Wednesday October 24, 2007
A Long-Term Problem in Need of Immediate Remedy
A story in today's Washington Post mirrors much of what I have heard in recent discussions with military groups, focusing on a problem that will have long-term implications for fighting hot wars, large and small, in the near future.
It is the crisis caused by the exodus of the middle cadre of the officer corps, the captains, majors and LTCs who simply are worn out by the military rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan, see no relief in sight and are dealing with an increasing level of equipment failure and other signs of material fatigue. Not to mention family lives that are sinking.
These are the men and women with combat experience, training and the leadership qualities that will be fighting hot wars, large and small, mostly against radical Islamists, for years to come.
The military has invested tens of thousands of dollars in their training and deployments. They are the ones learning lessons in the current forms of combat, lessons that must be learned and taught in years ahead. The experience is vital, given my baseline supposition that we will be fighting small-scale wars in faraway places on a regular basis. The Gulf of Guinea? Horn of Africa? the Stans (including Pakistan)? All are areas where al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups have vowed to open new fronts in a long war.
They are not leaving for lack of patriotism or lack of respect for the military, and many I have spoken to planned on making the military a 30-year career.
They feel they cannot do so and stay alive, keep their families together and count on the medical care and technical support they feel is vital to do their jobs.
As the article notes, the Army alone faces a shortage of more than 6,000 captains and majors needed to boost the force by 65,000 soldiers by 2010, and it recently began offering unprecedented bonuses of up to $35,000 and other incentives.
That is a large number, and one needs to take into account the need to retain them past that level to maintain a fighting force that is experienced, well-led and capable. Add in the other services, and the size of the problem is obvious. Losing these people in droves is a national crisis.
The cash bonuses are a start, but it is not likely to be enough. Adm. Michael Mullen, the new chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, is highly aware of the size and severity of the problem.
"This is the most combat-hardened force we've had in our history. . . . How do I hang on to all of that combat experience?" he said to the captains. "I don't want to lose that."
_A Vietnam veteran, Mullen vowed to do everything in his power to keep the all-volunteer force from breaking. "I watched the military break in the 1970s," he said. "I'm never going to let that happen again."_
It is not clear what his plan is, but if it is not successful, our national security will be severely impaired.
A first step, which Mullen has taken, is to listen to the men and women in uniform, and take their concerns seriously. I don't know what a long-term, successful strategy for keeping these folks is, but I do know we better find one soon.
It is the crisis caused by the exodus of the middle cadre of the officer corps, the captains, majors and LTCs who simply are worn out by the military rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan, see no relief in sight and are dealing with an increasing level of equipment failure and other signs of material fatigue. Not to mention family lives that are sinking.
These are the men and women with combat experience, training and the leadership qualities that will be fighting hot wars, large and small, mostly against radical Islamists, for years to come.
The military has invested tens of thousands of dollars in their training and deployments. They are the ones learning lessons in the current forms of combat, lessons that must be learned and taught in years ahead. The experience is vital, given my baseline supposition that we will be fighting small-scale wars in faraway places on a regular basis. The Gulf of Guinea? Horn of Africa? the Stans (including Pakistan)? All are areas where al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups have vowed to open new fronts in a long war.
They are not leaving for lack of patriotism or lack of respect for the military, and many I have spoken to planned on making the military a 30-year career.
They feel they cannot do so and stay alive, keep their families together and count on the medical care and technical support they feel is vital to do their jobs.
As the article notes, the Army alone faces a shortage of more than 6,000 captains and majors needed to boost the force by 65,000 soldiers by 2010, and it recently began offering unprecedented bonuses of up to $35,000 and other incentives.
That is a large number, and one needs to take into account the need to retain them past that level to maintain a fighting force that is experienced, well-led and capable. Add in the other services, and the size of the problem is obvious. Losing these people in droves is a national crisis.
The cash bonuses are a start, but it is not likely to be enough. Adm. Michael Mullen, the new chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, is highly aware of the size and severity of the problem.
"This is the most combat-hardened force we've had in our history. . . . How do I hang on to all of that combat experience?" he said to the captains. "I don't want to lose that."
_A Vietnam veteran, Mullen vowed to do everything in his power to keep the all-volunteer force from breaking. "I watched the military break in the 1970s," he said. "I'm never going to let that happen again."_
It is not clear what his plan is, but if it is not successful, our national security will be severely impaired.
A first step, which Mullen has taken, is to listen to the men and women in uniform, and take their concerns seriously. I don't know what a long-term, successful strategy for keeping these folks is, but I do know we better find one soon.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday October 22, 2007
A Hung Jury in the Holy Land Foundation Case
In an ending worthy of a thriller, a Dallas judge today declared a mistrial in the case of the Holy Land Foundation. The government said it would retry the case. One person, Mohammed El-Mezain, was found not guilty of most of the charges against him.
The outcome in the complicated and high-stakes trial, which for the first time publicly laid bare the clandestine inner workings of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, was not unexpected. The NEFA Foundation has a complete, annotated list of the exhibits for viewing.
That, in the absence of a guilty verdict, is the tremendous benefit of this case. After years of obfuscation, smoke blowing, lying and torturing the truth beyond all recognition, the truth of the Muslim Brotherhood activity in this country is now available through primary source documents.
The evidence may, in the eyes of the jury, not show definitive proof of support for terrorist activities. But they do show definitive proof that CAIR, ISNA, ICNA and all the Muslim Brotherhood groups in this country came here with a markedly different purpose from what they claim, and they have gone through decades of deceit to conceal their true identities and purposes.
That alone should discredit them as interlocutors for the Muslim community in this country, a community these groups cannot rightfully claim to represent as there is no evidence to support their statements and their actual membership is a small fraction of those they claim to give voice to.
The jury deliberated 19 days before reaching a verdict. Clearly, there was a lot of discussion and attempts to digest the information in the government's largest terror finance case.
What added drama to the affair was that the sealed verdict given to Judge Joe Fish acquitted most of the defendants of most of the charges. However, when Fish polled the jury after reading the verdict, three of them said they did not agree with the acquittals. After a brief conference, Fish declared a mistrial.
Perhaps the prosecution tried to cram too much information in with a group of jurors largely unfamiliar with anything to do with the case. Perhaps the reliance on the testimony of Israeli intelligence agents was resented. Perhaps wading through the reams of documents with unfamiliar names and places was just overwhelming.
Whatever the reason, the saga will continue, likely for several more years by the time it is all over. In the mean time, many new avenues of research and understanding have been opened up thanks to the new documents now in the public domain.
I hope that, in the next trial, the government will learn from the mistakes of this one. The jury system is what we have and what I believe we should have. If fellow citizens are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, then they must vote their conscience.
In the mean time, I have learned a great deal.
The outcome in the complicated and high-stakes trial, which for the first time publicly laid bare the clandestine inner workings of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, was not unexpected. The NEFA Foundation has a complete, annotated list of the exhibits for viewing.
That, in the absence of a guilty verdict, is the tremendous benefit of this case. After years of obfuscation, smoke blowing, lying and torturing the truth beyond all recognition, the truth of the Muslim Brotherhood activity in this country is now available through primary source documents.
The evidence may, in the eyes of the jury, not show definitive proof of support for terrorist activities. But they do show definitive proof that CAIR, ISNA, ICNA and all the Muslim Brotherhood groups in this country came here with a markedly different purpose from what they claim, and they have gone through decades of deceit to conceal their true identities and purposes.
That alone should discredit them as interlocutors for the Muslim community in this country, a community these groups cannot rightfully claim to represent as there is no evidence to support their statements and their actual membership is a small fraction of those they claim to give voice to.
The jury deliberated 19 days before reaching a verdict. Clearly, there was a lot of discussion and attempts to digest the information in the government's largest terror finance case.
What added drama to the affair was that the sealed verdict given to Judge Joe Fish acquitted most of the defendants of most of the charges. However, when Fish polled the jury after reading the verdict, three of them said they did not agree with the acquittals. After a brief conference, Fish declared a mistrial.
Perhaps the prosecution tried to cram too much information in with a group of jurors largely unfamiliar with anything to do with the case. Perhaps the reliance on the testimony of Israeli intelligence agents was resented. Perhaps wading through the reams of documents with unfamiliar names and places was just overwhelming.
Whatever the reason, the saga will continue, likely for several more years by the time it is all over. In the mean time, many new avenues of research and understanding have been opened up thanks to the new documents now in the public domain.
I hope that, in the next trial, the government will learn from the mistakes of this one. The jury system is what we have and what I believe we should have. If fellow citizens are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, then they must vote their conscience.
In the mean time, I have learned a great deal.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday October 18, 2007
Yousef Qaradawi and the Brotherhood Offer Olive Branch to Shi'ites: Bless Jihad for Iran
Yousef Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood, is reprising his role as mediator between the Sunni and Shi'ite groups. This time he is calling on all Muslims to defend Iran in case of a U.S. attack.
Qaradawi's interview with Islamonline Radio last week highlights the sheikh's role-and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood-in trying to bring about unity of the Muslim umma, regardless of one's affiliation.
"It is obligatory on all Muslims to resist any possible attack the US might launch against Iran," Qaradawi said. "Iran is a Muslim country which all Muslims should defend while the US is an enemy of Islam that has already declared war on Islam under the disguise of war on terrorism and provides Israel with unlimited support."
In the past, the Ikhwan collaborated closely with the regime of Ayatollah Khommeini, according to the accounts of Yousef Nada and other Brotherhood leaders. There was a falling out, but the Brotherhood has consistently maintained that the Sunni-Shi'ite differences are "minor" issues that should not interfere with the larger strategy of restoring the caliphate.
This has been one of the main issues dividing the Brotherhood from many of the _jihadist_ groups, particularly al Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Zarqawi. Zarqawi specifically targetted Shi'ites as apostates and killed them as unbelievers.
Perhaps Qaradawi's position in favor of _jihad_ in Iran was also born of the desire in part to resolve the issues that have consistently placed the Ikhwan on the outer margins of the current Islamist struggle.
In another step that could bolster his standing among more militant members of the Ikhwan and enhance the Brotherhood position among the _jihadists_, Qaradawi also took the unusual step of contradicting the Grand Mufti of Sauid Arabia, who had recently stated that young men should not wage _jihad_ outside of their national borders without permission from their governments. This position was taken at the urging of the United States, in an effort to halt the flow of Saudi men and material support for the insurgency in Iraq.
"When a Muslim country is invaded by some other country, all Muslims who are capable of doing _jihad_ should spare no efforts in defending the invaded country," Qaradawi said. "It is not true that Muslims should not go outside their countries to defend their fellow Muslims unless they get permission from the ruler of their country."
The irony of past U.S. and Saudi support for _jihadists_ was not lost on the cleric.
"Why did governments of Muslim countries allow their young people to go to Afghanistan to defend it against the former Soviet Union? Was it just because they got a green light from the US to do so?" he asked.
Qaradawi's interview with Islamonline Radio last week highlights the sheikh's role-and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood-in trying to bring about unity of the Muslim umma, regardless of one's affiliation.
"It is obligatory on all Muslims to resist any possible attack the US might launch against Iran," Qaradawi said. "Iran is a Muslim country which all Muslims should defend while the US is an enemy of Islam that has already declared war on Islam under the disguise of war on terrorism and provides Israel with unlimited support."
In the past, the Ikhwan collaborated closely with the regime of Ayatollah Khommeini, according to the accounts of Yousef Nada and other Brotherhood leaders. There was a falling out, but the Brotherhood has consistently maintained that the Sunni-Shi'ite differences are "minor" issues that should not interfere with the larger strategy of restoring the caliphate.
This has been one of the main issues dividing the Brotherhood from many of the _jihadist_ groups, particularly al Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Zarqawi. Zarqawi specifically targetted Shi'ites as apostates and killed them as unbelievers.
Perhaps Qaradawi's position in favor of _jihad_ in Iran was also born of the desire in part to resolve the issues that have consistently placed the Ikhwan on the outer margins of the current Islamist struggle.
In another step that could bolster his standing among more militant members of the Ikhwan and enhance the Brotherhood position among the _jihadists_, Qaradawi also took the unusual step of contradicting the Grand Mufti of Sauid Arabia, who had recently stated that young men should not wage _jihad_ outside of their national borders without permission from their governments. This position was taken at the urging of the United States, in an effort to halt the flow of Saudi men and material support for the insurgency in Iraq.
"When a Muslim country is invaded by some other country, all Muslims who are capable of doing _jihad_ should spare no efforts in defending the invaded country," Qaradawi said. "It is not true that Muslims should not go outside their countries to defend their fellow Muslims unless they get permission from the ruler of their country."
The irony of past U.S. and Saudi support for _jihadists_ was not lost on the cleric.
"Why did governments of Muslim countries allow their young people to go to Afghanistan to defend it against the former Soviet Union? Was it just because they got a green light from the US to do so?" he asked.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday October 17, 2007
Thoughts on the Fragmentation of Jihadists in Iraq
My colleague Evan Kohlmann has pointed out the dramatic infighting among the Islamist groups in Iraq. The significance of this willingness to publicly denounce each other and turn on each other is great, and the ability to exploit the current situation will be a major determinant in whether U.S. forces make significant strides in Iraq in coming months.
As my friend James Gordon Meek points out, it is likely much too early to declare victory. The threat remains and these groups have shown a remarkable resilience in the past. The Washington Post looks at the disagreement in the military over what to say about the recent developments.
My experience in dealing with armed groups (mostly Marxist at the time) is that there is almost always a radical core that is unwilling to compromise on anything. This has clearly happened before in Islamist groups, as Kohlmann has documented.
These lethal schisms are usually not recognized by outside forces in time to do anything about them. Now, thanks in part to the Internet, even internal disputes are now aired in a matter of hours or days.
If these lethal disputes can be fanned or encouraged, then these groups are weakened, have less time and resources to focus on the broader enemy, and are much more effective at eliminating each other than outside forces because they know each other's weaknesses and strengths.
The downward spiral of al Qaeda is not so much the product of military blows, according to my sources, but a successful unraveling of some of the financial networks, which have led to a cascading series of links to the activities those groups are funding. This has led to bomb makers, logistics networks, human trafficking networks and other parts of the network.
It has taken several years for U.S. intelligence operatives (led, in this case by the Special Operations Command) to begin putting the pieces together in a way that has seriously undermined the operational capability of the Islamist groups in Iraq. The "follow the money" axiom has been proven true once again.
Yet, one has to be cautious in assessing the long-term impact. These decentralized networks have a remarkable ability to bounce back, especially if the weaknesses and splits are not exploited. The much-heralded death of Zarqawi did not bring the anticipated disintegration of Al Qaeda in Iraq, nor have the other blows been lethal.
If the pressure is not steadily applied these groups, like starfish, simply grow back to their former selves, in different places and with different networks.
It is encouraging to see that the cooler heads have so far prevailed, declining to declare victory in what will be a long war. It is also encouraging to see that SOCOM and others are pushing as hard as possible to keep the pressure on and make rebuilding or reorganizing as difficult as possible.
But the internal fights among the Jihadis is real, and that in itself is a significant step in the right direction.
As my friend James Gordon Meek points out, it is likely much too early to declare victory. The threat remains and these groups have shown a remarkable resilience in the past. The Washington Post looks at the disagreement in the military over what to say about the recent developments.
My experience in dealing with armed groups (mostly Marxist at the time) is that there is almost always a radical core that is unwilling to compromise on anything. This has clearly happened before in Islamist groups, as Kohlmann has documented.
These lethal schisms are usually not recognized by outside forces in time to do anything about them. Now, thanks in part to the Internet, even internal disputes are now aired in a matter of hours or days.
If these lethal disputes can be fanned or encouraged, then these groups are weakened, have less time and resources to focus on the broader enemy, and are much more effective at eliminating each other than outside forces because they know each other's weaknesses and strengths.
The downward spiral of al Qaeda is not so much the product of military blows, according to my sources, but a successful unraveling of some of the financial networks, which have led to a cascading series of links to the activities those groups are funding. This has led to bomb makers, logistics networks, human trafficking networks and other parts of the network.
It has taken several years for U.S. intelligence operatives (led, in this case by the Special Operations Command) to begin putting the pieces together in a way that has seriously undermined the operational capability of the Islamist groups in Iraq. The "follow the money" axiom has been proven true once again.
Yet, one has to be cautious in assessing the long-term impact. These decentralized networks have a remarkable ability to bounce back, especially if the weaknesses and splits are not exploited. The much-heralded death of Zarqawi did not bring the anticipated disintegration of Al Qaeda in Iraq, nor have the other blows been lethal.
If the pressure is not steadily applied these groups, like starfish, simply grow back to their former selves, in different places and with different networks.
It is encouraging to see that the cooler heads have so far prevailed, declining to declare victory in what will be a long war. It is also encouraging to see that SOCOM and others are pushing as hard as possible to keep the pressure on and make rebuilding or reorganizing as difficult as possible.
But the internal fights among the Jihadis is real, and that in itself is a significant step in the right direction.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday October 12, 2007
The Ongoing Mystery of A.Q. Khan's Network
One of the most dangerous unsolved mysteries in the shadow world of terror and counter-terror is the extent of the nuclear network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.
How little the outside world has been able to glean about his operations is clear by the fact that the Pakistani government has refused to let anyone question him, and has allowed him to live in relative luxury despite his proven record of providing nuclear equipment to North Korean, Iran, Libya and possibly others.
All have been or continue to be state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea and Iran, particularly, (Libya has supposedly given up its nuclear arsenal that Khan was providing) are dangerous not only to their neighborhoods, but to the world.
Yet the outside world, including allied intelligence services, have been given no access to Khan since he was placed under house arrest a few years ago. His network has never been dismantled, and that network retains access to nuclear designs and facilities that pose a real danger to the world.
It looks like the hermetic seal around Khan in Pakistan is unlikely to change. Prime minister Shaukat Aziz recently reaffirmed Pakistan's refusal to let anyone except Pakistanis talk to the scientist.
This is clearly a dangerous game. Khan's network stretched around Europe and into South Africa and Dubai. Some of the most prominent actors were put out of business, most only temporarily. Many have never been sidelined at all.
In many ways, what is known about Khan is similar to what is known of Viktor Bout-both appear to be men of mediocre talent in their chosen professions but with uncanny abilities to see the holes in the new world order that can be exploited for profit.
Both used offshore facilities, both used Dubai and the UAE as hubs, and both mastered the art of staying several steps ahead of authorities. And in both cases, intelligence communities in several countries had the men under observation, understood their networks and failed to take action.
While Bout moved weapons and other materiel for different factions Khan was playing with nukes. He is also an Islamist who believes it is his divine duty to arm Islam.
Because of that, and the access to nuclear material, the Khan network remains a danger, even while Khan is comfortably on the sidelines.
How little the outside world has been able to glean about his operations is clear by the fact that the Pakistani government has refused to let anyone question him, and has allowed him to live in relative luxury despite his proven record of providing nuclear equipment to North Korean, Iran, Libya and possibly others.
All have been or continue to be state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea and Iran, particularly, (Libya has supposedly given up its nuclear arsenal that Khan was providing) are dangerous not only to their neighborhoods, but to the world.
Yet the outside world, including allied intelligence services, have been given no access to Khan since he was placed under house arrest a few years ago. His network has never been dismantled, and that network retains access to nuclear designs and facilities that pose a real danger to the world.
It looks like the hermetic seal around Khan in Pakistan is unlikely to change. Prime minister Shaukat Aziz recently reaffirmed Pakistan's refusal to let anyone except Pakistanis talk to the scientist.
This is clearly a dangerous game. Khan's network stretched around Europe and into South Africa and Dubai. Some of the most prominent actors were put out of business, most only temporarily. Many have never been sidelined at all.
In many ways, what is known about Khan is similar to what is known of Viktor Bout-both appear to be men of mediocre talent in their chosen professions but with uncanny abilities to see the holes in the new world order that can be exploited for profit.
Both used offshore facilities, both used Dubai and the UAE as hubs, and both mastered the art of staying several steps ahead of authorities. And in both cases, intelligence communities in several countries had the men under observation, understood their networks and failed to take action.
While Bout moved weapons and other materiel for different factions Khan was playing with nukes. He is also an Islamist who believes it is his divine duty to arm Islam.
Because of that, and the access to nuclear material, the Khan network remains a danger, even while Khan is comfortably on the sidelines.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH