Monday November 30, 2009
The Growing Evidence of the Transcontinental Cocaine Pipeline
One of the disturbing and little noticed events of recent weeks was the crash (or destruction) of a Boeing 727 in the desert of Mali.
The crash is disturbing for many reasons, among them these three: 1) the aircraft was carrying between 2 to 3 tons of cocaine, far more than other, smaller aircraft and boats that have been detected in recent months, indicating an escalation of the trade through the Trans-Sahel region; 2) The region where the aircraft was found, most likely torched by its crew to destroy evidence, in a area of heavy operation of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM); and 3) the aircraft departed from Venezuela, now Latin America's primary transshipment hub from Latin America to West Africa, and source of all the major air shipments of cocaine that have been interdicted in West Africa.
Finally, as the Observer article notes, British, U.S. and French authorities in West Africa have discovered HCL labs, used to make finished cocaine for the European market, as well as capsules and other items for making Meth capsules there, also likely for export to Europe.
All this points to a disturbing set conclusions. One is that the Colombian and Mexican traffickers are feeling sufficiently confident in their ability to move product through West Africa and upping the size of their loads based on that confidence. In testing new routes they always start small, to minimize losses if the route isn't working. Once they are confident they flood the zone. It seems that this is the first indication that the West Africa zone is now being flooded.
Another is that there could be a growing role of at least some branches of al Qaeda or other Islamist terrorist groups now willing to help move or protect the drugs as they move north. The crash indicates the cocaine was not going to be moved to Europe via boats, as it was far inland. The Tuareg and other groups that control the smuggling routes north through the Sahel will be making much more money as they move into the cocaine protection and movement business, much as the FARC in Colombia found itself awash in cash when they did.
Of course this could morph into a much more direct relationship that would fund AQIM and others at a much higher level, although it would also represent a significant change in the way the terrorist organization has traditionally done business. Other religious/political groups have made the jump to fully integrated criminal organizations, so it has to be viewed as a real possibility.
Any significant involvement in the cocaine trade, in turn, will give new strength not only to AQIM and other separatist movements that also percolate in that region of the world, further destabilizing the weak central governments that, in some cases, are already functioning criminal enterprises. The value of smuggling or protecting cocaine far outpaces the traditional cigarette, gasoline or human smuggling enterprises that already flourish.
Another possible conclusion is that the FARC will find new strength in Colombia, given that the designated terrorist organization controls most of the cocaine that moves through Venezuela to West Africa. That, in turn, would mean the war in Colombia is far from over as the FARC will continue to receive the financial resources necessary to maintain itself in some fashion.
Finally, Venezuela under Chávez is a huge part of the problem, not part of any potential solution. The Chávez government seems intent on doing whatever necessary to stay in power in the face of massive corruption, administrative incompetence, growing and costly expansionist programs for the "Bolivarian Revolution," and falling oil production and prices. That means making money wherever and however possible, and the drug trade offers multiple benefits: High profits as a way to mitigate the financial crisis, and a direct bonus to his allies in the FARC.
West Africa is paying a terrible price for recent developments. Given the transcontinental nature of the trade, so are Colombia and Venezuela.
The crash is disturbing for many reasons, among them these three: 1) the aircraft was carrying between 2 to 3 tons of cocaine, far more than other, smaller aircraft and boats that have been detected in recent months, indicating an escalation of the trade through the Trans-Sahel region; 2) The region where the aircraft was found, most likely torched by its crew to destroy evidence, in a area of heavy operation of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM); and 3) the aircraft departed from Venezuela, now Latin America's primary transshipment hub from Latin America to West Africa, and source of all the major air shipments of cocaine that have been interdicted in West Africa.
Finally, as the Observer article notes, British, U.S. and French authorities in West Africa have discovered HCL labs, used to make finished cocaine for the European market, as well as capsules and other items for making Meth capsules there, also likely for export to Europe.
All this points to a disturbing set conclusions. One is that the Colombian and Mexican traffickers are feeling sufficiently confident in their ability to move product through West Africa and upping the size of their loads based on that confidence. In testing new routes they always start small, to minimize losses if the route isn't working. Once they are confident they flood the zone. It seems that this is the first indication that the West Africa zone is now being flooded.
Another is that there could be a growing role of at least some branches of al Qaeda or other Islamist terrorist groups now willing to help move or protect the drugs as they move north. The crash indicates the cocaine was not going to be moved to Europe via boats, as it was far inland. The Tuareg and other groups that control the smuggling routes north through the Sahel will be making much more money as they move into the cocaine protection and movement business, much as the FARC in Colombia found itself awash in cash when they did.
Of course this could morph into a much more direct relationship that would fund AQIM and others at a much higher level, although it would also represent a significant change in the way the terrorist organization has traditionally done business. Other religious/political groups have made the jump to fully integrated criminal organizations, so it has to be viewed as a real possibility.
Any significant involvement in the cocaine trade, in turn, will give new strength not only to AQIM and other separatist movements that also percolate in that region of the world, further destabilizing the weak central governments that, in some cases, are already functioning criminal enterprises. The value of smuggling or protecting cocaine far outpaces the traditional cigarette, gasoline or human smuggling enterprises that already flourish.
Another possible conclusion is that the FARC will find new strength in Colombia, given that the designated terrorist organization controls most of the cocaine that moves through Venezuela to West Africa. That, in turn, would mean the war in Colombia is far from over as the FARC will continue to receive the financial resources necessary to maintain itself in some fashion.
Finally, Venezuela under Chávez is a huge part of the problem, not part of any potential solution. The Chávez government seems intent on doing whatever necessary to stay in power in the face of massive corruption, administrative incompetence, growing and costly expansionist programs for the "Bolivarian Revolution," and falling oil production and prices. That means making money wherever and however possible, and the drug trade offers multiple benefits: High profits as a way to mitigate the financial crisis, and a direct bonus to his allies in the FARC.
West Africa is paying a terrible price for recent developments. Given the transcontinental nature of the trade, so are Colombia and Venezuela.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday November 23, 2009
Chavez, Ahmadinejad, Lula and Latin America
There are times when Hugo Chávez just can't help but let his less appealing side peak out, as he recently did by publicly praising the convicted terrorist Carlos the Jackal, AKA Ilich Sanchez Ramirez during a speech Friday night saying: "I defend him. It doesn't matter to me what they say tomorrow in Europe."
While Chávez has a long history of praising terrorists and sponsoring them, particularly those who hate Israel, he is feeling particularly emboldened because Chávez and his Iranian counterpart and recognized recognized state sponsor of terrorism Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have scored a major victory.
After years of refusing to do so and behaving as a responsible international citizen, Brazil's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has not only sided with Iran on the issue of nuclear power, but has agreed to meet with Ahmadinejad in an embrace Lula says he is honored to host.
Lula should know better than to squander Brazil's new international prestige on such a meeting, and has faced internal protests by his own people who can't stomach Ahmadinejad's racism, hatred, anti-gay, Holocaust-denying views.
But Ahmadinejad's statement that "Iran and Brazil have a common vision about the situation in the world and are determined to develop their cooperation" makes one wonder what Lula is thinking. And Lula did not publicly dispute Ahmadinejad's always-close to the surface hatred of Israel, when the Iranian president added: "If the Brazilian people and the Iranian people are united on issues such as the Zionist regime's cruel attack on the defenceless people of Gaza, this will show a mutual desire for peace."
Many (myself included) had hoped that Lula would use his international and natural stature to stand up to the bullies who are fomenting armed revolutions and terrorism in Latin America like Chávez and his chief strategist, Ahmadinejad.
As a socialist labor leader with strong democratic credentials and the good sense to not try to change the constitution to stay in power indefinitely (a clear lesson to Chávez, Uribe in Colombia, Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador etc. etc.), Lula has been positioned to be a significant counter-weight to the authoritarian, anti-democratic tendencies of his neighbors.
However, he appears to be unwilling to confront Chávez and his Bolivarian allies on the fundamental rule of law questions or the support of armed groups across the continent. Now he appears willing to embrace a significant state sponsor of terrorism by welcoming Ahmadinejad, after being the first head of state to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his fraudulent electoral victory. A pretty sad record in the end.
Chávez, as I have often noted, is closely allied with Iran in part in the hopes of acquiring the capabilities to wage asymmetrical warfare against the United States, a capacity that Iran can provide through Hezbollah. Iran, in turn, wants to have financial institutions to avoid international sanctions and diplomatic ties across Latin America as a way to avoid total international isolation. So far, both sides seem to be benefitting from the alliance.
What is far less explicable is what Brazil could possibly hope to gain by hosting Ahmadinejad. Brazil does have a significant (and unlike Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador) and somewhat transparent commercial relationship with Iran. Lula has also hosted Israel's president with far less fanfare, perhaps in an effort to blunt some of the damage Ahmadinejad's visit will bring.
Lula has placed himself on the side of authoritarian thugs who sponsor terrorist groups. Not an inspiring performance at the end of what could have been a remarkable term in Brazilian history. Rep. Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.), who chairs a House subcommittee on Latin America, told the BBC last week that Brazil's invitation was "a serious mistake." Indeed.
While Chávez has a long history of praising terrorists and sponsoring them, particularly those who hate Israel, he is feeling particularly emboldened because Chávez and his Iranian counterpart and recognized recognized state sponsor of terrorism Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have scored a major victory.
After years of refusing to do so and behaving as a responsible international citizen, Brazil's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has not only sided with Iran on the issue of nuclear power, but has agreed to meet with Ahmadinejad in an embrace Lula says he is honored to host.
Lula should know better than to squander Brazil's new international prestige on such a meeting, and has faced internal protests by his own people who can't stomach Ahmadinejad's racism, hatred, anti-gay, Holocaust-denying views.
But Ahmadinejad's statement that "Iran and Brazil have a common vision about the situation in the world and are determined to develop their cooperation" makes one wonder what Lula is thinking. And Lula did not publicly dispute Ahmadinejad's always-close to the surface hatred of Israel, when the Iranian president added: "If the Brazilian people and the Iranian people are united on issues such as the Zionist regime's cruel attack on the defenceless people of Gaza, this will show a mutual desire for peace."
Many (myself included) had hoped that Lula would use his international and natural stature to stand up to the bullies who are fomenting armed revolutions and terrorism in Latin America like Chávez and his chief strategist, Ahmadinejad.
As a socialist labor leader with strong democratic credentials and the good sense to not try to change the constitution to stay in power indefinitely (a clear lesson to Chávez, Uribe in Colombia, Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador etc. etc.), Lula has been positioned to be a significant counter-weight to the authoritarian, anti-democratic tendencies of his neighbors.
However, he appears to be unwilling to confront Chávez and his Bolivarian allies on the fundamental rule of law questions or the support of armed groups across the continent. Now he appears willing to embrace a significant state sponsor of terrorism by welcoming Ahmadinejad, after being the first head of state to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his fraudulent electoral victory. A pretty sad record in the end.
Chávez, as I have often noted, is closely allied with Iran in part in the hopes of acquiring the capabilities to wage asymmetrical warfare against the United States, a capacity that Iran can provide through Hezbollah. Iran, in turn, wants to have financial institutions to avoid international sanctions and diplomatic ties across Latin America as a way to avoid total international isolation. So far, both sides seem to be benefitting from the alliance.
What is far less explicable is what Brazil could possibly hope to gain by hosting Ahmadinejad. Brazil does have a significant (and unlike Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador) and somewhat transparent commercial relationship with Iran. Lula has also hosted Israel's president with far less fanfare, perhaps in an effort to blunt some of the damage Ahmadinejad's visit will bring.
Lula has placed himself on the side of authoritarian thugs who sponsor terrorist groups. Not an inspiring performance at the end of what could have been a remarkable term in Brazilian history. Rep. Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.), who chairs a House subcommittee on Latin America, told the BBC last week that Brazil's invitation was "a serious mistake." Indeed.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday November 12, 2009
The Afghanistan Conundrum: How to Proceed When Both Sides Are Right?
The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Ikenberry has reportedly raised serious concerns about sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan because of the unreliability of the Karzai government.
Others in the Pentagon and Obama administration feel strongly that nothing can be won on the ground until there are enough troops to do the job properly, if the mission is defined as remaking Afghanistan. They also argue (rightly, I believe) that if Afghanistan were again controlled by the Taliban, al Qaeda would have a safe haven of operation that we would rue, and a public relations and psychological victory that would help revive their cause.
The problem is that both sides are right. I am not an Afghanistan expert, but I have spent years in war zones where the government is viewed as corrupt and illegitimate (including the drug wars in Colombia, and the 1980s conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua and then, West Africa). Without state legitimacy there is no way one can create conditions on the ground for that government to take ownership of any sort of popularly supported programs.
The Karzai government, with its top-down corruption, disdain for action and embrace of massive fraud in an electoral process, appear to embody the worst of all the elements that drive people to take up guns in the first place.
Yet without the necessary resources, the war is lost and the most brutal option available -- hardliners who feel they have achieved the right to govern through military victory -- takes root. The Taliban in their earlier incarnation showed this. Either outcome leaves the U.S. vital interests damaged and the Afghanistan people thrown to the predatory wolves of either side.
The only real option (and it seems to be something Obama personally is asking about and thinking about) is to bypass the central government. A tribal/regional focus, as was initially done in Iraq, is the only way to stand up a fighting force against the Taliban while having a shot a helping to nurture local political and economic progress that brings some sense of legitimacy to the tribal leadership.
Once the security is established, one can move on the education fronts, economic fronts and all the other myriad issues that must be addressed. The draw back is that many of these tribal and sub-tribal groups are extremely conservative and do not share a vision of anything like a society in which women are equals, the education of girls is valued, and the rule of law (rather than the rule of the leader) is valued.
Such a path will also reinforce the tendencies in the nation toward separation and division, rather than create movement toward a unified country under a central government. But until that government is willing to give people something worth fighting for, their legitimacy won't be recognized anyway. The central government, to most in Afghanistan, is an alien and predatory force that has no positive relationship to their lives, and may have many negatives.
Clearly there are no good or easy answers. It seems to me that the local option is by the most viable in the short term. In the longer term, clearly issues of nationhood must be addressed. But Afghanistan won't get there with this government. It is too rotten, too corrupted and too illegitimate to bring anyone into the fold. Bypassing it to work with local leaders, with all the risks, is a better option.
Others in the Pentagon and Obama administration feel strongly that nothing can be won on the ground until there are enough troops to do the job properly, if the mission is defined as remaking Afghanistan. They also argue (rightly, I believe) that if Afghanistan were again controlled by the Taliban, al Qaeda would have a safe haven of operation that we would rue, and a public relations and psychological victory that would help revive their cause.
The problem is that both sides are right. I am not an Afghanistan expert, but I have spent years in war zones where the government is viewed as corrupt and illegitimate (including the drug wars in Colombia, and the 1980s conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua and then, West Africa). Without state legitimacy there is no way one can create conditions on the ground for that government to take ownership of any sort of popularly supported programs.
The Karzai government, with its top-down corruption, disdain for action and embrace of massive fraud in an electoral process, appear to embody the worst of all the elements that drive people to take up guns in the first place.
Yet without the necessary resources, the war is lost and the most brutal option available -- hardliners who feel they have achieved the right to govern through military victory -- takes root. The Taliban in their earlier incarnation showed this. Either outcome leaves the U.S. vital interests damaged and the Afghanistan people thrown to the predatory wolves of either side.
The only real option (and it seems to be something Obama personally is asking about and thinking about) is to bypass the central government. A tribal/regional focus, as was initially done in Iraq, is the only way to stand up a fighting force against the Taliban while having a shot a helping to nurture local political and economic progress that brings some sense of legitimacy to the tribal leadership.
Once the security is established, one can move on the education fronts, economic fronts and all the other myriad issues that must be addressed. The draw back is that many of these tribal and sub-tribal groups are extremely conservative and do not share a vision of anything like a society in which women are equals, the education of girls is valued, and the rule of law (rather than the rule of the leader) is valued.
Such a path will also reinforce the tendencies in the nation toward separation and division, rather than create movement toward a unified country under a central government. But until that government is willing to give people something worth fighting for, their legitimacy won't be recognized anyway. The central government, to most in Afghanistan, is an alien and predatory force that has no positive relationship to their lives, and may have many negatives.
Clearly there are no good or easy answers. It seems to me that the local option is by the most viable in the short term. In the longer term, clearly issues of nationhood must be addressed. But Afghanistan won't get there with this government. It is too rotten, too corrupted and too illegitimate to bring anyone into the fold. Bypassing it to work with local leaders, with all the risks, is a better option.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday November 9, 2009
Venezuela Ramps Up its Border Security and Presses on with Iran
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez is militarizing his border and urging his people to prepare for war, while at the same time lavishing billions of dollars to an essentially parallel government in Nicaragua and announcing yet another summit with Iran's Ahmadinejad.
None of these are good signs, given his creation of militia units that are responsible to solely to him while at the same time moving aggressively, as the International Crisis Group notes, to further shrink the democratic spaces in Venezuela in the face of growing unpopularity and discontent.
At the same time the support for the FARC and ELN (both designated terrorist organizations) is unabated and drug trafficking is booming.
According to the ICG, the Chávez government has progressively abandoned core liberal democracy principles guaranteed under the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights. The executive has increased its power and provoked unrest internally by further politicising the armed forces and the oil sector, as well as exercising mounting influence over the electoral authorities, the legislative organs, the judiciary and other state entities. At the same time, Chávez’s attempts to play a political role in other states in the region are producing discomfort abroad.
The proximate cause of Chávez's attempts to set the region on fire is his deep-held belief that the United States and Colombia (or through Colombia) are preparing to attack him. He seems to sincerely believe, as only true meglomaniacs can, that he is the center of U.S. policy and world policy.
While he may not like the U.S. use of existing bases in Colombia (and many Latin American nations are sympathetic to his view on this), there are few demands for transparency in Venezuela's dealings with Iran, Russia, Libya, the FARC or anything else. It is desirable that external actors in the region be forced into some transparency in their military activities in the region, but that should be across the board.
There are other inconsistencies.
Venezuela's agricultural production is so low that it imports more than two-thirds of its foodstuffs, yet Chávez talks of his relationship with Ahmadinejad in terms of Venezuela providing much needed food products to Iran. When Chávez ordered 10 battalions of troops to the border of Colombia in 2008 it quickly became apparent that his military did not have more than two or three equipped and ready to roll. As the International Crisis Group recently reported, his oil production is in steep decline and the money being used to buy friends abroad, exacerbating his severe social problems at home.
This may help explain El Comandante's insatiable desire to regionalize the conflict, his support for the FARC and tolerance for drug trafficking through Venezuelan national territory. As his own situation deteriorates, he wants to tie his fate to the fate of the continent. To help them all stand together, he has pumped some $7 billion into Nicaragua, where virtually none of it is accounted for, does not pass through congress, is not audited and at under the personal care of Daniel Ortega.
There is little doubt the Colombians can handle whatever Chávez were to dish out militarily. But he is more likely to take a less direct route, given the state of his army. The FARC, ELN and Emerging Criminal organizations are all good proxies to bleed the Colombian efforts to reestablish state control, and have the endless source of revenue in the cocaine trade and other criminal activities.
But that doesn't mean one should not take the clearly-articulated efforts to destabilize the region military lightly. Chávez will do whatever is best for Chávez, and the rest of the region (and hemisphere) need to clearly understand that.
None of these are good signs, given his creation of militia units that are responsible to solely to him while at the same time moving aggressively, as the International Crisis Group notes, to further shrink the democratic spaces in Venezuela in the face of growing unpopularity and discontent.
At the same time the support for the FARC and ELN (both designated terrorist organizations) is unabated and drug trafficking is booming.
According to the ICG, the Chávez government has progressively abandoned core liberal democracy principles guaranteed under the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights. The executive has increased its power and provoked unrest internally by further politicising the armed forces and the oil sector, as well as exercising mounting influence over the electoral authorities, the legislative organs, the judiciary and other state entities. At the same time, Chávez’s attempts to play a political role in other states in the region are producing discomfort abroad.
The proximate cause of Chávez's attempts to set the region on fire is his deep-held belief that the United States and Colombia (or through Colombia) are preparing to attack him. He seems to sincerely believe, as only true meglomaniacs can, that he is the center of U.S. policy and world policy.
While he may not like the U.S. use of existing bases in Colombia (and many Latin American nations are sympathetic to his view on this), there are few demands for transparency in Venezuela's dealings with Iran, Russia, Libya, the FARC or anything else. It is desirable that external actors in the region be forced into some transparency in their military activities in the region, but that should be across the board.
There are other inconsistencies.
Venezuela's agricultural production is so low that it imports more than two-thirds of its foodstuffs, yet Chávez talks of his relationship with Ahmadinejad in terms of Venezuela providing much needed food products to Iran. When Chávez ordered 10 battalions of troops to the border of Colombia in 2008 it quickly became apparent that his military did not have more than two or three equipped and ready to roll. As the International Crisis Group recently reported, his oil production is in steep decline and the money being used to buy friends abroad, exacerbating his severe social problems at home.
This may help explain El Comandante's insatiable desire to regionalize the conflict, his support for the FARC and tolerance for drug trafficking through Venezuelan national territory. As his own situation deteriorates, he wants to tie his fate to the fate of the continent. To help them all stand together, he has pumped some $7 billion into Nicaragua, where virtually none of it is accounted for, does not pass through congress, is not audited and at under the personal care of Daniel Ortega.
There is little doubt the Colombians can handle whatever Chávez were to dish out militarily. But he is more likely to take a less direct route, given the state of his army. The FARC, ELN and Emerging Criminal organizations are all good proxies to bleed the Colombian efforts to reestablish state control, and have the endless source of revenue in the cocaine trade and other criminal activities.
But that doesn't mean one should not take the clearly-articulated efforts to destabilize the region military lightly. Chávez will do whatever is best for Chávez, and the rest of the region (and hemisphere) need to clearly understand that.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday November 3, 2009
The Criminal State vs. Failed States
Today's Washington Post has an interesting article on how the North Korean military is now the primary extractive body of the North Korean establishment, and is, in fact, relatively efficient at extracting natural resources to sell to China and elsewhere.
It is an important piece because it highlights a much broader reality that we have been slow to come to grips with. In almost any index of failed states, North Korea ranks fairly high. But in reality it is not a failed state at all. It retains the capacity to efficiently extract what it (the state) needs for survival. It may not provide basic necessities such as fuel, food, clothing, education, medical service or sewage, but it is efficient at what it sets out to do. And this economic extractive capacity is the key to perpetrating the regimes in power.
The primary danger of these criminal-extractive states (such as Liberia under Charles Taylor, Zimbabwe under Mugabe, Equatorial Guinea under the Obiang clan) is that they offer criminal and terrorist organizations ideal circumstances in which to operate. In fact, these overlapping networks are essential to the survival of the state as criminal syndicate.
Because these states rely on criminal networks for their economic survival (North Korea on counterfeit currency, illicit nuclear technology sales etc.; Charles Taylor on blood diamonds), and terrorist organizations increasingly rely on criminal organizations and activities for funding and facilitation, these states become host organisms to criminal and terrorist parasites.
In fact, these criminal states rely on criminal/terrorist networks to provide the illicit funds that make them viable.
This is what makes them so dangerous. Diplomatic passports from North Korea are recognized around the world, granting the bearer diplomatic immunity, despite the fact that the regime has demonstrably abused the system to engage in criminal activities.
I argue in some of my writings that these criminal states are in many ways more dangerous than the "ungoverned spaces" that have become the topic of much discussion in recent years. While almost every space is, in fact, governed by someone even if it is not the state, the value for training, indoctrination and relatively free movement is indeed valuable. But not nearly as valuable as ongoing access to a state apparatus, no matter how creaky that apparatus is.
The North Koreans control entry and exit points to their country, meaning they can guarantee the safe passage of Iranians or anyone else visiting nuclear facilities. It means they can guarantee the safe passage of nuclear goods and services out of the country with impunity. It is much better to have the state on your side than trying to just bribe or corrupt small parts of it. The risk is much less and the profits more secure.
Taylor granted diplomatic passports to international criminals, and allowed Viktor Bout and other war profiteers to use the Liberian aircraft registry to hide their aircraft. He allowed Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Russian organized crime, Ukranian organized crime, Israeli organized crime and South African organized crime to all operate in Liberia, for the exact same reason North Korea can prosper. He could guarantee that the state, rather than seeking them out to punish them, would in fact protect them.
This characterization of a growing number of states (criminal states) is largely missing from our discussions of terrorism. It needs to be factored in, especially when nuclear armed countries become criminal syndicates.
It is an important piece because it highlights a much broader reality that we have been slow to come to grips with. In almost any index of failed states, North Korea ranks fairly high. But in reality it is not a failed state at all. It retains the capacity to efficiently extract what it (the state) needs for survival. It may not provide basic necessities such as fuel, food, clothing, education, medical service or sewage, but it is efficient at what it sets out to do. And this economic extractive capacity is the key to perpetrating the regimes in power.
The primary danger of these criminal-extractive states (such as Liberia under Charles Taylor, Zimbabwe under Mugabe, Equatorial Guinea under the Obiang clan) is that they offer criminal and terrorist organizations ideal circumstances in which to operate. In fact, these overlapping networks are essential to the survival of the state as criminal syndicate.
Because these states rely on criminal networks for their economic survival (North Korea on counterfeit currency, illicit nuclear technology sales etc.; Charles Taylor on blood diamonds), and terrorist organizations increasingly rely on criminal organizations and activities for funding and facilitation, these states become host organisms to criminal and terrorist parasites.
In fact, these criminal states rely on criminal/terrorist networks to provide the illicit funds that make them viable.
This is what makes them so dangerous. Diplomatic passports from North Korea are recognized around the world, granting the bearer diplomatic immunity, despite the fact that the regime has demonstrably abused the system to engage in criminal activities.
I argue in some of my writings that these criminal states are in many ways more dangerous than the "ungoverned spaces" that have become the topic of much discussion in recent years. While almost every space is, in fact, governed by someone even if it is not the state, the value for training, indoctrination and relatively free movement is indeed valuable. But not nearly as valuable as ongoing access to a state apparatus, no matter how creaky that apparatus is.
The North Koreans control entry and exit points to their country, meaning they can guarantee the safe passage of Iranians or anyone else visiting nuclear facilities. It means they can guarantee the safe passage of nuclear goods and services out of the country with impunity. It is much better to have the state on your side than trying to just bribe or corrupt small parts of it. The risk is much less and the profits more secure.
Taylor granted diplomatic passports to international criminals, and allowed Viktor Bout and other war profiteers to use the Liberian aircraft registry to hide their aircraft. He allowed Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Russian organized crime, Ukranian organized crime, Israeli organized crime and South African organized crime to all operate in Liberia, for the exact same reason North Korea can prosper. He could guarantee that the state, rather than seeking them out to punish them, would in fact protect them.
This characterization of a growing number of states (criminal states) is largely missing from our discussions of terrorism. It needs to be factored in, especially when nuclear armed countries become criminal syndicates.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH