Wednesday July 23, 2008
Ortega Steps into the Breach with the FARC
While Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez seem content for the time being to keep is distance from his (erstwhile?) allies in Colombia, the FARC guerrillas-tied to international drug trafficking, kidnapping and assorted criminal and terrorist activities-Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega seems to have few such qualms.
Nicargua's leading newspaper, La Prensa, is reporting that a six-member FARC delegation visited Ortega earlier this month in Managua.
The aircraft carrying the FARC delegation left from Venezuela, and arrived in time to celebrate the July 19 anniversary of the 1979 Sandinista revolution. The delegation, while keeping a low public profile, met with Ortega, who has a long-standing relationship with the organization.
The flight from Venezuela was carried out despite an Interpol alert sent to Nicaragua and other countries that the FARC delegation that was about to travel was comprised of individuals with pending international arrest warrants, was en route to Managua.
The Interpol report, as reported by Colombia's leading newspaper, El Tiempo, says in part that:
We request your help in alerting immigration posts because these members of the FARC are internationally sought and have Interpol Red Notices pending.
While the Chávez-FARC relationship is the most significant and has received the most notice, the relationship of Ortega to the FARC is long-standing and strong.
In a hand-delivered note from Raúl Reyes (the FARC's deputy commander, killed in March 2008) to Ortega from Feb. 22, 2003,
the FARC leader sends Ortega an "effusive revolutionary greeting."
The note (taken from Reyes' computer after he was killed) goes on to say that the FARC has asked for a loan from Libya, and that the Libyan authorities "explained to us that compañero Daniel Ortega was responsible for carrying out the policies of the Libyan government in the region (Latin America)."
(For a further analysis of the FARC documents, see my paper for the NEFA Foundation here.)
Ortega does not have the weapons, physical sanctuary or cash on hand to help the FARC as Chávez does. But he controls several valuable commodities-access to the Central American pipeline for illicit goods and illegal immigration that runs through Central America and across our border; access to legitimate passports and travel documents; and a safe haven from Colombian military persecution.
Ortega has a long history of aiding and abetting terrorist and criminal groups.
Just before leaving office in 1990 he granted citizenship and passports to dozens of Red Brigade and other terrorists. Those working with the Shiekh Omar Abdul Rahman (The Blind Sheikh, convicted of conspiring to blow up much of New York City) had obtained Nicaraguan passports from the first Ortega regime. And he has supported the FARC since his own revolution triumphed in 1979.
So it is not surprising that, while Chávez seeks to back away a bit, given his well-documented, close and embarrassing with the FARC, Ortega has no such qualms.
Ortega's first years as president (1979-1990) were marked by war, political repression and a lack of democratic institutions. But his world has changed, although he has apparently not. He cannot lock up opponents, censure the press and dominate or intimidate the congress. That is why, little by little, his role in supporting the FARC has become public.
It may not stop him, but it will most likely slow him down considerably.
Nicargua's leading newspaper, La Prensa, is reporting that a six-member FARC delegation visited Ortega earlier this month in Managua.
The aircraft carrying the FARC delegation left from Venezuela, and arrived in time to celebrate the July 19 anniversary of the 1979 Sandinista revolution. The delegation, while keeping a low public profile, met with Ortega, who has a long-standing relationship with the organization.
The flight from Venezuela was carried out despite an Interpol alert sent to Nicaragua and other countries that the FARC delegation that was about to travel was comprised of individuals with pending international arrest warrants, was en route to Managua.
The Interpol report, as reported by Colombia's leading newspaper, El Tiempo, says in part that:
We request your help in alerting immigration posts because these members of the FARC are internationally sought and have Interpol Red Notices pending.
While the Chávez-FARC relationship is the most significant and has received the most notice, the relationship of Ortega to the FARC is long-standing and strong.
In a hand-delivered note from Raúl Reyes (the FARC's deputy commander, killed in March 2008) to Ortega from Feb. 22, 2003,
the FARC leader sends Ortega an "effusive revolutionary greeting."
The note (taken from Reyes' computer after he was killed) goes on to say that the FARC has asked for a loan from Libya, and that the Libyan authorities "explained to us that compañero Daniel Ortega was responsible for carrying out the policies of the Libyan government in the region (Latin America)."
(For a further analysis of the FARC documents, see my paper for the NEFA Foundation here.)
Ortega does not have the weapons, physical sanctuary or cash on hand to help the FARC as Chávez does. But he controls several valuable commodities-access to the Central American pipeline for illicit goods and illegal immigration that runs through Central America and across our border; access to legitimate passports and travel documents; and a safe haven from Colombian military persecution.
Ortega has a long history of aiding and abetting terrorist and criminal groups.
Just before leaving office in 1990 he granted citizenship and passports to dozens of Red Brigade and other terrorists. Those working with the Shiekh Omar Abdul Rahman (The Blind Sheikh, convicted of conspiring to blow up much of New York City) had obtained Nicaraguan passports from the first Ortega regime. And he has supported the FARC since his own revolution triumphed in 1979.
So it is not surprising that, while Chávez seeks to back away a bit, given his well-documented, close and embarrassing with the FARC, Ortega has no such qualms.
Ortega's first years as president (1979-1990) were marked by war, political repression and a lack of democratic institutions. But his world has changed, although he has apparently not. He cannot lock up opponents, censure the press and dominate or intimidate the congress. That is why, little by little, his role in supporting the FARC has become public.
It may not stop him, but it will most likely slow him down considerably.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday July 21, 2008
The Indictment of Bashir in Sudan, and the Failure to Act
It is a tired mantra being trotted out by those who oppose the indictment by the International Criminal Court of Omar al Bashir, and that is, that the peace process will be put in danger.
As if there were a viable peace process, and as if the government of Sudan (a radical Islamist state, claiming to act in the name of Islam responsible for genocide, without the slightest recrimination from other Muslim nations) were remotely interested in peace.
It should be noted that Bashir and his sometimes ally and sometimes nemesis Hasan al Turabi, have jointly and separately presided over state-sponsored meetings of radical Islamist terrorist organizations from around the world, as well as sheltering and nurturing al Qaeda and protecting Osama bin Laden. Not a pretty picture.
Then there is the matter of Sudan's state-sponsored genocide.
Someone should be held accountable, as as head of state, Bashir is one of those.
ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo said a three-year investigation has shown that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that... [al-Bashir] bears criminal responsibility in relation to 10 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes."
But there is a real danger associated with the indictment, as that is that it will once again lay bare the powerlessness of the international community to implement the steps it claims it will take.
Scattering a few poorly armed and ill-trained peacekeepers, in conditions that guarantee their failure and that many will be killed, is not an action that strikes terror-or even mild concern-in the hearts of Bashir and regimes like his.
Bashir will not be arrested. We are way past the point where an indictment has any name and shame value-after the mass murder of more than 300,000 people with no significant international response, a piece of paper means little.
The indictment, justified as it is, will ultimately only show, once again, how unwilling the international community is to stop the genocide. Bashir faces no credible threat of arrest. The ICC and the international bodies that supposedly have teeth to deal with criminal behavior, do face a credible threat, the threat of being shown (again) to be impotent.
It is better not to make a threat you cannot reasonably expect to fulfill than to make a threat in the hopes of scaring someone who is far past scaring.
Remember when then Secretary of State Colin Powell dared to utter the word genocide? And the false hope that engendered that something might finally be done to stop the murder? The indictment of the ICC is similar. It will give false hope that meaningful action is planned, when, in reality, it is a hollow act that will guarantee, rather than limit, impunity.
As if there were a viable peace process, and as if the government of Sudan (a radical Islamist state, claiming to act in the name of Islam responsible for genocide, without the slightest recrimination from other Muslim nations) were remotely interested in peace.
It should be noted that Bashir and his sometimes ally and sometimes nemesis Hasan al Turabi, have jointly and separately presided over state-sponsored meetings of radical Islamist terrorist organizations from around the world, as well as sheltering and nurturing al Qaeda and protecting Osama bin Laden. Not a pretty picture.
Then there is the matter of Sudan's state-sponsored genocide.
Someone should be held accountable, as as head of state, Bashir is one of those.
ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo said a three-year investigation has shown that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that... [al-Bashir] bears criminal responsibility in relation to 10 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes."
But there is a real danger associated with the indictment, as that is that it will once again lay bare the powerlessness of the international community to implement the steps it claims it will take.
Scattering a few poorly armed and ill-trained peacekeepers, in conditions that guarantee their failure and that many will be killed, is not an action that strikes terror-or even mild concern-in the hearts of Bashir and regimes like his.
Bashir will not be arrested. We are way past the point where an indictment has any name and shame value-after the mass murder of more than 300,000 people with no significant international response, a piece of paper means little.
The indictment, justified as it is, will ultimately only show, once again, how unwilling the international community is to stop the genocide. Bashir faces no credible threat of arrest. The ICC and the international bodies that supposedly have teeth to deal with criminal behavior, do face a credible threat, the threat of being shown (again) to be impotent.
It is better not to make a threat you cannot reasonably expect to fulfill than to make a threat in the hopes of scaring someone who is far past scaring.
Remember when then Secretary of State Colin Powell dared to utter the word genocide? And the false hope that engendered that something might finally be done to stop the murder? The indictment of the ICC is similar. It will give false hope that meaningful action is planned, when, in reality, it is a hollow act that will guarantee, rather than limit, impunity.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday July 11, 2008
The World of Passports in the Criminal/Terrorist Nexus
Seems that the UK is tightening its entry requirements for South Africa. The reason:
Britain has threatened to impose a visa regime on visitors from South Africa amidst fears that the country is being used as a transit point by al-Qaeda operatives to gain easy entry to the UK.
The Government is also concerned that the country is being used by people smugglers to bring non-South Africans into the UK.
There it is: the criminal/terrorist network. Both groups need the same thing and acquire them from the same place, with the same fixers running the shadow infrastructure that will service anyone who can pay.
Yesterday I attended a conference at the Wilson International Center for Scholars where Félix Maradiaga, Senior Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies and Public Policies (IEEPP), Nicaragua, discussed how Iranians were flooding into his country because visa controls had been relaxed.
Disturbingly, those who enter Nicaragua without control can then travel without visas to the rest Central America, who, like the EU, have a free transit zone in the region.
Those transiting to Britain with South African documents are inside the EU. They have breached the one and only wall to keep them out. Anywhere from there is basically free.
Iran has weekly flights to Caracas, Venezuela, and those passengers from Iran and Syria don't need visas either, and there are effectively no way to find out who has come and gone, even for the nation's immigration authorities.
Terrorists and criminals need several things that states can offer, and one of the primary items is identification papers. Passports that hide the true identity and/or nationality of a person are very valuable commodities.
Criminals want the same thing, the ability to move themselves and people who will pay them thousands of dollars, across borders with minimal risk. This entails having travel documents that are authentic or look authentic enough to pass muster, and enough corrupt officials on all sides of the pipeline to allow the enterprise to flourish with minimal risk.
These are the nexus that we must begin to pay more serious attention to. Consular offices now are understaffed, delays for visas are long and frustrating, and the system is still highly vulnerable. Until we confront this problem, so are our borders.
Britain has threatened to impose a visa regime on visitors from South Africa amidst fears that the country is being used as a transit point by al-Qaeda operatives to gain easy entry to the UK.
The Government is also concerned that the country is being used by people smugglers to bring non-South Africans into the UK.
There it is: the criminal/terrorist network. Both groups need the same thing and acquire them from the same place, with the same fixers running the shadow infrastructure that will service anyone who can pay.
Yesterday I attended a conference at the Wilson International Center for Scholars where Félix Maradiaga, Senior Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies and Public Policies (IEEPP), Nicaragua, discussed how Iranians were flooding into his country because visa controls had been relaxed.
Disturbingly, those who enter Nicaragua without control can then travel without visas to the rest Central America, who, like the EU, have a free transit zone in the region.
Those transiting to Britain with South African documents are inside the EU. They have breached the one and only wall to keep them out. Anywhere from there is basically free.
Iran has weekly flights to Caracas, Venezuela, and those passengers from Iran and Syria don't need visas either, and there are effectively no way to find out who has come and gone, even for the nation's immigration authorities.
Terrorists and criminals need several things that states can offer, and one of the primary items is identification papers. Passports that hide the true identity and/or nationality of a person are very valuable commodities.
Criminals want the same thing, the ability to move themselves and people who will pay them thousands of dollars, across borders with minimal risk. This entails having travel documents that are authentic or look authentic enough to pass muster, and enough corrupt officials on all sides of the pipeline to allow the enterprise to flourish with minimal risk.
These are the nexus that we must begin to pay more serious attention to. Consular offices now are understaffed, delays for visas are long and frustrating, and the system is still highly vulnerable. Until we confront this problem, so are our borders.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday July 9, 2008
Rays of Hope in Recent Operations
I have been rightly described as extremely pessimistic about the way our intelligence and law enforcement communities-with the exception of isolated pockets-are facing (or not) the challenges I see as most pressing for the 21st century.
These include the growing and spreading threat of non-state armed actors, the criminal-terrorist nexus, the spreading narco mini-states across Central and northern South America, and the world of shadow facilitators that tie disparate networks together.
In my experience, most of the problems center on a lack of understanding of how the world really operates, and a distinct inability to see things beyond how we have experienced them for ourselves, meaning the world is often viewed as operating according to our cultural and political experience, rather than operating as it operates.
But a string of recent successes (two by the Drug Enforcement Administration and one by the Colombian army with U.S. military support) show rays of hope. Some of the risk-aversion is being overcome, creative thinking is being more welcomed and human intelligence is again the key.
The cases are the arrest of Viktor Bout; the successful arrest and extradition of Monzar al Kassar; and the freeing of the FARC hostages.
What these cases have in common is the creativity with which the operations were conceived, the flexibility in the implementation of them, the correct identification of high-value targets, and the extensive use of human intelligence to develop the operations and carry them out successfully.
Each plan was audacious in its conception, bold in its execution, and blessed by officials despite the inherent risk each posed.
As the Washington Post noted today, the United States signed off on the Colombian operation because it involved the possible rescue of three U.S. citizens.
The operation could have been stopped there. It was unconventional, planned by others and high-risk. But it was given the green light.
This would not always have been the case. It is worth rereading this piece by my friend and former colleague Richard Shultz to see just how bad things had gotten.
Things changed since 9/11, but in many respects have fallen back to the old pattern of doing business, both among government agencies and in the shrinking strategic perception of the global threat environment.
But some things have changed, pushed in part by Attorney General Mukasey and his new focus on this nexus. The DEA, which has always done good human intelligence, has found new and creative ways to engage in this battle.
How deep the change goes remains to be seen, and whether it will be fostered by the next administration is a crucial question. For now, pessimistic as I am, I can see some rays of hope.
These include the growing and spreading threat of non-state armed actors, the criminal-terrorist nexus, the spreading narco mini-states across Central and northern South America, and the world of shadow facilitators that tie disparate networks together.
In my experience, most of the problems center on a lack of understanding of how the world really operates, and a distinct inability to see things beyond how we have experienced them for ourselves, meaning the world is often viewed as operating according to our cultural and political experience, rather than operating as it operates.
But a string of recent successes (two by the Drug Enforcement Administration and one by the Colombian army with U.S. military support) show rays of hope. Some of the risk-aversion is being overcome, creative thinking is being more welcomed and human intelligence is again the key.
The cases are the arrest of Viktor Bout; the successful arrest and extradition of Monzar al Kassar; and the freeing of the FARC hostages.
What these cases have in common is the creativity with which the operations were conceived, the flexibility in the implementation of them, the correct identification of high-value targets, and the extensive use of human intelligence to develop the operations and carry them out successfully.
Each plan was audacious in its conception, bold in its execution, and blessed by officials despite the inherent risk each posed.
As the Washington Post noted today, the United States signed off on the Colombian operation because it involved the possible rescue of three U.S. citizens.
The operation could have been stopped there. It was unconventional, planned by others and high-risk. But it was given the green light.
This would not always have been the case. It is worth rereading this piece by my friend and former colleague Richard Shultz to see just how bad things had gotten.
Things changed since 9/11, but in many respects have fallen back to the old pattern of doing business, both among government agencies and in the shrinking strategic perception of the global threat environment.
But some things have changed, pushed in part by Attorney General Mukasey and his new focus on this nexus. The DEA, which has always done good human intelligence, has found new and creative ways to engage in this battle.
How deep the change goes remains to be seen, and whether it will be fostered by the next administration is a crucial question. For now, pessimistic as I am, I can see some rays of hope.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday July 7, 2008
The Ties That Bind
The Washington Post's recent article on the surprises that the biometric database is turning in among those arrested abroad shows in part the ties that bind terrorist and criminal groups.
It also shows the power of sharing data across institutional lines, as well as the inherent issues related to individual privacy that will have to be navigated as the we move forward.
What the biometric database that has been developed since 9/11 shows is that many of those arrested in Iraq, Somalia, Colombia and elsewhere are wanted criminals in the United States. The hit rate is above 1 percent, which may not seem like a lot, but offers only a glimpse into the number of criminals now participating in wars against the United States.
These criminal records, matched by fingerprints, and is some cases iris scans and other measures, show just how vulnerable the United is should terrorists (whether Islamist extremists or other groups) choose to attack.
"I found the number stunning," said Frances Fragos Townsend, a security consultant and former assistant to the president for homeland security. "It suggested to me that this was going to give us far greater insight into the relationships between individuals fighting against U.S. forces in the theater and potential U.S. cells or support networks here in the United States."
So, many people who lived here, know the system and voluntarily or involuntarily leave to join radical Islamist movements abroad or carry out terrorist activities with other groups. And the ones that are known are those who have had the misfortune to get arrested and leave a criminal record.
Imagine how many others there must be.
The heart of the program is this:
Analysts are not just trying to identify the prints on the bomb. They want to find out who the bomb-carrier associates with. Who he calls. Who calls him. That could lead to the higher-level operatives who planned and financed attacks.
That, in effect, is looking at the person's network, rather than just the individual. It is the only way to get at and degrade closed terrorist and criminal groups. It is a concept that is only now being applied in a serious way in counter-terrorism.
Steve Nixon, a director at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said the effort is key to national security.
"When we look at the road and the challenges, globalization and the spread of technology has empowered small groups of individuals, bad guys, to be more powerful than at any other time in history," he said. "We have to know who these people are when we encounter them. A lot of what we're doing in intelligence now is trying to identify a person. Biometrics is a key element of that."
There are constant dangers of misidentification and the mistakenly targeted individuals. This will become more acute as more nations join in building a more global database, primarily through Interpol. Lives can be ruined easily through carelessness and faulty methods.
But, with the proper safeguards, the program can be extremely useful in identifying the ties that bind those who have been here and those who want to return to harm us.
It also shows the power of sharing data across institutional lines, as well as the inherent issues related to individual privacy that will have to be navigated as the we move forward.
What the biometric database that has been developed since 9/11 shows is that many of those arrested in Iraq, Somalia, Colombia and elsewhere are wanted criminals in the United States. The hit rate is above 1 percent, which may not seem like a lot, but offers only a glimpse into the number of criminals now participating in wars against the United States.
These criminal records, matched by fingerprints, and is some cases iris scans and other measures, show just how vulnerable the United is should terrorists (whether Islamist extremists or other groups) choose to attack.
"I found the number stunning," said Frances Fragos Townsend, a security consultant and former assistant to the president for homeland security. "It suggested to me that this was going to give us far greater insight into the relationships between individuals fighting against U.S. forces in the theater and potential U.S. cells or support networks here in the United States."
So, many people who lived here, know the system and voluntarily or involuntarily leave to join radical Islamist movements abroad or carry out terrorist activities with other groups. And the ones that are known are those who have had the misfortune to get arrested and leave a criminal record.
Imagine how many others there must be.
The heart of the program is this:
Analysts are not just trying to identify the prints on the bomb. They want to find out who the bomb-carrier associates with. Who he calls. Who calls him. That could lead to the higher-level operatives who planned and financed attacks.
That, in effect, is looking at the person's network, rather than just the individual. It is the only way to get at and degrade closed terrorist and criminal groups. It is a concept that is only now being applied in a serious way in counter-terrorism.
Steve Nixon, a director at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said the effort is key to national security.
"When we look at the road and the challenges, globalization and the spread of technology has empowered small groups of individuals, bad guys, to be more powerful than at any other time in history," he said. "We have to know who these people are when we encounter them. A lot of what we're doing in intelligence now is trying to identify a person. Biometrics is a key element of that."
There are constant dangers of misidentification and the mistakenly targeted individuals. This will become more acute as more nations join in building a more global database, primarily through Interpol. Lives can be ruined easily through carelessness and faulty methods.
But, with the proper safeguards, the program can be extremely useful in identifying the ties that bind those who have been here and those who want to return to harm us.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH