issues, see this paper I did for the NEFA Foundation.
These are different advantages from those offered by truly failed states or regions. Criminal states provide weapons, end-user certificates, travel documents, aircraft registries, banking facilities and much more to groups-including radical Islamist groups-who can buy or talk their way into the game in these havens.
There are much broader questions that are also going unaddressed:
What are the regional, ethnic and factional strains, the impact of population shifts, resource flows and other cross-cutting dynamics that will drive the behavior of people and states.
I don't know if Ms. Applebaum is correct when she says that "Islamic terrorism may one day be considered the least of our problems." I doubt that is true, but I agree that, in its present form, that may be the case.
What we will be facing in the future (and already face in some places, such as Afghanistan and Colombia) is the hybrid terrorist-criminal organization, where the revenues are derived from lucrative illicit activities, freeing the groups almost completely from state control. Yet these organizations and affiliations will prosper in criminal states because of the mutual need of these states and non-state actors.
The resources from drugs, human trafficking, black market commodity deals and countless other criminal enterprises will feed the coffers of terrorist/criminal groups. And then we will really have our hands full, in part because we are not even trying to figure out what is coming at us.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday August 13, 2008
The Emerging Russia's Terrorism Issues
I am not a Russia expert and defer to Robert Kagan and others to paint the macro picture of what Russia's incursion into Georgia means.
But there are several issues, outside of these, that need to be looked at in terms of Russia in the greater world, and our relationship to Russia, particularly in counter-terrorism and weapons proliferation issues.
What is clear is that Russia is set on selling weapons to those who want very badly to hurt us, and who buy their weapons with the stated purpose of using them for that.
Everyone sells weapons, and yes, the United States plays in the game. But Russia's willingness to arm non-state actors and states that are facing international sanction is qualitatively different.
The three clearest examples are the arming Hezbollah in the summer 2006 conflict (courtesy of their favorite delivery person with almost-plausible deniability, Viktor Bout); Venezuela, which recently purchased an additional $2 billion worth of weapons from Russia, in addition to the $4.4 billion already purchased in the past four years-including two AK-47 factories; and Iran, receiving advanced missile systems.
As noted above, Chavez's pitch for purchasing the weapons was the formation of an anti-US coalition with strategic interests in Latin America.
Bout was also known to be delivering, on behalf of the Russian government, weapons shipments to forces in Georgia's separatist regions, helping to pave the way for the armed incursion.
One can argue that sovereign nations can buy and sell weapons as they choose, and that is true. But Russia's willingness, and downright eagerness, to arm those who want to hurt us and have established ties to international terrorist organizations with a demonstrated willingness to attack, should give policy makers pause.
For many year, since President Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, we have been living the illusion that Russia is an ally. Bout was forgiven his multiple atrocities, in part, because we did not want to upset Russia while he delivered their weapons around the world, wreaking havoc.
The Georgia invasion may finally change this. But it has been evident for a long, long time that Russians friends are often our enemies, and Russia's willingness to arm them to hurt us is abundantly clear.
But there are several issues, outside of these, that need to be looked at in terms of Russia in the greater world, and our relationship to Russia, particularly in counter-terrorism and weapons proliferation issues.
What is clear is that Russia is set on selling weapons to those who want very badly to hurt us, and who buy their weapons with the stated purpose of using them for that.
Everyone sells weapons, and yes, the United States plays in the game. But Russia's willingness to arm non-state actors and states that are facing international sanction is qualitatively different.
The three clearest examples are the arming Hezbollah in the summer 2006 conflict (courtesy of their favorite delivery person with almost-plausible deniability, Viktor Bout); Venezuela, which recently purchased an additional $2 billion worth of weapons from Russia, in addition to the $4.4 billion already purchased in the past four years-including two AK-47 factories; and Iran, receiving advanced missile systems.
As noted above, Chavez's pitch for purchasing the weapons was the formation of an anti-US coalition with strategic interests in Latin America.
Bout was also known to be delivering, on behalf of the Russian government, weapons shipments to forces in Georgia's separatist regions, helping to pave the way for the armed incursion.
One can argue that sovereign nations can buy and sell weapons as they choose, and that is true. But Russia's willingness, and downright eagerness, to arm those who want to hurt us and have established ties to international terrorist organizations with a demonstrated willingness to attack, should give policy makers pause.
For many year, since President Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, we have been living the illusion that Russia is an ally. Bout was forgiven his multiple atrocities, in part, because we did not want to upset Russia while he delivered their weapons around the world, wreaking havoc.
The Georgia invasion may finally change this. But it has been evident for a long, long time that Russians friends are often our enemies, and Russia's willingness to arm them to hurt us is abundantly clear.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday August 11, 2008
A Look at the Resignation of Mazen Asbahi and the Muslim Brotherhood
In the week since the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free registration required) revealed the ties of Mazen Asbahi to Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups and his immediate resignation as an adviser to the Obama campaign, it has been fascinating to watch the Brotherhood response, particularly those of CAIR and the Muslim Student Association.
This is relevant because of the MB's historical ties to radical Islamist terrorism and the ties of members of legacy groups in the United States to multiple terrorist cases, investigations, etc. The line of inquiry would have been just as valid had Mr. Asbahi surfaced in the McCain camp, or any major political campaign.
(For a more complete look at these groups and their history in the United States, see this report I co-authored for the NEFA Foundation during the Holy Land Foundation trial).
The tactics have been familiar to any who follow these groups: attack the messenger, despite the fact that the postings simply laid out Mr. Ashbahi's multiple ties to MB groups, based on SEC filing and public records-and made no allegations of any illegality or impropriety; attack the Wall Street Journal and Glenn Simpson for following up on the report, and having the nerve to call Mr. Asbahi for comment (which is now described as a right-wing expose-in-the-making, as if belonging to FOUR-not one MB groups, as has been widely reported-were not worthy of comment, or a story when the resignation happened); blame the media et al for Mr. Asbahi's resignation, as if an e-mailed question about the relationship from a journalist were somehow an unacceptable practice in seeking information; and paint the entire thing as anti-Muslim bash-fest by the far right (see this wildly inaccurate and deceptive piece by James Zogby in the Huffington Post; and, finally, fail to address ANY of the substantive issues such associations raise.
For a good critique of the Zogby piece and its factual misrepresentations of the original piece, go here.
One of the favorite tactics is to paint those pushing back against CAIR et al as right-wing zealots. Fortunately, that is not true, although it resonates among many in the Obama camp because it paints the issue, falsely, as one of civil rights.
Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), who recently invited Steve Emerson to testify at a hearing where I was also a witness, refused to buckle to the the groups' pressure tactics and protests aimed a silencing Emerson. See this Action Alert for a taste of their language.
Sens. Charles Schumer, Barbara Boxer and Richard Durbin-hardly the right-wing fringe of American politics-have distanced themselves from CAIR and other MB groups, and noted the ties to terrorism and HAMAS. So, another lie, but one that lives on.
Most disappointing is that most of the major outlets that picked up the story were too lazy to read the original GMBDR, and simply quoted those attacking the story. One of the prices we pay, great and small, for having newsrooms slashed and veteran, inquisitive reporters now doing other things, or with no time to actually read materials. Simpson, one of the few who did take the time, got the story right.
The GMBDR has responded with a complete, dispassionate and factual recap of the matter. As for allegations that it is a shady, right-wing hit machine, one needs only read the two years of archives that simply chronicle the MB in ways the MB finds uncomfortable.
The rest of the us might find it useful to monitor the public record of a group whose publicly-stated view of its work in America is "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions."
Here is the GMBR recap, worth reading:
Some Last Thoughts On Mazen Asbahi And The Muslim Brotherhood
Posted By GlobalMB On August 9, 2008 @ 5:57 pm In Daily | No Comments
Now that the furor has died down over the [1] resignation of Mazen Asbahi, the former Obama campaign Muslim outreach coordinator, it may be instructive to take an overall view of the question of his ties to the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately, the larger question of these ties has gotten lost in the media focus only on his membership on the board of a Brotherhood organization where an imam of a mosque implicated in Brotherhood/Hamas support activities also served. Further confusing this issue is the [2] spin pushed by the U.S. Brotherhood itself which has claimed that Asbahi’s service on the board of Allied Asset Advisers is being used to "smear" Mr. Asbahi. What then is actually known about Mr Asbahi himself?
According to a local media [3] account, Mr. Asbahi, the son of immigrants from Syria, grew up in Northville Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. He attended the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in 1996, graduating with a degree in political science and Islamic studies, followed by Northwestern University law school and then became an attorney in Chicago. Left out of this account is Mr. Asbahi’s role as a leader of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) at the University of Michigan as discussed in an earlier [4] post. In 2000, probably while still in law school or shortly after graduation, he joined the board of Allied Asset Advisers as a trustee. As the original [5] post on Mr. Asbahi detailed, Allied Assets Advisers is a subsidiary of the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), in turn a part of the U.S Muslim Brotherhood and associated with the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). NAIT was instrumental in the early development of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and is the current title holder to a very large number of U.S. mosques and Islamic facilities. As this post also observed, the other five Allied trustees were all important leaders of the U.S Muslim Brotherhood including not only Jamal Said, the imam in question, but also four others, two of which have been identified in court documents and internal Brotherhood documents as part of the U.S. Brotherhood.
Mr. Asbahi has been widely quoted as stating that he resigned from the Allied board when learning about the allegations against Mr. Said whose mosque was later implicated by a Chicago Tribune [6] investigation in activities related to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. While no documentation has been produced to support his stated reasons for resignation, even taking Mr. Asbahi’s explanation at face value raises an even more important question which no journalist has yet thought to raise. How does a 24/25 year old law student or newly-minted lawyer come to be awarded fiduciary responsibility for a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood financial organization along with five other nationally known U.S. Brotherhood leaders? While part of the answer may lie in Mr. Asbahi’s leadership in the Muslim Student Association, experience with the Brotherhood suggest that family connections could also be a fruitful area for investigation.
It should also be repeated that Mr Asbahi went on to join four other organizations with connections to the U.S. Brotherhood. Three of these have been discussed in earlier [4] posts to which a fourth, can be added– the Nawawi Foundation, an Illinois organization that also has Ingrid Mattson, the current ISNA president on its [7] board. Mr Asbahi’s history of service to U.S. Brotherhood linked organizations and his close proximity to U.S. Brotherhood leaders along with his fiduciary responsibility for a Brotherhood financial organization strongly suggest that the question of Mr. Asbahi’s ties to the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood was and remains an important issue to examine in connection with an adviser to a U.S. Presidential candidate.
Article printed from The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report: http://globalmbreport.com
URL to article: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1031
URLs in this post:
[1] resignation: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1023
[2] spin: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1029
[3] account: http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080806/NEWS03/80806062/1005/NEWS03
[4] post: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1025
[5] post: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1016
[6] investigation: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0402080265feb08,0,3486861.story
[7] board: http://www.nawawi.org/aboutus/board.html
My position has always been that one can make a rational choice to dialogue with the MB. The only condition should be that the MB be recognized for what it really is, and that those like CAIR, ISNA, MSA et al be recognized for what they really are-organizations tied to and founded by the global MB. Then see if there is anything left to talk about.
This is relevant because of the MB's historical ties to radical Islamist terrorism and the ties of members of legacy groups in the United States to multiple terrorist cases, investigations, etc. The line of inquiry would have been just as valid had Mr. Asbahi surfaced in the McCain camp, or any major political campaign.
(For a more complete look at these groups and their history in the United States, see this report I co-authored for the NEFA Foundation during the Holy Land Foundation trial).
The tactics have been familiar to any who follow these groups: attack the messenger, despite the fact that the postings simply laid out Mr. Ashbahi's multiple ties to MB groups, based on SEC filing and public records-and made no allegations of any illegality or impropriety; attack the Wall Street Journal and Glenn Simpson for following up on the report, and having the nerve to call Mr. Asbahi for comment (which is now described as a right-wing expose-in-the-making, as if belonging to FOUR-not one MB groups, as has been widely reported-were not worthy of comment, or a story when the resignation happened); blame the media et al for Mr. Asbahi's resignation, as if an e-mailed question about the relationship from a journalist were somehow an unacceptable practice in seeking information; and paint the entire thing as anti-Muslim bash-fest by the far right (see this wildly inaccurate and deceptive piece by James Zogby in the Huffington Post; and, finally, fail to address ANY of the substantive issues such associations raise.
For a good critique of the Zogby piece and its factual misrepresentations of the original piece, go here.
One of the favorite tactics is to paint those pushing back against CAIR et al as right-wing zealots. Fortunately, that is not true, although it resonates among many in the Obama camp because it paints the issue, falsely, as one of civil rights.
Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), who recently invited Steve Emerson to testify at a hearing where I was also a witness, refused to buckle to the the groups' pressure tactics and protests aimed a silencing Emerson. See this Action Alert for a taste of their language.
Sens. Charles Schumer, Barbara Boxer and Richard Durbin-hardly the right-wing fringe of American politics-have distanced themselves from CAIR and other MB groups, and noted the ties to terrorism and HAMAS. So, another lie, but one that lives on.
Most disappointing is that most of the major outlets that picked up the story were too lazy to read the original GMBDR, and simply quoted those attacking the story. One of the prices we pay, great and small, for having newsrooms slashed and veteran, inquisitive reporters now doing other things, or with no time to actually read materials. Simpson, one of the few who did take the time, got the story right.
The GMBDR has responded with a complete, dispassionate and factual recap of the matter. As for allegations that it is a shady, right-wing hit machine, one needs only read the two years of archives that simply chronicle the MB in ways the MB finds uncomfortable.
The rest of the us might find it useful to monitor the public record of a group whose publicly-stated view of its work in America is "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions."
Here is the GMBR recap, worth reading:
Some Last Thoughts On Mazen Asbahi And The Muslim Brotherhood
Posted By GlobalMB On August 9, 2008 @ 5:57 pm In Daily | No Comments
Now that the furor has died down over the [1] resignation of Mazen Asbahi, the former Obama campaign Muslim outreach coordinator, it may be instructive to take an overall view of the question of his ties to the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately, the larger question of these ties has gotten lost in the media focus only on his membership on the board of a Brotherhood organization where an imam of a mosque implicated in Brotherhood/Hamas support activities also served. Further confusing this issue is the [2] spin pushed by the U.S. Brotherhood itself which has claimed that Asbahi’s service on the board of Allied Asset Advisers is being used to "smear" Mr. Asbahi. What then is actually known about Mr Asbahi himself?
According to a local media [3] account, Mr. Asbahi, the son of immigrants from Syria, grew up in Northville Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. He attended the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in 1996, graduating with a degree in political science and Islamic studies, followed by Northwestern University law school and then became an attorney in Chicago. Left out of this account is Mr. Asbahi’s role as a leader of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) at the University of Michigan as discussed in an earlier [4] post. In 2000, probably while still in law school or shortly after graduation, he joined the board of Allied Asset Advisers as a trustee. As the original [5] post on Mr. Asbahi detailed, Allied Assets Advisers is a subsidiary of the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), in turn a part of the U.S Muslim Brotherhood and associated with the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). NAIT was instrumental in the early development of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and is the current title holder to a very large number of U.S. mosques and Islamic facilities. As this post also observed, the other five Allied trustees were all important leaders of the U.S Muslim Brotherhood including not only Jamal Said, the imam in question, but also four others, two of which have been identified in court documents and internal Brotherhood documents as part of the U.S. Brotherhood.
Mr. Asbahi has been widely quoted as stating that he resigned from the Allied board when learning about the allegations against Mr. Said whose mosque was later implicated by a Chicago Tribune [6] investigation in activities related to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. While no documentation has been produced to support his stated reasons for resignation, even taking Mr. Asbahi’s explanation at face value raises an even more important question which no journalist has yet thought to raise. How does a 24/25 year old law student or newly-minted lawyer come to be awarded fiduciary responsibility for a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood financial organization along with five other nationally known U.S. Brotherhood leaders? While part of the answer may lie in Mr. Asbahi’s leadership in the Muslim Student Association, experience with the Brotherhood suggest that family connections could also be a fruitful area for investigation.
It should also be repeated that Mr Asbahi went on to join four other organizations with connections to the U.S. Brotherhood. Three of these have been discussed in earlier [4] posts to which a fourth, can be added– the Nawawi Foundation, an Illinois organization that also has Ingrid Mattson, the current ISNA president on its [7] board. Mr Asbahi’s history of service to U.S. Brotherhood linked organizations and his close proximity to U.S. Brotherhood leaders along with his fiduciary responsibility for a Brotherhood financial organization strongly suggest that the question of Mr. Asbahi’s ties to the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood was and remains an important issue to examine in connection with an adviser to a U.S. Presidential candidate.
Article printed from The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report: http://globalmbreport.com
URL to article: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1031
URLs in this post:
[1] resignation: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1023
[2] spin: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1029
[3] account: http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080806/NEWS03/80806062/1005/NEWS03
[4] post: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1025
[5] post: http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1016
[6] investigation: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0402080265feb08,0,3486861.story
[7] board: http://www.nawawi.org/aboutus/board.html
My position has always been that one can make a rational choice to dialogue with the MB. The only condition should be that the MB be recognized for what it really is, and that those like CAIR, ISNA, MSA et al be recognized for what they really are-organizations tied to and founded by the global MB. Then see if there is anything left to talk about.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday August 6, 2008
Evidence that Africa Matters for al Qaeda
Recently, two people on whom I did extensive reporting because of their ties to al Qaeda in West Africa have again surfaced in the news, a useful reminder that sub-Saharan Africa was and is a target of opportunity for radical Islamist movements.
In Kenya, there is an an intense manhunt underway for Fazul Adallah, one of the masterminds of 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
Fazul was also active in Liberia and Sierra Leone immediately after the embassy bombings. While several of his suspected cohorts have been rounded up, he has again, it seems, managed to escape.
This indicates that senior al Qaeda operatives continue to operate in East Africa, where they have carried out successful attacks in the past. There are increasing reports of efforts by _wahhabi_ groups to radicalize East African Muslim, who have traditionally been tolerant of other beliefs.
The second is Aafia Siddiqui, who may have been involved in the West African diamond trade as well. She is expected in a New York court today on charges of attempted murder.
As my colleague Andrew Cochran has noted, Siddiqui is said by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to have been in Liberia receiving al Qaeda diamonds.
My own research showed that a woman had arrived to collect diamonds from al Qaeda operatives in Monrovia, and had returned, with two men, to Karachi, Pakistan, and then moved on to Quetta, where police and intelligence lost her trace. It was not clear to me at the time of the reporting that the woman was Siddiqui. Perhaps the New York trial will help clarify the issue.
Sub-Saharan Africa remains a high-risk area because of its vast, ungoverned spaces, ample resource base, rampant corruption and the presence of several states that operate as criminal syndicates.
This combination of factors, as I argued in my testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade last week, that is one of the premier challenges of fighting the war on terrorism.
While there is some recognition of this now in senior government circles, the response remains largely muted and limited to occasional training exercises with militaries and police forces widely feared for their brutality and corruption. It is hardly a strategy that can lead to success.
Fazul and others remain in the region because they feel safe enough to operate there, and there is work to be done. Otherwise, senior operatives would not hang around, but would move on to the next job.
Siddiqui's possible role will be more difficult to decipher, but prosecutors should press her on her possible ties to al Qaeda in Liberia. If the woman in question is her, it will open a whole new line of inquiry into the role of West Africa in the al Qaeda worldview.
In Kenya, there is an an intense manhunt underway for Fazul Adallah, one of the masterminds of 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
Fazul was also active in Liberia and Sierra Leone immediately after the embassy bombings. While several of his suspected cohorts have been rounded up, he has again, it seems, managed to escape.
This indicates that senior al Qaeda operatives continue to operate in East Africa, where they have carried out successful attacks in the past. There are increasing reports of efforts by _wahhabi_ groups to radicalize East African Muslim, who have traditionally been tolerant of other beliefs.
The second is Aafia Siddiqui, who may have been involved in the West African diamond trade as well. She is expected in a New York court today on charges of attempted murder.
As my colleague Andrew Cochran has noted, Siddiqui is said by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to have been in Liberia receiving al Qaeda diamonds.
My own research showed that a woman had arrived to collect diamonds from al Qaeda operatives in Monrovia, and had returned, with two men, to Karachi, Pakistan, and then moved on to Quetta, where police and intelligence lost her trace. It was not clear to me at the time of the reporting that the woman was Siddiqui. Perhaps the New York trial will help clarify the issue.
Sub-Saharan Africa remains a high-risk area because of its vast, ungoverned spaces, ample resource base, rampant corruption and the presence of several states that operate as criminal syndicates.
This combination of factors, as I argued in my testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade last week, that is one of the premier challenges of fighting the war on terrorism.
While there is some recognition of this now in senior government circles, the response remains largely muted and limited to occasional training exercises with militaries and police forces widely feared for their brutality and corruption. It is hardly a strategy that can lead to success.
Fazul and others remain in the region because they feel safe enough to operate there, and there is work to be done. Otherwise, senior operatives would not hang around, but would move on to the next job.
Siddiqui's possible role will be more difficult to decipher, but prosecutors should press her on her possible ties to al Qaeda in Liberia. If the woman in question is her, it will open a whole new line of inquiry into the role of West Africa in the al Qaeda worldview.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH