Wednesday November 7, 2007
Winds of Change in the Military Approach
In recent weeks I have spent time at numerous events with U.S. military personnel across the different services, speaking, listening and watching as the senior officers challenge the assumptions they have help on the war on terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan and other pressing issues.
One of the most innovative new concepts bubbling to the surface is that a great deal can be accomplished in pushing back against Islamist radicals, transnational criminal groups, warlords and militias by recognizing these issues all affect a nation's sovereignty.
If one recognizes this, then the need to form coalitions built on U.S. assumptions, pressures and cajoling diminishes considerably. Nations can take actions in their own enlightened self interest to improve or regain their own sovereignty that benefit aspects of U.S. policy, without having to agree on any other policy aspect.
Most nations do not want organized criminal networks corrupting the system. Most do not want their territory to be terrorist enclaves. Most do not want warlords controlling vast swaths of territory.
This concept of helping nations focus on their own national sovereignty issues is liberating from the highly unpopular concepts of "coalitions of the willing" and other policies that have been trotted out in recent times.
Another noticeable change is the military's new openness to outside thinking and input. This accounts, in large part, for my recent visits to different commands.
There is a growing recognition that the assumptions in recent years about tackling the broader issues of terrorism, as well as handling matters in Iraq, have to be adjusted. It is heartening to see a marked change toward the use and acceptance of open source material as valid, as well as the willingness to listen to sometimes harsh critics who share the same goals but debate the tactics and strategy.
One of the realities that much of the military has recognized for many years is that this will not be a military war, at least not the vast bulk of the struggles that arise. The military remains an integral and vital part of the architecture to deal with state and non-state threats, but are not the only part and are often not the lead part.
Given the weakness of the State Department, the generally-recognized inability of Karen Hughes to advance a coherent agenda on outreach, the weakness of the intelligence community and the hodge-podge on strategic thinking that has often prevailed, the military has been called on to do things that it is not qualified to do and should not be asked to do.
Now, it seems, the lines of responsibility are taking shape in a more coherent manner. Contrary to what many think, the military is quite happy to shed some of the responsibilities that have been thrown its way.
I don't know how Iraq will turn out or if the situation in Pakistan will lead to a strengthening of al Qaeda. I do know that much creative thinking is now going into the short and long term issues this complex mosaic presents. It is refreshing to see.
One of the most innovative new concepts bubbling to the surface is that a great deal can be accomplished in pushing back against Islamist radicals, transnational criminal groups, warlords and militias by recognizing these issues all affect a nation's sovereignty.
If one recognizes this, then the need to form coalitions built on U.S. assumptions, pressures and cajoling diminishes considerably. Nations can take actions in their own enlightened self interest to improve or regain their own sovereignty that benefit aspects of U.S. policy, without having to agree on any other policy aspect.
Most nations do not want organized criminal networks corrupting the system. Most do not want their territory to be terrorist enclaves. Most do not want warlords controlling vast swaths of territory.
This concept of helping nations focus on their own national sovereignty issues is liberating from the highly unpopular concepts of "coalitions of the willing" and other policies that have been trotted out in recent times.
Another noticeable change is the military's new openness to outside thinking and input. This accounts, in large part, for my recent visits to different commands.
There is a growing recognition that the assumptions in recent years about tackling the broader issues of terrorism, as well as handling matters in Iraq, have to be adjusted. It is heartening to see a marked change toward the use and acceptance of open source material as valid, as well as the willingness to listen to sometimes harsh critics who share the same goals but debate the tactics and strategy.
One of the realities that much of the military has recognized for many years is that this will not be a military war, at least not the vast bulk of the struggles that arise. The military remains an integral and vital part of the architecture to deal with state and non-state threats, but are not the only part and are often not the lead part.
Given the weakness of the State Department, the generally-recognized inability of Karen Hughes to advance a coherent agenda on outreach, the weakness of the intelligence community and the hodge-podge on strategic thinking that has often prevailed, the military has been called on to do things that it is not qualified to do and should not be asked to do.
Now, it seems, the lines of responsibility are taking shape in a more coherent manner. Contrary to what many think, the military is quite happy to shed some of the responsibilities that have been thrown its way.
I don't know how Iraq will turn out or if the situation in Pakistan will lead to a strengthening of al Qaeda. I do know that much creative thinking is now going into the short and long term issues this complex mosaic presents. It is refreshing to see.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday November 5, 2007
The Real Danger of Pakistan's Chaos
It is clear that Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf has serious problems on his hands, and that his decision to impose marshal law is a setback for democracy.
But the real long-term danger, as noted by Bruce Riedel in Newsweek is that ""If you were to look around the world for where Al Qaeda is going to find its bomb, it's right in their backyard."
The facts on the ground in Pakistan pose serious challenges, and those challenges spill over in lethal form to neighboring Afghanistan, where the Taliban is slowly but consistently edging closer to Kabul and maintaining a presence on the economic arteries of the country, including the opium trade.
But the most dangerous element of Pakistan's chaos is its secret nuclear program and unauthorized proliferation, which did not stop with the house arrest of A.Q. Khan in 2004. The ISI and Pakistan's nuclear agents remain loyal to the highest bidder, with a predisposition toward radical Islamist movements.
Musharraf's inability or unwillingness to purge the ISI, the intelligence service's continued support of the Taliban, and the growing presence of radical Islamists in the mid-level ranks of the nation's intelligence services, mean that an uncertain situation is much less certain.
It even less clear now that it was a few months ago who is really in control in Pakistan and who controls the nuclear arsenal. There is certainly no guarantee that secularists or moderates have any control at all over the arsenal.
A.Q. Khan himself remains an ardent Islamist who has shown no hesitation in arming the worst elements of the world, be they secular (North Korea) or Islamist (Libya when he started, Iran, and Pakistan, among others). His network, active from Europe to Dubai, China to Latin America, was never dismantled.
Al Qaeda and its related groups have made no secret of their desire to possess a nuclear weapon to use against the West. The best chance these groups have is through its friends in Pakistan, where the relationships from the days of jihad in Afghanistan against the USSR remain strong.
The realization of the nightmare scenario is closer now that Musharraf has chosen to plunge Pakistan even further into chaos. He has managed to alienate just about everyone, from Islamists to moderates.
Military and foreign efforts necessarily center on reaching some sort of stability while mitigating the abuses of the civilian population. But that attention means less attention elsewhere, including on nuclear issues.
There is little between the Islamists and the bomb. That has been the case for some time. Now there is even less.
But the real long-term danger, as noted by Bruce Riedel in Newsweek is that ""If you were to look around the world for where Al Qaeda is going to find its bomb, it's right in their backyard."
The facts on the ground in Pakistan pose serious challenges, and those challenges spill over in lethal form to neighboring Afghanistan, where the Taliban is slowly but consistently edging closer to Kabul and maintaining a presence on the economic arteries of the country, including the opium trade.
But the most dangerous element of Pakistan's chaos is its secret nuclear program and unauthorized proliferation, which did not stop with the house arrest of A.Q. Khan in 2004. The ISI and Pakistan's nuclear agents remain loyal to the highest bidder, with a predisposition toward radical Islamist movements.
Musharraf's inability or unwillingness to purge the ISI, the intelligence service's continued support of the Taliban, and the growing presence of radical Islamists in the mid-level ranks of the nation's intelligence services, mean that an uncertain situation is much less certain.
It even less clear now that it was a few months ago who is really in control in Pakistan and who controls the nuclear arsenal. There is certainly no guarantee that secularists or moderates have any control at all over the arsenal.
A.Q. Khan himself remains an ardent Islamist who has shown no hesitation in arming the worst elements of the world, be they secular (North Korea) or Islamist (Libya when he started, Iran, and Pakistan, among others). His network, active from Europe to Dubai, China to Latin America, was never dismantled.
Al Qaeda and its related groups have made no secret of their desire to possess a nuclear weapon to use against the West. The best chance these groups have is through its friends in Pakistan, where the relationships from the days of jihad in Afghanistan against the USSR remain strong.
The realization of the nightmare scenario is closer now that Musharraf has chosen to plunge Pakistan even further into chaos. He has managed to alienate just about everyone, from Islamists to moderates.
Military and foreign efforts necessarily center on reaching some sort of stability while mitigating the abuses of the civilian population. But that attention means less attention elsewhere, including on nuclear issues.
There is little between the Islamists and the bomb. That has been the case for some time. Now there is even less.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday November 1, 2007
Horn of Africa On the Decline
Al Qaeda and its affiliates in recent years have made no secret of their desire to open new hot war fronts that will drain the resources and willpower of the West.
The Horn of Africa is clearly part of that strategy, and the inroads the radical are now clearly discerable. Perhaps the most dramatic public setback has been the government of Yemen's decision to pardon Jamal al-Badawi, a key architect of the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. The bombing left 17 U.S. sailor dead, and was the announcement of al Qaeda's continuing presence in the region. In 1998 the group successfully bombed two U.S. embassies East Africa.
Al-Badawi, who recruited the Cole bombers, was originally sentenced to death, had escaped from prison once, and was recaptured. He suddenly swore allegiance to Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Last week Badawi was set free, and was reportedly receiving well-wishers at his home outside Aden.
The pardon came just days after Frances Fragos Townsend, President Bush's top counterterrorism adviser, had been in Yemen praising that nation's contributions to the war on terror. Who played whom like a fiddle?
Compounding the insult, U.S. officials say they have strong reason to believe a number of other Al Qaeda figures have been released by the Yemenis, including Jaber Elbaneh, an FBI fugitive who was indicted for providing material support to Al Qaeda as part of the investigation into a terror cell in Lackawana, N.Y., in 2003.
This is a pretty clear sign that, absent a stronger U.S. presence and interest in the region, Yemen and others will do what they feel they must or what they want to with al Qaeda-linked groups in the region. If these are our allies, hard to imagine just what our enemies might be up to.
The al-Badawi incident is not the only incident signaling a breakdown in the Horn.
In Somalia, the odd alliance of the government of Eritrea with radical Islamists continues to destabilize the weak central government, such as it is. The continuing presence of Ethiopian troops continues to antagonize the population as it protects a government that cannot perform even minimal functions-functions that the Islamists, when briefly in power, were able to perform, such as picking up trash and making the streets safe.
As a result, the ICU looks good, tens of thousands of Somalis are again fleeing the capital and the Islamist forces look good in comparison to the current situation.
At the same time, the formation of the U.S. military's Africa Command remains bogged down over competing visions of what it should be and do, coupled with a strong pushback from many African nations that do not want a U.S. military footprint on the continent.
What relatively few resources the Africa command would have are already being whittled away to plug holes in Iraq. There are few Africa experts being assigned to the command structure and, being a low priority in the relative scheme of things, vital decisions are not being made.
One has only to look at where the most significant radical Islamist activity outside of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and Iraq to see the importance of the Horn. One Joint Task force there, with few intel assets, is not an effective counter to movements that enjoy support even in the governments of those we call our allies.
The Horn is slipping toward chaos. Only radical Islamist movements and their allied criminal groups that can adequately exploit the chaos, will benefit.
The Horn of Africa is clearly part of that strategy, and the inroads the radical are now clearly discerable. Perhaps the most dramatic public setback has been the government of Yemen's decision to pardon Jamal al-Badawi, a key architect of the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. The bombing left 17 U.S. sailor dead, and was the announcement of al Qaeda's continuing presence in the region. In 1998 the group successfully bombed two U.S. embassies East Africa.
Al-Badawi, who recruited the Cole bombers, was originally sentenced to death, had escaped from prison once, and was recaptured. He suddenly swore allegiance to Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Last week Badawi was set free, and was reportedly receiving well-wishers at his home outside Aden.
The pardon came just days after Frances Fragos Townsend, President Bush's top counterterrorism adviser, had been in Yemen praising that nation's contributions to the war on terror. Who played whom like a fiddle?
Compounding the insult, U.S. officials say they have strong reason to believe a number of other Al Qaeda figures have been released by the Yemenis, including Jaber Elbaneh, an FBI fugitive who was indicted for providing material support to Al Qaeda as part of the investigation into a terror cell in Lackawana, N.Y., in 2003.
This is a pretty clear sign that, absent a stronger U.S. presence and interest in the region, Yemen and others will do what they feel they must or what they want to with al Qaeda-linked groups in the region. If these are our allies, hard to imagine just what our enemies might be up to.
The al-Badawi incident is not the only incident signaling a breakdown in the Horn.
In Somalia, the odd alliance of the government of Eritrea with radical Islamists continues to destabilize the weak central government, such as it is. The continuing presence of Ethiopian troops continues to antagonize the population as it protects a government that cannot perform even minimal functions-functions that the Islamists, when briefly in power, were able to perform, such as picking up trash and making the streets safe.
As a result, the ICU looks good, tens of thousands of Somalis are again fleeing the capital and the Islamist forces look good in comparison to the current situation.
At the same time, the formation of the U.S. military's Africa Command remains bogged down over competing visions of what it should be and do, coupled with a strong pushback from many African nations that do not want a U.S. military footprint on the continent.
What relatively few resources the Africa command would have are already being whittled away to plug holes in Iraq. There are few Africa experts being assigned to the command structure and, being a low priority in the relative scheme of things, vital decisions are not being made.
One has only to look at where the most significant radical Islamist activity outside of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and Iraq to see the importance of the Horn. One Joint Task force there, with few intel assets, is not an effective counter to movements that enjoy support even in the governments of those we call our allies.
The Horn is slipping toward chaos. Only radical Islamist movements and their allied criminal groups that can adequately exploit the chaos, will benefit.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday October 29, 2007
A Disturbing Pattern that Benefits Terrorists
There is a disturbing story in today's Washington Post on the role the U.S. weapons market plays in arming Mexican drug cartels.
"You're looking at the same firepower here on the border that our soldiers are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan," Thomas Mangan, a spokesman in Phoenix for the ATF.
The army of "ants" described in the story, carrying weapons south through the same routes they use to bring drugs north, is not new. What appears to be new is the sheer volume of weapons these criminal groups are able to acquire that move directly to the hands of the drug cartels, who can pay well for the merchandise.
It is interesting to note all the tricks used to distract border guards and others as the weapons traffickers, usually carrying small amounts of weapons purchased legally at U.S. gun shows, move across the border. These include using young women to carry the weapons, standing behind a young man that is clean but might arouse suspicion, and other tricks.
It is hard to believe that those from other groups-particularly Hezbollah, which has already had several militant arrested crossing into Texas, have not studied the MO and know how the system works as well as the traffickers. And if they don't, they can pay to have experienced hands lead them.
It is erroneous to think of the drug pipeline purely in terms of drugs delivered to those willing to pay for it in this country. The pipeline is the same one that moves illegal human traffic, be it those seeking work, those indentured to work as prostitutes or low-wage serfs in factories, or terrorists seeking to enter the country.
There is the reverse flow of merchandise was well-weapons, cash and stolen cars primarily.
Much has been written recently about the brutal wars among the different drug cartels along the U.S.-Mexico border. And the enormous drug profits are certainly a major force.
But much of the fighting is also over a harder to define commodity: the pipeline itself, which generates a huge amount of revenue because it can move so many products.
He or she who controls the pipeline controls the trade. It is that simple. As the cartels have fragmented and specialized, these groups specializing in movement and transportation take on an additional importance, but remain little understood and relatively unmonitored.
If thousands of guns a year can move south virtually undetected it is hard to imagine that goods-nuclear, biological or chemical-can not move the other way, along with the people trained to use them.
That is why the pipeline matters, even if one does not place a high priority on the interdiction of illicit drugs. We will all pay a high price for the rivers of illicit goods these pipelines carry back and forth with virtual impunity.
"You're looking at the same firepower here on the border that our soldiers are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan," Thomas Mangan, a spokesman in Phoenix for the ATF.
The army of "ants" described in the story, carrying weapons south through the same routes they use to bring drugs north, is not new. What appears to be new is the sheer volume of weapons these criminal groups are able to acquire that move directly to the hands of the drug cartels, who can pay well for the merchandise.
It is interesting to note all the tricks used to distract border guards and others as the weapons traffickers, usually carrying small amounts of weapons purchased legally at U.S. gun shows, move across the border. These include using young women to carry the weapons, standing behind a young man that is clean but might arouse suspicion, and other tricks.
It is hard to believe that those from other groups-particularly Hezbollah, which has already had several militant arrested crossing into Texas, have not studied the MO and know how the system works as well as the traffickers. And if they don't, they can pay to have experienced hands lead them.
It is erroneous to think of the drug pipeline purely in terms of drugs delivered to those willing to pay for it in this country. The pipeline is the same one that moves illegal human traffic, be it those seeking work, those indentured to work as prostitutes or low-wage serfs in factories, or terrorists seeking to enter the country.
There is the reverse flow of merchandise was well-weapons, cash and stolen cars primarily.
Much has been written recently about the brutal wars among the different drug cartels along the U.S.-Mexico border. And the enormous drug profits are certainly a major force.
But much of the fighting is also over a harder to define commodity: the pipeline itself, which generates a huge amount of revenue because it can move so many products.
He or she who controls the pipeline controls the trade. It is that simple. As the cartels have fragmented and specialized, these groups specializing in movement and transportation take on an additional importance, but remain little understood and relatively unmonitored.
If thousands of guns a year can move south virtually undetected it is hard to imagine that goods-nuclear, biological or chemical-can not move the other way, along with the people trained to use them.
That is why the pipeline matters, even if one does not place a high priority on the interdiction of illicit drugs. We will all pay a high price for the rivers of illicit goods these pipelines carry back and forth with virtual impunity.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday October 26, 2007
A Focus on the Other War on Terrorism
While Islamist terrorism has been the focus of almost all counter-terrorism policies since 9-11, there are some indications that the long-standing and equally intractable struggle with drug-related terrorist gangs is coming back on to the radar screen.
It is worth remembering that the damage done by drug trafficking structures, due to the huge amounts of revenue and violence that they generate, do considerable damage as well. This is not a debate or whether drugs should be legalized, but a recognition that policy is not going to change any time soon, and this is the reality.
In fact, drug traffickers are the only other economic group that can rival the billions of dollars the Saudi government and wealthy Gulf donors but into the infrastructure that supports Islamist terrorism.
Despite the signs of progress in Colombia, the FARC remains a formidable, multi-billion dollar industry with significant ties to criminal and terrorist organizations, from weapons traffickers to the Lebanese expatriate communities that send significant resources to Hezbollah and, to a lesser degree, Hamas.
The FARC's ties to the Central American gangs and weapons trafficking networks pose a challenge that is only now being studied. The pipelines of people trafficking, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering merge into one large stream from Honduras through Mexico.
The threat is not just potential alliances between the drug-fed groups and radical Islamist groups, although that danger is real. It is the that the pipeline is not discriminating at all in what it carries, and most of the products are lethal or potentially so.
It is also worth remembering the havoc these groups wreak in their own country through terrorism-attacks on civilians, kidnappings, murders of journalists, deep political penetration, massive corruption, and measurable distortions in the legitimate economies that make doing real business virtually impossible.
The ripple effects in the consuming countries, from the United States to Europe and Russia, are not insignificant. Corruption, destroyed lives, the economic empowering of the most violent sectors of society, the murders and breakdown in civil order are all pieces of the tab that we continually pay.
But the new front line is clearly Mexico, where the administration of Felipe Calderon has been making important strides. In recognition of this, the Bush administration is asking Congress for hundreds of millions of dollars for a new, massive, counter-drug effort.
Much of it is an attempt to replicate the most successful parts of Plan Colombia (one would hope that safeguards will also be built in to avoid the abuses Plan Colombia has helped engender, but it is not clear that much thought has been given to that.)
The main success in Colombia was creating vetted, monitored, clean police units to tackle the drug cartels and a simultaneous effort to root out the political protectors of the drug cartels. Both processes have been slow, painful and bloody.
In the process it would be worth remembering that virtually every Mexican administration since that of Carlos Salinas (1988-94) has initially vowed to tackle the corruption and terror of the drug cartels, and received hundreds of millions of U.S. tax dollars to do so. Twenty years later the situation is worse than ever.
It could be the Calderon government will have the will to carry out the reforms pioneered in the Colombia police and judiciary. It could be the will to weed out the corruption in the army, the weak link in Colombia still.
But it is not guaranteed that even if Calderon has the political will that the rest of the system will respond. It took years, and many death, in Colombia for significant change to begin. The sooner the clean up process is started, the short it is.
It is worth remembering that the damage done by drug trafficking structures, due to the huge amounts of revenue and violence that they generate, do considerable damage as well. This is not a debate or whether drugs should be legalized, but a recognition that policy is not going to change any time soon, and this is the reality.
In fact, drug traffickers are the only other economic group that can rival the billions of dollars the Saudi government and wealthy Gulf donors but into the infrastructure that supports Islamist terrorism.
Despite the signs of progress in Colombia, the FARC remains a formidable, multi-billion dollar industry with significant ties to criminal and terrorist organizations, from weapons traffickers to the Lebanese expatriate communities that send significant resources to Hezbollah and, to a lesser degree, Hamas.
The FARC's ties to the Central American gangs and weapons trafficking networks pose a challenge that is only now being studied. The pipelines of people trafficking, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering merge into one large stream from Honduras through Mexico.
The threat is not just potential alliances between the drug-fed groups and radical Islamist groups, although that danger is real. It is the that the pipeline is not discriminating at all in what it carries, and most of the products are lethal or potentially so.
It is also worth remembering the havoc these groups wreak in their own country through terrorism-attacks on civilians, kidnappings, murders of journalists, deep political penetration, massive corruption, and measurable distortions in the legitimate economies that make doing real business virtually impossible.
The ripple effects in the consuming countries, from the United States to Europe and Russia, are not insignificant. Corruption, destroyed lives, the economic empowering of the most violent sectors of society, the murders and breakdown in civil order are all pieces of the tab that we continually pay.
But the new front line is clearly Mexico, where the administration of Felipe Calderon has been making important strides. In recognition of this, the Bush administration is asking Congress for hundreds of millions of dollars for a new, massive, counter-drug effort.
Much of it is an attempt to replicate the most successful parts of Plan Colombia (one would hope that safeguards will also be built in to avoid the abuses Plan Colombia has helped engender, but it is not clear that much thought has been given to that.)
The main success in Colombia was creating vetted, monitored, clean police units to tackle the drug cartels and a simultaneous effort to root out the political protectors of the drug cartels. Both processes have been slow, painful and bloody.
In the process it would be worth remembering that virtually every Mexican administration since that of Carlos Salinas (1988-94) has initially vowed to tackle the corruption and terror of the drug cartels, and received hundreds of millions of U.S. tax dollars to do so. Twenty years later the situation is worse than ever.
It could be the Calderon government will have the will to carry out the reforms pioneered in the Colombia police and judiciary. It could be the will to weed out the corruption in the army, the weak link in Colombia still.
But it is not guaranteed that even if Calderon has the political will that the rest of the system will respond. It took years, and many death, in Colombia for significant change to begin. The sooner the clean up process is started, the short it is.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH