Wednesday January 2, 2008
The FARC's Cruel New Year's Hoax
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) perpetrated a cruel hoax both on their friends (Hugo Chavez et al) and the families of the victims they have kidnapped and held for years.
The FARC, a designated terrorist entity, is the oldest insurgent group in Latin America, and a significant force in the production and marketing of the majority of the cocaine on the streets of the United States and Europe. Because of this, its international reputation is tarnished, to say the least. Chavez was going to help fix all that with a grand humanitarian gesture.
While the U.S. has provided more than $1 billion the the past 10 years to Colombia to help curb drug trafficking, the FARC has grown, as has its budget and operational capabilities. Coca planting has not been significantly reduced, in part because the FARC has not been seriously rolled back.
Chavez, using his contacts and friendship with the FARC, a group that has long since lost its ideological moorings and become a functioning criminal enterprise, to arrange the the release of three hostages, including one child from the FARC.
Oliver Stone, the former president of Argentina, senior Bolivian officials and international representatives were all called to Caracas to witness the historic event of Chavez bringing the FARC to some form of respectability.
Not only did Chavez arrange for an all-star cast to meet the hostages, who were to be released onto Venezuelan helicopters, but he gave numerous assurances that the plan was on track.
Only it wasn't. It turns out the FARC may not even have the boy, who would be almost 4 years old in hand. The hopes of getting the hostages out soon have foundered. Chavez is badly humiliated by his friends, and the FARC's tattered reputation took another hit.
The FARC is currently holding some 750 hostages, including three American contract workers, and Ingrid Betancourt, a former presidential candidate. Some of those held are soldiers and policemen captured up to 10 years ago, and marched endlessly through the jungle to keep them from being liberated.
The current fiasco is typical FARC MO. They have never fulfilled the promises they have made to free hostages, end their worst human rights abuses, or deal with drug trafficking.
Instead, they have turned a group of Marxist rebels with some semblance of coherent ideology into a private army of some 17,000 combatants, controlling 40 percent of the national territory. They rely on kidnappings, the protection of coca fields and the production of cocaine to finance their increasingly well financed and sophisticated operations.
Little high-level attention is paid the the FARC, as attention is focused on Iraq, Afghanistan and a few other places. But the FARC, with its criminal connections, is a major threat both to Colombia, the Andean region, and the United States.
The latest fiasco, and the new round of heartbreak for the families whose hopes were raised, just highlights the limits of even sympathetic intervention on behalf of those who suffer from the FARC's senseless cruelty.
The FARC, a designated terrorist entity, is the oldest insurgent group in Latin America, and a significant force in the production and marketing of the majority of the cocaine on the streets of the United States and Europe. Because of this, its international reputation is tarnished, to say the least. Chavez was going to help fix all that with a grand humanitarian gesture.
While the U.S. has provided more than $1 billion the the past 10 years to Colombia to help curb drug trafficking, the FARC has grown, as has its budget and operational capabilities. Coca planting has not been significantly reduced, in part because the FARC has not been seriously rolled back.
Chavez, using his contacts and friendship with the FARC, a group that has long since lost its ideological moorings and become a functioning criminal enterprise, to arrange the the release of three hostages, including one child from the FARC.
Oliver Stone, the former president of Argentina, senior Bolivian officials and international representatives were all called to Caracas to witness the historic event of Chavez bringing the FARC to some form of respectability.
Not only did Chavez arrange for an all-star cast to meet the hostages, who were to be released onto Venezuelan helicopters, but he gave numerous assurances that the plan was on track.
Only it wasn't. It turns out the FARC may not even have the boy, who would be almost 4 years old in hand. The hopes of getting the hostages out soon have foundered. Chavez is badly humiliated by his friends, and the FARC's tattered reputation took another hit.
The FARC is currently holding some 750 hostages, including three American contract workers, and Ingrid Betancourt, a former presidential candidate. Some of those held are soldiers and policemen captured up to 10 years ago, and marched endlessly through the jungle to keep them from being liberated.
The current fiasco is typical FARC MO. They have never fulfilled the promises they have made to free hostages, end their worst human rights abuses, or deal with drug trafficking.
Instead, they have turned a group of Marxist rebels with some semblance of coherent ideology into a private army of some 17,000 combatants, controlling 40 percent of the national territory. They rely on kidnappings, the protection of coca fields and the production of cocaine to finance their increasingly well financed and sophisticated operations.
Little high-level attention is paid the the FARC, as attention is focused on Iraq, Afghanistan and a few other places. But the FARC, with its criminal connections, is a major threat both to Colombia, the Andean region, and the United States.
The latest fiasco, and the new round of heartbreak for the families whose hopes were raised, just highlights the limits of even sympathetic intervention on behalf of those who suffer from the FARC's senseless cruelty.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday December 28, 2007
Odds and Ends at Year's End
Like the stock market, this year had some ups and a lot of downs. Here is how it looks to me:
On a macro level, the conflict is growing more chaotic. States cannot hold firm in the face of the widespread and growing assaults by non-state actors that threaten them. The primary enemy, militant Islamist extremism, is less coherent that it is generally portrayed, but it doesn't need to be rigidly hierarchical structure to succeed.
The movement thrives from various, decentralized hubs which may, but do not need, to seek guidance and direction from others. The Internet, other methods of direct communication and the constant river of wahhabi/salafist money and teaching create the virus that is spreading rapidly, and cannot be controlled through traditional means or strategies.
The most recent example, of course, is the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, with a cast of thousands of potential perpetrators, including the state or rogue actors within the state.
If it was an al Qaeda-affiliated group that carried out the murder, it could have been simply an attempt to carry out the will of Allah as those involved understand that will. When their God speaks, they listen, and no further justification or thought is necessary.
State laws and means for prosecution remain woefully outdated, slow and ponderous. There is little of the legal agility needed to fight a against an enemy that uses front groups, deception, violence and lack of transparency as part of its primary tactics.
This leads to a lack of cohesion and consistency. I am not arguing for a diminishing of basic rights. But states have to come up with new methods, even those that will be challenged in court and written about in the media, that will allow it to move forward. If those methods and tools are not viewed as legitimate by most of the people in that country, they will eventually be tossed out as illegitimate.
A recent example is the little-noted closing of the Swiss case against Yasin al-Qadi, the alleged financier of radical Islamist movements.
While he remains on the U.S. and U.N. designation lists, the Swiss investigation was important, though mired in allegations of prosecutorial improprieties, illicit information exchanges and generally shabby handling.
This follows the unexpected and still-unexplained decision by the U.S. and U.N. to de-list Idriss Nasreddin from the list of sanctioned individuals.
As I have
written before, perhaps those mechanisms are outdated and need to be either ended or strengthened. This grey area in between, where it is neither enforced nor explained, is the worst of all worlds.
There was another important, though little-noted decision along these same lines this week as well. The NEFA Foundation posted the decision by a federal judge upholding the U.S. government's decision to exclude Tariq Ramadan from the United States (that is, not grant him a visa). Judge Paul Crotty of the Southern District of New York ruled that the government's "exclusion of
Professor Ramadan is facially legitimate and bona fide."
So, where does that leave us at year's end? Al Qaeda in Iraq is weaker and the militant Islamist groups there have turned on each other to an interesting degree, enough to make them all less effective.
But the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Qaeda central, Taliban in Pakistan, the Islamic Court's Union in Somalia, the emerging al Qaeda linked groups in the Sahel region of Africa, the Iranian-backed expansion of Hezbollah in Latin America and other developments of this nature make me less than optimistic about how the struggle against radical Islamists, both Shi'ite and Sunni, is going. I hope I am wrong.
Finally, a heart-felt word of thanks to those who take time to read my thoughts, comment thoughtfully on them, and who wish to make the world a better place. Happy New Year.
On a macro level, the conflict is growing more chaotic. States cannot hold firm in the face of the widespread and growing assaults by non-state actors that threaten them. The primary enemy, militant Islamist extremism, is less coherent that it is generally portrayed, but it doesn't need to be rigidly hierarchical structure to succeed.
The movement thrives from various, decentralized hubs which may, but do not need, to seek guidance and direction from others. The Internet, other methods of direct communication and the constant river of wahhabi/salafist money and teaching create the virus that is spreading rapidly, and cannot be controlled through traditional means or strategies.
The most recent example, of course, is the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, with a cast of thousands of potential perpetrators, including the state or rogue actors within the state.
If it was an al Qaeda-affiliated group that carried out the murder, it could have been simply an attempt to carry out the will of Allah as those involved understand that will. When their God speaks, they listen, and no further justification or thought is necessary.
State laws and means for prosecution remain woefully outdated, slow and ponderous. There is little of the legal agility needed to fight a against an enemy that uses front groups, deception, violence and lack of transparency as part of its primary tactics.
This leads to a lack of cohesion and consistency. I am not arguing for a diminishing of basic rights. But states have to come up with new methods, even those that will be challenged in court and written about in the media, that will allow it to move forward. If those methods and tools are not viewed as legitimate by most of the people in that country, they will eventually be tossed out as illegitimate.
A recent example is the little-noted closing of the Swiss case against Yasin al-Qadi, the alleged financier of radical Islamist movements.
While he remains on the U.S. and U.N. designation lists, the Swiss investigation was important, though mired in allegations of prosecutorial improprieties, illicit information exchanges and generally shabby handling.
This follows the unexpected and still-unexplained decision by the U.S. and U.N. to de-list Idriss Nasreddin from the list of sanctioned individuals.
As I have
written before, perhaps those mechanisms are outdated and need to be either ended or strengthened. This grey area in between, where it is neither enforced nor explained, is the worst of all worlds.
There was another important, though little-noted decision along these same lines this week as well. The NEFA Foundation posted the decision by a federal judge upholding the U.S. government's decision to exclude Tariq Ramadan from the United States (that is, not grant him a visa). Judge Paul Crotty of the Southern District of New York ruled that the government's "exclusion of
Professor Ramadan is facially legitimate and bona fide."
So, where does that leave us at year's end? Al Qaeda in Iraq is weaker and the militant Islamist groups there have turned on each other to an interesting degree, enough to make them all less effective.
But the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Qaeda central, Taliban in Pakistan, the Islamic Court's Union in Somalia, the emerging al Qaeda linked groups in the Sahel region of Africa, the Iranian-backed expansion of Hezbollah in Latin America and other developments of this nature make me less than optimistic about how the struggle against radical Islamists, both Shi'ite and Sunni, is going. I hope I am wrong.
Finally, a heart-felt word of thanks to those who take time to read my thoughts, comment thoughtfully on them, and who wish to make the world a better place. Happy New Year.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday December 21, 2007
The Taliban and the Drug Trade
Well, for those who have argued there is no smoking gun linking the Taliban to opium production, the jig is now up. NATO forces discovered 11 tons of processed opium in a Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan, meaning the opium was at the stage where it can be converted to heroin on about a one-to-one ratio. In other words, it was almost 11 tons of heroin.
The Taliban had an ambivalent relationship with the poppy trade during its reign of terror in Afghanistan, and now appears to have done away with any pretense of not engaging in the lucrative trade.
This explains in large part, as I have written about over the past year, why the Taliban and the Arab/foreign fighters allied with them, have greatly increased their firepower and tactical and communications capabilities.
This is only the latest sign of the merging pipelines and blurring of the distinctions with terrorists and transnational criminal organizations. The great equalizer in this is the drug trade, which offers relatively easy access to huge amounts of money. Few seem able to resist it, from the thugs running Burma to the Central American gangs and criminal groups that control the Central America-Mexico pipeline.
There has been a long-held predisposition in the intelligence community to believe that because Islam severely frowns on the use of drugs (particularly the kind of Islam espoused by the Taliban), the group did not really participate in the drug trade. If they execute people for drug possession, then how could they justify trafficking in the product?
Well, the answer lies in creative theology. There have been several fatwas issued by Taliban theologians since 2001 allowing a Muslim to engage in activities that are harmful to the enemy (that would be us), even if they are actions that a Muslim normally could not take.
It is not so different elsewhere, where ideology can be substituted for theology.
Over the years we have seen the FARC lose all trace of ideology as the drug trade and its wealth has supplanted Marxism as a reason to fight the state. The Self-Defense groups, formed to fight the FARC, also devolved into cocaine trafficking organizations that reaped tens of millions of dollars.
In both cases (and many others), the situation is complex. The Taliban, FARC and others allow people in the territories they control to benefit from one of the few economically viable activities that exist there. This, in turn, buys the Taliban or FARC a measure of goodwill from the population.
Eradication efforts, while somewhat harmful to drug trafficking organizations, is far more costly for the government or state actor in the equation. The state is depriving people of their livelihoods, on top of not protecting them from the rebels/terrorist/bandits. Not a great way to build political capital or credibility among people who have no alternatives.
But the cost of doing nothing is also high. Look at the Taliban's gains to see what opium money has gotten them.
The slide toward criminal activity is almost impossible to stop once it starts. Protecting poppy or coca plants soon becomes providing protection for drug trafficking organizations, which eventually becomes drug trafficking itself. Each step brings increasing profits, which are hard to forego.
Once a group can plug into a pipeline that moves one illicit product, it is very little effort to diversify to put other products in the same pipeline. After all, the gatekeepers in the pipeline are the same, whether the product is drugs, guns, humans or diamonds.
And once in the pipeline, it is very difficult to get out. The money is too good, the threats for leaving too great, the ideology or theology easily massaged to justify what is happening.
The Taliban is well down a slippery slope that we will all pay a price for, none more than the long-suffering people of Afghanistan.
The Taliban had an ambivalent relationship with the poppy trade during its reign of terror in Afghanistan, and now appears to have done away with any pretense of not engaging in the lucrative trade.
This explains in large part, as I have written about over the past year, why the Taliban and the Arab/foreign fighters allied with them, have greatly increased their firepower and tactical and communications capabilities.
This is only the latest sign of the merging pipelines and blurring of the distinctions with terrorists and transnational criminal organizations. The great equalizer in this is the drug trade, which offers relatively easy access to huge amounts of money. Few seem able to resist it, from the thugs running Burma to the Central American gangs and criminal groups that control the Central America-Mexico pipeline.
There has been a long-held predisposition in the intelligence community to believe that because Islam severely frowns on the use of drugs (particularly the kind of Islam espoused by the Taliban), the group did not really participate in the drug trade. If they execute people for drug possession, then how could they justify trafficking in the product?
Well, the answer lies in creative theology. There have been several fatwas issued by Taliban theologians since 2001 allowing a Muslim to engage in activities that are harmful to the enemy (that would be us), even if they are actions that a Muslim normally could not take.
It is not so different elsewhere, where ideology can be substituted for theology.
Over the years we have seen the FARC lose all trace of ideology as the drug trade and its wealth has supplanted Marxism as a reason to fight the state. The Self-Defense groups, formed to fight the FARC, also devolved into cocaine trafficking organizations that reaped tens of millions of dollars.
In both cases (and many others), the situation is complex. The Taliban, FARC and others allow people in the territories they control to benefit from one of the few economically viable activities that exist there. This, in turn, buys the Taliban or FARC a measure of goodwill from the population.
Eradication efforts, while somewhat harmful to drug trafficking organizations, is far more costly for the government or state actor in the equation. The state is depriving people of their livelihoods, on top of not protecting them from the rebels/terrorist/bandits. Not a great way to build political capital or credibility among people who have no alternatives.
But the cost of doing nothing is also high. Look at the Taliban's gains to see what opium money has gotten them.
The slide toward criminal activity is almost impossible to stop once it starts. Protecting poppy or coca plants soon becomes providing protection for drug trafficking organizations, which eventually becomes drug trafficking itself. Each step brings increasing profits, which are hard to forego.
Once a group can plug into a pipeline that moves one illicit product, it is very little effort to diversify to put other products in the same pipeline. After all, the gatekeepers in the pipeline are the same, whether the product is drugs, guns, humans or diamonds.
And once in the pipeline, it is very difficult to get out. The money is too good, the threats for leaving too great, the ideology or theology easily massaged to justify what is happening.
The Taliban is well down a slippery slope that we will all pay a price for, none more than the long-suffering people of Afghanistan.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday December 19, 2007
The Changing Dynamic in Latin America
Several recent stories highlight the growing dangers faced in Latin America, where many of the once-idealistic leaders of the old Left are now making alliances of convenience to counter U.S. influence in the region.
The danger is the mixture of once-national issues with transnational threats that are beyond the control of the old Left-Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and others to a lesser degree.
These leaders may see themselves as populists addressing years of historic inequities in their homelands, but their strategic alliances are ranging dangerously far afield, into sponsors of state terrorism and the growing nexus with transnational criminal syndicates.
There is, of course, the Iranian spending spree in Latin America, highlighted, as Andy Cochran has noted. The alliance of Tehran and Caracas to build a canal through Nicaragua, at a cost of $350 million, is not not necessarily a bad thing for the region, and has been talked about for decades.
But why now, when Tehran has no trade or strategic interest in Nicaragua? Already strained financially, it is unlikely to give a costly gift to a country that is far from its sphere of influence.
However, that sphere of influence is greatly expanded if one looks at Hezbollah and its activities around the region.
As the San Antonio Express noted,
"The bottom line is if there is a confrontation with Iran, and Iran gets bombed, I have absolutely no doubt that Iran is going to lash out globally," said John R. Schindler, a veteran former counterintelligence officer and analyst for the National Security Agency.
"The Iranians have that ability, particularly from South America. Hezbollah has fronts all over Latin America. That is not new. But it's certainly something we're starting to care about now."
Particularly worrisome, to me after covering the region for almost two decades, is Ortega's long history of operating clandestine structures, collaborating with terrorists (the Red Brigade, Abu Nidal and folks he granted citizenship to just before leaving office in 1990, and dozens of internationally-wanted felons), and willingness to ally with anyone to achieve power.
The relationship with Iran is not new. Ortega has long expressed admiration for Iran, and one of the first things he did when he took office was send a cadre of some 15 officials to Tehran for "diplomatic training." Not much of a euphemism for intelligence work. Tehran is not know for its diplomacy on the world stage.
Non-state actors like Hezbollah need state actors in order to obtain travel documents, safe passage, cover stories and safe houses. Ortega has decades of experience in supplying all of those to clandestine groups.
Add to that Tehran's close ties to Chavez, Chavez's purchase of an AK-47 factory from Russia designed to make 100,000 weapons a year, and Chavez's proximity, ideologically and financially to the FARC, and his meddling in financing the Argentine electoral campaign (where Hezbollah and Iran have already been active and carried out attacks), the picture gets dark quickly.
The El Universal newspaper brings new reports of Chavez's ties to the FARC, and his government's complicity in allowing the drug trafficking and kidnapping organization safe haven, even to keep hostages.
So, the canal itself is not a bad thing. It is the circumstances that give rise to it are indeed worrisome.
The danger is the mixture of once-national issues with transnational threats that are beyond the control of the old Left-Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and others to a lesser degree.
These leaders may see themselves as populists addressing years of historic inequities in their homelands, but their strategic alliances are ranging dangerously far afield, into sponsors of state terrorism and the growing nexus with transnational criminal syndicates.
There is, of course, the Iranian spending spree in Latin America, highlighted, as Andy Cochran has noted. The alliance of Tehran and Caracas to build a canal through Nicaragua, at a cost of $350 million, is not not necessarily a bad thing for the region, and has been talked about for decades.
But why now, when Tehran has no trade or strategic interest in Nicaragua? Already strained financially, it is unlikely to give a costly gift to a country that is far from its sphere of influence.
However, that sphere of influence is greatly expanded if one looks at Hezbollah and its activities around the region.
As the San Antonio Express noted,
"The bottom line is if there is a confrontation with Iran, and Iran gets bombed, I have absolutely no doubt that Iran is going to lash out globally," said John R. Schindler, a veteran former counterintelligence officer and analyst for the National Security Agency.
"The Iranians have that ability, particularly from South America. Hezbollah has fronts all over Latin America. That is not new. But it's certainly something we're starting to care about now."
Particularly worrisome, to me after covering the region for almost two decades, is Ortega's long history of operating clandestine structures, collaborating with terrorists (the Red Brigade, Abu Nidal and folks he granted citizenship to just before leaving office in 1990, and dozens of internationally-wanted felons), and willingness to ally with anyone to achieve power.
The relationship with Iran is not new. Ortega has long expressed admiration for Iran, and one of the first things he did when he took office was send a cadre of some 15 officials to Tehran for "diplomatic training." Not much of a euphemism for intelligence work. Tehran is not know for its diplomacy on the world stage.
Non-state actors like Hezbollah need state actors in order to obtain travel documents, safe passage, cover stories and safe houses. Ortega has decades of experience in supplying all of those to clandestine groups.
Add to that Tehran's close ties to Chavez, Chavez's purchase of an AK-47 factory from Russia designed to make 100,000 weapons a year, and Chavez's proximity, ideologically and financially to the FARC, and his meddling in financing the Argentine electoral campaign (where Hezbollah and Iran have already been active and carried out attacks), the picture gets dark quickly.
The El Universal newspaper brings new reports of Chavez's ties to the FARC, and his government's complicity in allowing the drug trafficking and kidnapping organization safe haven, even to keep hostages.
So, the canal itself is not a bad thing. It is the circumstances that give rise to it are indeed worrisome.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 17, 2007
A Bad Weekend for Law Enforcement
Well, it was a bad weekend for law enforcement officials on several continents, and a good one for the _jihadists_ and their support network. Thanks to Josh Lefkowitz of the NEFA Foundation for flagging these items.
These cases illustrate key advantages the Islamist groups have over those operating in a state-centric legal framework. The laws simply cannot, and have not, kept up with the changing realities of the world in which we live. Our legal systems, here and abroad, are extremely slow in defining new threats as crimes and providing a legal framework in which to prosecute and punish them.
This is, of course, a great strength of democratic systems-there has to be a consensus before certain types of behavior are criminalized. But the flip side is that we get dangerous ruling while the overall process is sorted out.
The other advantage is in the sphere of religious sympathy and/or corruption that allow laws to be bent beyond recognition.
Of course, corruption is not limited to Pakistan and elsewhere "out there." There have been many cases in this country where money louder than the law or one's conscience.
The most egregious case is the escape of Rashid Rauf from Pakistani police custody. Rauf is a British-Pakistani suspected of being a leading figure in the plot dismantled in London in August 2006, designed to blow up several transatlantic flights.
Rauf, who had fled to Pakistan, was due to be extradicted back to the UK in a few weeks to stand trial for murder, as well as investigations for terrorist activities.
His police guards allowed him to enter a mosque alone to pray as they returned to prison and (gasp, shock, horror) he didn't come back.
The Pakistani government, of course, is expressing deep regret, promising a full investigation, etc. etc. Several relatives have been arrested etc. etc. Perhaps some policemen were accomplices, etc. etc.
Something about the whole incident makes one wonder about the sincerity of the Pakistani security apparatus. Was a money, or the close ties the Pakistani security apparatus has to radical Islamist groups? Both?
Rauf is important because of his ties to Jaish-e-Mohammed (the Army of Mohammed), a radical Islamist group whose primary focus is the Kashmir conflict, but which has also been linked to the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
Another incident shows the difficulties democracies have in seeking to prevent terrorist attacks while protecting civil liberties.
The United States does not have "control orders," as the British do. The closest thing might be the Treasury/OFAC freezing orders on certain individuals suspected of wrong doing, and depriving them of their financial holdings.
In this case, the person in question skipped out on his control order, which severely curtailed his activities, but argued that he had a "legitimate right" to break the law because he was not charged with a crime and the order was making his life miserable. The jury agreed with him
If there is another terrorist plot in which he had a hand, we will rue the day and curse the jury. If he is innocent of ties to radical Islamist groups, we will be ashamed we curtailed his liberty.
This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the current war on radical Islam. We have rules that constrain our behavior, and they don't. Not hard to see who is fighting at a disadvantage in this one. The question is how to make the legal system more flexible and quick to respond. There may not be a good answer.
These cases illustrate key advantages the Islamist groups have over those operating in a state-centric legal framework. The laws simply cannot, and have not, kept up with the changing realities of the world in which we live. Our legal systems, here and abroad, are extremely slow in defining new threats as crimes and providing a legal framework in which to prosecute and punish them.
This is, of course, a great strength of democratic systems-there has to be a consensus before certain types of behavior are criminalized. But the flip side is that we get dangerous ruling while the overall process is sorted out.
The other advantage is in the sphere of religious sympathy and/or corruption that allow laws to be bent beyond recognition.
Of course, corruption is not limited to Pakistan and elsewhere "out there." There have been many cases in this country where money louder than the law or one's conscience.
The most egregious case is the escape of Rashid Rauf from Pakistani police custody. Rauf is a British-Pakistani suspected of being a leading figure in the plot dismantled in London in August 2006, designed to blow up several transatlantic flights.
Rauf, who had fled to Pakistan, was due to be extradicted back to the UK in a few weeks to stand trial for murder, as well as investigations for terrorist activities.
His police guards allowed him to enter a mosque alone to pray as they returned to prison and (gasp, shock, horror) he didn't come back.
The Pakistani government, of course, is expressing deep regret, promising a full investigation, etc. etc. Several relatives have been arrested etc. etc. Perhaps some policemen were accomplices, etc. etc.
Something about the whole incident makes one wonder about the sincerity of the Pakistani security apparatus. Was a money, or the close ties the Pakistani security apparatus has to radical Islamist groups? Both?
Rauf is important because of his ties to Jaish-e-Mohammed (the Army of Mohammed), a radical Islamist group whose primary focus is the Kashmir conflict, but which has also been linked to the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
Another incident shows the difficulties democracies have in seeking to prevent terrorist attacks while protecting civil liberties.
The United States does not have "control orders," as the British do. The closest thing might be the Treasury/OFAC freezing orders on certain individuals suspected of wrong doing, and depriving them of their financial holdings.
In this case, the person in question skipped out on his control order, which severely curtailed his activities, but argued that he had a "legitimate right" to break the law because he was not charged with a crime and the order was making his life miserable. The jury agreed with him
If there is another terrorist plot in which he had a hand, we will rue the day and curse the jury. If he is innocent of ties to radical Islamist groups, we will be ashamed we curtailed his liberty.
This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the current war on radical Islam. We have rules that constrain our behavior, and they don't. Not hard to see who is fighting at a disadvantage in this one. The question is how to make the legal system more flexible and quick to respond. There may not be a good answer.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH