Friday November 16, 2007
The Criminal-Terrorist Pipeline to the United States
The Justice Department recently unveiled a case that demonstrates the growing nexus between criminal and terrorist organizations.
The case involves corrupt Colombia police officials facilitating the travel of informants purporting to be from the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the Western Hemisphere's oldest Marxist guerrilla movement and designated terrorist organization. The FARC has, over the past decade, devolved into an organization that concentrates heavily on kidnappings, extortion and the protection of the drug trade rather than any ideological motivation.
What is interesting in the case is that criminal groups are willing to knowingly transport terrorist to the United States, and not simply using the "coyote" route through Central America and Mexico.
Rather, the criminal groups offered false passports from Spain with all the supporting documents, to those posing as terrorists seeking safe passage to the United States.
This reinforces the point I have been making in recent talks to the military and elsewhere-that that pipelines matter, and control of the pipelines is one of the key concepts of the new, flat world of transnational criminal organizations. These pipelines are increasingly necessary to terrorist organizations who need many of the things these pipelines offer.
Several people have pleaded guilty in the smuggling case. The primary person involved is a Palestinian national, resident in Bogota, named Jalal SADAT Moheisen, who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support for a terrorist organization.
According to the DOJ statement:
"Sadat admitted that between July 2005 and January 2006, he facilitated travel to the United States for three cooperating government informants who posed as FARC operatives. Sadat not only agreed to smuggle the informants to the United States, but upon learning that their mission was to launder $4-5 million from the U.S. to Colombia, he offered to introduce them to a local emerald salesman who could carry out the transaction."
"To facilitate the informants’ travel, Sadat made their flight reservations and contracted to provide fraudulent Spanish passports that permit entry into the United States without a visa. To assist the informants in falsely representing themselves as Spaniards, Sadat’s co-defendant procured fraudulent Spanish driver’s licenses, Spanish identity documents and Spanish trade association cards. Sadat also coordinated inspection-free passage through immigration at the Bogota airport by working with co-defendants Tapasco and Jorge De Los Reyes Bautista Martinez."
This highlights numerous points of overlap between criminal and terrorist groups that are necessary. Access to secure entry and exit points of a country, the need for legal travel documents and the supporting paperwork, the need for safe travel.
This plan was controlled because informants were acting as FARC, but it shows how fluid the lines are that allow networks to cross over and prosper. If the group was willing to move FARC representatives and launder their money, it does not take much imagination to envision the same networks being used by Islamist radicals. There is nothing to impede their access to the pipeline if they chose to use it. And that should give us pause.
The case involves corrupt Colombia police officials facilitating the travel of informants purporting to be from the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the Western Hemisphere's oldest Marxist guerrilla movement and designated terrorist organization. The FARC has, over the past decade, devolved into an organization that concentrates heavily on kidnappings, extortion and the protection of the drug trade rather than any ideological motivation.
What is interesting in the case is that criminal groups are willing to knowingly transport terrorist to the United States, and not simply using the "coyote" route through Central America and Mexico.
Rather, the criminal groups offered false passports from Spain with all the supporting documents, to those posing as terrorists seeking safe passage to the United States.
This reinforces the point I have been making in recent talks to the military and elsewhere-that that pipelines matter, and control of the pipelines is one of the key concepts of the new, flat world of transnational criminal organizations. These pipelines are increasingly necessary to terrorist organizations who need many of the things these pipelines offer.
Several people have pleaded guilty in the smuggling case. The primary person involved is a Palestinian national, resident in Bogota, named Jalal SADAT Moheisen, who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support for a terrorist organization.
According to the DOJ statement:
"Sadat admitted that between July 2005 and January 2006, he facilitated travel to the United States for three cooperating government informants who posed as FARC operatives. Sadat not only agreed to smuggle the informants to the United States, but upon learning that their mission was to launder $4-5 million from the U.S. to Colombia, he offered to introduce them to a local emerald salesman who could carry out the transaction."
"To facilitate the informants’ travel, Sadat made their flight reservations and contracted to provide fraudulent Spanish passports that permit entry into the United States without a visa. To assist the informants in falsely representing themselves as Spaniards, Sadat’s co-defendant procured fraudulent Spanish driver’s licenses, Spanish identity documents and Spanish trade association cards. Sadat also coordinated inspection-free passage through immigration at the Bogota airport by working with co-defendants Tapasco and Jorge De Los Reyes Bautista Martinez."
This highlights numerous points of overlap between criminal and terrorist groups that are necessary. Access to secure entry and exit points of a country, the need for legal travel documents and the supporting paperwork, the need for safe travel.
This plan was controlled because informants were acting as FARC, but it shows how fluid the lines are that allow networks to cross over and prosper. If the group was willing to move FARC representatives and launder their money, it does not take much imagination to envision the same networks being used by Islamist radicals. There is nothing to impede their access to the pipeline if they chose to use it. And that should give us pause.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday November 15, 2007
The Failure of Counterintelligence
As my colleagues have noted, the case of Nadia Nadim Prouty and her ability to illegally acquire citizenship, security clearances and sensitive employment in the FBI and CIA, raises many disturbing issues.
But underlying this failure and numerous other penetration efforts by Islamist groups is the large-scale failure of U.S. counterintelligence efforts for many years. There are numerous cases of Chinese infiltration agents, Islamist penetration and Russian penetrations that underscore the shrinking ability to monitor or detect the spies working in this country.
The capacity has been rapidly shrinking for several decades, and, despite the threat of Islamist terrorists and the growing activities of the Chinese in both traditional and industrial espionage, the entire concept of a counterintelligence has withered on the vine, from before the Clinton administration through the current administration. Currently, that capacity barely exists, according to my friends in the intelligence community.
This does not mean spying on everyone or running roughshod over our constitutional rights. But it does imply a realistic view of how the world works, and basic measures to protect ourselves. There are historic examples of counterintelligence efforts run amok, too, and safeguards must be put in place to guard against that.
One of the fundamental problems goes back to the basic conceptualization of the problem. When the Cold War ended it was assumed that counter-intelligence capacity was no longer needed. The Soviet Union was gone, the world was becoming flat and the capacity was redundant.
The trade craft was lost or atrophied. The modest efforts to revive the ability to monitor the spies spying on us have run into the problem that we are no longer familiar with the new, modern methods and technologies being used against us.
There must be a basic understanding that our enemies, including radical Islamists who have spent decades learning our system, want to know what we are doing and how to foil that. This implies that clearance processes, immigration standards and basic operational security measures be taken seriously.
Radical Islamists, as the British, Spanish and others are discovering, burrow into their host societies with the intent to wage a type of asymmetrical warfare that will cause large-scale damage with few resources. We have been largely unwilling, for reasons of political correctness, to acknowledge that radical Islamists have operational units and designs on the United States.
This comprises only a tiny fraction of the Muslims in this country, as Chinese espionage efforts comprise only a fraction of the Chinese community, or others operating here. No witch hunt is necessary. Only the recognition of the need to be aware there is a real problem.
To me, this is one of the great challenges posed by groups affiliated with the international Muslim Brotherhood operating in this country. They have proved themselves to be masters of penetration on behalf of a theology that espouses the destruction of our way of life. They are not illegal groups nor have they been designated, but they have, by their own admission, hostile intent and a desire to penetrate institutions.
The mission of penetration has been greatly aided by these groups' ability to gain open access to the White House, the FBI, DOJ, DHS, State Department etc., etc., etc. ad nauseum.
As an open society with large immigrant population, penetration is far easier than our penetrating radical Islamist cells. Good counterintelligence requires acknowledging that there are those, like Ms. Prouty, who get into the system with intent to aid other parties that want to hurt us.
What is striking in the Prouty case is that she was conducting unauthorized classified searches in 2003, and yet was not shut down until 2007. It seems that it took a long time for the dime to drop on that one.
But underlying this failure and numerous other penetration efforts by Islamist groups is the large-scale failure of U.S. counterintelligence efforts for many years. There are numerous cases of Chinese infiltration agents, Islamist penetration and Russian penetrations that underscore the shrinking ability to monitor or detect the spies working in this country.
The capacity has been rapidly shrinking for several decades, and, despite the threat of Islamist terrorists and the growing activities of the Chinese in both traditional and industrial espionage, the entire concept of a counterintelligence has withered on the vine, from before the Clinton administration through the current administration. Currently, that capacity barely exists, according to my friends in the intelligence community.
This does not mean spying on everyone or running roughshod over our constitutional rights. But it does imply a realistic view of how the world works, and basic measures to protect ourselves. There are historic examples of counterintelligence efforts run amok, too, and safeguards must be put in place to guard against that.
One of the fundamental problems goes back to the basic conceptualization of the problem. When the Cold War ended it was assumed that counter-intelligence capacity was no longer needed. The Soviet Union was gone, the world was becoming flat and the capacity was redundant.
The trade craft was lost or atrophied. The modest efforts to revive the ability to monitor the spies spying on us have run into the problem that we are no longer familiar with the new, modern methods and technologies being used against us.
There must be a basic understanding that our enemies, including radical Islamists who have spent decades learning our system, want to know what we are doing and how to foil that. This implies that clearance processes, immigration standards and basic operational security measures be taken seriously.
Radical Islamists, as the British, Spanish and others are discovering, burrow into their host societies with the intent to wage a type of asymmetrical warfare that will cause large-scale damage with few resources. We have been largely unwilling, for reasons of political correctness, to acknowledge that radical Islamists have operational units and designs on the United States.
This comprises only a tiny fraction of the Muslims in this country, as Chinese espionage efforts comprise only a fraction of the Chinese community, or others operating here. No witch hunt is necessary. Only the recognition of the need to be aware there is a real problem.
To me, this is one of the great challenges posed by groups affiliated with the international Muslim Brotherhood operating in this country. They have proved themselves to be masters of penetration on behalf of a theology that espouses the destruction of our way of life. They are not illegal groups nor have they been designated, but they have, by their own admission, hostile intent and a desire to penetrate institutions.
The mission of penetration has been greatly aided by these groups' ability to gain open access to the White House, the FBI, DOJ, DHS, State Department etc., etc., etc. ad nauseum.
As an open society with large immigrant population, penetration is far easier than our penetrating radical Islamist cells. Good counterintelligence requires acknowledging that there are those, like Ms. Prouty, who get into the system with intent to aid other parties that want to hurt us.
What is striking in the Prouty case is that she was conducting unauthorized classified searches in 2003, and yet was not shut down until 2007. It seems that it took a long time for the dime to drop on that one.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday November 12, 2007
A Massive and Dangerous Shift
The Washington Post had a provocative article on the massive redistribution of oil wealth the new, record prices for oil, is causing.
The reality of shifting resources from one section of the world to another is not unusual, although this shift is the largest in history. Nor is it necessarily a bad thing for new countries to experience the bounty of controlling a vital natural resource. But what is disturbing about it is that it is mostly benefiting countries that wish to do us harm.
Our inability to wean ourselves from foreign oil has long been providing the financing for groups and countries that want to eliminate us, including terrorist organizations fed from the oil-rich nations. Former CIA director R. James Woolsey has been trying to drive that point home for years. The irony of financing our own destruction seems lost on most policy makers.
Even if one does not buy into the ecological stakes in the need to slash our oil consumption, the national security reasons should be compelling, and yet no one in this election year, Democrats or Republicans, is making that case. And the current administration certainly has not.
In short, we are delivering a $700 billion (at least, as prices are still rising) to the following nations: Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Venezuela. The implications are profound, and an orchestrated response by us is years away.
Iran not only has more cash with which to circumvent UN sanctions for its nuclear violations, but it is flush with cash for support of Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Guard and other terrorist groups. Lebanon, Israel, Iraq and others will feel the impact of Iran's financial security. There are already serious reports of the a major increase in Iran's spending on weapons, some of which are ending up in Iraq.
The Sudanese government is the creation of the international Muslim Brotherhood and is responsible for the genocide in Darfur. Nice to know their financial needs are being met.
Saudi Arabia is building new cities with its money, but one can rest assured that the the spread of the _wahhabist_ theology around the world will also benefit from a boost. That means mosques that spew hate, text books that promote intolerance and millions of dollars more through zakat money to charities that often align with terrorists. Comforting!
Russia is now flush enough with cash that Putin can continue his retreat from democracy without fear of international sanction. The pressure on the former Soviet republics will continue, and those like Viktor Bout who aid and abet terrorists when it suits Russian national interests (Iran/Hezbollah etc.) will continue to ply their lucrative trade.
In Venezuela, Chavez is freer than ever to install is Bolivarian revolution, which is looking increasingly like one-man and one party rule for the foreseeable future. He can cement his ties to the FARC in Colombia, regardless of international pressure, and cocaine shipments from Venezuelan air space have already increased dramatically in the past year.
It is a simple equation to understand, but one that has not been articulated except in small, isolated cases. Until we recognize how we are empowering our enemies, change will not come. And that might be too late.
The reality of shifting resources from one section of the world to another is not unusual, although this shift is the largest in history. Nor is it necessarily a bad thing for new countries to experience the bounty of controlling a vital natural resource. But what is disturbing about it is that it is mostly benefiting countries that wish to do us harm.
Our inability to wean ourselves from foreign oil has long been providing the financing for groups and countries that want to eliminate us, including terrorist organizations fed from the oil-rich nations. Former CIA director R. James Woolsey has been trying to drive that point home for years. The irony of financing our own destruction seems lost on most policy makers.
Even if one does not buy into the ecological stakes in the need to slash our oil consumption, the national security reasons should be compelling, and yet no one in this election year, Democrats or Republicans, is making that case. And the current administration certainly has not.
In short, we are delivering a $700 billion (at least, as prices are still rising) to the following nations: Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Venezuela. The implications are profound, and an orchestrated response by us is years away.
Iran not only has more cash with which to circumvent UN sanctions for its nuclear violations, but it is flush with cash for support of Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Guard and other terrorist groups. Lebanon, Israel, Iraq and others will feel the impact of Iran's financial security. There are already serious reports of the a major increase in Iran's spending on weapons, some of which are ending up in Iraq.
The Sudanese government is the creation of the international Muslim Brotherhood and is responsible for the genocide in Darfur. Nice to know their financial needs are being met.
Saudi Arabia is building new cities with its money, but one can rest assured that the the spread of the _wahhabist_ theology around the world will also benefit from a boost. That means mosques that spew hate, text books that promote intolerance and millions of dollars more through zakat money to charities that often align with terrorists. Comforting!
Russia is now flush enough with cash that Putin can continue his retreat from democracy without fear of international sanction. The pressure on the former Soviet republics will continue, and those like Viktor Bout who aid and abet terrorists when it suits Russian national interests (Iran/Hezbollah etc.) will continue to ply their lucrative trade.
In Venezuela, Chavez is freer than ever to install is Bolivarian revolution, which is looking increasingly like one-man and one party rule for the foreseeable future. He can cement his ties to the FARC in Colombia, regardless of international pressure, and cocaine shipments from Venezuelan air space have already increased dramatically in the past year.
It is a simple equation to understand, but one that has not been articulated except in small, isolated cases. Until we recognize how we are empowering our enemies, change will not come. And that might be too late.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday November 9, 2007
Islamists Waste Little Time in Pakistan
Defense secretary Robert Gates is rightly concerned that the internal turmoil in Pakistan is distracting crucial efforts from tracking al Qaeda and the resurgent Taliban.
"The concern I have is that the longer the internal problems continue, the more distracted the Pakistani army and security services will be in terms of the internal situation rather than focusing on the terrorist threat in the frontier area," Gates said.
There are plenty of signs of the damage already done. Some 200 members of government forces in the Swat Valley surrendered to the Taliban in recent days. In the Northwest Frontier Territory, a car bomb has killed a senior government official. Across the country troops are deployed to monitor, arrest and beat the democratic opposition.
How distracted is the army? It seems like plenty. Musharraf's power play has discredited an already weak government, and my friends monitoring the situation say the command-and-control structure is in tatters.
If the primary concern now is arresting people, beating journalists, shutting down the media, confining political leaders to their homes and other activities that are manpower intensive but of little use in counter-terrorism, then we are in severe difficulty. The Taliban has shown its opportunistic streak before, and its leaders are smart enough to know opportunity when it smacks them upside the head.
This matters tremendously when the consequences of such chaos significantly up the odds that Islamist radicals can get their hands on nuclear weapons. It is not like the Taliban and al Qaeda are strangers to the ISI and military in Pakistan. And the Islamists have made it clear that acquiring these weapons is their highest priority.
They have relationships that go back decades, and a great deal of religious and political agreement built on fundamentalist, Wahhabist theology.
This is also a view shared by most of the Pakistani public. A recent poll cited by Diana West shows that
Pakistanis listed defeating "al Qaeda, the Taliban and other Jihadi groups" dead last in their list of priorities.
It is not hard to understand that if one is living in poverty, in a highly corrupted system, that defeating someone of the same general theology and ideology would not be a high priority.
And it is a dangerous sign of the weakness of a civilian, secular government represented by politicians like Benazir Bhutto. This reality further constricts the limited options available as Musharraf goes about his grab for power.
A.Q. Khan's network showed how efficiently nuclear plans, technology and machinery can move when the primary motivation is economic. This efficiency is only likely to be improved when the motivation is primarily religious and ideological.
There are no good options in Pakistan. But securing the nuclear arsenal from those who have made acquiring the weapons their highest priority must be our highest priority. Otherwise, we risk an attack that will make 9/11 look minor in comparison.
"The concern I have is that the longer the internal problems continue, the more distracted the Pakistani army and security services will be in terms of the internal situation rather than focusing on the terrorist threat in the frontier area," Gates said.
There are plenty of signs of the damage already done. Some 200 members of government forces in the Swat Valley surrendered to the Taliban in recent days. In the Northwest Frontier Territory, a car bomb has killed a senior government official. Across the country troops are deployed to monitor, arrest and beat the democratic opposition.
How distracted is the army? It seems like plenty. Musharraf's power play has discredited an already weak government, and my friends monitoring the situation say the command-and-control structure is in tatters.
If the primary concern now is arresting people, beating journalists, shutting down the media, confining political leaders to their homes and other activities that are manpower intensive but of little use in counter-terrorism, then we are in severe difficulty. The Taliban has shown its opportunistic streak before, and its leaders are smart enough to know opportunity when it smacks them upside the head.
This matters tremendously when the consequences of such chaos significantly up the odds that Islamist radicals can get their hands on nuclear weapons. It is not like the Taliban and al Qaeda are strangers to the ISI and military in Pakistan. And the Islamists have made it clear that acquiring these weapons is their highest priority.
They have relationships that go back decades, and a great deal of religious and political agreement built on fundamentalist, Wahhabist theology.
This is also a view shared by most of the Pakistani public. A recent poll cited by Diana West shows that
Pakistanis listed defeating "al Qaeda, the Taliban and other Jihadi groups" dead last in their list of priorities.
It is not hard to understand that if one is living in poverty, in a highly corrupted system, that defeating someone of the same general theology and ideology would not be a high priority.
And it is a dangerous sign of the weakness of a civilian, secular government represented by politicians like Benazir Bhutto. This reality further constricts the limited options available as Musharraf goes about his grab for power.
A.Q. Khan's network showed how efficiently nuclear plans, technology and machinery can move when the primary motivation is economic. This efficiency is only likely to be improved when the motivation is primarily religious and ideological.
There are no good options in Pakistan. But securing the nuclear arsenal from those who have made acquiring the weapons their highest priority must be our highest priority. Otherwise, we risk an attack that will make 9/11 look minor in comparison.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday November 7, 2007
Winds of Change in the Military Approach
In recent weeks I have spent time at numerous events with U.S. military personnel across the different services, speaking, listening and watching as the senior officers challenge the assumptions they have help on the war on terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan and other pressing issues.
One of the most innovative new concepts bubbling to the surface is that a great deal can be accomplished in pushing back against Islamist radicals, transnational criminal groups, warlords and militias by recognizing these issues all affect a nation's sovereignty.
If one recognizes this, then the need to form coalitions built on U.S. assumptions, pressures and cajoling diminishes considerably. Nations can take actions in their own enlightened self interest to improve or regain their own sovereignty that benefit aspects of U.S. policy, without having to agree on any other policy aspect.
Most nations do not want organized criminal networks corrupting the system. Most do not want their territory to be terrorist enclaves. Most do not want warlords controlling vast swaths of territory.
This concept of helping nations focus on their own national sovereignty issues is liberating from the highly unpopular concepts of "coalitions of the willing" and other policies that have been trotted out in recent times.
Another noticeable change is the military's new openness to outside thinking and input. This accounts, in large part, for my recent visits to different commands.
There is a growing recognition that the assumptions in recent years about tackling the broader issues of terrorism, as well as handling matters in Iraq, have to be adjusted. It is heartening to see a marked change toward the use and acceptance of open source material as valid, as well as the willingness to listen to sometimes harsh critics who share the same goals but debate the tactics and strategy.
One of the realities that much of the military has recognized for many years is that this will not be a military war, at least not the vast bulk of the struggles that arise. The military remains an integral and vital part of the architecture to deal with state and non-state threats, but are not the only part and are often not the lead part.
Given the weakness of the State Department, the generally-recognized inability of Karen Hughes to advance a coherent agenda on outreach, the weakness of the intelligence community and the hodge-podge on strategic thinking that has often prevailed, the military has been called on to do things that it is not qualified to do and should not be asked to do.
Now, it seems, the lines of responsibility are taking shape in a more coherent manner. Contrary to what many think, the military is quite happy to shed some of the responsibilities that have been thrown its way.
I don't know how Iraq will turn out or if the situation in Pakistan will lead to a strengthening of al Qaeda. I do know that much creative thinking is now going into the short and long term issues this complex mosaic presents. It is refreshing to see.
One of the most innovative new concepts bubbling to the surface is that a great deal can be accomplished in pushing back against Islamist radicals, transnational criminal groups, warlords and militias by recognizing these issues all affect a nation's sovereignty.
If one recognizes this, then the need to form coalitions built on U.S. assumptions, pressures and cajoling diminishes considerably. Nations can take actions in their own enlightened self interest to improve or regain their own sovereignty that benefit aspects of U.S. policy, without having to agree on any other policy aspect.
Most nations do not want organized criminal networks corrupting the system. Most do not want their territory to be terrorist enclaves. Most do not want warlords controlling vast swaths of territory.
This concept of helping nations focus on their own national sovereignty issues is liberating from the highly unpopular concepts of "coalitions of the willing" and other policies that have been trotted out in recent times.
Another noticeable change is the military's new openness to outside thinking and input. This accounts, in large part, for my recent visits to different commands.
There is a growing recognition that the assumptions in recent years about tackling the broader issues of terrorism, as well as handling matters in Iraq, have to be adjusted. It is heartening to see a marked change toward the use and acceptance of open source material as valid, as well as the willingness to listen to sometimes harsh critics who share the same goals but debate the tactics and strategy.
One of the realities that much of the military has recognized for many years is that this will not be a military war, at least not the vast bulk of the struggles that arise. The military remains an integral and vital part of the architecture to deal with state and non-state threats, but are not the only part and are often not the lead part.
Given the weakness of the State Department, the generally-recognized inability of Karen Hughes to advance a coherent agenda on outreach, the weakness of the intelligence community and the hodge-podge on strategic thinking that has often prevailed, the military has been called on to do things that it is not qualified to do and should not be asked to do.
Now, it seems, the lines of responsibility are taking shape in a more coherent manner. Contrary to what many think, the military is quite happy to shed some of the responsibilities that have been thrown its way.
I don't know how Iraq will turn out or if the situation in Pakistan will lead to a strengthening of al Qaeda. I do know that much creative thinking is now going into the short and long term issues this complex mosaic presents. It is refreshing to see.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH