Tuesday May 6, 2008
Viktor Bout Indicted on Charges of Seeking to Kill U.S. Citizens
The Justice Department today unsealed a four-count indictment of Russian weapons trafficker Viktor Bout, charging him with the following:
"Between November 2007 and March 2008, Bout agreed to sell to the FARC millions of dollars’ worth of weapons -- including surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), armor piercing rocket launchers, AK-47 firearms, millions of rounds of ammunition, Russian spare parts for rifles, anti-personnel land mines, C-4 plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, "ultralight" airplanes that could be outfitted with grenade launchers and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Bout agreed to sell the weapons to two confidential sources working with the DEA (the CSs), who represented that they were acquiring these weapons for the FARC, with the specific understanding that the weapons were to be used to attack United States helicopters in Colombia."
The full indictment can be read here. Bout, known as The Merchant of Death and subject of a book by the same name by me and my co-author, Steve Braun, was arrested in Thailand on March 6.
He is still in prison outside Bangkok, and the US government, or at least parts of it, are pressing hard for his extradition. If convicted, Bout would face a life sentence.
As with his dealings with the Taliban, Bout was not bashful about promising to deliver lethal weapons to a terrorist group (the FARC, or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) have been on the US terrorist list since 1997 and on the EU list since 2001.
The day of his arrest, according to the indictment, Bout agreed to sell to confidential DEA sources 700-800 surface-to-air missiles; 5,000 AK-47 assault rifles; millions of rounds of ammunition; spare parts for the rifles; anti-personnel land mines and C-4 explosives; night vision equipment; "ultra-light plane which could be outfitted with missiles and grenade launchers; and unmanned aerial vehicles with a range of 200 to 300 kilometers.
Not a bad shopping list for $15 million to $20 million, as Bout requested.
During the meeting, Bout allegedly said that the "United States was also his enemy," and, when informed the weapons would be used to kill U.S. troops in Colombia, said the fight against the United States was also his fight, so he would supply the FARC with the weapons.
Perhaps that will be enough to put some spine into those waffling on the US side, hoping to negotiate Bout for some large strategic concession from Russia.
It may be time for them to recognize that Bout is a serious enough threat that he should be non-negotiable.
"Between November 2007 and March 2008, Bout agreed to sell to the FARC millions of dollars’ worth of weapons -- including surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), armor piercing rocket launchers, AK-47 firearms, millions of rounds of ammunition, Russian spare parts for rifles, anti-personnel land mines, C-4 plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, "ultralight" airplanes that could be outfitted with grenade launchers and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Bout agreed to sell the weapons to two confidential sources working with the DEA (the CSs), who represented that they were acquiring these weapons for the FARC, with the specific understanding that the weapons were to be used to attack United States helicopters in Colombia."
The full indictment can be read here. Bout, known as The Merchant of Death and subject of a book by the same name by me and my co-author, Steve Braun, was arrested in Thailand on March 6.
He is still in prison outside Bangkok, and the US government, or at least parts of it, are pressing hard for his extradition. If convicted, Bout would face a life sentence.
As with his dealings with the Taliban, Bout was not bashful about promising to deliver lethal weapons to a terrorist group (the FARC, or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) have been on the US terrorist list since 1997 and on the EU list since 2001.
The day of his arrest, according to the indictment, Bout agreed to sell to confidential DEA sources 700-800 surface-to-air missiles; 5,000 AK-47 assault rifles; millions of rounds of ammunition; spare parts for the rifles; anti-personnel land mines and C-4 explosives; night vision equipment; "ultra-light plane which could be outfitted with missiles and grenade launchers; and unmanned aerial vehicles with a range of 200 to 300 kilometers.
Not a bad shopping list for $15 million to $20 million, as Bout requested.
During the meeting, Bout allegedly said that the "United States was also his enemy," and, when informed the weapons would be used to kill U.S. troops in Colombia, said the fight against the United States was also his fight, so he would supply the FARC with the weapons.
Perhaps that will be enough to put some spine into those waffling on the US side, hoping to negotiate Bout for some large strategic concession from Russia.
It may be time for them to recognize that Bout is a serious enough threat that he should be non-negotiable.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday May 5, 2008
The Tragedy of the USS Cole Case
The Washington Post this weekend carried an extensive and depressing look at how the main suspects in the USS Cole bombing have gone free.
The most infuriating piece is on the freedom of Jamal al-Badawi, who helped organize the October 2000 attack on the US battleship that left 17 sailors dead.
It was a bold attack, and one that should never have succeeded. The hesitancy by the crew to inflict potential civilian casualties cost the lives of soldiers in an era when the armed forces were not yet used to suicide bombing.
It is important to recognize the role bringing perpetrators of violent acts to justice plays in fighting radical Islamists or any other terrorist group, or rather the tremendously high price we pay for impunity.
Impunity in these cases, especially with the complicity of senior government officials (in this case, in Yemen) will, without a doubt not only contribute to emboldening would-be terrorists for future attacks. It also contributes greatly to the _jihadist_ (with apologies to the authors of the much commented-on and rightly condemned DHS memo on language use) narrative of their struggle.
There is no doubt that the US government's conduct in the initial investigation left much to be desired. Lack of cultural training and knowledge and lack of trust made it a difficult task from the beginning.
But that is not the real reason for the unraveling of the case, and there is plenty of responsibility to be shared by all sides. The lack of sustained interest by the Bush administration, Yemeni authorities who view the attacks as less than important, and the weak and corruptible judicial system all are factors.
As the story noted:
In March 2002, President Bush said his administration was cooperating with Yemen to prevent it from becoming "a haven for terrorists." He added: "Every terrorist must be made to live as an international fugitive with no place to settle or organize, no place to hide, no governments to hide behind and not even a safe place to sleep."
Since then, Yemen has refused to extradite Badawi and an accomplice to the United States, where they have been indicted on murder charges. Other Cole conspirators have been freed after short prison terms. At least two went on to commit suicide attacks in Iraq.
"After we worked day and night to bring justice to the victims and prove that these Qaeda operatives were responsible, we're back to square one," said Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent and a lead investigator into the bombing. "Do they have laws over there or not? It's really frustrating what's happening."
The answer is, there are not laws as we understand them, and the attack is widely viewed in the Muslim world (again, a nod to DHS) as a successful act of _jihad_ against the infidel.
(One can quickly see the brilliance of the DHS Muslim advisers in their recommendations, as it soon becomes virtually impossible to write, in any meaningful or intelligent way, about radical Islamism and what it means. Yes, words do matter, and now they have appropriated all the words. Truly brilliant.)
So now Badawi and others who perpetrated and were convicted of the Cole attack are free so they can help turn over al Qaeda operatives.
It would be interesting to know how that has worked out. Of course, it may be a little hard to ascertain as Badawi and his fellow attackers seem to come and go from jail as they choose. Perhaps they turn in periodic written intelligence reports, or simply report directly to the warden of the maximum security jail they are able to wander in and out of at will.
These stories of escape and impunity have deep resonance in the _jihadist_ world, and make a mockery of the promises routinely issued to bring those responsible to justice. It is better not to make those promises than to make them only so they can be shown to be hollow.
The most infuriating piece is on the freedom of Jamal al-Badawi, who helped organize the October 2000 attack on the US battleship that left 17 sailors dead.
It was a bold attack, and one that should never have succeeded. The hesitancy by the crew to inflict potential civilian casualties cost the lives of soldiers in an era when the armed forces were not yet used to suicide bombing.
It is important to recognize the role bringing perpetrators of violent acts to justice plays in fighting radical Islamists or any other terrorist group, or rather the tremendously high price we pay for impunity.
Impunity in these cases, especially with the complicity of senior government officials (in this case, in Yemen) will, without a doubt not only contribute to emboldening would-be terrorists for future attacks. It also contributes greatly to the _jihadist_ (with apologies to the authors of the much commented-on and rightly condemned DHS memo on language use) narrative of their struggle.
There is no doubt that the US government's conduct in the initial investigation left much to be desired. Lack of cultural training and knowledge and lack of trust made it a difficult task from the beginning.
But that is not the real reason for the unraveling of the case, and there is plenty of responsibility to be shared by all sides. The lack of sustained interest by the Bush administration, Yemeni authorities who view the attacks as less than important, and the weak and corruptible judicial system all are factors.
As the story noted:
In March 2002, President Bush said his administration was cooperating with Yemen to prevent it from becoming "a haven for terrorists." He added: "Every terrorist must be made to live as an international fugitive with no place to settle or organize, no place to hide, no governments to hide behind and not even a safe place to sleep."
Since then, Yemen has refused to extradite Badawi and an accomplice to the United States, where they have been indicted on murder charges. Other Cole conspirators have been freed after short prison terms. At least two went on to commit suicide attacks in Iraq.
"After we worked day and night to bring justice to the victims and prove that these Qaeda operatives were responsible, we're back to square one," said Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent and a lead investigator into the bombing. "Do they have laws over there or not? It's really frustrating what's happening."
The answer is, there are not laws as we understand them, and the attack is widely viewed in the Muslim world (again, a nod to DHS) as a successful act of _jihad_ against the infidel.
(One can quickly see the brilliance of the DHS Muslim advisers in their recommendations, as it soon becomes virtually impossible to write, in any meaningful or intelligent way, about radical Islamism and what it means. Yes, words do matter, and now they have appropriated all the words. Truly brilliant.)
So now Badawi and others who perpetrated and were convicted of the Cole attack are free so they can help turn over al Qaeda operatives.
It would be interesting to know how that has worked out. Of course, it may be a little hard to ascertain as Badawi and his fellow attackers seem to come and go from jail as they choose. Perhaps they turn in periodic written intelligence reports, or simply report directly to the warden of the maximum security jail they are able to wander in and out of at will.
These stories of escape and impunity have deep resonance in the _jihadist_ world, and make a mockery of the promises routinely issued to bring those responsible to justice. It is better not to make those promises than to make them only so they can be shown to be hollow.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday May 1, 2008
An Interesting Pairing at a Conference
It is interesting to note that CAIR director Nihad Awad will soon be sharing center stage in a major conference with Mohammad Akram al-Adlouni, the probable author of the most damning documents made public during the Holy Land Foundation trial.
The conference in Denmark, heavily populated with Muslim Brotherhood figures, is, according the program, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Nakbah or catastrophe, as they refer to the founding of the state of Israel.
The joint attendance of Awad and al Adlouni, now head of the al Quds Foundation in Lebanon, was first noted by the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report.
The GMBDR further noted that:
The Palestinian Return Centre in London, characterized by sources in London as close to Hamas, has Trustees that have also been on the board of the Muslim Association of Britain, one of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the U.K. The Centre itself has been widely promoted by the U.K Brotherhood. CAIR, in turn, had its origins in the Hamas support infrastructure in the U.S.
So, the old gang is getting together again, in the service of the Muslim Brotherhood and its armed wing, Hamas.
It was al-Adlouni who penned the famous "On the General
Strategic Goal for the Group in North America," referring to Muslim Brotherhood organizations, including those in which Awad has been active. CAIR was formed later, but comes from the same family of organizations linked to the Ikhwan.
As I wrote in the analysis for the NEFA Foundation, "In the document, the author is strikingly clear
about the ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States." The document stated that:
The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.
I will repeat a bit more of the paper here, because it is important to see where this group's true agenda lies, as these old allies and others of their ideological and theological persuasion meet again, with an agenda largely unchanged from what they articulated 17 years ago and have never renounced:
In order to establish his authority in the Explanatory Memorandum, Adlouni states that his authority is derived from the 1987Shura Council and Organizational Conference of 1987, the highest governing bodies of the Brotherhood in the United States. To claim this authority he quotes the group’s agreed goals from that conference, including:
"Enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic state wherever it is."
After going into some detail in establishing the relevance and authority of his missive, Adlouni spends considerable time on the fundamental concept of settlement, central to the Muslim Brotherhood-led efforts in North America. He describes settlement as necessary so "That Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland it lives in."
The process of settlement isalso defined as follows:
"In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the live of its
society and has firmly established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and – on top of them – the Muslim Brotherhood in this country…
The conference in Denmark, heavily populated with Muslim Brotherhood figures, is, according the program, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Nakbah or catastrophe, as they refer to the founding of the state of Israel.
The joint attendance of Awad and al Adlouni, now head of the al Quds Foundation in Lebanon, was first noted by the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report.
The GMBDR further noted that:
The Palestinian Return Centre in London, characterized by sources in London as close to Hamas, has Trustees that have also been on the board of the Muslim Association of Britain, one of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the U.K. The Centre itself has been widely promoted by the U.K Brotherhood. CAIR, in turn, had its origins in the Hamas support infrastructure in the U.S.
So, the old gang is getting together again, in the service of the Muslim Brotherhood and its armed wing, Hamas.
It was al-Adlouni who penned the famous "On the General
Strategic Goal for the Group in North America," referring to Muslim Brotherhood organizations, including those in which Awad has been active. CAIR was formed later, but comes from the same family of organizations linked to the Ikhwan.
As I wrote in the analysis for the NEFA Foundation, "In the document, the author is strikingly clear
about the ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States." The document stated that:
The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.
I will repeat a bit more of the paper here, because it is important to see where this group's true agenda lies, as these old allies and others of their ideological and theological persuasion meet again, with an agenda largely unchanged from what they articulated 17 years ago and have never renounced:
In order to establish his authority in the Explanatory Memorandum, Adlouni states that his authority is derived from the 1987Shura Council and Organizational Conference of 1987, the highest governing bodies of the Brotherhood in the United States. To claim this authority he quotes the group’s agreed goals from that conference, including:
"Enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic state wherever it is."
After going into some detail in establishing the relevance and authority of his missive, Adlouni spends considerable time on the fundamental concept of settlement, central to the Muslim Brotherhood-led efforts in North America. He describes settlement as necessary so "That Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland it lives in."
The process of settlement isalso defined as follows:
"In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the live of its
society and has firmly established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and – on top of them – the Muslim Brotherhood in this country…
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday April 30, 2008
AG Mukasey's Overdue Attention to Organized Crime
Almost as soon as my last post on the transnational threat of cigarette smuggling was posted, several alert friends sent me the recent speech by Attorney General Michael Mukasey at CSIS, where he announced a new effort to understand and combat transnational criminal organizations.
The initiative is long overdue. As Mukasey noted, the Organized Crime Council had not met for 15 years. Quite a feat, given the numerous and wide-ranging indications that organized criminal groups have steadily gained influence, power and control or near-control over areas that are vital national security. As Mukasey noted:
International organized crime is a hybrid criminal problem that implicates three of the department’s national priorities: national security, violent crime, and public corruption. It needs a coordinated response and an openness to new ways of doing business. It also demands that we work closely with our foreign colleagues in order to dismantle global criminal syndicates. In short, this is about more than the Department of Justice. It involves our law enforcement and non-law enforcement colleagues at the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Treasury, and Labor, the U.S. Postal Service, as well as the intelligence community. And I’d like to thank these other agencies for their help and for their efforts.
The attorney general’s Organized Crime Council will have a leading role in coordinating that effort.
But one thing was curiously missing from Mukasey's comments, and that is growing link, as I and others have outlined numerous times, between these organized criminal networks and terrorism, including but not limited to terrorism driven by radical Islamist theology.
Mukasey did mention the case of Viktor Bout and the FARC, which I have written about extensively. But it is hear that Mukasey's silence is most interesting.
Regarding the Bout case, Mukasey said:
As this example makes clear, although these criminals are not motivated by ideology, when the price is right, they are more than willing to help the people who are motivated by ideology.
That is certainly true. But it can also be people motivated by theology. Bout sold weapons and aircraft to the Taliban, and indirectly armed al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He has helped arm Hezbollah, the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, and other cases.
All have the stated goal of establishing a radical Islamist government that transcends any nation state, imposes sharia law and ushers in a radically different world.
My point is that what makes transnational criminal organizations more dangerous now transcends the power to corrupt, undermine the legitimate economy and threaten the sovereignty and security of the states in which they operate.
Those issues are clearly vitally important. But the real difference between today and 10 years ago is that criminal groups have not only grown and created pipelines for moving illicit goods, but that terrorist organizations now place people and products in those same pipelines, as I described recently in a paper for the NEFA Foundation.
While criminal organizations are driven by economic considerations, often kill those who stand in their way and challenge the authorities of states in numerous ways, they have not traditionally had, as an objective, the destruction of the West, the toppling of governments and the imposition of a government claiming divine legitimacy.
Yet these criminal groups now provide the infrastructure on which radical political groups (FARC etc.), governments (Iran, North Korea, Venezueal etc.) and radical, expansionist religious groups (al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas etc.) can build.
That is the true difference between our time and the time when the Council stopped meeting. States can-and often but not always do-ultimately meet the challenges of transnational criminal organizations.
But the pipelines that they develop and constantly shift can be used by terrorists who are not interested in money, but in maximizing the number of people they can kill. And that is a whole new world.
The initiative is long overdue. As Mukasey noted, the Organized Crime Council had not met for 15 years. Quite a feat, given the numerous and wide-ranging indications that organized criminal groups have steadily gained influence, power and control or near-control over areas that are vital national security. As Mukasey noted:
International organized crime is a hybrid criminal problem that implicates three of the department’s national priorities: national security, violent crime, and public corruption. It needs a coordinated response and an openness to new ways of doing business. It also demands that we work closely with our foreign colleagues in order to dismantle global criminal syndicates. In short, this is about more than the Department of Justice. It involves our law enforcement and non-law enforcement colleagues at the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Treasury, and Labor, the U.S. Postal Service, as well as the intelligence community. And I’d like to thank these other agencies for their help and for their efforts.
The attorney general’s Organized Crime Council will have a leading role in coordinating that effort.
But one thing was curiously missing from Mukasey's comments, and that is growing link, as I and others have outlined numerous times, between these organized criminal networks and terrorism, including but not limited to terrorism driven by radical Islamist theology.
Mukasey did mention the case of Viktor Bout and the FARC, which I have written about extensively. But it is hear that Mukasey's silence is most interesting.
Regarding the Bout case, Mukasey said:
As this example makes clear, although these criminals are not motivated by ideology, when the price is right, they are more than willing to help the people who are motivated by ideology.
That is certainly true. But it can also be people motivated by theology. Bout sold weapons and aircraft to the Taliban, and indirectly armed al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He has helped arm Hezbollah, the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, and other cases.
All have the stated goal of establishing a radical Islamist government that transcends any nation state, imposes sharia law and ushers in a radically different world.
My point is that what makes transnational criminal organizations more dangerous now transcends the power to corrupt, undermine the legitimate economy and threaten the sovereignty and security of the states in which they operate.
Those issues are clearly vitally important. But the real difference between today and 10 years ago is that criminal groups have not only grown and created pipelines for moving illicit goods, but that terrorist organizations now place people and products in those same pipelines, as I described recently in a paper for the NEFA Foundation.
While criminal organizations are driven by economic considerations, often kill those who stand in their way and challenge the authorities of states in numerous ways, they have not traditionally had, as an objective, the destruction of the West, the toppling of governments and the imposition of a government claiming divine legitimacy.
Yet these criminal groups now provide the infrastructure on which radical political groups (FARC etc.), governments (Iran, North Korea, Venezueal etc.) and radical, expansionist religious groups (al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas etc.) can build.
That is the true difference between our time and the time when the Council stopped meeting. States can-and often but not always do-ultimately meet the challenges of transnational criminal organizations.
But the pipelines that they develop and constantly shift can be used by terrorists who are not interested in money, but in maximizing the number of people they can kill. And that is a whole new world.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday April 29, 2008
Cigarettes and the Criminal-Terrorist Nexus
The minority staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security has, as first reported by Fox News, posted an interesting report on the ties between cigarette smuggling and terrorism.
The report focuses primarily on smuggling in New York and the billions of dollars in lost revenues suffered from illicit cigarette sales.
But in fact, the smuggling and sales of cigarettes have long been one of the primary life-blood sources of criminals and, increasingly, of terrorist activities.
The criminal-terrorist nexus is not new, but it is of growing importance.
The Taliban's deep engagement in the poppy trade and the FARC's growing dominance in the cocaine trade are the two clearest examples, but there are countless others.
Some of it is petty crime, but often the overlap comes in the world's largest illicit markets, precisely because the true ownership and connections are hardest to detect in those settings.
Cigarette smuggling is one of those venues, and is not new, but is perhaps now more dangerous.
The report, (with little additional evidence other than a footnote attributing the information to interviews with law enforcement) concludes that:
Historically, the low-risk, high profitability of the illicit cigarette trade served as a gateway for traditional criminal traffickers to move into lucrative and dangerous criminal enterprises such as money laundering, arms dealing and drug trafficking. Recent law enforcement investigations, however, have directly linked those involved in [the] illicit tobacco trade to infamous terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and al Qaeda.
The connection is likely to be less linear than the prose suggests, but it is likely there, as it has been for other organizations for decades.
I wrote an extensive piece on it 10 years ago for the Washington Post on how the main Colombian drug cartels use cigarettes to launder their profits and to corrupt the political process.
As with any such enterprise, the profit margins drive the business. It is easy to look at the new methodologies for raising and moving money to for criminal activities, but it is often the old, tried and true methods that bring the best results.
Hezbollah learned that lesson in cigarette smuggling, as has the FARC in Colombia, Hamas, and the thugs who run Burma. The criminal and terrorist groups need not control the entire operation to benefit.
For example, FARC need only control some of the points of entry on the Caribbean or Pacific coast in order to extract hundreds of thousands of dollars in transit fees from the smugglers. The organization does not need to have contacts in Aruba or Panama, where the shipments originate.
The reason is simple. Despite successful law suits against tobacco companies for knowingly helping to launder drug proceeds, and despite repeatedly-trumpeted campaigns against cigarette smuggling, little has changed in the ability to enforce existing laws.
Like cocaine and other drugs fought in the "drug war," tobacco has a built in market, able to constantly expand to new markets when old ones stagnate. North America doesn't like smoking? Latin America does. Or China. Or much of Europe. Etc.
While pressure is exerted on "traditional" methods of financing terrorist activities (ie., those that were suddenly obvious after 9/11, such as the use of charites), little is done on fronts that can yield equal, and low risk profits.
Those engaged in terrorist actions or criminal enterprises are generally smart people, able to operate in harmony with the laws of supply and demand. Underestimating their creativity in making and moving money is lethal.
The report focuses primarily on smuggling in New York and the billions of dollars in lost revenues suffered from illicit cigarette sales.
But in fact, the smuggling and sales of cigarettes have long been one of the primary life-blood sources of criminals and, increasingly, of terrorist activities.
The criminal-terrorist nexus is not new, but it is of growing importance.
The Taliban's deep engagement in the poppy trade and the FARC's growing dominance in the cocaine trade are the two clearest examples, but there are countless others.
Some of it is petty crime, but often the overlap comes in the world's largest illicit markets, precisely because the true ownership and connections are hardest to detect in those settings.
Cigarette smuggling is one of those venues, and is not new, but is perhaps now more dangerous.
The report, (with little additional evidence other than a footnote attributing the information to interviews with law enforcement) concludes that:
Historically, the low-risk, high profitability of the illicit cigarette trade served as a gateway for traditional criminal traffickers to move into lucrative and dangerous criminal enterprises such as money laundering, arms dealing and drug trafficking. Recent law enforcement investigations, however, have directly linked those involved in [the] illicit tobacco trade to infamous terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and al Qaeda.
The connection is likely to be less linear than the prose suggests, but it is likely there, as it has been for other organizations for decades.
I wrote an extensive piece on it 10 years ago for the Washington Post on how the main Colombian drug cartels use cigarettes to launder their profits and to corrupt the political process.
As with any such enterprise, the profit margins drive the business. It is easy to look at the new methodologies for raising and moving money to for criminal activities, but it is often the old, tried and true methods that bring the best results.
Hezbollah learned that lesson in cigarette smuggling, as has the FARC in Colombia, Hamas, and the thugs who run Burma. The criminal and terrorist groups need not control the entire operation to benefit.
For example, FARC need only control some of the points of entry on the Caribbean or Pacific coast in order to extract hundreds of thousands of dollars in transit fees from the smugglers. The organization does not need to have contacts in Aruba or Panama, where the shipments originate.
The reason is simple. Despite successful law suits against tobacco companies for knowingly helping to launder drug proceeds, and despite repeatedly-trumpeted campaigns against cigarette smuggling, little has changed in the ability to enforce existing laws.
Like cocaine and other drugs fought in the "drug war," tobacco has a built in market, able to constantly expand to new markets when old ones stagnate. North America doesn't like smoking? Latin America does. Or China. Or much of Europe. Etc.
While pressure is exerted on "traditional" methods of financing terrorist activities (ie., those that were suddenly obvious after 9/11, such as the use of charites), little is done on fronts that can yield equal, and low risk profits.
Those engaged in terrorist actions or criminal enterprises are generally smart people, able to operate in harmony with the laws of supply and demand. Underestimating their creativity in making and moving money is lethal.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH