Friday December 14, 2007
Why Al Qaeda 1.0 Still Matters
The Dec. 11 attack in Algiers by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb shows that the old guard of al Qaeda, what some analysts call al Qaeda 1.0 (rather than the new, decentralized structure) still matters.
As Craig Whitlock noted in the Washington Post, the group (formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat-GSPC) has markedly improved is capabilities since formally allying with al Qaeda 14 months ago.
What is striking, as noted by my colleague Evan Kohlmann in that piece and elsewhere, is the quantum leap in the propaganda capabilities of AQIM, the ability to film the attack and rapidly make high-quality video available on the Internet.
The simultaneous nature of the rising sophistication of AQIM, particularly its "media" wing, and the formal alliance with al Qaeda central strike me as more than a passing coincidence.
It is increasingly clear that the old guard, operating from Pakistan and the border region with Afghanistan, has regrouped and is in more direct communication with its affiliates than it was 6 months ago.
Resources still flow through them, perhaps not in as centralized a form as before, but again, a reconsolidated resource gathering and distribution appears to have been established. A formal alliance brings certain benefits that freelance operators, and perhaps some homegrown groups, do not have, particularly in access to military and propaganda training, as well as economic resources.
I am not disputing the validity of the al Qaeda 2.0 thesis put forward by Peter Bergan and others. I think it is accurate in describing how the Salafist networks are shape shifting to carry on their struggle in many parts of the world. It is also useful, however, to not lose sight of the fact that the bin Laden's of the world still matter and still wield a great deal of influence.
The pattern of the spread of al Qaeda to northern Africa is the same as elsewhere around the globe, facilitating what the old guard is so adept at.
Across Mauritania, Mali and much of the rest of the Maghreb there has been a huge influx of Saudi government funds to facilitate the building of mosques and schools to spread _wahhabist_ theology. This is accompanied by the rapid growth of _wahhabist_ charities that, financed in large part by Saudi petrodollars, can offer goods and services the state or the poorer Islamic groups, simply cannot.
The pattern of penetration of Saudi money and clerics, coupled with NGOs that have little oversight by either the Saudi or the host government, has been seen from Bosnia to Pakistan to northern Nigeria and Indonesia.
With these groups providing the ideological/theological softening up, those advocating direct violence are harvesting in well-plowed ground. This is how the old guard al Qaeda has traditionally operated. This is why the Maghreb is in such danger.
It is also increasingly clear that the old guard has learned that the impact of any operation can be greatly amplified by being able to reproduce images of the attack on the Internet, creating the sensation of a divinely-led blow to in infidel.
The fact that soft targets everywhere are extremely vulnerable and that the attacks may not require a great deal of skill, are not mentioned. The images of government buildings in flames and panicked civilians fleeing, are enough to show the hand of Allah in the victory.
We see these propaganda strides in Iraq, in the increasing frequency and sophistication of the communications by bin Laden and Zawahiri, and the ability of groups like AQIM to quickly produce evidence of their attacks.
As long as they are able to do this, their ability to recruit from an already-prepared population will remain high.
As Craig Whitlock noted in the Washington Post, the group (formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat-GSPC) has markedly improved is capabilities since formally allying with al Qaeda 14 months ago.
What is striking, as noted by my colleague Evan Kohlmann in that piece and elsewhere, is the quantum leap in the propaganda capabilities of AQIM, the ability to film the attack and rapidly make high-quality video available on the Internet.
The simultaneous nature of the rising sophistication of AQIM, particularly its "media" wing, and the formal alliance with al Qaeda central strike me as more than a passing coincidence.
It is increasingly clear that the old guard, operating from Pakistan and the border region with Afghanistan, has regrouped and is in more direct communication with its affiliates than it was 6 months ago.
Resources still flow through them, perhaps not in as centralized a form as before, but again, a reconsolidated resource gathering and distribution appears to have been established. A formal alliance brings certain benefits that freelance operators, and perhaps some homegrown groups, do not have, particularly in access to military and propaganda training, as well as economic resources.
I am not disputing the validity of the al Qaeda 2.0 thesis put forward by Peter Bergan and others. I think it is accurate in describing how the Salafist networks are shape shifting to carry on their struggle in many parts of the world. It is also useful, however, to not lose sight of the fact that the bin Laden's of the world still matter and still wield a great deal of influence.
The pattern of the spread of al Qaeda to northern Africa is the same as elsewhere around the globe, facilitating what the old guard is so adept at.
Across Mauritania, Mali and much of the rest of the Maghreb there has been a huge influx of Saudi government funds to facilitate the building of mosques and schools to spread _wahhabist_ theology. This is accompanied by the rapid growth of _wahhabist_ charities that, financed in large part by Saudi petrodollars, can offer goods and services the state or the poorer Islamic groups, simply cannot.
The pattern of penetration of Saudi money and clerics, coupled with NGOs that have little oversight by either the Saudi or the host government, has been seen from Bosnia to Pakistan to northern Nigeria and Indonesia.
With these groups providing the ideological/theological softening up, those advocating direct violence are harvesting in well-plowed ground. This is how the old guard al Qaeda has traditionally operated. This is why the Maghreb is in such danger.
It is also increasingly clear that the old guard has learned that the impact of any operation can be greatly amplified by being able to reproduce images of the attack on the Internet, creating the sensation of a divinely-led blow to in infidel.
The fact that soft targets everywhere are extremely vulnerable and that the attacks may not require a great deal of skill, are not mentioned. The images of government buildings in flames and panicked civilians fleeing, are enough to show the hand of Allah in the victory.
We see these propaganda strides in Iraq, in the increasing frequency and sophistication of the communications by bin Laden and Zawahiri, and the ability of groups like AQIM to quickly produce evidence of their attacks.
As long as they are able to do this, their ability to recruit from an already-prepared population will remain high.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday December 13, 2007
Window into the Midset of Jihadists
The Middle East Media Research Institute and the NEFA Foundation offer two interesting and enlightening views into the current mindset of Islamist jihadis, particularly as it relates to the Iraq conflict.
MEMRI transcribes an interview with a person claiming to be a former leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. Several things are striking. One is the rather striking disregard for human life, and the assumption in the discussion that one human being (if of the proper Muslim stripe) can and should kill everyone else. There is no wavering on this, as seen in the response to who the Islamists are targetting:
Everybody was targeted, but the Americans took precedence."
Interviewer: "Who is 'everybody'?"
Jawhar: "Whoever fights against 'there is no god but Allah.' Is there anyone who defends the Americans any better than them? The infidels are one and the same. An infidel is an infidel - whether he is a Palestinian, a Jew, or an Argentinean. The infidels are one and the same, while an American Muslim is a Muslim. So what's the problem? What, an Iraqi who is an apostate and who helps the Americans should be treated like a VIP? He is worse than the Americans."
It is also interesting to note the claim not to hold Iraqis for ransom, which would be against Islamic law. Unfortunately, that means they are usually killed.
Another interesting factor is the nationalities Jawhar claims were in Iraq, from Europeans to Americans to Africans. It seems this is likely true, showing the transnational nature of the threat, and the ability the Internet gives to recruit people from every corner of the globe.
It is also clear that Palestine remains dear to the heart of the jihadists, and that many would prefer to fight there in Iraq. But, for unexplained reasons, Jawhar says that Lebanon and other powers will not let the jihadis operate there freely. These same restrictions clearly do not hold for those seeking to fight in Iraq.
There are also clearly points of vulnerability, expressed by Jawhar and Abu Omar Al Baghdadi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Jawhar says that what the insurgents most fear is the U.S. air force, and makes it clear that the ability of aircraft to monitor the insurgent movements has greatly disconcerted his combatants.
And al Baghdadi makes it clear that, like Zarqawi before him, he views the Shi'ite Muslims as a primary enemy. This was a constant source of friction between Zarqawi and the Osama bin Laden/Zawahiri wing of the old-guard al Qaeda, who view the Shi'ia as a lesser evil to be dealt with at a future date, not to wage war against now.
It is also clear that much deeper divisions remain among the Islamists. They have been publicly insulting each other for several months, and the new message is far from conciliatory.
One of the root causes of this, according to military and intel folks, is that the U.S. forces have become, in recent months, much more adept at cutting off the flow of funds to the insurgents. As the competition for increasingly-scarce resources has heated up, so has the internal fighting. That is an important lesson.
As the jihadis know, the more fronts they can make us fight on, the better off they are. But the converse is also true. The more fronts they have to fight on, the less time they have to kill us.
MEMRI transcribes an interview with a person claiming to be a former leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. Several things are striking. One is the rather striking disregard for human life, and the assumption in the discussion that one human being (if of the proper Muslim stripe) can and should kill everyone else. There is no wavering on this, as seen in the response to who the Islamists are targetting:
Everybody was targeted, but the Americans took precedence."
Interviewer: "Who is 'everybody'?"
Jawhar: "Whoever fights against 'there is no god but Allah.' Is there anyone who defends the Americans any better than them? The infidels are one and the same. An infidel is an infidel - whether he is a Palestinian, a Jew, or an Argentinean. The infidels are one and the same, while an American Muslim is a Muslim. So what's the problem? What, an Iraqi who is an apostate and who helps the Americans should be treated like a VIP? He is worse than the Americans."
It is also interesting to note the claim not to hold Iraqis for ransom, which would be against Islamic law. Unfortunately, that means they are usually killed.
Another interesting factor is the nationalities Jawhar claims were in Iraq, from Europeans to Americans to Africans. It seems this is likely true, showing the transnational nature of the threat, and the ability the Internet gives to recruit people from every corner of the globe.
It is also clear that Palestine remains dear to the heart of the jihadists, and that many would prefer to fight there in Iraq. But, for unexplained reasons, Jawhar says that Lebanon and other powers will not let the jihadis operate there freely. These same restrictions clearly do not hold for those seeking to fight in Iraq.
There are also clearly points of vulnerability, expressed by Jawhar and Abu Omar Al Baghdadi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Jawhar says that what the insurgents most fear is the U.S. air force, and makes it clear that the ability of aircraft to monitor the insurgent movements has greatly disconcerted his combatants.
And al Baghdadi makes it clear that, like Zarqawi before him, he views the Shi'ite Muslims as a primary enemy. This was a constant source of friction between Zarqawi and the Osama bin Laden/Zawahiri wing of the old-guard al Qaeda, who view the Shi'ia as a lesser evil to be dealt with at a future date, not to wage war against now.
It is also clear that much deeper divisions remain among the Islamists. They have been publicly insulting each other for several months, and the new message is far from conciliatory.
One of the root causes of this, according to military and intel folks, is that the U.S. forces have become, in recent months, much more adept at cutting off the flow of funds to the insurgents. As the competition for increasingly-scarce resources has heated up, so has the internal fighting. That is an important lesson.
As the jihadis know, the more fronts they can make us fight on, the better off they are. But the converse is also true. The more fronts they have to fight on, the less time they have to kill us.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 10, 2007
Guilty Pleas by FARC Operatives Shows How Pipelines Work
Three Colombians have pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting FARC guerrillasthrough efforts to launder money on behalf of the terrorist organization and alien smuggling.
The case is important not only for putting FARC supporters and corrupt agents of the Colombian government in prison, but because it gives a glimpse into the pipelines that cross over between terrorist/guerrilla groups and transnational criminal networks.
The FARC, the oldest insurgency in Latin America, has long made its economic fortune through participation in the cocaine trade and in the cruel tactic of long-term kidnappings of valuable hostages, many who die after years of captivity, others whose lives are shattered because the FARC cannot and does not negotiate in good faith.
In the interest of full disclosure, I know several people who have been taken hostage by the FARC, including the most famous of the current crop, Igrid Bentancourt.
Ingrid is a friend of mine and I came to know her as a tremendously courageous senator taking on drug traffickers in the corrupt government of Ernesto Samper. She (and many others, including three American contractors) have been held in inhuman conditions for years.
Besides the terrorism and corruption based on a now-defunct ideology, the FARC engages in this this type of crimes against humanity on a regular and systematic basis. The recently-released tape of Ingrid looking gaunt and feeble briefly brought some attention to the abuses of the FARC, but that is soon likely to fade.
In this particular case in Miami, the corrupt government officials were involved in alien smuggling and attempts to launder large quantities of cash for the FARC. The same pipelines could be used for moving shipments of cocaine, illegal Chinese immigrants, stolen cars or weapons.
The members of the pipeline network are not important for what they have, but for who they are-discreet facilitators in making sure goods flow through the pipeline with impunity.
This is significantly different from a criminal enterprise that controls something of economic value: cocaine, diamonds, cobalt etc. The intrinsic value of those commodities is clear. What is less visible but equally important is the pipleline that moves the goods across borders. Both need each other to thrive, but do not necessarily have an organic link.
The centralization of the pipelines that was the paradigm of the mega drug cartels in the 1980s and much of the 1990s no longer exists. The current, non-centralized and often virtually leaderless networks move things for anyone who can pay.
These pipelines are not as efficient in the centralized operations, but they are far harder to combat. Where once one could cripple a money laundering operation or smuggling operation by going after one or two key individuals, the new networks are far less dependent on a few top individuals. Rather, they have the ability to morph and adapt across a broad range of options, some which may be used and then discarded for long periods of time.
This is true in Colombia, as it is true in the al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq to the Hezbollah networks in West Africa. Small victories are important, but they must be consistent to make a serious difference in the long term.
The case is important not only for putting FARC supporters and corrupt agents of the Colombian government in prison, but because it gives a glimpse into the pipelines that cross over between terrorist/guerrilla groups and transnational criminal networks.
The FARC, the oldest insurgency in Latin America, has long made its economic fortune through participation in the cocaine trade and in the cruel tactic of long-term kidnappings of valuable hostages, many who die after years of captivity, others whose lives are shattered because the FARC cannot and does not negotiate in good faith.
In the interest of full disclosure, I know several people who have been taken hostage by the FARC, including the most famous of the current crop, Igrid Bentancourt.
Ingrid is a friend of mine and I came to know her as a tremendously courageous senator taking on drug traffickers in the corrupt government of Ernesto Samper. She (and many others, including three American contractors) have been held in inhuman conditions for years.
Besides the terrorism and corruption based on a now-defunct ideology, the FARC engages in this this type of crimes against humanity on a regular and systematic basis. The recently-released tape of Ingrid looking gaunt and feeble briefly brought some attention to the abuses of the FARC, but that is soon likely to fade.
In this particular case in Miami, the corrupt government officials were involved in alien smuggling and attempts to launder large quantities of cash for the FARC. The same pipelines could be used for moving shipments of cocaine, illegal Chinese immigrants, stolen cars or weapons.
The members of the pipeline network are not important for what they have, but for who they are-discreet facilitators in making sure goods flow through the pipeline with impunity.
This is significantly different from a criminal enterprise that controls something of economic value: cocaine, diamonds, cobalt etc. The intrinsic value of those commodities is clear. What is less visible but equally important is the pipleline that moves the goods across borders. Both need each other to thrive, but do not necessarily have an organic link.
The centralization of the pipelines that was the paradigm of the mega drug cartels in the 1980s and much of the 1990s no longer exists. The current, non-centralized and often virtually leaderless networks move things for anyone who can pay.
These pipelines are not as efficient in the centralized operations, but they are far harder to combat. Where once one could cripple a money laundering operation or smuggling operation by going after one or two key individuals, the new networks are far less dependent on a few top individuals. Rather, they have the ability to morph and adapt across a broad range of options, some which may be used and then discarded for long periods of time.
This is true in Colombia, as it is true in the al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq to the Hezbollah networks in West Africa. Small victories are important, but they must be consistent to make a serious difference in the long term.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday December 6, 2007
Africa Slipping Away
Secretary of State is reportedly uneasy over the faltering peace efforts across Africa, an unraveling that will have direct strategic and security implications for the United States.
Among the top three problem spots, mostly ignored over the past decade, are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan.
These are at the top because they are ongoing, armed conflicts. The Sudanese regime (surprise, surprise) stood Rice up on her recent trip to the region; the president of Ethiopia is ailing, and Somalian leaders refuse to create a truly inclusive government that could embrace everyone except the radical Islamist factions. So that conflict drags on.
The DRC, with its vast mineral resources, has uranium, a strong North Korean presence, Hizbollah (and possibly al Qaeda) diamond networks and is a long-standing center for weapons trafficking and other smuggling activities. The endless wars against new warlords rage on, in part because the central government has no legitimacy and the DRC's neighbors make a killing by raping the natural resource base of the country.
But the hot wars are hardly the only issues to resolve.
One could add South Africa, a growing haven for radical Islamist groups; Zimbabwe, a destabilizing factor that is dragging down several other countries; Angola and Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Cameroon, all despotic but oil-rich regimes with a vast network of criminal pipelines crisscrossing them; and many other trouble spots.
West Africa, while more peaceful since the demise of Charles Taylor in Liberia and the end of conflict in Sierra Leone, is now part of the new and growing cocaine pipeline to Europe. Nigeria is an internationally-know haven for scammers of all types and rogue elements, including the main drug kingpins in the region.
What this adds up to is a continent in crisis, where the U.S. policy and intelligence communities have little interest and expend few resources.
It is a continent that is home to a fanatical Islamist regime, and where radical Islamic groups have carried out some of the most deadly recent attacks on American targets (the Embassy bombings in 1998, the USS Cole bombing in 2000).
It is also a continent where Islamist banking structures, freed from normal oversight, can move money to terrorist operations, as they have in the past.
Transnational criminal pipelines overlap with terrorist groups, creating a dangerous marriage of convenience. This marriage can be seen in the diamonds and weapons trafficking arenas. It extends far further.
The ongoing wars provide the necessary instability these multiple but overlapping interests need in order to thrive. Peace, strong states and the rule of law would put them out of business.
So, it is nice to know that Secretary Rice is "uneasy." What she should be is terrified, mortified and willing to spend some of her remaining time and political capital on halting the further unraveling of a continent.
Among the top three problem spots, mostly ignored over the past decade, are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan.
These are at the top because they are ongoing, armed conflicts. The Sudanese regime (surprise, surprise) stood Rice up on her recent trip to the region; the president of Ethiopia is ailing, and Somalian leaders refuse to create a truly inclusive government that could embrace everyone except the radical Islamist factions. So that conflict drags on.
The DRC, with its vast mineral resources, has uranium, a strong North Korean presence, Hizbollah (and possibly al Qaeda) diamond networks and is a long-standing center for weapons trafficking and other smuggling activities. The endless wars against new warlords rage on, in part because the central government has no legitimacy and the DRC's neighbors make a killing by raping the natural resource base of the country.
But the hot wars are hardly the only issues to resolve.
One could add South Africa, a growing haven for radical Islamist groups; Zimbabwe, a destabilizing factor that is dragging down several other countries; Angola and Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Cameroon, all despotic but oil-rich regimes with a vast network of criminal pipelines crisscrossing them; and many other trouble spots.
West Africa, while more peaceful since the demise of Charles Taylor in Liberia and the end of conflict in Sierra Leone, is now part of the new and growing cocaine pipeline to Europe. Nigeria is an internationally-know haven for scammers of all types and rogue elements, including the main drug kingpins in the region.
What this adds up to is a continent in crisis, where the U.S. policy and intelligence communities have little interest and expend few resources.
It is a continent that is home to a fanatical Islamist regime, and where radical Islamic groups have carried out some of the most deadly recent attacks on American targets (the Embassy bombings in 1998, the USS Cole bombing in 2000).
It is also a continent where Islamist banking structures, freed from normal oversight, can move money to terrorist operations, as they have in the past.
Transnational criminal pipelines overlap with terrorist groups, creating a dangerous marriage of convenience. This marriage can be seen in the diamonds and weapons trafficking arenas. It extends far further.
The ongoing wars provide the necessary instability these multiple but overlapping interests need in order to thrive. Peace, strong states and the rule of law would put them out of business.
So, it is nice to know that Secretary Rice is "uneasy." What she should be is terrified, mortified and willing to spend some of her remaining time and political capital on halting the further unraveling of a continent.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 4, 2007
With Little Fanfare, Yousef Nada Kept on U.N. Terror Designation List
The Swiss Supreme Court has ruled that Youssef Nada, a leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood, must stay on the list specially designated individuals implemented by the United Nations Security Council in the immediate aftermath of 9-11.
The Nov. 27 ruling by the Swiss court stands in sharp contrast to the decision of the United Nations and the U.S. Treasury Department to delist one of Nada's most active partners in banking and investment around the world, Idriss Nasreddin.
The Swiss ruling denied Nada's motion to be be de-listed under Swiss law because one of the primary cases against him and his web of al Taqwa companies and financial institutions, had been dropped by Swiss prosecutors. The case included Bank al Taqwa, based in Nassau, Bahamas and a key financial institution of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The contrasting views of the UN sanctions regime highlights the growing difficulty of making and keeping them effective.
As my colleague Jonathan Winer noted with Nasreddin,the move to take Nasreddin off the list was a surprising move with no coherent public explanation, particularly given the fact that President Bush personally announced the Nada and Nasreddin designations simultaneously.
According to the Treasury Department statement issued when the Nasreddin de-listing became public, the main reason for Nasreddin's initial designation was his association with Nada.
Nasreddin, Treasury said, had submitted sworn statements that he had severed all his ties ties Nada, a key step in his rehabilitation.
If that is what it takes, many more could be de-listed. But the U.S. and European officials also publicly stated that Nasreddin had funded the Islamic center in Milan, Italy, that served as a way station for global jihadist movement. Was that not true, or how does one explain that away?
The truth, according to UN and US officials, is that the designations process is applied so unevenly and is so easy to get around now, that its main value is to stigmatize the individual, not actually hurt their business ventures.
It is simply too easy to quickly change the paperwork on the ownership of designated businesses in order to leave the the few countries that might actually be willing to freeze assets with nothing to freeze.
This has been done by numerous designated individuals, including Nada and others. If their financial holdings are fundamentally untouched and no one wants to take the massive amount of time and resources to continually monitor the actions of all of the designated individuals, it is fair to ask whether the designation regime has outlived most of its usefulness.
I think it is fair to argue that, in the early days, with a vigorous UN monitoring mechanism, of which my colleague Vic Comras was a member, the measures were somewhat successful.
While incapable of monitoring everything, their reports reflected an active effort to monitor developments, point out weaknesses in enforcement and generally let countries know that there was someone paying attention to compliance.
In part because of the effectiveness, which angered some UN members, the group was watered down, given fewer resources and a mandate that was interpreted more narrowly.
The result has been that the process is greatly weakened and ever-less vigorously enforced.
Perhaps what is needed, rather than a weakening of the efforts, is a strengthening of them. The Swiss ruling acknowledged the important place international sanctions regimes have within the nation's legal structure.
It should not be hard to build on that. But for any process of moving forward to have credibility, the United States will have to make its listing and delisting decisions more transparent. One cannot have the president, on national TV, designate an individual then quietly walk away from that decision four years later.
If the initial designation was wrong, then that should be acknowledged and dealt with. If it is solid, then, as was done in the Nada and Nasreddin cases (jointly), what information that exists that can be declassified should be, and placed in the public domain. If a decision is made to delist someone, then that decision should be explained to the fullest extent possible.
Otherwise, we will continue to have weakened policies that do little.
The Nov. 27 ruling by the Swiss court stands in sharp contrast to the decision of the United Nations and the U.S. Treasury Department to delist one of Nada's most active partners in banking and investment around the world, Idriss Nasreddin.
The Swiss ruling denied Nada's motion to be be de-listed under Swiss law because one of the primary cases against him and his web of al Taqwa companies and financial institutions, had been dropped by Swiss prosecutors. The case included Bank al Taqwa, based in Nassau, Bahamas and a key financial institution of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The contrasting views of the UN sanctions regime highlights the growing difficulty of making and keeping them effective.
As my colleague Jonathan Winer noted with Nasreddin,the move to take Nasreddin off the list was a surprising move with no coherent public explanation, particularly given the fact that President Bush personally announced the Nada and Nasreddin designations simultaneously.
According to the Treasury Department statement issued when the Nasreddin de-listing became public, the main reason for Nasreddin's initial designation was his association with Nada.
Nasreddin, Treasury said, had submitted sworn statements that he had severed all his ties ties Nada, a key step in his rehabilitation.
If that is what it takes, many more could be de-listed. But the U.S. and European officials also publicly stated that Nasreddin had funded the Islamic center in Milan, Italy, that served as a way station for global jihadist movement. Was that not true, or how does one explain that away?
The truth, according to UN and US officials, is that the designations process is applied so unevenly and is so easy to get around now, that its main value is to stigmatize the individual, not actually hurt their business ventures.
It is simply too easy to quickly change the paperwork on the ownership of designated businesses in order to leave the the few countries that might actually be willing to freeze assets with nothing to freeze.
This has been done by numerous designated individuals, including Nada and others. If their financial holdings are fundamentally untouched and no one wants to take the massive amount of time and resources to continually monitor the actions of all of the designated individuals, it is fair to ask whether the designation regime has outlived most of its usefulness.
I think it is fair to argue that, in the early days, with a vigorous UN monitoring mechanism, of which my colleague Vic Comras was a member, the measures were somewhat successful.
While incapable of monitoring everything, their reports reflected an active effort to monitor developments, point out weaknesses in enforcement and generally let countries know that there was someone paying attention to compliance.
In part because of the effectiveness, which angered some UN members, the group was watered down, given fewer resources and a mandate that was interpreted more narrowly.
The result has been that the process is greatly weakened and ever-less vigorously enforced.
Perhaps what is needed, rather than a weakening of the efforts, is a strengthening of them. The Swiss ruling acknowledged the important place international sanctions regimes have within the nation's legal structure.
It should not be hard to build on that. But for any process of moving forward to have credibility, the United States will have to make its listing and delisting decisions more transparent. One cannot have the president, on national TV, designate an individual then quietly walk away from that decision four years later.
If the initial designation was wrong, then that should be acknowledged and dealt with. If it is solid, then, as was done in the Nada and Nasreddin cases (jointly), what information that exists that can be declassified should be, and placed in the public domain. If a decision is made to delist someone, then that decision should be explained to the fullest extent possible.
Otherwise, we will continue to have weakened policies that do little.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH