Monday August 4, 2008
The Law of Unintended Consequences
The Times of London today brings an interesting reminder of the law of unintended consequences, and the rise of radical Islam, through the first Bosnian conflict.
I and others have long argued the the Bosnian conflict provided the template for al Qaeda action in the years ahead. Fresh off driving the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and convinced Allah would deliver another major victory, thousands of _mujahadeen_rushed from Afghanistan and elsewhere to fight for Bosnian Muslims.
The recruitment, training, rapid radicalization and the the massive use of charities (the Third World Relief Agency-TWRA-in particular) came from the Afghan playbook and were honed in Bosnia.
How did this come to pass, that al Qaeda suddenly found an opening to recruit and fight in the West? The movement had its root in the campaign of Rodovan Karadzic and his allies, of ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.
In the eyes of Serb propagandists, the Muslim population of Bosnia was doubly contemptible, both for their religion and because they were historically seen as renegade Serbs. Karadzic's deputy and then successor, Biljana Plavsic, has explained: "It was genetically deformed material [among the Serbs] that embraced Islam. And now, of course," she lamented, "with each successive generation, this gene simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse and worse..." But a well-crafted final solution was at hand, and 100,000 Muslims paid the price of such "deformity" with their lives.
The Muslims in Bosnia, traditionally unaffiliated with the _wahhabist_ and _jihadist_ theology of radical Islamism, turned to the Muslim world for aid, finding benefactors in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and elsewhere. THe unifying force that held these disparate donor groups together was the Muslim Brotherhood, operating through TWRA and linked to Sudan's primary MB leader, Hassan al Turabi. (For more on this, see my previous work here
The early 1990s were formative in the rise of global Islamic terrorism, including what would be al-Qaeda, and Bosnia was central to this. In despair, the largely Muslim Sarajevo Government turned for support to Islamic groups and countries. Money and arms poured in - from among others, it seems, Osama bin Laden. There also arrived several thousand mujahideen, initially from Iran and Afghanistan, later from North Africa and the Middle East.
Distinguished by their bloodthirsty tactics rather than their military effectiveness, these foreign recruits were employed first against the Serbs and then against the Croats of central Bosnia in 1993, after the two former allies fell out. Their numerous crimes are still coming to light.
I doubt Karadzic could or even tried to foresee the potential consequences of his genocidal campaign, which echo down to today.
But it is worth keeping in mind that actions bring reactions, and the best policies, particularly in dealing with foreign issues such as radical Islamism, should take into account the likely and long-lasting reactions to those policies.
The art of red teaming to work through possible scenarios in response to a given action has largely been lost in the intelligence community, as has the desire and capability to look far over the horizon to see what the world will look like decades from now, not just weeks or months.
As Karadzic and his ilk show, there is something to be said for the value of looking for unintended consequences.
I and others have long argued the the Bosnian conflict provided the template for al Qaeda action in the years ahead. Fresh off driving the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and convinced Allah would deliver another major victory, thousands of _mujahadeen_rushed from Afghanistan and elsewhere to fight for Bosnian Muslims.
The recruitment, training, rapid radicalization and the the massive use of charities (the Third World Relief Agency-TWRA-in particular) came from the Afghan playbook and were honed in Bosnia.
How did this come to pass, that al Qaeda suddenly found an opening to recruit and fight in the West? The movement had its root in the campaign of Rodovan Karadzic and his allies, of ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.
In the eyes of Serb propagandists, the Muslim population of Bosnia was doubly contemptible, both for their religion and because they were historically seen as renegade Serbs. Karadzic's deputy and then successor, Biljana Plavsic, has explained: "It was genetically deformed material [among the Serbs] that embraced Islam. And now, of course," she lamented, "with each successive generation, this gene simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse and worse..." But a well-crafted final solution was at hand, and 100,000 Muslims paid the price of such "deformity" with their lives.
The Muslims in Bosnia, traditionally unaffiliated with the _wahhabist_ and _jihadist_ theology of radical Islamism, turned to the Muslim world for aid, finding benefactors in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and elsewhere. THe unifying force that held these disparate donor groups together was the Muslim Brotherhood, operating through TWRA and linked to Sudan's primary MB leader, Hassan al Turabi. (For more on this, see my previous work here
The early 1990s were formative in the rise of global Islamic terrorism, including what would be al-Qaeda, and Bosnia was central to this. In despair, the largely Muslim Sarajevo Government turned for support to Islamic groups and countries. Money and arms poured in - from among others, it seems, Osama bin Laden. There also arrived several thousand mujahideen, initially from Iran and Afghanistan, later from North Africa and the Middle East.
Distinguished by their bloodthirsty tactics rather than their military effectiveness, these foreign recruits were employed first against the Serbs and then against the Croats of central Bosnia in 1993, after the two former allies fell out. Their numerous crimes are still coming to light.
I doubt Karadzic could or even tried to foresee the potential consequences of his genocidal campaign, which echo down to today.
But it is worth keeping in mind that actions bring reactions, and the best policies, particularly in dealing with foreign issues such as radical Islamism, should take into account the likely and long-lasting reactions to those policies.
The art of red teaming to work through possible scenarios in response to a given action has largely been lost in the intelligence community, as has the desire and capability to look far over the horizon to see what the world will look like decades from now, not just weeks or months.
As Karadzic and his ilk show, there is something to be said for the value of looking for unintended consequences.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday August 1, 2008
Deja vu All Over Again
It didn't take long for that old Yogi Berra feeling to hit. Immediately after questions about Pakistan's ISI's definition of who the enemy actually is, we get a report that says the ISI is actively aiding the Taliban in bombing activities.
The conclusion (that the ISI helped plan the July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul) was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region.
The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.
So, not only are members of the ISI, the recipient of billions of dollars in US aid since 9/11, not interested in helping hunt for Bin Laden, but they are using US taxpayer dollars to help plan attacks by our enemies against our friends.
(For a comprehensive look at the Taliban's new emergence, see this NEFA Foundation report.)
What is wrong with that picture?
Yesterday I testified in the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.
The panel before mine (which I shared with Steve Emerson), was Ambassador Dell Daily, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. In the Q&A session after his testimony, Mr. Daily was asked several times about Pakistan, and the amount of money going there, and the justification of those funds.
There was, quite simply, no answer. Mr. Daily acknowledged that new accounting mechanisms had been put into place to try to track the massive aid given to the ISI with virtually no oversight, and said they would allow "due diligence" in monitoring the money going forward.
The fundamental issue that has to be faced is that much of the ISI is composed of people who view the Taliban and al Qaeda as the good guys in this conflict. They are radical Islamists who are happy to take US money, in order to protect their friends and hurt the United States. That is what they believe Allah would have them do.
No amount of visiting CIA executives or pleas to reform can achieve results. When the ISI operatives at lower levels weigh their loyalties, it will almost always be on the side of the _jihadists._ It is time to realize that, and cut the losses.
The money, Mr. Daily and others argue, buy leverage. That, sadly, is clearly not the case. It simply gives the ISI better ways to plan attacks against us, warn our enemies, and hurt our friends.
The conclusion (that the ISI helped plan the July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul) was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region.
The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.
So, not only are members of the ISI, the recipient of billions of dollars in US aid since 9/11, not interested in helping hunt for Bin Laden, but they are using US taxpayer dollars to help plan attacks by our enemies against our friends.
(For a comprehensive look at the Taliban's new emergence, see this NEFA Foundation report.)
What is wrong with that picture?
Yesterday I testified in the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.
The panel before mine (which I shared with Steve Emerson), was Ambassador Dell Daily, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. In the Q&A session after his testimony, Mr. Daily was asked several times about Pakistan, and the amount of money going there, and the justification of those funds.
There was, quite simply, no answer. Mr. Daily acknowledged that new accounting mechanisms had been put into place to try to track the massive aid given to the ISI with virtually no oversight, and said they would allow "due diligence" in monitoring the money going forward.
The fundamental issue that has to be faced is that much of the ISI is composed of people who view the Taliban and al Qaeda as the good guys in this conflict. They are radical Islamists who are happy to take US money, in order to protect their friends and hurt the United States. That is what they believe Allah would have them do.
No amount of visiting CIA executives or pleas to reform can achieve results. When the ISI operatives at lower levels weigh their loyalties, it will almost always be on the side of the _jihadists._ It is time to realize that, and cut the losses.
The money, Mr. Daily and others argue, buy leverage. That, sadly, is clearly not the case. It simply gives the ISI better ways to plan attacks against us, warn our enemies, and hurt our friends.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday July 30, 2008
What Pakistan's Intelligence Ties Say About Ending Terrorism
The International Herald Tribune today reports on a recent CIA mission to Pakistan to confront leaders of the ISI there about the ties ISI members retain to the Taliban and al Qaeda.
The CIA assessment specifically points to links between members of the spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, and the militant network led by Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, which American officials believe maintains close ties to senior figures of Al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas.
The CIA has depended heavily on the ISI for information about militants in Pakistan, despite longstanding concerns about divided loyalties within the Pakistani spy service, which had close relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11 attacks.
This is not new, but is useful when juxtaposed with the conclusions of the new and very useful Rand Corporation report on how to end terrorism.
While the central argument of the study is to make police work and intelligence the backbone of the counterterrorism efforts, it also argues strongly for a greatly reduced U.S. military presence and overall reduced footprint abroad.
Make policing and intelligence the backbone of U.S. efforts. Al Qa'ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This requires careful involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as their cooperation with foreign police and intelligence agencies.
Minimize the use of U.S. military force. In most operations against al Qa'ida, local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate and a better understanding of the operating environment than U.S. forces have. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all.
The problem with that approach, particularly in Afghanistan and along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border is precisely that many of those who are classified as allies in combating radical Islamist are, in fact, not allies at all.
The CIA's often less than careful involvement with the ISI, and cooperation with local police and intelligence agencies simply provides information to the enemy.
The solution often cannot be the liaison relationships with other services. For many, the groups we consider to be hostile are heros, martyrs and allies to those services. Establishing something in common, and building trust, is virtually impossible.
I am not arguing against the basic thrust of the report on the need, in a broad sense, to rely less on the military to do the vast bulk of counterterrorism work.
The fact is that the military has often been thrust into roles it is not equipped and does not want to handle. They get the job because they are on the ground where few other US agencies are, including the CIA.
The solution, in part, has to be to get others out there, including the intelligence community, so the ability to understand and counter al Qaeda comes from a broader breadth of experience than simply the military.
But this is not possible as long as US embassies are largely shells of their former selves, with greatly reduced staffs and the inability of diplomats to actually get out and do their jobs. And this includes the station chiefs and agents in many instances.
The military does what it does, and it does it well. But it has been asked to do too much. A shift in policy toward more intelligence and police work, however, is extremely problematic, given the history of human rights abuses and internal terror of many of those with whom U.S. agencies would have to engage.
It would also require a significant shift in resources, something that is unlikely as long as the war in Iraq is going on and Afghanistan continues to threaten to fall apart.
It seems to me unlikely another warning from the CIA to the ISI will be productive. The warnings have come and gone, and at the end of the day, the ISI remains an unreliable ally, if an ally at all.
The CIA assessment specifically points to links between members of the spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, and the militant network led by Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, which American officials believe maintains close ties to senior figures of Al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas.
The CIA has depended heavily on the ISI for information about militants in Pakistan, despite longstanding concerns about divided loyalties within the Pakistani spy service, which had close relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11 attacks.
This is not new, but is useful when juxtaposed with the conclusions of the new and very useful Rand Corporation report on how to end terrorism.
While the central argument of the study is to make police work and intelligence the backbone of the counterterrorism efforts, it also argues strongly for a greatly reduced U.S. military presence and overall reduced footprint abroad.
Make policing and intelligence the backbone of U.S. efforts. Al Qa'ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This requires careful involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as their cooperation with foreign police and intelligence agencies.
Minimize the use of U.S. military force. In most operations against al Qa'ida, local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate and a better understanding of the operating environment than U.S. forces have. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all.
The problem with that approach, particularly in Afghanistan and along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border is precisely that many of those who are classified as allies in combating radical Islamist are, in fact, not allies at all.
The CIA's often less than careful involvement with the ISI, and cooperation with local police and intelligence agencies simply provides information to the enemy.
The solution often cannot be the liaison relationships with other services. For many, the groups we consider to be hostile are heros, martyrs and allies to those services. Establishing something in common, and building trust, is virtually impossible.
I am not arguing against the basic thrust of the report on the need, in a broad sense, to rely less on the military to do the vast bulk of counterterrorism work.
The fact is that the military has often been thrust into roles it is not equipped and does not want to handle. They get the job because they are on the ground where few other US agencies are, including the CIA.
The solution, in part, has to be to get others out there, including the intelligence community, so the ability to understand and counter al Qaeda comes from a broader breadth of experience than simply the military.
But this is not possible as long as US embassies are largely shells of their former selves, with greatly reduced staffs and the inability of diplomats to actually get out and do their jobs. And this includes the station chiefs and agents in many instances.
The military does what it does, and it does it well. But it has been asked to do too much. A shift in policy toward more intelligence and police work, however, is extremely problematic, given the history of human rights abuses and internal terror of many of those with whom U.S. agencies would have to engage.
It would also require a significant shift in resources, something that is unlikely as long as the war in Iraq is going on and Afghanistan continues to threaten to fall apart.
It seems to me unlikely another warning from the CIA to the ISI will be productive. The warnings have come and gone, and at the end of the day, the ISI remains an unreliable ally, if an ally at all.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday July 28, 2008
The International Muslim Brotherhood and Darfur
One of the fascinating and disheartening issues around those who advocate an on-going dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood is the failure to look at the record of what the Brotherhood is and what it stands for.
The latest example is the reaction of several important Muslim Brotherhood groups to the International Criminal Court's decision to indict Sudanese president Omar Bashir on charges of genocide. It is easy to forget that Sudan justifies its actions on the basis of being an Islamic nation, and many of its current and past leaders, particularly Hassan al Turabi, are senior members of the Brotherhood.
According to the Daily Muslim Brotherhood Global Report (subscription required), the International Union for Muslim Scholars, led by senior Brotherhood theologian Yousef Qaradawi, as well as several other organizations, have condemned the ICC indictment. The reasons are interesting, and predictable.
First, claim nothing happened:
The delegation of the IUMS, which was headed by the IUMS president, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, visited Sudan and Darfur in the midst of events (September 2004). During this visit, the IUMS delegation met with many political leaders from the Sudanese government and opposition, including Dr. Hassan Turabi, who was then under house arrest, along with many ` leaders. The delegation ascertained that no ethnic cleansing took place, no crimes against humanity occurred and likewise no genocide was committed by government forces or any allied militia. In its statement that was issued following this visit on Rajab 22, 1425 A.H., corresponding to Sep. 7, 2004, the IUMS declared that all media allegations about ethnic cleansing, genocide and mass rape were unfounded. Moreover, the statement appreciated the efforts of the Sudanese government in addressing social problems and the humanitarian situation, and praised their decision to establish a fact-finding committee, headed by the honorable scholar professor, Daf`allah Al-Hajj Yusuf, former Sudanese chief justice.
Comforting to know that, in the Brotherhood's eyes, nothing at all has happened in Darfur. It is all in the imaginations of the international community.
Second, portray the action as part of the U.S. war against Islam in general:
The American threat to take action to arrest the Sudanese president, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir is simply part of a series of American interventions in the private internal affairs of other states. The American administration seeks to play the role of "international policeman", that enables it to exercise its military strength without commitment to the rules that have been established in international laws and the provisions of international treaties.
And third, rally the Muslim world against the action because it is anti-Muslim:
The IUMS believes that the Arab failure to halt the false measures currently being taken against the Sudanese president will open the door to other acts against Arab kings and presidents, especially in light of the successive accusations against many Arab countries concerning the violation of human rights. Therefore, the Islamic duty necessitates all Arab and Muslim states to unite and stand together to prevent any violation of human rights in their homelands, regardless of the cause. In addition, Islam requires Arab and Muslim states to take all possible actions against the violation of international law and the ICC Statute, through their attitudes within the United Nations and through their international bilateral and collective relations, in order to retain the prestige of the international system and the sovereignty of states.
So, there you have it from those of demand the implementation of sharia law in non-Muslim countries, by the moderate group our governments seek to engage as the voice of reason.
Good luck.
The latest example is the reaction of several important Muslim Brotherhood groups to the International Criminal Court's decision to indict Sudanese president Omar Bashir on charges of genocide. It is easy to forget that Sudan justifies its actions on the basis of being an Islamic nation, and many of its current and past leaders, particularly Hassan al Turabi, are senior members of the Brotherhood.
According to the Daily Muslim Brotherhood Global Report (subscription required), the International Union for Muslim Scholars, led by senior Brotherhood theologian Yousef Qaradawi, as well as several other organizations, have condemned the ICC indictment. The reasons are interesting, and predictable.
First, claim nothing happened:
The delegation of the IUMS, which was headed by the IUMS president, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, visited Sudan and Darfur in the midst of events (September 2004). During this visit, the IUMS delegation met with many political leaders from the Sudanese government and opposition, including Dr. Hassan Turabi, who was then under house arrest, along with many ` leaders. The delegation ascertained that no ethnic cleansing took place, no crimes against humanity occurred and likewise no genocide was committed by government forces or any allied militia. In its statement that was issued following this visit on Rajab 22, 1425 A.H., corresponding to Sep. 7, 2004, the IUMS declared that all media allegations about ethnic cleansing, genocide and mass rape were unfounded. Moreover, the statement appreciated the efforts of the Sudanese government in addressing social problems and the humanitarian situation, and praised their decision to establish a fact-finding committee, headed by the honorable scholar professor, Daf`allah Al-Hajj Yusuf, former Sudanese chief justice.
Comforting to know that, in the Brotherhood's eyes, nothing at all has happened in Darfur. It is all in the imaginations of the international community.
Second, portray the action as part of the U.S. war against Islam in general:
The American threat to take action to arrest the Sudanese president, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir is simply part of a series of American interventions in the private internal affairs of other states. The American administration seeks to play the role of "international policeman", that enables it to exercise its military strength without commitment to the rules that have been established in international laws and the provisions of international treaties.
And third, rally the Muslim world against the action because it is anti-Muslim:
The IUMS believes that the Arab failure to halt the false measures currently being taken against the Sudanese president will open the door to other acts against Arab kings and presidents, especially in light of the successive accusations against many Arab countries concerning the violation of human rights. Therefore, the Islamic duty necessitates all Arab and Muslim states to unite and stand together to prevent any violation of human rights in their homelands, regardless of the cause. In addition, Islam requires Arab and Muslim states to take all possible actions against the violation of international law and the ICC Statute, through their attitudes within the United Nations and through their international bilateral and collective relations, in order to retain the prestige of the international system and the sovereignty of states.
So, there you have it from those of demand the implementation of sharia law in non-Muslim countries, by the moderate group our governments seek to engage as the voice of reason.
Good luck.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday July 25, 2008
Congressional Pressure to Pursue Bout's Extradition
A bipartisan group of 35 legislators, led by Rep. Ed Royce (R-Ca), have written a strong letter to the prime minister of Thailand requesting that Viktor Bout be extradited quickly to the United States to stand trial.
(For more on Bout and his arrest, see: this post and many other I and my colleagues at the Counterterrorism Blog have written.
The Royce letter said in part that:
Viktor Bout is an international terrorist who made a global empire out of arming the world's worst. It is past time he faced justice. Congress is grateful for the close cooperation between U.S. authorities and the Royal Thai Police in his capture. We now look forward to his timely extradition to the United States to face terrorism charges.".
The first significant hearing on Bout's extradition is scheduled for July 28. This hearing, originally scheduled for June, was delayed due to illness of one of Bout's lawyers.
The July 28 hearing is the first of several to determine whether the Thai justice system will allow Bout to be extradited to stand trial on charges of seeking to aid a designated terrorist organization.
The letter notes the "negative influence" Russia is exercising to keep Bout from being extradited to the United States, which seems to be a mild understatement. Senior Russian officials are actively pursuing an "economic" solution to Bout's Thai case, offering everything from weapons deals to oil and gas deals in exchange for his freedom. For more details, see:
Royce et al rightly note that Bout has had strong terrorist connections, from the FARC in Colombia to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the sting operation where he was arrested, he repeatedly stated his desire to kill Americans and work with anyone who shared that goal with him.
President Bush will be in Thailand in early August, and one hopes that the Thais will be able to deliver good news. It is heartening to see that some in Congress, despite the electoral silly season, take their oversight responsibilities seriously and are determined to hold both the Thais and the administration accountable in this case.
(For more on Bout and his arrest, see: this post and many other I and my colleagues at the Counterterrorism Blog have written.
The Royce letter said in part that:
Viktor Bout is an international terrorist who made a global empire out of arming the world's worst. It is past time he faced justice. Congress is grateful for the close cooperation between U.S. authorities and the Royal Thai Police in his capture. We now look forward to his timely extradition to the United States to face terrorism charges.".
The first significant hearing on Bout's extradition is scheduled for July 28. This hearing, originally scheduled for June, was delayed due to illness of one of Bout's lawyers.
The July 28 hearing is the first of several to determine whether the Thai justice system will allow Bout to be extradited to stand trial on charges of seeking to aid a designated terrorist organization.
The letter notes the "negative influence" Russia is exercising to keep Bout from being extradited to the United States, which seems to be a mild understatement. Senior Russian officials are actively pursuing an "economic" solution to Bout's Thai case, offering everything from weapons deals to oil and gas deals in exchange for his freedom. For more details, see:
Royce et al rightly note that Bout has had strong terrorist connections, from the FARC in Colombia to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the sting operation where he was arrested, he repeatedly stated his desire to kill Americans and work with anyone who shared that goal with him.
President Bush will be in Thailand in early August, and one hopes that the Thais will be able to deliver good news. It is heartening to see that some in Congress, despite the electoral silly season, take their oversight responsibilities seriously and are determined to hold both the Thais and the administration accountable in this case.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH