Friday April 25, 2008
One Step on the Road to Defeating the Islamists
One of the more interesting things to me in the recent spate of statements by Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders is al Qaeda's need now to constantly and viciously attack other Islamist tendencies, particularly Iran and Shities, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Brotherhood-linked Hamas.
In addition to the attacks, the recent communications show two things: a clear awareness of current events, and the ability to comment on them quickly; and a clear lack of understanding of how the world really operates.
The increasingly sharp tone of the attacks and the underlying belief in a broad conspiracy of the United States and Iran to ally against al Qaeda, indicate the organization is under some considerable stress. It may also indicate that Zawahiri's days of trying to work out some sort of tactical if short term alliance with Tehran against the United States have ended in failure.
In this translation of a recent Zawahiri statement by the NEFA Foundation, the al Qaeda leader says:
Regarding Iran, its goals are explicit: annexing southern and eastern Iraq and continuing its effort to establish a continuum with its supporters in southern Lebanon. If their (the U.S.) understanding with Iran is on the basis of accepting some, or all of its goals in exchange for ignoring the American presence in the region, this understanding will only pour more oil onto the fire that is burning at our foundation..and will spark a massive [Sunni] Islamic revival, fed by the Iranian-American conspiracy."
In another statement, Zawahiri accused Iran and al Qaeda of fostering the theory that Israel, not al Qaeda, was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Al-Zawahri accused Hezbollah's Al-Manar television of starting the rumor. "The purpose of this lie is clear —
(to suggest) that there are no heroes among the Sunnis who can hurt America as no else did in history.
"Iranian media snapped up this lie and repeated it," he said. "Iran's aim here is also clear — to cover up its involvement with America in invading the homes of Muslims in
Afghanistan and Iraq," he added. Iran cooperated with the United States in the 2001 U.S. assault on Afghanistan that toppled al-Qaida's allies, the Taliban.
This begs the question of what Iran has done with the senior al Qaeda commanders and other high value targets that Iran has been holding.
For some time after 9/11 Iran let those targets enjoy some level of operational capability.
Zawahiri is equally critical of Hamas' leadership and the broader Muslim Brotherhood, accusing them (and Sheikh Qaradawi by name) of selling out to the West and betraying al Qaeda.
In his first Open Meeting where he responds to numerous questions, Zawahiri spends about one-third of his time in attacking Hamas, Qaradawi (whose writings he knows well and quotes at length in order to rebut them) and the Muslim Brotherhood.
All of this points to some growing isolation by al Qaeda and its core leadership, from others outside their group. The splintering of the Islamist groups that share the same overarching objective-our obliteration-can only be good news.
In addition to the attacks, the recent communications show two things: a clear awareness of current events, and the ability to comment on them quickly; and a clear lack of understanding of how the world really operates.
The increasingly sharp tone of the attacks and the underlying belief in a broad conspiracy of the United States and Iran to ally against al Qaeda, indicate the organization is under some considerable stress. It may also indicate that Zawahiri's days of trying to work out some sort of tactical if short term alliance with Tehran against the United States have ended in failure.
In this translation of a recent Zawahiri statement by the NEFA Foundation, the al Qaeda leader says:
Regarding Iran, its goals are explicit: annexing southern and eastern Iraq and continuing its effort to establish a continuum with its supporters in southern Lebanon. If their (the U.S.) understanding with Iran is on the basis of accepting some, or all of its goals in exchange for ignoring the American presence in the region, this understanding will only pour more oil onto the fire that is burning at our foundation..and will spark a massive [Sunni] Islamic revival, fed by the Iranian-American conspiracy."
In another statement, Zawahiri accused Iran and al Qaeda of fostering the theory that Israel, not al Qaeda, was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Al-Zawahri accused Hezbollah's Al-Manar television of starting the rumor. "The purpose of this lie is clear —
(to suggest) that there are no heroes among the Sunnis who can hurt America as no else did in history.
"Iranian media snapped up this lie and repeated it," he said. "Iran's aim here is also clear — to cover up its involvement with America in invading the homes of Muslims in
Afghanistan and Iraq," he added. Iran cooperated with the United States in the 2001 U.S. assault on Afghanistan that toppled al-Qaida's allies, the Taliban.
This begs the question of what Iran has done with the senior al Qaeda commanders and other high value targets that Iran has been holding.
For some time after 9/11 Iran let those targets enjoy some level of operational capability.
Zawahiri is equally critical of Hamas' leadership and the broader Muslim Brotherhood, accusing them (and Sheikh Qaradawi by name) of selling out to the West and betraying al Qaeda.
In his first Open Meeting where he responds to numerous questions, Zawahiri spends about one-third of his time in attacking Hamas, Qaradawi (whose writings he knows well and quotes at length in order to rebut them) and the Muslim Brotherhood.
All of this points to some growing isolation by al Qaeda and its core leadership, from others outside their group. The splintering of the Islamist groups that share the same overarching objective-our obliteration-can only be good news.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday April 23, 2008
The Muslim Brotherhood and Voting
If one wants to get a more realistic picture of how the Muslim Brotherhood and its international legacy organizations view voting and the democratic process than the usual platitudes of their public discourse, it is well worth reading the Guide to Voting in Islam,posted by the Muslim Association of Britain.
This document and commentary on its content was first posted on the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, available for a free subscription.
Because the Koran makes no distinction between the state and religion, voting itself becomes, as one British Imam is quoted in the document as saying, a form of jihad:
I consider Muslim political participation, especially in a non-Muslim country, as a form of jihad. This is our country and it would be foolish not to participate in the political processes which eventually shape our future and that of Islam. I support marching in the streets to raise awareness about certain issues. However, if we really want to change the status-quo then we have to influence those who walk the corridors of power. Muslims need not only to vote but put forward Muslim candidates in all the mainstream and serious independent parties. We need to be represented or be present at the tables around which policies are discussed, made and agreed.
The Guide to Voting offers grudging support for alliances with non-Muslims if the alliance is for the good of the Muslim population. Totally absent is the consideration of what is good for the country in which the Muslim individual is voting. This is made explicitly clear in a quote by Abdur Raheem Green, Dawah Administrator of the Central Mosque of London included in the Guide:
It has long been my position that any type of participation in democracy is a type of approval of that system. **I have no doubt that democracy is antithetical to Islam.** However, having read and listened to the sayings of many scholars on this issue, and being faced with the reality of a growing Muslim population here in the UK, who for all intents and purposes consider this their home, it has become clear to me that we must participate in every aspect of society as much as possible to ensure our rights and continued existence and well being in this society. This participation most certainly includes voting for whichever party or candidate best serves the needs and interests of the UK and indeed world wide Muslim population. **This does not mean approval or acceptance of the ideal of secular democracy, but the intention is to use the means and avenues available to benefit Muslims and the communities we reside in.**
That seems pretty straightforward to me. There is not a commitment to the fundamental concept of freedom and multi-party democracy. There is solely a commitment to establishing an Islamic state, and if that can be advanced through participating in elections, then so be it.
This ties in with the calls of the MB legacy groups in the United States to get Sen. John McCain stop using the adjective Islamic to describe radical Islamist terrorists.
The charge is led by Muneer Fareed of ISNA, who says that "I think this is just criminality, fair and square. We should just call them criminals. You want to call them terrorist criminals, fine. But adding the word 'Muslim' or 'Islamic' certainly doesn't help our cause as Americans."
But therein lies the rub, because it is clear from the Guide, and many other writings, that the MB's primary loyalty is not to whatever country they live in, but to the establishment of an Islamist state. And the terrorists define themselves as acting on behalf of Islam, and embrace the word.
So on whose behalf is Fareed and ISNA speaking? One must always ask that when dealing with the MB.
This document and commentary on its content was first posted on the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, available for a free subscription.
Because the Koran makes no distinction between the state and religion, voting itself becomes, as one British Imam is quoted in the document as saying, a form of jihad:
I consider Muslim political participation, especially in a non-Muslim country, as a form of jihad. This is our country and it would be foolish not to participate in the political processes which eventually shape our future and that of Islam. I support marching in the streets to raise awareness about certain issues. However, if we really want to change the status-quo then we have to influence those who walk the corridors of power. Muslims need not only to vote but put forward Muslim candidates in all the mainstream and serious independent parties. We need to be represented or be present at the tables around which policies are discussed, made and agreed.
The Guide to Voting offers grudging support for alliances with non-Muslims if the alliance is for the good of the Muslim population. Totally absent is the consideration of what is good for the country in which the Muslim individual is voting. This is made explicitly clear in a quote by Abdur Raheem Green, Dawah Administrator of the Central Mosque of London included in the Guide:
It has long been my position that any type of participation in democracy is a type of approval of that system. **I have no doubt that democracy is antithetical to Islam.** However, having read and listened to the sayings of many scholars on this issue, and being faced with the reality of a growing Muslim population here in the UK, who for all intents and purposes consider this their home, it has become clear to me that we must participate in every aspect of society as much as possible to ensure our rights and continued existence and well being in this society. This participation most certainly includes voting for whichever party or candidate best serves the needs and interests of the UK and indeed world wide Muslim population. **This does not mean approval or acceptance of the ideal of secular democracy, but the intention is to use the means and avenues available to benefit Muslims and the communities we reside in.**
That seems pretty straightforward to me. There is not a commitment to the fundamental concept of freedom and multi-party democracy. There is solely a commitment to establishing an Islamic state, and if that can be advanced through participating in elections, then so be it.
This ties in with the calls of the MB legacy groups in the United States to get Sen. John McCain stop using the adjective Islamic to describe radical Islamist terrorists.
The charge is led by Muneer Fareed of ISNA, who says that "I think this is just criminality, fair and square. We should just call them criminals. You want to call them terrorist criminals, fine. But adding the word 'Muslim' or 'Islamic' certainly doesn't help our cause as Americans."
But therein lies the rub, because it is clear from the Guide, and many other writings, that the MB's primary loyalty is not to whatever country they live in, but to the establishment of an Islamist state. And the terrorists define themselves as acting on behalf of Islam, and embrace the word.
So on whose behalf is Fareed and ISNA speaking? One must always ask that when dealing with the MB.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday April 21, 2008
New Insights on MB Convictions in Egypt
A few days ago Jeff Breinholt, my colleague on the Counterterrorism Blog noted a valuable new web resource, the
Global Muslim Brotherhood Report, open to responsible researchers who are willing to provide a name and institutional affiliation.
Today the site gives a rundown on an extremely interesting case in Egypt, where five leaders of the international Muslim Brotehrhood were sentenced in abstentia to 10 years in prison for terrorism and money laundering.
Those convicted include some of the oldest and most venerated of the MB global structure:
These include Yousef Nada, Ali Ghaleb Hemmat, Ibrahim Farouk al-Zayyat, Fathi al-Khouli and Tawfeek al-Raey.
The sentencing was widely reported, but without some of the salient information the site offers.
Nada and Hemmat are relatively well known in the West because of their involvement in Bank al Taqwa, based in Nassau, Bahamas, and designated by the United States and the United Nations as a sponsor of terrorism. Nada and Hemmat are also listed as individuals supporting terrorism.
But the others sentenced are just as interesting. According to the site:
Ibrahim Farouk Al-Zayyat (aka Ibrahim El-Zayat) is the current leader of the German Muslim Brotherhood as well as an important figure in the European Muslim Brotherhood organization known as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). At the time the original Egyptian indictments were issued, El-Zayat denied being associated with the Brotherhood and his name disappeared from the Egyptian Brotherhood online lists of indicted Brotherhood leaders. The German domestic intelligence agency has for years listed El-Zayat and his German organization as associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Fathi Al Khouli has been described by a U.K. Brotherhood site as more than 87 years old and who left Egypt fifty years ago.
Of course, the sentences were handed down by a repressive regime in Egypt, so it hardly meets the criteria for impartial and fair justice.
Given that at least two of those convicted are under international sanction for alleged support of al Qaeda, it would be extremely useful for the Egyptian government to make public the evidence against them.
An alternative would be for the Egyptians to show the evidence to international investigators in Switzerland, Germany, the United States and elsewhere that have investigations into the activities of Nada and Hemmat.
If it is real evidence and not something manufactured by the Egyptian state to target the Muslim Brotherhood, then it would likely be of great value in helping to find how the MB leaders move their money, and broaden the knowledge of their ties to terrorist organizations.
So far, Nada and Hemmat have largely made it through different investigations unscathed. It would help all, and greatly enhance the credibility of the Egyptian authorities, if the evidence were put up to international scrutiny.
Global Muslim Brotherhood Report, open to responsible researchers who are willing to provide a name and institutional affiliation.
Today the site gives a rundown on an extremely interesting case in Egypt, where five leaders of the international Muslim Brotehrhood were sentenced in abstentia to 10 years in prison for terrorism and money laundering.
Those convicted include some of the oldest and most venerated of the MB global structure:
These include Yousef Nada, Ali Ghaleb Hemmat, Ibrahim Farouk al-Zayyat, Fathi al-Khouli and Tawfeek al-Raey.
The sentencing was widely reported, but without some of the salient information the site offers.
Nada and Hemmat are relatively well known in the West because of their involvement in Bank al Taqwa, based in Nassau, Bahamas, and designated by the United States and the United Nations as a sponsor of terrorism. Nada and Hemmat are also listed as individuals supporting terrorism.
But the others sentenced are just as interesting. According to the site:
Ibrahim Farouk Al-Zayyat (aka Ibrahim El-Zayat) is the current leader of the German Muslim Brotherhood as well as an important figure in the European Muslim Brotherhood organization known as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). At the time the original Egyptian indictments were issued, El-Zayat denied being associated with the Brotherhood and his name disappeared from the Egyptian Brotherhood online lists of indicted Brotherhood leaders. The German domestic intelligence agency has for years listed El-Zayat and his German organization as associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Fathi Al Khouli has been described by a U.K. Brotherhood site as more than 87 years old and who left Egypt fifty years ago.
Of course, the sentences were handed down by a repressive regime in Egypt, so it hardly meets the criteria for impartial and fair justice.
Given that at least two of those convicted are under international sanction for alleged support of al Qaeda, it would be extremely useful for the Egyptian government to make public the evidence against them.
An alternative would be for the Egyptians to show the evidence to international investigators in Switzerland, Germany, the United States and elsewhere that have investigations into the activities of Nada and Hemmat.
If it is real evidence and not something manufactured by the Egyptian state to target the Muslim Brotherhood, then it would likely be of great value in helping to find how the MB leaders move their money, and broaden the knowledge of their ties to terrorist organizations.
So far, Nada and Hemmat have largely made it through different investigations unscathed. It would help all, and greatly enhance the credibility of the Egyptian authorities, if the evidence were put up to international scrutiny.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday April 18, 2008
A Deeply Disturbing Report on the Lack of Strategic Thinking
The General Accounting Office recently released a devastating reporton the lack of a coherent strategy governing the U.S. approach to dealing with the terrorist threat from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs).
This is true FIVE YEARS after the development of such a strategy was "stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007)."
Why this is not major news is beyond me. The report (with which the Defense Department and USAID concurred, and which State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not bother to comment on, and thus did not dispute) is a huge red flag about the core of the counterterrorism strategy that is being implemented, or not implemented.
Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—called for by the various national security strategies and Congress.
This strikes me as a colossal failure on many levels. There is, in essence, no strategy for taking on the enemy's command and control center, its operational center and the home to its most wanted leadership.
Were we dealing with a little-known group whose ability to carry out strategic threats against us in debate, that might be understandable. But we are talking the traditional, old guard leadership of al Qaeda which has carried out numerous, deadly attacks.
But, as the report makes clear, there has been little imperative to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with our primary enemy despite the fact that it is known they are operating from the very areas we have no policy for.
Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there.
GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA.
But let's review. The FATA is home to about 3.1 million people. The United States has spent $5.8 billion there in five years ($1.16 billion a year, or $516 per person per year in a region where the average family income is $250 a year), and yet there is no comprehensive strategy for how or where the money is spent.
We know that $5.56 billion in taxpayer money went to reimburse the Pakistani military, which in turn appears to have allowed al Qaeda to "regenerate its ability to attack the United States" while establishing a safe haven in the region. Sounds like money well spent, indeed.
Is this because all the attention of every policy maker and planner is focused on Iraq? There is no one left who can get the attention of senior policy makers to bring focus to this effort?
I know there are people across the government worried about this, but they seem to be unable to get the attention of folks further up the food chain who can actually make policy decisions.
Can we really go five years without developing the program that would likely have the most impact on our security? This really does seem to me to almost criminal negligence at very senior levels of the intelligence and policy communities.
This is true FIVE YEARS after the development of such a strategy was "stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007)."
Why this is not major news is beyond me. The report (with which the Defense Department and USAID concurred, and which State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not bother to comment on, and thus did not dispute) is a huge red flag about the core of the counterterrorism strategy that is being implemented, or not implemented.
Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—called for by the various national security strategies and Congress.
This strikes me as a colossal failure on many levels. There is, in essence, no strategy for taking on the enemy's command and control center, its operational center and the home to its most wanted leadership.
Were we dealing with a little-known group whose ability to carry out strategic threats against us in debate, that might be understandable. But we are talking the traditional, old guard leadership of al Qaeda which has carried out numerous, deadly attacks.
But, as the report makes clear, there has been little imperative to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with our primary enemy despite the fact that it is known they are operating from the very areas we have no policy for.
Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there.
GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA.
But let's review. The FATA is home to about 3.1 million people. The United States has spent $5.8 billion there in five years ($1.16 billion a year, or $516 per person per year in a region where the average family income is $250 a year), and yet there is no comprehensive strategy for how or where the money is spent.
We know that $5.56 billion in taxpayer money went to reimburse the Pakistani military, which in turn appears to have allowed al Qaeda to "regenerate its ability to attack the United States" while establishing a safe haven in the region. Sounds like money well spent, indeed.
Is this because all the attention of every policy maker and planner is focused on Iraq? There is no one left who can get the attention of senior policy makers to bring focus to this effort?
I know there are people across the government worried about this, but they seem to be unable to get the attention of folks further up the food chain who can actually make policy decisions.
Can we really go five years without developing the program that would likely have the most impact on our security? This really does seem to me to almost criminal negligence at very senior levels of the intelligence and policy communities.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday April 16, 2008
Somalia's Jihadists Clarify Their Stance on the United States
For many months there was a debate inside the State Department and elsewhere in the policy community on how seriously to take the _jihadist_ threat from al-Shabaad al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, and whether the group was really linked to al Qaeda.
Ultimately, the group was designated by the Treasury Department as a terrorist entity in February.
This was the right decision, in my opinion. What I find interesting is how unable we often are to believe people when they say they want to kill us, even though they have a proven track record of doing so.
As my colleague Evan Kohlmann noted recently, the al Shabaad statement was in direct response to the Treasury designation.
As the document recently translated by the NEFA Foundation shows, the group is more than willing to answer the question for those who thought they may be the sort of group one could talk to.
Our lack of clarity towards groups who clearly state what they want-to eliminate us and all those like us-is not unusual. There is almost always a part of the policy community that wants to find a way to talk to those who may be misunderstood or who could potentially be our allies. Often, the goal is to make the United States a country that these people like instead of hate.
That is rational in many cases, but does not hold when dealing with radical Islamist groups. There is nothing to negotiate with them, as there was with the enemy in the Cold War or other wars fought over ideology. When the enemy embraces death, as the _jihadists_ do, and demand submission or surrender as the only alternatives, there is nothing to discuss.
So, when a group like this tells the _mujahideen_ not to listen to those "who wish to compromise between _jihad_ and pleasing America" and promises a campaign they call "Our Terrorism is Praiseworthy," there is no reason to think they do not mean it.
The group reiterates: ""We swear to Allah that... we will only repeat what our late Shaykh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi once said: ‘we will not compromise on our religion, we will not change the way of jihad, and will not be satisfied with compromises. Between us and the infidels, there is only the sword of Islam.'"
Can they carry out such a campaign? Not necessarily. But is it their dream that clearly puts them on the side of Salafist/jihadi struggle? Without a doubt. Is there any room to doubt or negotiate with them. Clearly not.
Designations are useful but limited tool dealing with foreign terrorist entities, primarily because few have any assets in the United States that can be taken under the asset freezing mechanism.
But it is clear that the move got the attention of the al-Shabaad leadership.
Whether the have the capacity to act as promised remains to be seen. What can no longer be in doubt is that the leadership views itself as part of the global _jihadist_ movement intent on restoring the caliphate and establishing Islamic rule, first in Somalia, then the rest of the world. There is no ambiguity there.
Ultimately, the group was designated by the Treasury Department as a terrorist entity in February.
This was the right decision, in my opinion. What I find interesting is how unable we often are to believe people when they say they want to kill us, even though they have a proven track record of doing so.
As my colleague Evan Kohlmann noted recently, the al Shabaad statement was in direct response to the Treasury designation.
As the document recently translated by the NEFA Foundation shows, the group is more than willing to answer the question for those who thought they may be the sort of group one could talk to.
Our lack of clarity towards groups who clearly state what they want-to eliminate us and all those like us-is not unusual. There is almost always a part of the policy community that wants to find a way to talk to those who may be misunderstood or who could potentially be our allies. Often, the goal is to make the United States a country that these people like instead of hate.
That is rational in many cases, but does not hold when dealing with radical Islamist groups. There is nothing to negotiate with them, as there was with the enemy in the Cold War or other wars fought over ideology. When the enemy embraces death, as the _jihadists_ do, and demand submission or surrender as the only alternatives, there is nothing to discuss.
So, when a group like this tells the _mujahideen_ not to listen to those "who wish to compromise between _jihad_ and pleasing America" and promises a campaign they call "Our Terrorism is Praiseworthy," there is no reason to think they do not mean it.
The group reiterates: ""We swear to Allah that... we will only repeat what our late Shaykh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi once said: ‘we will not compromise on our religion, we will not change the way of jihad, and will not be satisfied with compromises. Between us and the infidels, there is only the sword of Islam.'"
Can they carry out such a campaign? Not necessarily. But is it their dream that clearly puts them on the side of Salafist/jihadi struggle? Without a doubt. Is there any room to doubt or negotiate with them. Clearly not.
Designations are useful but limited tool dealing with foreign terrorist entities, primarily because few have any assets in the United States that can be taken under the asset freezing mechanism.
But it is clear that the move got the attention of the al-Shabaad leadership.
Whether the have the capacity to act as promised remains to be seen. What can no longer be in doubt is that the leadership views itself as part of the global _jihadist_ movement intent on restoring the caliphate and establishing Islamic rule, first in Somalia, then the rest of the world. There is no ambiguity there.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH