Monday January 14, 2008
Chavez and the FARC-The Unveiling
This weekend Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez publicly defended Colombia's FARC rebels as a "true army" with a political project that must be respected and negotiated with.
Coming on the heels of his belatedly successful efforts to free two hostages (leaving 750 or so still in hands of the group), Chavez unveiled his role as defenders of an armed group that primarily lives off of drug trafficking and kidnap-for-ransom.
"They are insurgent forces that have a political project," Chavez said in a marathon speech to lawmakers. "I say it even though someone could be bothered by it."
He demanded that the outside world stop referring to the FARC as "terrorists" and embrace them as rebels with a cause.
It is a Marxist-Leninist cause that has long-since run its course. Even when I was spending time with the FARC in the late 1990s, they had, in a pragmatic and capitalist way, abandoned any pretense of Marxist egalitarianism or ideology in the field.
I have covered many insurgencies in Latin America, including the FMLN in El Salvador; the Contras in Honduras/Nicaragua; M-19, FARC, EPL and ELN in Colombia and the Tumpac Amaru in Peru. There was indeed a time when, whatever you thought of their ideologies, there were ideologies and principles impelling the revolution (or counter-revolution) forward.
Those days are gone, and have been for decades in the case of the FARC, which largely refuses to recognize the historic reality of the collapse of the world-wide Marxist movement.
The corruption of the steadily-increasing amount of drug money into the ranks, coupled with the strategic decision to use kidnapping (and holding hostages for years at a time) as both a political weapon and fund-raising mechanism, makes the claim of the group's "political project" untenable at every level.
It is largely an economic project that profits from the extreme poverty that continues to exist in much of the country, the lack of state infrastructure, etc.
This economic project shows up in different and dangerous ways. The most obvious is in drug trafficking. U.S. and Latin American officials are noting an alarming rise in the number of drug shipments that originate in Venezuela territory, into Central America, the Caribbean or Mexico.
If the Chavez government is not protecting the shipments, then it interdiction forces are among the most incompetent in a region not known for setting high standards in that regard.
Chavez's formal embrace of the FARC only makes his strenuous denials that he maintains a formal relationship with them more difficult to believe. His credibility was already strained by the presence of numerous FARC leaders living without much fear in Caracas.
Others are in the vast military expenditures that Chavez has embarked on, including the construction of a Kalashinkov (AK-47) assault rifle factory. Just what the region needs, cheap and plentiful small weapons floating around with little control. Ask the West Africans how that turns out.
Human rights groups have, for decades, documented the abuses of the FARC, from forced recruitment of children to systematic attacks on civilians.
Chavez's rise to power has breathed new life into the FARC, which had, in recent decades, become one of the few rebel groups that had managed to alienate just about everyone.
Now they have a friend and protector, and one with a grandiose vision of the Bolivarian project across Latin America. Not a good combination on a continent where historic inequities have yet to be redressed, where economies are stagnating and where armed movements and dictatorships were the norm less than a generation ago.
Coming on the heels of his belatedly successful efforts to free two hostages (leaving 750 or so still in hands of the group), Chavez unveiled his role as defenders of an armed group that primarily lives off of drug trafficking and kidnap-for-ransom.
"They are insurgent forces that have a political project," Chavez said in a marathon speech to lawmakers. "I say it even though someone could be bothered by it."
He demanded that the outside world stop referring to the FARC as "terrorists" and embrace them as rebels with a cause.
It is a Marxist-Leninist cause that has long-since run its course. Even when I was spending time with the FARC in the late 1990s, they had, in a pragmatic and capitalist way, abandoned any pretense of Marxist egalitarianism or ideology in the field.
I have covered many insurgencies in Latin America, including the FMLN in El Salvador; the Contras in Honduras/Nicaragua; M-19, FARC, EPL and ELN in Colombia and the Tumpac Amaru in Peru. There was indeed a time when, whatever you thought of their ideologies, there were ideologies and principles impelling the revolution (or counter-revolution) forward.
Those days are gone, and have been for decades in the case of the FARC, which largely refuses to recognize the historic reality of the collapse of the world-wide Marxist movement.
The corruption of the steadily-increasing amount of drug money into the ranks, coupled with the strategic decision to use kidnapping (and holding hostages for years at a time) as both a political weapon and fund-raising mechanism, makes the claim of the group's "political project" untenable at every level.
It is largely an economic project that profits from the extreme poverty that continues to exist in much of the country, the lack of state infrastructure, etc.
This economic project shows up in different and dangerous ways. The most obvious is in drug trafficking. U.S. and Latin American officials are noting an alarming rise in the number of drug shipments that originate in Venezuela territory, into Central America, the Caribbean or Mexico.
If the Chavez government is not protecting the shipments, then it interdiction forces are among the most incompetent in a region not known for setting high standards in that regard.
Chavez's formal embrace of the FARC only makes his strenuous denials that he maintains a formal relationship with them more difficult to believe. His credibility was already strained by the presence of numerous FARC leaders living without much fear in Caracas.
Others are in the vast military expenditures that Chavez has embarked on, including the construction of a Kalashinkov (AK-47) assault rifle factory. Just what the region needs, cheap and plentiful small weapons floating around with little control. Ask the West Africans how that turns out.
Human rights groups have, for decades, documented the abuses of the FARC, from forced recruitment of children to systematic attacks on civilians.
Chavez's rise to power has breathed new life into the FARC, which had, in recent decades, become one of the few rebel groups that had managed to alienate just about everyone.
Now they have a friend and protector, and one with a grandiose vision of the Bolivarian project across Latin America. Not a good combination on a continent where historic inequities have yet to be redressed, where economies are stagnating and where armed movements and dictatorships were the norm less than a generation ago.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Saturday January 12, 2008
The Fascinating Debate in and About Radical Islam
In the January 6 issue of the New York Times Book Review, Tariq Ramadan has an essay that argues, in its essence, that non-believers cannot really read or understand the Koran-because it speaks exclusively to believers.
One's heart, Ramadan argues, is one's guide for understanding the Koran, and the heart can only lead you once "the heart has made the message of Islam its own."
So, in essence, an outsider (infidel) cannot understand the text, therefore an outsider really cannot have a valid opinion about the text because an outsider does not understand what he or she is talking about, because it is not on a rational plane.
This is an argument that, of course, means looking at the historial record of Islam, the more explicit verses on killing Jews and infidels, and waging _jihad_, as well as the true meaning of _jihad_, cannot be debated by infidels.
Islamists themselves will define the texts and their meaning for us, on their terms exclusively. We need not bother even trying.
That is akin to saying that, if one is not a born again Christian one should not attempt biblical scholarship, and perhaps some argue that. In reality, the historical texts can be read, examined, looked at for internal consistencies and inconsistencies, debated and dissected.
That is the rational response to the endeavor to understand history. One can have a different interpretation of texts one believes to be divine, but that does not negate the validity of scholarship.
This leads directly to the issue raised by the decision of the Joint Chiefs to not allow attorney and US Army intelligence reserve Major Stephen Coughlin to continue with his work on Islamic law in the Pentagon.
The main problem for the Islamists such as Hasham Islam, and their fellow travelers, such as ISNA, MPAC, Fiqh Council and AMCE, inside and around the Pentagon who worked to get rid of him, is that Coughlin, as a non-Muslim, and a legal scholar, with decade of experience in legal texts working as well as in military intelligence, often knew the Islamic texts better than the Islamists themselves. Coughlin's MA thesis is in Islamic law.
How embarrassing to have a non-believer who is an expert on Sharia law, and the Islamic texts, be able to debate intelligently and articulately, and use the texts themselves to inform their analysis and argument.
The answer, of course, is to say he cannot understand because he is not a Muslim. This is a classic logical fallacy. Nevertheless, this argument seems to have prevailed, at least for the moment, in Coughlin's case. As Bill Gertz has reported, there seems to be some rallying to his defense and against the indefensible action of silencing the only true scholar in these issues that the Pentagon has.
Part of the confusion over how this happens is dealt with in an essay review in the same New York Times review, by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in her review of Leo Harris' new book, "The Suicide of Reason."
I think Ali (and I have not yet read Harris' book) precisely sums up the dominant position among the political establishment on both sides of the aisle, and why that approach is so destructive.
This, to me, is part of the highly successful strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, both on the _jihadist_ front and on the political side. They subtly set the terms of the debate to exclude anyone but themselves. And way too often, we accept those terms, to the detriment of ourselves in general, and to those who fight this strategy, like Stephen Coughlin.
One's heart, Ramadan argues, is one's guide for understanding the Koran, and the heart can only lead you once "the heart has made the message of Islam its own."
So, in essence, an outsider (infidel) cannot understand the text, therefore an outsider really cannot have a valid opinion about the text because an outsider does not understand what he or she is talking about, because it is not on a rational plane.
This is an argument that, of course, means looking at the historial record of Islam, the more explicit verses on killing Jews and infidels, and waging _jihad_, as well as the true meaning of _jihad_, cannot be debated by infidels.
Islamists themselves will define the texts and their meaning for us, on their terms exclusively. We need not bother even trying.
That is akin to saying that, if one is not a born again Christian one should not attempt biblical scholarship, and perhaps some argue that. In reality, the historical texts can be read, examined, looked at for internal consistencies and inconsistencies, debated and dissected.
That is the rational response to the endeavor to understand history. One can have a different interpretation of texts one believes to be divine, but that does not negate the validity of scholarship.
This leads directly to the issue raised by the decision of the Joint Chiefs to not allow attorney and US Army intelligence reserve Major Stephen Coughlin to continue with his work on Islamic law in the Pentagon.
The main problem for the Islamists such as Hasham Islam, and their fellow travelers, such as ISNA, MPAC, Fiqh Council and AMCE, inside and around the Pentagon who worked to get rid of him, is that Coughlin, as a non-Muslim, and a legal scholar, with decade of experience in legal texts working as well as in military intelligence, often knew the Islamic texts better than the Islamists themselves. Coughlin's MA thesis is in Islamic law.
How embarrassing to have a non-believer who is an expert on Sharia law, and the Islamic texts, be able to debate intelligently and articulately, and use the texts themselves to inform their analysis and argument.
The answer, of course, is to say he cannot understand because he is not a Muslim. This is a classic logical fallacy. Nevertheless, this argument seems to have prevailed, at least for the moment, in Coughlin's case. As Bill Gertz has reported, there seems to be some rallying to his defense and against the indefensible action of silencing the only true scholar in these issues that the Pentagon has.
Part of the confusion over how this happens is dealt with in an essay review in the same New York Times review, by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in her review of Leo Harris' new book, "The Suicide of Reason."
I think Ali (and I have not yet read Harris' book) precisely sums up the dominant position among the political establishment on both sides of the aisle, and why that approach is so destructive.
Westerners see these cultures merely as different versions of the world they know, with dominant values similar to those espoused in their own culture. But this, Harris argues, is a fatal mistake. It implies that the West fails to appreciate both its history and the true nature of its opposition.
Nor, he points out, is the failure linked to a particular political outlook. Liberals and conservatives alike share this misperception. Noam Chomsky and Paul Wolfowitz agreed, Harris writes, "that you couldn’t really blame the terrorists, since they were merely the victims of an evil system — for Chomsky, American imperialism, for Wolfowitz, the corrupt and despotic regimes of the Middle East." That is to say, while left and right may disagree on the causes and the remedies, they both overlook the fanaticism inherent in Islam itself. Driven by their blind faith in reason, they interpret the problem in a way that is familiar to them, in order to find a solution that fits within their doctrine of reason. The same is true for such prominent intellectuals as Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama.
This, to me, is part of the highly successful strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, both on the _jihadist_ front and on the political side. They subtly set the terms of the debate to exclude anyone but themselves. And way too often, we accept those terms, to the detriment of ourselves in general, and to those who fight this strategy, like Stephen Coughlin.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 8, 2008
Way Too Close for Comfort
The newly-released tape of the Iranian patrol boats pushing in on U.S warships shows just how close we are, routinely, to a major conflagration with unknowable consequences.
That the crew of the USS Hopper did not open fire on the speedboats and cause a serious international incident is a tribute to their discipline, particularly given the memory of the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen.
To be able to resist pulling the trigger when someone says "I am coming at you. You will explode in a few minutes" is nothing short of a miracle.
But it is exactly the type of attack that U.S. forces are most worried about-a large-scale attack by an enemy that embraces death rather than seeking to inflict damage but live to fight another day. This is what makes what may once have been routine harassment measures into what must now be viewed as serious, lethal threats.
In reading the literature of radical Islamists, both Sunni and Shia, the narrative told of embracing death for the sake of Allah leading eternal and immediate reward is pervasive.
This teaching is embraced and propounded not just by recognized _jihadist_ groups like al Qaeda, who embraced the tactic on 9/11 and since. That might be easier to isolate and discredit.
However, the narrative has gained widespread public currency with the most prominent of the supposedly "moderate" members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Yousef al-Qaradawi and Azzam Tamimi.
The Brotherhood's endorsement and sponsorship of this tactic, and all that in entails in the loss of civilian life, serves as a powerful motivating factor for young people to embrace suicide bombing.
Given the Brotherhood's control of mosques, teaching materials and the public face of Islam, both in Europe and the United States, the group's active endorsement of this tactic has a broad reach, with catastrophic consequences
Such a step is only possible if one has been convinced of the ultimate benefit of the suicide. The Brotherhood leaders, among others, provide that justification.
It is interesting to note that those like Tamimi, who claims to be willing to be suicide bombers, or Qaradawi, who ask others to blow themselves up, live quite in comfort in London and Qatar.
I have often wondered how people like John Esposito, Bob Leiken and others who sit on boards with Tamimi and Qaradawi, cite them as moderates and seek to engage them, rationalize this issue away.
How do you join forces with people who happily send others to their death (both the bombers and their victims) while sitting in London giving fiery speeches? Not an easy intellectual or ethical journey, I would guess. Do they think it is a simple religious difference that can be overlooked? A cultural issue?
It is not possible to know if the speedboats charging the U.S. ships in international waters were acting under orders, going for a little fun, or seriously wishing to provoke an international incident.
But it is clear that such incidents, in today's world, are deadly serious, and must be treated as such.
The risk is simply too high to assume that Islamists acting on behalf of Allah will behave in a way we find rational or non-lethal.
That the crew of the USS Hopper did not open fire on the speedboats and cause a serious international incident is a tribute to their discipline, particularly given the memory of the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen.
To be able to resist pulling the trigger when someone says "I am coming at you. You will explode in a few minutes" is nothing short of a miracle.
But it is exactly the type of attack that U.S. forces are most worried about-a large-scale attack by an enemy that embraces death rather than seeking to inflict damage but live to fight another day. This is what makes what may once have been routine harassment measures into what must now be viewed as serious, lethal threats.
In reading the literature of radical Islamists, both Sunni and Shia, the narrative told of embracing death for the sake of Allah leading eternal and immediate reward is pervasive.
This teaching is embraced and propounded not just by recognized _jihadist_ groups like al Qaeda, who embraced the tactic on 9/11 and since. That might be easier to isolate and discredit.
However, the narrative has gained widespread public currency with the most prominent of the supposedly "moderate" members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Yousef al-Qaradawi and Azzam Tamimi.
The Brotherhood's endorsement and sponsorship of this tactic, and all that in entails in the loss of civilian life, serves as a powerful motivating factor for young people to embrace suicide bombing.
Given the Brotherhood's control of mosques, teaching materials and the public face of Islam, both in Europe and the United States, the group's active endorsement of this tactic has a broad reach, with catastrophic consequences
Such a step is only possible if one has been convinced of the ultimate benefit of the suicide. The Brotherhood leaders, among others, provide that justification.
It is interesting to note that those like Tamimi, who claims to be willing to be suicide bombers, or Qaradawi, who ask others to blow themselves up, live quite in comfort in London and Qatar.
I have often wondered how people like John Esposito, Bob Leiken and others who sit on boards with Tamimi and Qaradawi, cite them as moderates and seek to engage them, rationalize this issue away.
How do you join forces with people who happily send others to their death (both the bombers and their victims) while sitting in London giving fiery speeches? Not an easy intellectual or ethical journey, I would guess. Do they think it is a simple religious difference that can be overlooked? A cultural issue?
It is not possible to know if the speedboats charging the U.S. ships in international waters were acting under orders, going for a little fun, or seriously wishing to provoke an international incident.
But it is clear that such incidents, in today's world, are deadly serious, and must be treated as such.
The risk is simply too high to assume that Islamists acting on behalf of Allah will behave in a way we find rational or non-lethal.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday January 7, 2008
Africa and Africom Again
NOTE: The trial of former Liberian Charles Taylor resumed today in the Hague. It is an important test of the ability to hold dictators accountable for their actions.
It is also an important part of the struggle against the ability of radical Islamist groups and transnational criminal organizations to fund themselves through failed and failing states. I will try to keep abreast of the most significant developments.
Now:
David Ignatius in the Washington Post raised the fundamental question that needs to be addressed about the U.S. military's role in Africa and the role of the new unified command for the continent, AFRICOM.
I have supported AFRICOM and still do. Having the continent divided among three separate commands, with no overlapping abilities to look at regions rather than specific countries, was a prescription for disaster.
The growing terrorist networks, the demonstrated ability of al Qaeda to operate in East and West Africa, and the continued weakening of key states (Kenya being the most recent) demonstrate to me the need for a military command that focuses exclusively on the continent.
But the danger, as Ignatius and others point out, (including the CRS report from May 16, 2007) is that the military is being asked to do what others should be doing, both in terms of overall mission and in terms of combatting radical Islamist terrorism there.
With the cut back in most aid programs, the hardening of embassies and the reduction in personnel there to carry out traditional diplomatic and intelligence gathering and carry out the public diplomacy so desperately needed, the military is left in an untenable quandry.
"The U.S. military is so powerful -- so blessed with money and logistical skill and leadership -- that it's easy to make it the default answer to problems that are otherwise in the "too hard" category. That's my worry about AFRICOM," Ignatius writes.
That is my feeling exactly, and I say it frequently to the military audiences I address. It is an amazing thing to have a military that will take its tasking, no matter how far afield they may seem, and seek to fulfill the mission with competence and dedication.
That is what the U.S. military does. But should its mission include vaccinating cattle, drilling wells, settling land disputes, establishing functioning civilian institutions etc.? My best guess is no. But no one else will take on the jobs. So shovel it over to the military.
The question is, what is AFRICOM's tasking to be? There is still no clear-cut mission statement that one can hang on to. There is nothing worse than an ill-defined mission to ensure that nothing gets done.
According to the CRS report:
As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.
But what does that mean on the ground? How would Kenya policy and reaction have been different if AFRICOM were up and running? Would U.S. troops stand by, work with NGOs to strengthen civil society? Train troops for possible repressive actions?
It is clear the AFRICOM footprint will have to be small. There is too much controversy on the continent for any country to be able to accept anything else and survive politically.
What that footprint is designed to do is of utmost importance. Before the command is up and running, those core questions need to be answered at the highest level.
Otherwise, we risk putting the already-overstretched military in another situation where mission creep will make their job mission impossible.
It is also an important part of the struggle against the ability of radical Islamist groups and transnational criminal organizations to fund themselves through failed and failing states. I will try to keep abreast of the most significant developments.
Now:
David Ignatius in the Washington Post raised the fundamental question that needs to be addressed about the U.S. military's role in Africa and the role of the new unified command for the continent, AFRICOM.
I have supported AFRICOM and still do. Having the continent divided among three separate commands, with no overlapping abilities to look at regions rather than specific countries, was a prescription for disaster.
The growing terrorist networks, the demonstrated ability of al Qaeda to operate in East and West Africa, and the continued weakening of key states (Kenya being the most recent) demonstrate to me the need for a military command that focuses exclusively on the continent.
But the danger, as Ignatius and others point out, (including the CRS report from May 16, 2007) is that the military is being asked to do what others should be doing, both in terms of overall mission and in terms of combatting radical Islamist terrorism there.
With the cut back in most aid programs, the hardening of embassies and the reduction in personnel there to carry out traditional diplomatic and intelligence gathering and carry out the public diplomacy so desperately needed, the military is left in an untenable quandry.
"The U.S. military is so powerful -- so blessed with money and logistical skill and leadership -- that it's easy to make it the default answer to problems that are otherwise in the "too hard" category. That's my worry about AFRICOM," Ignatius writes.
That is my feeling exactly, and I say it frequently to the military audiences I address. It is an amazing thing to have a military that will take its tasking, no matter how far afield they may seem, and seek to fulfill the mission with competence and dedication.
That is what the U.S. military does. But should its mission include vaccinating cattle, drilling wells, settling land disputes, establishing functioning civilian institutions etc.? My best guess is no. But no one else will take on the jobs. So shovel it over to the military.
The question is, what is AFRICOM's tasking to be? There is still no clear-cut mission statement that one can hang on to. There is nothing worse than an ill-defined mission to ensure that nothing gets done.
According to the CRS report:
As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.
But what does that mean on the ground? How would Kenya policy and reaction have been different if AFRICOM were up and running? Would U.S. troops stand by, work with NGOs to strengthen civil society? Train troops for possible repressive actions?
It is clear the AFRICOM footprint will have to be small. There is too much controversy on the continent for any country to be able to accept anything else and survive politically.
What that footprint is designed to do is of utmost importance. Before the command is up and running, those core questions need to be answered at the highest level.
Otherwise, we risk putting the already-overstretched military in another situation where mission creep will make their job mission impossible.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday January 4, 2008
Kenya' Volatility Dangerous for the Region
The sudden spiral into near-chaos of much of Kenya, long regarded as one of the most stable nations in East Africa, is a powerful reminder of how quickly even seemingly-secure countries can edge toward the precipice.
The sudden flaring of ethnic rivalries, large-scale killings and unresolved electoral disputes combine to greatly weaken the credibility of the state at a time when radical Islamist groups, including al Qaeda, have made clear their intent to increase activity in the Horn of Africa region.
This is not to say there is a terrorist hand in the current events. There are legitimate grievances, ancient hostilities, abuses, corruption, etc. etc. All are legitimate reasons and pressures for internal strife and the general mess.
But Kenya is in a strategic position, has been an al Qaeda operational center in the past and sits in a bad neighborhood where the Islamists have a strong interest. The chaos there will only facilitate the Islamist strategy of spreading instability, as they look for weak spots into which they can flow.
Given the previous, large-scale activities of al Qaeda in Kenya (the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing, where the investigation revealed a sophisticated al Qaeda infrastructure), they know the lay of the land.
The Mombasa bombing of 2002 showed that al Qaeda-related groups maintained structure there, including cadres with the capacity to acquire and use, albeit unsuccessfully, surface-to-air missiles.
The Islamist activities in Kenya are not by accident, but by design, given the country's geographic location.
Kenya abuts Somalia and Sudan, as well as the volatile Ethiopia. Kenya had been the relative anchor in a region awash in instability and strife. It would be an obvious target, where resources could be easily mobilized to penetrate already-familiar surroundings.
It is similar in many ways to the sudden collapse of Cote d'Ivoire a few years ago. The thin veneer that held the country together was pierced when the government lost a significant amount of credibility through corruption and electoral fraud. Ethnic and religious rivalries flared in ways that seemed unimaginable only a few months before.
Policymakers and strategists tend to ignore or dismiss the seriousness of unrest and the weakening of states in sub-Saharan Africa because the region seems far away and of little threat.
But if one reads al Qaeda's works, where they specifically describe their strategy of creating small wars and conflicts that bleed the non-Muslim world of resources and political will, the shortsightedness of this thinking becomes clear.
To see the value of these stateless regions of the world, one need only to look at the territories in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, where al Qaeda, the Taliban (of Afghanistan and Pakistan), opium smugglers and weapons merchants can co-mingle, network and enter lucrative joint ventures.
Kenya, unfortunately, sits at the crossroads of where the Islamist revolution is hot (Somalia and Sudan) and where it would like to spread. It has a long history of al Qaeda activity in-country.
Because of this, the chaotic situation in Kenya poses a problem that will have an impact far beyond its national borders.
The sudden flaring of ethnic rivalries, large-scale killings and unresolved electoral disputes combine to greatly weaken the credibility of the state at a time when radical Islamist groups, including al Qaeda, have made clear their intent to increase activity in the Horn of Africa region.
This is not to say there is a terrorist hand in the current events. There are legitimate grievances, ancient hostilities, abuses, corruption, etc. etc. All are legitimate reasons and pressures for internal strife and the general mess.
But Kenya is in a strategic position, has been an al Qaeda operational center in the past and sits in a bad neighborhood where the Islamists have a strong interest. The chaos there will only facilitate the Islamist strategy of spreading instability, as they look for weak spots into which they can flow.
Given the previous, large-scale activities of al Qaeda in Kenya (the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing, where the investigation revealed a sophisticated al Qaeda infrastructure), they know the lay of the land.
The Mombasa bombing of 2002 showed that al Qaeda-related groups maintained structure there, including cadres with the capacity to acquire and use, albeit unsuccessfully, surface-to-air missiles.
The Islamist activities in Kenya are not by accident, but by design, given the country's geographic location.
Kenya abuts Somalia and Sudan, as well as the volatile Ethiopia. Kenya had been the relative anchor in a region awash in instability and strife. It would be an obvious target, where resources could be easily mobilized to penetrate already-familiar surroundings.
It is similar in many ways to the sudden collapse of Cote d'Ivoire a few years ago. The thin veneer that held the country together was pierced when the government lost a significant amount of credibility through corruption and electoral fraud. Ethnic and religious rivalries flared in ways that seemed unimaginable only a few months before.
Policymakers and strategists tend to ignore or dismiss the seriousness of unrest and the weakening of states in sub-Saharan Africa because the region seems far away and of little threat.
But if one reads al Qaeda's works, where they specifically describe their strategy of creating small wars and conflicts that bleed the non-Muslim world of resources and political will, the shortsightedness of this thinking becomes clear.
To see the value of these stateless regions of the world, one need only to look at the territories in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, where al Qaeda, the Taliban (of Afghanistan and Pakistan), opium smugglers and weapons merchants can co-mingle, network and enter lucrative joint ventures.
Kenya, unfortunately, sits at the crossroads of where the Islamist revolution is hot (Somalia and Sudan) and where it would like to spread. It has a long history of al Qaeda activity in-country.
Because of this, the chaotic situation in Kenya poses a problem that will have an impact far beyond its national borders.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH