Wednesday October 10, 2007
More on the HLF Exhibits and the Ikhwan in America
While there are signs the deliberations in the case against the Holy Land Foundation are deadlocked, an ongoing review of government exhibits compiled by the NEFA Foundation are the gift that keep on giving in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood's activity in the United States.
Several things stand out in the overall review of the exhibits, which are internal HLF documents, written by the Muslim Brothers themselves. It is not hearsay or impressions, but in their own words, accepted as such by the defense and uncontested when placed in court as exhibits.
One exhibit stands out because it show HLF gave a $5,000 check to CAIR in 1994, just as CAIR was getting founded.
Nothing unusual about that, except that, in September 2003 Congressional testimony CAIR executive director Nihad Awad said that it was "an outright lie" that his organization had received ANY seed money from HLF. He challenged Steve Emerson to produce "even a shred of evidence" that HLF had provided such funds.
To the untrained eye this seems like a rather large, unshredded piece of evidence. Perhaps it wasn't seed money, but full-blown flower money? HLF was unlikely to fund a group it had no relationship with.
Then there is the is the virulently ant-Jewish sentiment, expressed repeatedly.
On the Jewish conspiracy, outlined in an October 1992 internal memo of the IAP, the primary Muslim Brotherhood U.S. organization:
_The struggle is with the Jews who do not constitute a danger to Palestine alone, but a danger to Arabs and Muslims in their homelands, resources, religion, traditions, influence and political entity._
_Due to the Jewish influence in different global nations specially America and Europe, the struggle in Palestine has a degree of entanglement and complexity, or junctions and contradictions between international politics like no other cause in the world._
_Due to this entanglement and complexity, no Arab or Muslim nation or a nation with an impact on international politics has not been affected by this struggle either
negatively or positively._
The same documents links the IAP, later mutated into different Brotherhood organizations, directly to the Muslim Brotherhood.
_These two characteristics make the cause of Palestine a unique cause which requires a unique method and means to manage the struggle as well._
_This is what the Islamic Movement -the Muslim Brotherhood-has realized. Therefore, it paid a special attention to the cause of Palestine and established a special apparatus for it which requires support and assistance from all the Brotherhood's movements._
The second is the organic link that is openly expressed between the Brotherhood and Hamas. This may not be enough to convince a jury that money from HLF went to fund terrorist acts by Hamas, but the clarity of the tie is undeniable.
As the IAP memo points out, along with many other references:
_With the increase of the Intifada and the advance of the Islamic action inside and outside Palestine, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), provided through its activities in resisting
the Zionist occupation a lot of sacrifices from martyrs, detainees, wounded, injured, fugitives and deportees and it was able to prove that it is an original and an effective movement in leading the Palestinian people._
_This Movement - *which was bred in the bosom of the mother movement, "The Muslim Brotherhood"* - restored hope and life to the Muslim nation and the notion that the flare of Jihad has not died out and that the banner of Islamic Jihad is still raised._
This slide exhibit outlines the ties between HLF and Hamas in graphics.
Third, for an organization that is not illegal here, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated groups spent a great deal of energy in trying to hide their true affiliations.
Board members were instructed on secure meeting protocols, classification systems for documents, press communications, sweeping for bugs, strict compartmentalization, etc. Not normal procedures for a charity that is doing solely charitable work.
For an extended look at this secret apparatus, and discussions of how to hide the real identity of the Brotherhood organizations, read: security manual outlining it all. The English begins on page 12.
And fourth, there are many, many family ties among those on trial and Hamas leaders. This is not evidence of guilt, but it seems to me to show a clear pattern of using family members (trusted and loyal) to carry out the Brotherhood's overall objectives.
Here is a slide exhibit that gives the basics.
Several things stand out in the overall review of the exhibits, which are internal HLF documents, written by the Muslim Brothers themselves. It is not hearsay or impressions, but in their own words, accepted as such by the defense and uncontested when placed in court as exhibits.
One exhibit stands out because it show HLF gave a $5,000 check to CAIR in 1994, just as CAIR was getting founded.
Nothing unusual about that, except that, in September 2003 Congressional testimony CAIR executive director Nihad Awad said that it was "an outright lie" that his organization had received ANY seed money from HLF. He challenged Steve Emerson to produce "even a shred of evidence" that HLF had provided such funds.
To the untrained eye this seems like a rather large, unshredded piece of evidence. Perhaps it wasn't seed money, but full-blown flower money? HLF was unlikely to fund a group it had no relationship with.
Then there is the is the virulently ant-Jewish sentiment, expressed repeatedly.
On the Jewish conspiracy, outlined in an October 1992 internal memo of the IAP, the primary Muslim Brotherhood U.S. organization:
_The struggle is with the Jews who do not constitute a danger to Palestine alone, but a danger to Arabs and Muslims in their homelands, resources, religion, traditions, influence and political entity._
_Due to the Jewish influence in different global nations specially America and Europe, the struggle in Palestine has a degree of entanglement and complexity, or junctions and contradictions between international politics like no other cause in the world._
_Due to this entanglement and complexity, no Arab or Muslim nation or a nation with an impact on international politics has not been affected by this struggle either
negatively or positively._
The same documents links the IAP, later mutated into different Brotherhood organizations, directly to the Muslim Brotherhood.
_These two characteristics make the cause of Palestine a unique cause which requires a unique method and means to manage the struggle as well._
_This is what the Islamic Movement -the Muslim Brotherhood-has realized. Therefore, it paid a special attention to the cause of Palestine and established a special apparatus for it which requires support and assistance from all the Brotherhood's movements._
The second is the organic link that is openly expressed between the Brotherhood and Hamas. This may not be enough to convince a jury that money from HLF went to fund terrorist acts by Hamas, but the clarity of the tie is undeniable.
As the IAP memo points out, along with many other references:
_With the increase of the Intifada and the advance of the Islamic action inside and outside Palestine, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), provided through its activities in resisting
the Zionist occupation a lot of sacrifices from martyrs, detainees, wounded, injured, fugitives and deportees and it was able to prove that it is an original and an effective movement in leading the Palestinian people._
_This Movement - *which was bred in the bosom of the mother movement, "The Muslim Brotherhood"* - restored hope and life to the Muslim nation and the notion that the flare of Jihad has not died out and that the banner of Islamic Jihad is still raised._
This slide exhibit outlines the ties between HLF and Hamas in graphics.
Third, for an organization that is not illegal here, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated groups spent a great deal of energy in trying to hide their true affiliations.
Board members were instructed on secure meeting protocols, classification systems for documents, press communications, sweeping for bugs, strict compartmentalization, etc. Not normal procedures for a charity that is doing solely charitable work.
For an extended look at this secret apparatus, and discussions of how to hide the real identity of the Brotherhood organizations, read: security manual outlining it all. The English begins on page 12.
And fourth, there are many, many family ties among those on trial and Hamas leaders. This is not evidence of guilt, but it seems to me to show a clear pattern of using family members (trusted and loyal) to carry out the Brotherhood's overall objectives.
Here is a slide exhibit that gives the basics.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday October 9, 2007
New Bits on Funding for the Holy Land Foundation
The NEFA Foundation has translated a part of a new document from the Dutch government think tank Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-en Documentatie Centrum (Scientific Research and Documentation Center), which has some interesting, if cryptic things to say about the Holy Land Foundation, now on trial in Dallas for allegedly funding terrorist activities by Hamas.
The document,in discussing criminal activities in St. Maarten, a Dutch territory, notes on page 104 that:
"Large amounts of money are being transferred through bank accounts at St. Maarten to these (terrorist) organizations. St Maarten is possibly playing a role in the financing of terrorist organizations, the money is said to come from drug trade and human smuggling. ‘Money is sent from S. Maarten to suspected organizations. XX [name deleted in text] sends large amounts to the Holy Land Foundation. Most of the money probably comes from drug earnings.’ (2004) "
The HLF has denied any ties to terrorist or criminal groups or activities.
The Dutch report further notes that St. Maarten, primarily a Caribbean playground for the rich, could be home to radical Islamist training camps and radical Muslims who are on the American "no-fly" list. The report notes that "There are Arabs on St. Maarten who we know are in contact with extreme radical movements." (p. 105)
The report further notes that companies are remitting large amounts of money to the Arab peninsula, and that the "amounts send to the Middle East are much larger than those companies legally can make."
All intriguing bits that point to the potential danger and possible criminal-terrorist nexus in the Caribbean.
The criminal influence in the Caribbean is, of course, is not new. Billions of dollars from drug trafficking, the trafficking of illegal aliens and other illicit activities wash through the region on an annual basis, benefitting only a few and fueling corruption.
From Trinidad and Tobago to Haiti, Surinam and the Dominican Republic, criminal gangs exercise a great deal of control. The Caribbean coasts of Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico are now virtually narco-territories, where the government exercises little real control.
What is new here is the link made to a U.S. Islamic charity, and other possible ties to radical Islamist terrorist activities. Given the proximity to the United States and the ease with which the borders are breached from the Caribbean, this should be a real concern.
I hope the Dutch government will be forthcoming with more information in the near future, to help fill in some of the large blanks this report leaves.
The document,in discussing criminal activities in St. Maarten, a Dutch territory, notes on page 104 that:
"Large amounts of money are being transferred through bank accounts at St. Maarten to these (terrorist) organizations. St Maarten is possibly playing a role in the financing of terrorist organizations, the money is said to come from drug trade and human smuggling. ‘Money is sent from S. Maarten to suspected organizations. XX [name deleted in text] sends large amounts to the Holy Land Foundation. Most of the money probably comes from drug earnings.’ (2004) "
The HLF has denied any ties to terrorist or criminal groups or activities.
The Dutch report further notes that St. Maarten, primarily a Caribbean playground for the rich, could be home to radical Islamist training camps and radical Muslims who are on the American "no-fly" list. The report notes that "There are Arabs on St. Maarten who we know are in contact with extreme radical movements." (p. 105)
The report further notes that companies are remitting large amounts of money to the Arab peninsula, and that the "amounts send to the Middle East are much larger than those companies legally can make."
All intriguing bits that point to the potential danger and possible criminal-terrorist nexus in the Caribbean.
The criminal influence in the Caribbean is, of course, is not new. Billions of dollars from drug trafficking, the trafficking of illegal aliens and other illicit activities wash through the region on an annual basis, benefitting only a few and fueling corruption.
From Trinidad and Tobago to Haiti, Surinam and the Dominican Republic, criminal gangs exercise a great deal of control. The Caribbean coasts of Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico are now virtually narco-territories, where the government exercises little real control.
What is new here is the link made to a U.S. Islamic charity, and other possible ties to radical Islamist terrorist activities. Given the proximity to the United States and the ease with which the borders are breached from the Caribbean, this should be a real concern.
I hope the Dutch government will be forthcoming with more information in the near future, to help fill in some of the large blanks this report leaves.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday October 8, 2007
Why the Suicide Bomb Network Must be Dismantled
There has been much written recently about the inability to halt young suicide bombers because of their willingness to die for their cause. It is one of the greatest difficulties facing forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But, as the Times of London points out in graphic detail, the bombers are the end product of network of radicalization that includes the religious teachings of respected imams around the world.
It is true that it is virtually impossible to halt the actual suicide bomber on his mission. But there are vulnerabilities in the network that create these human weapons. These areas can be far more easily attacked than the final product.
As Bob Baer, formerly of the CIA, recently wrote,, there is little defense against these "children of death."
As Baer points out, "this is an ideological battle that will be won, or lost, at the local mosque, at the family dinner table or between friends across the Islamic world. Suicide bombing will be defeated not by a gun or a fancy scanner but by the religious principles of Koran itself."
(I am not sure of the final statement, because these principles are not broadly articulated across the Muslim world, but perhaps they could be.)
There are several noteworthy statements in the piece on suicide bombers, in addition to the chill one gets at the thought of the deliberate recruitment of young men to kill themselves in the belief that they are doing Allah's will and that he will reward them generously. Here are a few that highlight the NETWORK aspect of the phenomenon.
_These were no psychopathic loners from the ghetto, but articulate, middle-class men in their twenties and early thirties who had come from good homes and gone to university. One was a newly married accountant._
_Yet all had reached the chilling conclusion that killing "sinners" would transport them to paradise. None had the slightest inkling that they might be exploited by Al-Qaeda and other battle-hardened groups which will probably use these fresh-faced idealists for no higher purpose than to sustain the most brutal sectarian conflict of our age._
_But Abu Ziad’s is no ordinary business. He takes eager volunteers, inveigles them into Iraq for a fee and delivers them to insurgents who consign them to a bloody death with clinical efficiency._
_His network includes the imams who drum up the volunteers and forgers who create new identities for their journey across the 390-mile border with Iraq._
_Then there are the officials he bribes to turn a blind eye, and insurgent groups ranging from the pan-Arab, fundamentalist Al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Iraqi nationalist 1920 Revolution Brigade, started by former members of Saddam’s armed forces._
Imams that drum up volunteers-a key element. One that is often undertaken by mosques associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Europe, and most noticeably in Great Britain.
Forgers almost always operate in networks, with different types of expertise working together. Another choke point.
But there is also evidence we have not learned one of the most basic lessons-radicalization often happens in prison.
_It was in prison that Ahmed first heard about suicide bombing. His interest was stoked by clerics whose fiery sermons the Americans obligingly photocop-ied and distributed without the slightest understanding of their destructive force. Seminars followed on the making of suicide belts, the selection of targets and the timing of attacks._
_By the time Ahmed emerged from jail, he had not only been radicalised but was armed with deadly new skills. Arrested a second time, he tricked his way to freedom by promising to inform on his fellow insurgents. Instead, he presented them with a proposal to carry out the group’s first suicide mission himself._
Any of these chokepoints, from radicalization in mosques to radicalization in prison to cutting off the criminal enterprises that convey the suicide bombers to Iraq, are more efficient that hoping to stop the young person once they are one their way with a vest packed with explosives.
On a personal note, I dealt extensively with child soldiers in West Africa, most who were forcibly recruited, often forced to kill their own parents, then put on drugs that enabled them to carry out unspeakable atrocities.
One woman in Sierra Leone, working with children recovered from the ranks of the rebels said it best: "A child is a child. But whoever led the children astray is responsible and is a monster."
But, as the Times of London points out in graphic detail, the bombers are the end product of network of radicalization that includes the religious teachings of respected imams around the world.
It is true that it is virtually impossible to halt the actual suicide bomber on his mission. But there are vulnerabilities in the network that create these human weapons. These areas can be far more easily attacked than the final product.
As Bob Baer, formerly of the CIA, recently wrote,, there is little defense against these "children of death."
As Baer points out, "this is an ideological battle that will be won, or lost, at the local mosque, at the family dinner table or between friends across the Islamic world. Suicide bombing will be defeated not by a gun or a fancy scanner but by the religious principles of Koran itself."
(I am not sure of the final statement, because these principles are not broadly articulated across the Muslim world, but perhaps they could be.)
There are several noteworthy statements in the piece on suicide bombers, in addition to the chill one gets at the thought of the deliberate recruitment of young men to kill themselves in the belief that they are doing Allah's will and that he will reward them generously. Here are a few that highlight the NETWORK aspect of the phenomenon.
_These were no psychopathic loners from the ghetto, but articulate, middle-class men in their twenties and early thirties who had come from good homes and gone to university. One was a newly married accountant._
_Yet all had reached the chilling conclusion that killing "sinners" would transport them to paradise. None had the slightest inkling that they might be exploited by Al-Qaeda and other battle-hardened groups which will probably use these fresh-faced idealists for no higher purpose than to sustain the most brutal sectarian conflict of our age._
_But Abu Ziad’s is no ordinary business. He takes eager volunteers, inveigles them into Iraq for a fee and delivers them to insurgents who consign them to a bloody death with clinical efficiency._
_His network includes the imams who drum up the volunteers and forgers who create new identities for their journey across the 390-mile border with Iraq._
_Then there are the officials he bribes to turn a blind eye, and insurgent groups ranging from the pan-Arab, fundamentalist Al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Iraqi nationalist 1920 Revolution Brigade, started by former members of Saddam’s armed forces._
Imams that drum up volunteers-a key element. One that is often undertaken by mosques associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Europe, and most noticeably in Great Britain.
Forgers almost always operate in networks, with different types of expertise working together. Another choke point.
But there is also evidence we have not learned one of the most basic lessons-radicalization often happens in prison.
_It was in prison that Ahmed first heard about suicide bombing. His interest was stoked by clerics whose fiery sermons the Americans obligingly photocop-ied and distributed without the slightest understanding of their destructive force. Seminars followed on the making of suicide belts, the selection of targets and the timing of attacks._
_By the time Ahmed emerged from jail, he had not only been radicalised but was armed with deadly new skills. Arrested a second time, he tricked his way to freedom by promising to inform on his fellow insurgents. Instead, he presented them with a proposal to carry out the group’s first suicide mission himself._
Any of these chokepoints, from radicalization in mosques to radicalization in prison to cutting off the criminal enterprises that convey the suicide bombers to Iraq, are more efficient that hoping to stop the young person once they are one their way with a vest packed with explosives.
On a personal note, I dealt extensively with child soldiers in West Africa, most who were forcibly recruited, often forced to kill their own parents, then put on drugs that enabled them to carry out unspeakable atrocities.
One woman in Sierra Leone, working with children recovered from the ranks of the rebels said it best: "A child is a child. But whoever led the children astray is responsible and is a monster."
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday October 5, 2007
Corruption and the War on Terror
The disheartening story in the Washington Post today highlights one of the greatest vulnerabilities in fighting terrorism anywhere in the world-high tolerance for corruption and the disgust this fuels in the populations.
Having covered wars several continents, there has never been an armed conflict where those in rebellion did not have legitimate concerns, anger and frustration over the level of corruption and impunity for the corruption, in the regimes they were fighting.
The apparently rampant corruption in Iraq, mostly stealing U.S. taxpayer money, not only cheats us, but is one of the most helpful elements to all the different insurgencies operating in that country.
Nothing undermines the legitimacy of a government than widespread corruption and the tolerance of corruption by that government's backers. This was true in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, the DRC, Angola, etc. etc. Corruption and impunity from that corruption are cancers that destroy one's allies and strengthens ones enemies.
For terrorist groups to operate against a state in a relatively limited space the group must have some legitimacy in the eyes of the people where they are operating. Nothing fuels the that sense of legitimacy more than knowing that the oil money/foreign aid money/diamond revenue is being siphoned off by a few to the detriment of the many, and the reality that no one is held accountable.
This goes to the heart of the difference between truly failed states and states that operate as criminal enterprises. In the former, little state power exists at all. In the latter, the state is actually quite efficient in extracting revenues, but operate as a profitable criminal enterprise rather than a government.
If the U.S. wants to make real progress in Iraq, as everyone knows, it will not be entirely on the military side. It must come, yes, through political reconciliation. But if that reconciliation is solely a means to redistribute ill-gotten gain, then the insurgencies will be stronger and the government will fall, no matter what the military strategy is.
Having covered wars several continents, there has never been an armed conflict where those in rebellion did not have legitimate concerns, anger and frustration over the level of corruption and impunity for the corruption, in the regimes they were fighting.
The apparently rampant corruption in Iraq, mostly stealing U.S. taxpayer money, not only cheats us, but is one of the most helpful elements to all the different insurgencies operating in that country.
Nothing undermines the legitimacy of a government than widespread corruption and the tolerance of corruption by that government's backers. This was true in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, the DRC, Angola, etc. etc. Corruption and impunity from that corruption are cancers that destroy one's allies and strengthens ones enemies.
For terrorist groups to operate against a state in a relatively limited space the group must have some legitimacy in the eyes of the people where they are operating. Nothing fuels the that sense of legitimacy more than knowing that the oil money/foreign aid money/diamond revenue is being siphoned off by a few to the detriment of the many, and the reality that no one is held accountable.
This goes to the heart of the difference between truly failed states and states that operate as criminal enterprises. In the former, little state power exists at all. In the latter, the state is actually quite efficient in extracting revenues, but operate as a profitable criminal enterprise rather than a government.
If the U.S. wants to make real progress in Iraq, as everyone knows, it will not be entirely on the military side. It must come, yes, through political reconciliation. But if that reconciliation is solely a means to redistribute ill-gotten gain, then the insurgencies will be stronger and the government will fall, no matter what the military strategy is.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday October 2, 2007
A Small Victory in the Drug War?
U.S. drug officials are declaring new progress in the almost-forgotten war on drugs. The price of cocaine is up in major cities for the first time in decades, signaling a possible shortage of drug on the street.
But even drug czar John Walters acknowledges, however, it will only really be progress if the measures can be sustained over time. My guess is that such a reduction will be short lived. I hope I am wrong.
While the "war on drugs" was proclaimed in the late 1980s with almost as much fanfare as the "war on terrorism," it is now only occassionally in the national radar screen. But it is worth remembering the drug wars that ravaged our major cities, threatened the very existence of Colombia as a nation and has cost us tens of billions of dollars.
Those direct and more quantifiable threats have eased, although drug production has not, at least not for significant periods of time. Nor has the narco danger abated in many parts of the world.
While there is little indication that drug trafficking finances Islamist terrorism except perhaps in Afghanistan, the billions of dollars that flow through that economy certainly fuel other terrorist movements around the world, from the paramilitary AUC to the Marxist FARC in Colombia, to gangs in Central America and heroin traffickers across central Asia.
The human cost is tremendous, and the cartels, despite the upbeat talk, control much of Central America, from the coasts of Honduras, to most of Guatemala to the Caribbean shore of Mexico and, of course, much of the border areas.
I have covered drug trafficking up close for 20 years, and recall similar assessments that a significant corner was being turned in combatting the supply side. But like water running down hill, the coke, or money or precursor chemicals may be blocked for a while, but eventually find a way to flow again.
Interdicting the money flows into Mexico and elsewhere delivers the biggest bang for the buck, because the cartels are in it for the money. Take that away and they are really hurt.
The seizure of $200 million in cash in Mexico in March shows the magnitude of the drug problem on several levels.
The first is the vast amounts of money. The $200 million hurts, but it is really a drop in the bucket in the overall drug economy. The second is more worrisome. The meth production and distribution ring involved people from Canada to China in a vast transnational network moving illicit goods.
Those pipelines can be used to move virtually anything, from humans to nuclear components. And here is simply too much money at stake and too many entrenched interests across the board for the flow to stop.
It is encouraging that the new Mexican government seems to be able to take steps that previous governments wouldn't but then, most Mexican governments start off with a bang, only to lose enthusiasm as the cost grows.
U.S. officials are carrying out a record number of corruption investigations on this side of the border too, showing that we have much to do to put our own house in order.
It is interesting to note that Richard Nixon carried out one of the few programs that focused as heavily on demand as it did on supply. It is also interesting to note that during the few years of this experiment, drug use dropped consistently.
Perhaps there is a lesson there. But, after 20 years, it will take more than a momentary rise in the street price of coke to make me think real progress has been made.
But even drug czar John Walters acknowledges, however, it will only really be progress if the measures can be sustained over time. My guess is that such a reduction will be short lived. I hope I am wrong.
While the "war on drugs" was proclaimed in the late 1980s with almost as much fanfare as the "war on terrorism," it is now only occassionally in the national radar screen. But it is worth remembering the drug wars that ravaged our major cities, threatened the very existence of Colombia as a nation and has cost us tens of billions of dollars.
Those direct and more quantifiable threats have eased, although drug production has not, at least not for significant periods of time. Nor has the narco danger abated in many parts of the world.
While there is little indication that drug trafficking finances Islamist terrorism except perhaps in Afghanistan, the billions of dollars that flow through that economy certainly fuel other terrorist movements around the world, from the paramilitary AUC to the Marxist FARC in Colombia, to gangs in Central America and heroin traffickers across central Asia.
The human cost is tremendous, and the cartels, despite the upbeat talk, control much of Central America, from the coasts of Honduras, to most of Guatemala to the Caribbean shore of Mexico and, of course, much of the border areas.
I have covered drug trafficking up close for 20 years, and recall similar assessments that a significant corner was being turned in combatting the supply side. But like water running down hill, the coke, or money or precursor chemicals may be blocked for a while, but eventually find a way to flow again.
Interdicting the money flows into Mexico and elsewhere delivers the biggest bang for the buck, because the cartels are in it for the money. Take that away and they are really hurt.
The seizure of $200 million in cash in Mexico in March shows the magnitude of the drug problem on several levels.
The first is the vast amounts of money. The $200 million hurts, but it is really a drop in the bucket in the overall drug economy. The second is more worrisome. The meth production and distribution ring involved people from Canada to China in a vast transnational network moving illicit goods.
Those pipelines can be used to move virtually anything, from humans to nuclear components. And here is simply too much money at stake and too many entrenched interests across the board for the flow to stop.
It is encouraging that the new Mexican government seems to be able to take steps that previous governments wouldn't but then, most Mexican governments start off with a bang, only to lose enthusiasm as the cost grows.
U.S. officials are carrying out a record number of corruption investigations on this side of the border too, showing that we have much to do to put our own house in order.
It is interesting to note that Richard Nixon carried out one of the few programs that focused as heavily on demand as it did on supply. It is also interesting to note that during the few years of this experiment, drug use dropped consistently.
Perhaps there is a lesson there. But, after 20 years, it will take more than a momentary rise in the street price of coke to make me think real progress has been made.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH