Friday January 25, 2008
State Actors in Criminal/Terrorist Pipelines
Stateless regions and/or failed states have become a hot, if often-shoddily- investigated topic in the counter-terrorism world. In my conception of the criminal/terrorist pipelines, there are important holes in general literature.
One of the primary ones is the limited ability to disaggregate truly failed or stateless regions from states that are not failed, but rather function as criminal enterprises. These states, in some ways, are more valuable to terrorist and criminal organizations than true, stateless regions.
The reason is demonstrated by the benefits that accrue to these groups from state actors, such as the ability to acquire legal passports.
Victor Bout and many others used states to secure End User Certificates to purchase weapons, obtain diplomatic passports, aircraft registries and countless other benefits that only a state can confer, despite the overall weakening of the nation-state structure.
This is one of my main concerns in the emerging Latin American alliances between the FARC in Colombia and Chavez, Chavez and Iran, and Iran and Venezuela with Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
One of the most impressive memories I have of my decade covering Central America is the tremendous explosion in Nicaragua in mid-1993, that blew up a secret underground bunker the Sandinistas had built to store weapons and false identifications. (I find references to my front page story in the Washington Post on July 14, 1993, but cannot a direct link to the complete story).
The bunker was huge, and filled with blank personal identification cards, cameras to take pictures, real and original blank passports, birth certificate forms-in short, a one-stop shop for those the Sandinista regime wanted to hide.
As I wrote at the time, a diplomat familiar with the case said that "The vault 'looked like a one-stop shopping center for terrorist activities, where you could get guns and documents. You would have to be extraordinarily naive to think this was not under the aegis of some part of the intelligence operation of the Sandinistas.'"
It turned out, of course, that the Sandinstas had given passports to Basque ETA terrorists, Italy's Red Brigade members and others. Daniel Ortega was in charge of the clandestine structure then, and it is hard to believe he would not be involved now if it suited his interests.
The Bosnia case, linked above, is another example. In the end, cyperspace has made life easier for terrorists and criminals, but they still do need to travel to different parts of the world, not just the stateless regions. To do that, they need to have clean documents.
States, like Venezuela has done with FARC leaders, and the Sandinistas, can provide those documents that are impossible to detect because they are not false. They are the real deal, and that is invaluable.
So, while stateless areas are important, the actors in those regions need to be able to safely interact with state actors as well. Cutting that nexus is key.
One of the primary ones is the limited ability to disaggregate truly failed or stateless regions from states that are not failed, but rather function as criminal enterprises. These states, in some ways, are more valuable to terrorist and criminal organizations than true, stateless regions.
The reason is demonstrated by the benefits that accrue to these groups from state actors, such as the ability to acquire legal passports.
Victor Bout and many others used states to secure End User Certificates to purchase weapons, obtain diplomatic passports, aircraft registries and countless other benefits that only a state can confer, despite the overall weakening of the nation-state structure.
This is one of my main concerns in the emerging Latin American alliances between the FARC in Colombia and Chavez, Chavez and Iran, and Iran and Venezuela with Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
One of the most impressive memories I have of my decade covering Central America is the tremendous explosion in Nicaragua in mid-1993, that blew up a secret underground bunker the Sandinistas had built to store weapons and false identifications. (I find references to my front page story in the Washington Post on July 14, 1993, but cannot a direct link to the complete story).
The bunker was huge, and filled with blank personal identification cards, cameras to take pictures, real and original blank passports, birth certificate forms-in short, a one-stop shop for those the Sandinista regime wanted to hide.
As I wrote at the time, a diplomat familiar with the case said that "The vault 'looked like a one-stop shopping center for terrorist activities, where you could get guns and documents. You would have to be extraordinarily naive to think this was not under the aegis of some part of the intelligence operation of the Sandinistas.'"
It turned out, of course, that the Sandinstas had given passports to Basque ETA terrorists, Italy's Red Brigade members and others. Daniel Ortega was in charge of the clandestine structure then, and it is hard to believe he would not be involved now if it suited his interests.
The Bosnia case, linked above, is another example. In the end, cyperspace has made life easier for terrorists and criminals, but they still do need to travel to different parts of the world, not just the stateless regions. To do that, they need to have clean documents.
States, like Venezuela has done with FARC leaders, and the Sandinistas, can provide those documents that are impossible to detect because they are not false. They are the real deal, and that is invaluable.
So, while stateless areas are important, the actors in those regions need to be able to safely interact with state actors as well. Cutting that nexus is key.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday January 24, 2008
Jihadists Move to Encryption on Internet Sights
One finds interesting articles in unexpected places these days. Recently Computerworld looked at the use of Jihadi encrytion on their websites. Shows how much the world has changed, when computer magazines start paying attention to this stuff.
This includes a new version of an already-existing encryption system offered from a website hosted in Florida that claims to be "the first Islamic computer program for secure exchange [of information] on the Internet," providing users with "the five best encryption algorithms, and with symmetrical encryption keys (256 bit), asymmetrical encryption keys (2048 bit) and data compression [tools]."
Dubbed Mujahadeen Secrets 2, the Ekhlaas website said the newer iteration is a "special edition of the software was developed and issued by ... Ekhlaas in order to support the mujahideen in general and the (al Qaeda-linked group) Islamic State in Iraq in particular."
This shows three things: that the outside world has grown increasingly better at monitoring their unencrypted communications; that the jihadists have the technological wherewithal to take their communications to the next level; and that they still apparently like to operate out of the United States.
Before being hosted in Florida, the site was reportedly hosted in Minnesota. I understand the debate over whether closing down websites or monitoring them, and don't know what the answer is. But they must feel pretty safe here in order to run this operation this way.
It also seems to indicate, whether in reality or for propaganda purposes, that the jihadists are technologically capable of tailoring their software to specific needs of specific groups facing specific challenges. If true, that is a big step forward.
To move from one-size-fits-all programing to meeting specific needs of specific environments, there is a knowledge of both the technology and the terrain in which the technology will be used.
While those like my colleague
Evan Kohlmann has long been studying the jihadist use of the internet, the outside world is finally starting to notice as well.
Today's Washington Post carries an extensive look at the radicalization of two Islamists from the state of Georgia who were filming potential targets in Washington, D.C.
Much of the process took place on line, as did the radicalization of an Egyptian businessman who sponsored the trip of combatants to Iraq based on the Internet statements and broadcasts by Yousef al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The flat world of technology spread cuts many ways. This is one of the inevitable but costly ways our open systems can be exploited to make our lives more dangerous.
This includes a new version of an already-existing encryption system offered from a website hosted in Florida that claims to be "the first Islamic computer program for secure exchange [of information] on the Internet," providing users with "the five best encryption algorithms, and with symmetrical encryption keys (256 bit), asymmetrical encryption keys (2048 bit) and data compression [tools]."
Dubbed Mujahadeen Secrets 2, the Ekhlaas website said the newer iteration is a "special edition of the software was developed and issued by ... Ekhlaas in order to support the mujahideen in general and the (al Qaeda-linked group) Islamic State in Iraq in particular."
This shows three things: that the outside world has grown increasingly better at monitoring their unencrypted communications; that the jihadists have the technological wherewithal to take their communications to the next level; and that they still apparently like to operate out of the United States.
Before being hosted in Florida, the site was reportedly hosted in Minnesota. I understand the debate over whether closing down websites or monitoring them, and don't know what the answer is. But they must feel pretty safe here in order to run this operation this way.
It also seems to indicate, whether in reality or for propaganda purposes, that the jihadists are technologically capable of tailoring their software to specific needs of specific groups facing specific challenges. If true, that is a big step forward.
To move from one-size-fits-all programing to meeting specific needs of specific environments, there is a knowledge of both the technology and the terrain in which the technology will be used.
While those like my colleague
Evan Kohlmann has long been studying the jihadist use of the internet, the outside world is finally starting to notice as well.
Today's Washington Post carries an extensive look at the radicalization of two Islamists from the state of Georgia who were filming potential targets in Washington, D.C.
Much of the process took place on line, as did the radicalization of an Egyptian businessman who sponsored the trip of combatants to Iraq based on the Internet statements and broadcasts by Yousef al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The flat world of technology spread cuts many ways. This is one of the inevitable but costly ways our open systems can be exploited to make our lives more dangerous.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday January 21, 2008
The Real Issue on the Latin American Landscape
My colleague Andrew Cochran's post on the threat (or not) to the Panama Canal seems to me to miss the larger picture of the threat from Latin America.
That threat is contained in the recent statements by Adm. James Stavridis, head of the US Southern Command at a recent CSIS conference.
Stavridis warned that "the connectivity between narcoterrorism and Islamic radical terrorism could be disastrous in this region. What I worry about in this region with outside actors coming into it is the potential for those streams to cross, if you will, for the fuel of narcoterrorism to become engaged in Islamic radicalism here in the Americas."
That is it in a nutshell. It is the Iran-Venezuela-Nicaragua nexus, built on a foundation of already-existing Hezbollah and Hamas operatives who have been economically active in the region for decades.
These groups have primarily focused on the laundering and procurement of cash for their home groups, not carrying out direct acts of terrorism against targets in this hemisphere.
That does not mean that that will continue to be the case. Look at the attacks on Jewish targets in Argentina a decade ago to see how the Iran/Hezbollah connection can go operational with devastating consequences.
What has changed, with advent the Chavez/Ahmadinejad alliance, is that Iran (and by extension Hezbollah) now have numerous state platforms from which to launch attacks in this hemisphere, should it be judged to be necessary. The trigger would likely be military action against Iran.
In this context, I think, the potential threat against targets like the Panama Canal need to be reassessed. There may not be a huge and quantifiable threat at this time. But it is unlikely there are not contingency plans drawn up for action if action is deemed necessary.
Given Iran's official entree now in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua, it is highly unlikely they want or can abstain from making serious mischief.
Chavez has the money, and exercises a great deal of influence with Colombia's FARC rebels. The FARC, in turn has extensive access to the drug trade, something Hezbollah knows a great deal about and can benefit from.
Nicaragua is a key part of the pipeline that moves illicit goods and services (from people to drugs and weapons) to and from the Mexican corridor into the United States.
That, to me, is a disturbing constellation of realities on the ground. There almost always is a connectivity among different illicit groups operating in the same region. There are few borders among them, in part because, even as they vie with each other on some issues, they can and do use each other extensively.
This to me is the broader threat that can and likely will pose a threat to the Canal and other areas. In a narrow sense, the threat can be seen as overblown. In the rapidly-changing Latin American context, however, I would argue that the threat is real.
That threat is contained in the recent statements by Adm. James Stavridis, head of the US Southern Command at a recent CSIS conference.
Stavridis warned that "the connectivity between narcoterrorism and Islamic radical terrorism could be disastrous in this region. What I worry about in this region with outside actors coming into it is the potential for those streams to cross, if you will, for the fuel of narcoterrorism to become engaged in Islamic radicalism here in the Americas."
That is it in a nutshell. It is the Iran-Venezuela-Nicaragua nexus, built on a foundation of already-existing Hezbollah and Hamas operatives who have been economically active in the region for decades.
These groups have primarily focused on the laundering and procurement of cash for their home groups, not carrying out direct acts of terrorism against targets in this hemisphere.
That does not mean that that will continue to be the case. Look at the attacks on Jewish targets in Argentina a decade ago to see how the Iran/Hezbollah connection can go operational with devastating consequences.
What has changed, with advent the Chavez/Ahmadinejad alliance, is that Iran (and by extension Hezbollah) now have numerous state platforms from which to launch attacks in this hemisphere, should it be judged to be necessary. The trigger would likely be military action against Iran.
In this context, I think, the potential threat against targets like the Panama Canal need to be reassessed. There may not be a huge and quantifiable threat at this time. But it is unlikely there are not contingency plans drawn up for action if action is deemed necessary.
Given Iran's official entree now in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua, it is highly unlikely they want or can abstain from making serious mischief.
Chavez has the money, and exercises a great deal of influence with Colombia's FARC rebels. The FARC, in turn has extensive access to the drug trade, something Hezbollah knows a great deal about and can benefit from.
Nicaragua is a key part of the pipeline that moves illicit goods and services (from people to drugs and weapons) to and from the Mexican corridor into the United States.
That, to me, is a disturbing constellation of realities on the ground. There almost always is a connectivity among different illicit groups operating in the same region. There are few borders among them, in part because, even as they vie with each other on some issues, they can and do use each other extensively.
This to me is the broader threat that can and likely will pose a threat to the Canal and other areas. In a narrow sense, the threat can be seen as overblown. In the rapidly-changing Latin American context, however, I would argue that the threat is real.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday January 17, 2008
Indictment of Another Islamic Charity Shows Possible Tradecraft
The Justice Department's announcement of the indictment of an Islamic charity for financially aiding a terrorist tied to al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as a former U.S. congressman for lobbying on behalf of the group with money stolen from the U.S. government, presents several interesting facets. The indictment is here.
If the government is right, an Islamic "charity," headqurarted in sleepy Missouri and directed by those with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime in Sudan, stole U.S. money aimed at humanitarian relief and then used that money to lobby the U.S. government in order to be able to raise more money.
That would not be the random operation of unsophisticated people, but a complex operation that demonstrates knowledge of how the U.S. system works, and how to exploit the holes in the system.
First is that the Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA), with ties to Sudan, morphed over the years, using different names, while retaining essentially the same people and same organization. This is standard among charities seeking to avoid scrutiny of the IRS and others.
Second, the IARA allegedly felt it was worth a significant amount of money (allegedly pilfered from a USAID project that the IARA failed to complete) to be removed from a Senate Banking Committee list of suspect charities.
It does not appear to have worked. The organization was designated by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control in October 2004.
According to the indictment, at this point they hired Mark Deli Siljander, a former congressman who ran as a conservative evangelical and then set up a lobbying firm in Northern Virginia.
Siljander was reportedly paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars stolen by the IARA, and then allegedly knew the money was illicit and set up accounts to launder the money to make it appear to be legitimate.
In interviews with the FBI, the indictment says, Siljaner knowing lied about taking money from IARA and attempted to obstruct the investigation.
Siljander's lawyer says he will plead not guilty on all charges.
The IARA, in turn is charged with funneling money to benefit Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Specially Designated Individual with a long and sordid past as one of the most vicious warlords to emerge during the cycle of wars in Afghanistan. A one-time ally of the United States, he also has extensive ties to Iran and has urged the fighting against NATO troops in Afghanistan.
Like many suspect charities, the IARA chose an out-of-the way place to operate from, in this case, Columbia, Mo. As U.S. Attorney John F. Wood said:
"An organization right here in the American heartland allegedly sent funds to Pakistan for the benefit of a specially designated global terrorist with ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. By bringing this case in the middle of America, we seek to make it harder for terrorists to do business halfway around the globe."
If the government is right, an Islamic "charity," headqurarted in sleepy Missouri and directed by those with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime in Sudan, stole U.S. money aimed at humanitarian relief and then used that money to lobby the U.S. government in order to be able to raise more money.
That would not be the random operation of unsophisticated people, but a complex operation that demonstrates knowledge of how the U.S. system works, and how to exploit the holes in the system.
First is that the Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA), with ties to Sudan, morphed over the years, using different names, while retaining essentially the same people and same organization. This is standard among charities seeking to avoid scrutiny of the IRS and others.
Second, the IARA allegedly felt it was worth a significant amount of money (allegedly pilfered from a USAID project that the IARA failed to complete) to be removed from a Senate Banking Committee list of suspect charities.
It does not appear to have worked. The organization was designated by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control in October 2004.
According to the indictment, at this point they hired Mark Deli Siljander, a former congressman who ran as a conservative evangelical and then set up a lobbying firm in Northern Virginia.
Siljander was reportedly paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars stolen by the IARA, and then allegedly knew the money was illicit and set up accounts to launder the money to make it appear to be legitimate.
In interviews with the FBI, the indictment says, Siljaner knowing lied about taking money from IARA and attempted to obstruct the investigation.
Siljander's lawyer says he will plead not guilty on all charges.
The IARA, in turn is charged with funneling money to benefit Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Specially Designated Individual with a long and sordid past as one of the most vicious warlords to emerge during the cycle of wars in Afghanistan. A one-time ally of the United States, he also has extensive ties to Iran and has urged the fighting against NATO troops in Afghanistan.
Like many suspect charities, the IARA chose an out-of-the way place to operate from, in this case, Columbia, Mo. As U.S. Attorney John F. Wood said:
"An organization right here in the American heartland allegedly sent funds to Pakistan for the benefit of a specially designated global terrorist with ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. By bringing this case in the middle of America, we seek to make it harder for terrorists to do business halfway around the globe."
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 15, 2008
The New Tactic on Terrorism-related Prosecutions
As numerous colleagues have mentioned here, the recent guilty verdicts in the CARE International charity case is an important one for the government.
It is important to highlight the the strategy successfully used by the government in this case-forcing transparency on groups that claim to be charitable.
One of the architects of the government's national strategy in this regard is our colleague Jeffrey Breinholt, on leave from the Department of Justice's terror finance division. He highlighted the tactic in his book Taxing Terrorism From Al Capone to al Qaeda: Fighting Violence Through Financial Regulation.
Islamist groups (and others operating under false pretenses) cannot operate with the required transparency because they are operating in an opaque manner to hide what they do.
Operating in the U.S. system, which has mechanisms for enforcing the transparency requirements, is more difficult to do that it is elsewhere. Hiding the money or its destinations can lead to seemingly mundane charges of readily-recognized crimes.
Just last month at a public event on Capitol Hill, moderated by CTB's Andy Cochran, Breinholt spoke about the strategic opportunities that arise from legal regimes that seek to force transparency on those prone to tradecraft. Tradecraft can be difficult to prove, but white collar crime is less so.
That is the reason for the success of this tactic, and, I believe, why we will see it again in upcoming cases: juries understand white collar crimes, from mis-directing money from charities to tax evasion, far more easily than they do cases that try to tie together a host of facts that led to a specific type of terrorist action.
The strategy is starting to pay off. It not only narrows the cases down to digestible, recognizable and familiar crimes, also imposes a discipline on the prosecutors, so they focus their cases in ways that effectively deprives the defense of their ability to claim the government overcharged or over reached in the case.
My colleague Matt Levitt summed it up nicely:
It is important to highlight the the strategy successfully used by the government in this case-forcing transparency on groups that claim to be charitable.
One of the architects of the government's national strategy in this regard is our colleague Jeffrey Breinholt, on leave from the Department of Justice's terror finance division. He highlighted the tactic in his book Taxing Terrorism From Al Capone to al Qaeda: Fighting Violence Through Financial Regulation.
Islamist groups (and others operating under false pretenses) cannot operate with the required transparency because they are operating in an opaque manner to hide what they do.
Operating in the U.S. system, which has mechanisms for enforcing the transparency requirements, is more difficult to do that it is elsewhere. Hiding the money or its destinations can lead to seemingly mundane charges of readily-recognized crimes.
Just last month at a public event on Capitol Hill, moderated by CTB's Andy Cochran, Breinholt spoke about the strategic opportunities that arise from legal regimes that seek to force transparency on those prone to tradecraft. Tradecraft can be difficult to prove, but white collar crime is less so.
That is the reason for the success of this tactic, and, I believe, why we will see it again in upcoming cases: juries understand white collar crimes, from mis-directing money from charities to tax evasion, far more easily than they do cases that try to tie together a host of facts that led to a specific type of terrorist action.
The strategy is starting to pay off. It not only narrows the cases down to digestible, recognizable and familiar crimes, also imposes a discipline on the prosecutors, so they focus their cases in ways that effectively deprives the defense of their ability to claim the government overcharged or over reached in the case.
My colleague Matt Levitt summed it up nicely:
Despite all of the above evidence tying Care to terrorism, the organization -- like Al Capone -- was ultimately held accountable for mundane charges on which the government could secure criminal convictions.
In fact, the judge barred the word "terrorism" throughout the trial in an effort to keep the jury focused on the specific charges at hand. But the ultimate effect of the tax law conviction was to expose and hold accountable a fundraising network that raised significant amounts of money for al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups. Detractors may say the lack of a specific terrorism charge proves this was not a terrorism case, but the evidence belies such claims. Sometimes the best strategy for a terrorism prosecution is to focus on the underlying and mundane criminal activity.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH