Wednesday June 13, 2007
A Small Step Forward
Well, it seems that after the Department of Justice's decision to name CAIR and ISNA as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land case, the senior leadership at the DOJ has suddenly discovered "scheduling conflicts" that will not allow its leaders to meet the Islamist leader in a planned community outreach program.
The June 27 event, to have been presided over by AG Alberto Gonzalez, is now not being held. A panelist was to have been the vice president of ISNA. Several prominent CAIR members, as well as many of its allies, were to be present.
It seems to me this is the first time the DOJ has had the intestinal fortitude to take a step back away from groups that have pushed their way into the public arena as representatives of the Muslim community while simultaneously having several of its members investigated and indicted by the federal government in terrorism related cases and other cases.
At the same time, it seems that CAIR, which holds itself out as the representative of the Muslim community in the United States, has seen its membership plummet 90 percent since 9-11.
This underscores the weakness of the group's claim to speak for anyone other than a tiny minority of Muslims. With 29,000 members (if that number was accurate) before 9-11, the group has dropped to fewer than 1,700 members. Enough to give anyone pause.
There apparently was a series of heated meetings in DOJ following the public naming of CAIR, ISNA and others as Muslim Brotherhood groups in the Holy Land case, and as unindicted co-conspirators. Some wanted the meeting to go forward anyway, arguing that the outreach was necessary. But they did not carry the day.
The decision to call off the meeting, at least for now, was taken somewhat reluctantly by senior DOJ officials, my sources say, but it was taken none the less.
As I wrote earlier, the naming is not a criminal charge.
What it means is that because the defendants and those listed people/entities communicated about matters within a conspiracy designed to provide material support to Hamas, all of those particular communications are admissible in court as exception to the hearsay rule.
This is important in the case, and something that will likely have broad implications for how the government deals with Islamist groups. Especially if their own members decide to opt out of the groups whose legitimacy is increasingly under fire.
The June 27 event, to have been presided over by AG Alberto Gonzalez, is now not being held. A panelist was to have been the vice president of ISNA. Several prominent CAIR members, as well as many of its allies, were to be present.
It seems to me this is the first time the DOJ has had the intestinal fortitude to take a step back away from groups that have pushed their way into the public arena as representatives of the Muslim community while simultaneously having several of its members investigated and indicted by the federal government in terrorism related cases and other cases.
At the same time, it seems that CAIR, which holds itself out as the representative of the Muslim community in the United States, has seen its membership plummet 90 percent since 9-11.
This underscores the weakness of the group's claim to speak for anyone other than a tiny minority of Muslims. With 29,000 members (if that number was accurate) before 9-11, the group has dropped to fewer than 1,700 members. Enough to give anyone pause.
There apparently was a series of heated meetings in DOJ following the public naming of CAIR, ISNA and others as Muslim Brotherhood groups in the Holy Land case, and as unindicted co-conspirators. Some wanted the meeting to go forward anyway, arguing that the outreach was necessary. But they did not carry the day.
The decision to call off the meeting, at least for now, was taken somewhat reluctantly by senior DOJ officials, my sources say, but it was taken none the less.
As I wrote earlier, the naming is not a criminal charge.
What it means is that because the defendants and those listed people/entities communicated about matters within a conspiracy designed to provide material support to Hamas, all of those particular communications are admissible in court as exception to the hearsay rule.
This is important in the case, and something that will likely have broad implications for how the government deals with Islamist groups. Especially if their own members decide to opt out of the groups whose legitimacy is increasingly under fire.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday June 11, 2007
The Dangerous Game of Alliances
The U.S. military and intelligence community appear to have concluded that the only way to fight the al Qaeda-related groups in Iraq is to enlist the help of Sunni groups hostile to the United States. This is a risky strategy that carries almost as many dangers as it does possibilities.
Having seen efforts to divide radical groups through material inducements (Marxist groups and paramilitary groups in Latin America, primarily), it seems clear that the U.S. will have to offer the Sunnis something tangible to make such an alliance more than a one-night stand where there is deep remorse on all sides almost immediately.
Without a Sunni stake in the long term peaceful existence in Iraq, with the power proportionate to their minority status, but with the ability to be heard and influence national events, the process will turn out, I would bet, worse for all of us.
The question is, to me, if the U.S. arms Sunni groups who are fed up with the violence of the al Qaeda groups, and are willing and able to take them on directly, how does one insure they don't eventually turn that fire back on U.S. troops?
The answer is that the Sunni groups will have to have some stake in the emerging political system of Iraq, something that they don't now feel they have.
Instead, the Shia majority has opened the doors of influence and power to not only their own majority groups in Iraq, but to the radicalized government of Iran.
This is the reason the current strategy has the most to offer in the long term. Iran is the threat that keeps the Saudi, Jordanian and Egyptian elite awake at night. It is the one unifying force that can help Sunnis work together for a viable political presence in Iran, not tied to Islamist violence.
The problem across the board seems to be the unwillingness of the current national government to get past the desire for revenge on Saddam and the Sunnis who supported him and benefitted from his rule.
Such short-sighted political games have cost the country dearly, and do not seem ready to change under the current Iraqi leadership, certainly not without a strong shove from the United States.
Gen. Patreaus, the Congress and the Bush administration seem to finally be willing to deal with this reality, and hence the acceptance of benchmarks, no matter how weak, in the funding process. These give teeth to U.S. threats that aid can and will be cut if behavior is not changed.
This is similar in many ways to the way aid was delivered in El Salvador and Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s. The conditions, for all their controversy, did modify the behavior of the Salvadoran military, the Contras and other actors. It is not a pretty picture, and the conditionality needs to be carefully thought out and implemented, rather than a knee-jerk reaction to obtain an immediate result with little regard for long-term consequences. But it can get results if done right.
The risks are enormous. The Sunni groups intensely dislike the United States and are only willing to form a tactical alliance, at this point, to get rid of the al Qaeda groups, viewed as too willing to kill other Muslims. Once that threat is mitigated, the guns could turn back on the American "allies" in the blink of an eye. The enemy of my enemy becomes simply the enemy again.
Then there is the problem of Sunni militias in all out war with Shia militias, some tied to the national government. What is the U.S. policy going to be then?
It is not a pretty picture with exciting options. Perhaps this is the best available course at this time.
Having seen efforts to divide radical groups through material inducements (Marxist groups and paramilitary groups in Latin America, primarily), it seems clear that the U.S. will have to offer the Sunnis something tangible to make such an alliance more than a one-night stand where there is deep remorse on all sides almost immediately.
Without a Sunni stake in the long term peaceful existence in Iraq, with the power proportionate to their minority status, but with the ability to be heard and influence national events, the process will turn out, I would bet, worse for all of us.
The question is, to me, if the U.S. arms Sunni groups who are fed up with the violence of the al Qaeda groups, and are willing and able to take them on directly, how does one insure they don't eventually turn that fire back on U.S. troops?
The answer is that the Sunni groups will have to have some stake in the emerging political system of Iraq, something that they don't now feel they have.
Instead, the Shia majority has opened the doors of influence and power to not only their own majority groups in Iraq, but to the radicalized government of Iran.
This is the reason the current strategy has the most to offer in the long term. Iran is the threat that keeps the Saudi, Jordanian and Egyptian elite awake at night. It is the one unifying force that can help Sunnis work together for a viable political presence in Iran, not tied to Islamist violence.
The problem across the board seems to be the unwillingness of the current national government to get past the desire for revenge on Saddam and the Sunnis who supported him and benefitted from his rule.
Such short-sighted political games have cost the country dearly, and do not seem ready to change under the current Iraqi leadership, certainly not without a strong shove from the United States.
Gen. Patreaus, the Congress and the Bush administration seem to finally be willing to deal with this reality, and hence the acceptance of benchmarks, no matter how weak, in the funding process. These give teeth to U.S. threats that aid can and will be cut if behavior is not changed.
This is similar in many ways to the way aid was delivered in El Salvador and Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s. The conditions, for all their controversy, did modify the behavior of the Salvadoran military, the Contras and other actors. It is not a pretty picture, and the conditionality needs to be carefully thought out and implemented, rather than a knee-jerk reaction to obtain an immediate result with little regard for long-term consequences. But it can get results if done right.
The risks are enormous. The Sunni groups intensely dislike the United States and are only willing to form a tactical alliance, at this point, to get rid of the al Qaeda groups, viewed as too willing to kill other Muslims. Once that threat is mitigated, the guns could turn back on the American "allies" in the blink of an eye. The enemy of my enemy becomes simply the enemy again.
Then there is the problem of Sunni militias in all out war with Shia militias, some tied to the national government. What is the U.S. policy going to be then?
It is not a pretty picture with exciting options. Perhaps this is the best available course at this time.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday June 8, 2007
With CAIR as Unindicted Co-Conspirator and MB Ties, Will Policy Towar them Change?
How many organizations designated as uninindicted co-conspirators in terrorism-related cases still get invited not only to participate, but to play lead roles in major U.S. government events?
Not many, but there seems to be an exception for the Islamist-Muslim Brotherhood groups, who stand front and center in upcoming Department of Justice events and recent events with the Department of Defense.
It is hard to believe the word has not gotten out in government circles, but maybe is hasn't.
In an event that past largely unnoticed, the U.S. government, in open court filings, for the first time named several of the most prominent Islamist groups in the country, (including CAIR and ISNA) as unindicted co-conspirators in the upcoming prosecutions of those associated with the Holy Land Foundation (itself as specially designated terrorist entity by the U.S. government).
The filing also for the first time identified ISNA, NAIT, and MAYA as part of the U.S. structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. It listed CAIR as a member of the "US Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee."
Being named an unindicted co-conspirator is not an accusation of guilt, but it does have interesting connotations.
The inclusion of any on the list of unindicted co-conspirators means this: because the defendants and those listed people/entities communicated about matters within a conspiracy designed to provide material support to Hamas, all of those particular communications are admissible in court as exception to the hearsay rule.
So it is not insignificant. Nor is the formal link to the Brotherhood. While the MB is not a designated entity, and there is plenty to debate over the wisdom of such an action, it nonetheless clearly espouses a radical Islamist view, particularly on re-establishing the caliphate, rolling back women's rights, depriving non-Muslims of religious rights etc.
These U.S. groups have long denied ties to the Brotherhood. Now the government has formally said otherwise.
With enough people from these organizations in jail and under investigation for terrorism-related activities, the addition of these groups as entities, (as well as numerous individuals affiliated with the organizations named) should be enough to change government policy from one of embracing them as "moderates" to at least extreme caution.
One could reasonably argue for cutting off all contact until the legal implications of their behavior is known.
But this does not appear to be the case. On June 27 the Justice Department is hosting an event titled: "Securing America: Law Enforcement Partnerships with American Muslims, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian Communities."
The keynote speaker? AG Alberto Gonzalez. Panelists include, yes, the vice president of ISNA. Guests include CAIR its its allies, by the dozens.
So, party on. The foxes are in the hen house, the wolves are in sheep's clothing and many other cliches come to mind. This would make a hilarious Monty Python skit if it didn't involve our national security. But it does. And it is not remotely funny.
Not many, but there seems to be an exception for the Islamist-Muslim Brotherhood groups, who stand front and center in upcoming Department of Justice events and recent events with the Department of Defense.
It is hard to believe the word has not gotten out in government circles, but maybe is hasn't.
In an event that past largely unnoticed, the U.S. government, in open court filings, for the first time named several of the most prominent Islamist groups in the country, (including CAIR and ISNA) as unindicted co-conspirators in the upcoming prosecutions of those associated with the Holy Land Foundation (itself as specially designated terrorist entity by the U.S. government).
The filing also for the first time identified ISNA, NAIT, and MAYA as part of the U.S. structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. It listed CAIR as a member of the "US Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee."
Being named an unindicted co-conspirator is not an accusation of guilt, but it does have interesting connotations.
The inclusion of any on the list of unindicted co-conspirators means this: because the defendants and those listed people/entities communicated about matters within a conspiracy designed to provide material support to Hamas, all of those particular communications are admissible in court as exception to the hearsay rule.
So it is not insignificant. Nor is the formal link to the Brotherhood. While the MB is not a designated entity, and there is plenty to debate over the wisdom of such an action, it nonetheless clearly espouses a radical Islamist view, particularly on re-establishing the caliphate, rolling back women's rights, depriving non-Muslims of religious rights etc.
These U.S. groups have long denied ties to the Brotherhood. Now the government has formally said otherwise.
With enough people from these organizations in jail and under investigation for terrorism-related activities, the addition of these groups as entities, (as well as numerous individuals affiliated with the organizations named) should be enough to change government policy from one of embracing them as "moderates" to at least extreme caution.
One could reasonably argue for cutting off all contact until the legal implications of their behavior is known.
But this does not appear to be the case. On June 27 the Justice Department is hosting an event titled: "Securing America: Law Enforcement Partnerships with American Muslims, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian Communities."
The keynote speaker? AG Alberto Gonzalez. Panelists include, yes, the vice president of ISNA. Guests include CAIR its its allies, by the dozens.
So, party on. The foxes are in the hen house, the wolves are in sheep's clothing and many other cliches come to mind. This would make a hilarious Monty Python skit if it didn't involve our national security. But it does. And it is not remotely funny.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday June 6, 2007
Charles Taylor on Trial, Chichakli's Motion is Denied
Former Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, almost unnoticed, made his first non-appearance before the special court that has charged him with 11 counts of crimes against humanity.
Saying he was being railroaded, and having fired his attorney in order to conduct his own defense, Taylor boycotted the trial, but the opening statement by the prosecution was given anyway. It detailed the horrendous atrocities Taylor presided over in the interests of making money.
This trial of Taylor for overseeing mass murder, butchery, rape and abduction (particularly of children), is hugely important for establishing the rule of law not only in Liberia but across Africa. Taylor, who not only abused his own population but aided and abetted Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Russian organized crime, South African organized crime and a host of other inhabitants of the criminal/terrorist underworld, never believed the rule of law should be applied.
Now he is getting the kind of trial he never afforded anyone else. His opponents and those deemed threats, were summarily executed. His proxy army in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), amputated the arms, legs, ears and lips of children as young as 2 years old and raped women over 70 years of age. The trial is to obtain a small measure of justice for the countless victims of his desire for money, diamonds and power.
One of Taylor's facilitators was Viktor Bout, the Russian arms dealer, who, along with his U.S.-Syrian friend and accountant Richard Chichakli, have had their assets frozen by the U.S. Treasury Department.
Chichakli, now in Moscow, has vigorously disputed his designation. On Monday a U.S. District court judge filleted Chichakli in a ruling, denying his motions to dismiss, upholding Treasury's actions and generally leaving Chichakli completely in the cold.
So, the wheels of justice grind slowly, but they may, at least in some cases, lead to a proper end.
Taylor is facing a day he never dreamed would come, confident that his ability to bully, corrupt and murder would protect him. Chichakli, whose favorite tactic is bullying any who deal with his case, can yell his obscenities all he wants, he has lost in court.
These cases are important if one believes the rule of law is important. The impunity with which Taylor and Africa's other Big Men have operated has brought the continent to its knees. Those who facilitate their butchery through weapons sales and other support should likewise be held accountable.
Saying he was being railroaded, and having fired his attorney in order to conduct his own defense, Taylor boycotted the trial, but the opening statement by the prosecution was given anyway. It detailed the horrendous atrocities Taylor presided over in the interests of making money.
This trial of Taylor for overseeing mass murder, butchery, rape and abduction (particularly of children), is hugely important for establishing the rule of law not only in Liberia but across Africa. Taylor, who not only abused his own population but aided and abetted Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Russian organized crime, South African organized crime and a host of other inhabitants of the criminal/terrorist underworld, never believed the rule of law should be applied.
Now he is getting the kind of trial he never afforded anyone else. His opponents and those deemed threats, were summarily executed. His proxy army in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), amputated the arms, legs, ears and lips of children as young as 2 years old and raped women over 70 years of age. The trial is to obtain a small measure of justice for the countless victims of his desire for money, diamonds and power.
One of Taylor's facilitators was Viktor Bout, the Russian arms dealer, who, along with his U.S.-Syrian friend and accountant Richard Chichakli, have had their assets frozen by the U.S. Treasury Department.
Chichakli, now in Moscow, has vigorously disputed his designation. On Monday a U.S. District court judge filleted Chichakli in a ruling, denying his motions to dismiss, upholding Treasury's actions and generally leaving Chichakli completely in the cold.
So, the wheels of justice grind slowly, but they may, at least in some cases, lead to a proper end.
Taylor is facing a day he never dreamed would come, confident that his ability to bully, corrupt and murder would protect him. Chichakli, whose favorite tactic is bullying any who deal with his case, can yell his obscenities all he wants, he has lost in court.
These cases are important if one believes the rule of law is important. The impunity with which Taylor and Africa's other Big Men have operated has brought the continent to its knees. Those who facilitate their butchery through weapons sales and other support should likewise be held accountable.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday June 4, 2007
The Possible Threat from Latin America
Earlier this year I wrote a paper for the International Assessment and Strategy Center on the Islamist threat from Latin America. What I found, after spending decades in Latin America, was startling, because of the clear focus both Hezbollah and Sunni groups funded by Saudi Arabia have placed on the continent.
There are now mosques and multiple web sites in countries with virtually no Muslim population (Bolivia, Peru), and extremely active sites in countries with small populations (Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana). These are somewhat separate from the Sunni websites that operate in Brazil and Argentina, where there are significant Muslim populations.
Not only is there an extensive network of websites linking to Hezbollah-related groups around the continent for communication and reinforcement of the message, there are pockets of radicalization with members frequently linked to organized criminal structures that reach deep into the United States, Europe and Africa.
To me, the primary concern is a combination of factors, in part facilitated by the close ties of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua:
Plots such as that of bombing JFK airport can come to fruition because of the mixture of Hezbollah training and intelligence guidance under the protection of states; access to sophisticated weaponry from the FARC and other rebel groups in the northern tier of South America, again with the protection of states, primarily Venezuela; clear, easy access to our borders through the normal _coyote_ routes through Central America; the ability to move people and materiel by the Central American _maras_, or gangs, that now have franchise operations in more than 30 states in the United States.
These gangs are particularly troublesome because they control the primary commodity Central America has to offer criminal and terrorist networks-the pipeline to move things (people, stolen cars, cocaine, weapons etc.). The pipeline is efficient and moves both ways, offering those who can pay entry and egress from the United States with ease.
Nicaragua and Venezuela can offer legitimate travel documents to whomever the government wants. If for some reason that is more difficult, Guyana, Surinam and many other countries offer their passports for a song. Guyana is especially notorious for this, and it is interesting to note that several of the West African criminal organizations I studied also did business in Guyana.
Some countries, like Liberia and Sierra Leone, offered criminal and terrorist organizations lucrative commodities such as diamonds and timber. Central American gangs, in alliance with drug traffickers, control an equally-lucrative but harder to quantify commodity, which is the route itself.
We are largely unused to looking at criminal and terrorist structures in this light. But to me the over-riding threat from Latin America is not just the few radicalized individuals or groups that may grow up. It is the possible alliance with the commodity brokers-the gangs and drug traffickers that control the movement of illicit goods-with radical groups to penetrate our borders.
Another part of this is the FARC's widespread and easy access to the most sophisticated weaponry available. With hundreds of millions of dollars a year to spend on upgrading their arsenals in recent years-supplemented by the $4.3 billion Chavez has publicly acknowledged spending on weapons in the past two years (yes, that is a correct figure, more than China or India has spent), it is not hard to see where the capability of carrying out lethal attacks can come from.
We tend to look at numbers of potential radicalized Muslims as our favorite metric for judging a threat. I would argue that this is likely to leave us looking too long in the wrong places.
There are now mosques and multiple web sites in countries with virtually no Muslim population (Bolivia, Peru), and extremely active sites in countries with small populations (Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana). These are somewhat separate from the Sunni websites that operate in Brazil and Argentina, where there are significant Muslim populations.
Not only is there an extensive network of websites linking to Hezbollah-related groups around the continent for communication and reinforcement of the message, there are pockets of radicalization with members frequently linked to organized criminal structures that reach deep into the United States, Europe and Africa.
To me, the primary concern is a combination of factors, in part facilitated by the close ties of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua:
Plots such as that of bombing JFK airport can come to fruition because of the mixture of Hezbollah training and intelligence guidance under the protection of states; access to sophisticated weaponry from the FARC and other rebel groups in the northern tier of South America, again with the protection of states, primarily Venezuela; clear, easy access to our borders through the normal _coyote_ routes through Central America; the ability to move people and materiel by the Central American _maras_, or gangs, that now have franchise operations in more than 30 states in the United States.
These gangs are particularly troublesome because they control the primary commodity Central America has to offer criminal and terrorist networks-the pipeline to move things (people, stolen cars, cocaine, weapons etc.). The pipeline is efficient and moves both ways, offering those who can pay entry and egress from the United States with ease.
Nicaragua and Venezuela can offer legitimate travel documents to whomever the government wants. If for some reason that is more difficult, Guyana, Surinam and many other countries offer their passports for a song. Guyana is especially notorious for this, and it is interesting to note that several of the West African criminal organizations I studied also did business in Guyana.
Some countries, like Liberia and Sierra Leone, offered criminal and terrorist organizations lucrative commodities such as diamonds and timber. Central American gangs, in alliance with drug traffickers, control an equally-lucrative but harder to quantify commodity, which is the route itself.
We are largely unused to looking at criminal and terrorist structures in this light. But to me the over-riding threat from Latin America is not just the few radicalized individuals or groups that may grow up. It is the possible alliance with the commodity brokers-the gangs and drug traffickers that control the movement of illicit goods-with radical groups to penetrate our borders.
Another part of this is the FARC's widespread and easy access to the most sophisticated weaponry available. With hundreds of millions of dollars a year to spend on upgrading their arsenals in recent years-supplemented by the $4.3 billion Chavez has publicly acknowledged spending on weapons in the past two years (yes, that is a correct figure, more than China or India has spent), it is not hard to see where the capability of carrying out lethal attacks can come from.
We tend to look at numbers of potential radicalized Muslims as our favorite metric for judging a threat. I would argue that this is likely to leave us looking too long in the wrong places.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH