Friday June 1, 2007
A Potential Glimmer of Hope in Iraq
I am not optimistic about Iraq. But there a few glimmers that make me think that, for reasons that have little to do directly with U.S. policy, the situation, at least as far as al Qaeda-related groups go, may improve.
The most important is the apparent new willingness of Sunni groups to confront al Qaeda without U.S. assistance.
The reports of fighting in western Baghdad between Sunni groups and al Qaeda-linked groups, as well as a turn against al Qaeda by some of the tribal leaders in Anbar province show that the _jihadist_ inability to compromise on any issue, while a great motivating factor and recruitment tool, cuts both ways.
Eventually, one kills to many of one's own, alienating many potential allies. My first contact with this was with the FMLN in El Salvador. A rebel leader in San Vicente began executing everyone he suspected of being ideologically deviant, then all who might become traitors to the cause.
By the end, more than 250 people had been executed and the FMLN had to assassinate the commander. But the cost was that the rebels lost hold in the region and never regained it. The fragile popular trust was gone.
It seems from a bit of a distance that the unwillingness or inability of the al Qaeda-led factions to build and maintain long-term coalitions is one of their greatest potential weaknesses. The indiscriminate deaths from suicide bombings and IED has taken its toll, as has the pursuit of the al Qaeda-affiliated forces, in the form of heavy losses and insecurity in areas where the _jihadists_ operate.
No matter how well they operate in the environment, they need local support or, at a minimum, local passivity to their presence.
When the fear and hatred of the _jihadists_ reaches the point where people, under difficult circumstances, are willing to pick up weapons and kill them, a serious tipping point has been reached.
As described, the attacks on the _jihadists_ were fairly sophisticated, using an IED to blow up al Qaeda members who came to paint over anti-al Qaeda graffiti. This shows a knowledge of the enemy and an ability to accurately predict their movements.
The best thing the U.S. forces can do is stay out of the way unless specifically asked to help. As one Sunni told the Washington Post, "But if the Americans interfere, it will blow up, because they are the enemy of us both, and we will unite against them and stop fighting each other."
This may not sound like a policy, but it is worth considering. Yes, the alliance with the Anbar chiefs is backing one private army against another. At this point, the major difference is that one private army poses a strategic threat to us and the other, at least at this time, does not.
Given the extremely limited options in making any progress in Iraq, this may be the most viable. These groups are unlikely to align with the Shia majority (and Iran), and can be a counterweight to Shia militias. And they do not want to spread _jihad_ to the rest of the world.
I am not saying they are allies or don't want to kill us. The Sunni groups seem intent on fighting the U.S. presence. But their vantage point seems more like that of a classic insurgency rather than a religious _jihad_, and therefore open to different types of solutions.
This leads to a second development, the possibility of arranging a U.S.-brokered ceasefire among different factions of insurgents, those not linked to al Qaeda.
"We are talking about cease-fires, and maybe signing some things that say they won't conduct operations against the government of Iraq or against coalition forces," Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno said from Camp Victory in Baghdad. "We believe a large majority of groups within Iraq are reconcilable and are now interested in engaging with us. But more importantly, they want to engage and become a part of the government of Iraq."
That sounds optimistic to me, but I am not on the ground. If up to 80 percent of the insurgent groups want to negotiate, as Odierno says, and most of the rest are al Qaeda-linked groups the population is turning on, there could be the basis for significant lessening of violence.
So far that lessening is not at all evident, and it may be wishful thinking that ceasefires can be brokered. Or maybe people are tired enough of the slaughter to be looking for a way out.
Hardly the establishment of democracy or utopia, but perhaps better than an al Qaeda victory.
The most important is the apparent new willingness of Sunni groups to confront al Qaeda without U.S. assistance.
The reports of fighting in western Baghdad between Sunni groups and al Qaeda-linked groups, as well as a turn against al Qaeda by some of the tribal leaders in Anbar province show that the _jihadist_ inability to compromise on any issue, while a great motivating factor and recruitment tool, cuts both ways.
Eventually, one kills to many of one's own, alienating many potential allies. My first contact with this was with the FMLN in El Salvador. A rebel leader in San Vicente began executing everyone he suspected of being ideologically deviant, then all who might become traitors to the cause.
By the end, more than 250 people had been executed and the FMLN had to assassinate the commander. But the cost was that the rebels lost hold in the region and never regained it. The fragile popular trust was gone.
It seems from a bit of a distance that the unwillingness or inability of the al Qaeda-led factions to build and maintain long-term coalitions is one of their greatest potential weaknesses. The indiscriminate deaths from suicide bombings and IED has taken its toll, as has the pursuit of the al Qaeda-affiliated forces, in the form of heavy losses and insecurity in areas where the _jihadists_ operate.
No matter how well they operate in the environment, they need local support or, at a minimum, local passivity to their presence.
When the fear and hatred of the _jihadists_ reaches the point where people, under difficult circumstances, are willing to pick up weapons and kill them, a serious tipping point has been reached.
As described, the attacks on the _jihadists_ were fairly sophisticated, using an IED to blow up al Qaeda members who came to paint over anti-al Qaeda graffiti. This shows a knowledge of the enemy and an ability to accurately predict their movements.
The best thing the U.S. forces can do is stay out of the way unless specifically asked to help. As one Sunni told the Washington Post, "But if the Americans interfere, it will blow up, because they are the enemy of us both, and we will unite against them and stop fighting each other."
This may not sound like a policy, but it is worth considering. Yes, the alliance with the Anbar chiefs is backing one private army against another. At this point, the major difference is that one private army poses a strategic threat to us and the other, at least at this time, does not.
Given the extremely limited options in making any progress in Iraq, this may be the most viable. These groups are unlikely to align with the Shia majority (and Iran), and can be a counterweight to Shia militias. And they do not want to spread _jihad_ to the rest of the world.
I am not saying they are allies or don't want to kill us. The Sunni groups seem intent on fighting the U.S. presence. But their vantage point seems more like that of a classic insurgency rather than a religious _jihad_, and therefore open to different types of solutions.
This leads to a second development, the possibility of arranging a U.S.-brokered ceasefire among different factions of insurgents, those not linked to al Qaeda.
"We are talking about cease-fires, and maybe signing some things that say they won't conduct operations against the government of Iraq or against coalition forces," Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno said from Camp Victory in Baghdad. "We believe a large majority of groups within Iraq are reconcilable and are now interested in engaging with us. But more importantly, they want to engage and become a part of the government of Iraq."
That sounds optimistic to me, but I am not on the ground. If up to 80 percent of the insurgent groups want to negotiate, as Odierno says, and most of the rest are al Qaeda-linked groups the population is turning on, there could be the basis for significant lessening of violence.
So far that lessening is not at all evident, and it may be wishful thinking that ceasefires can be brokered. Or maybe people are tired enough of the slaughter to be looking for a way out.
Hardly the establishment of democracy or utopia, but perhaps better than an al Qaeda victory.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday May 30, 2007
A Welcome Victory for Freedom of Expression and Thought
Today brings the welcome news that the Islamic Society of Boston has folded its cards in the middle of the discovery process, and dropped its defamation lawsuit against Steve Emerson's Investigative Project and several Boston-area news organizations.
Like CAIR and other groups before it who have brought law suits primarily aimed at silencing their critics through legal intimidation, the ISB found that, unlike Saudi Arabia and other Wahhabist/Salafist societies, there are still some principles underlying U.S. law that make bullying more difficult, whether the name of Allah is invoked or not.
It is an expensive proposition to defend oneself against the harassment lawsuits of the Islamists, and they have clearly figured that out. The threat of lawsuits, or real lawsuits that are frivolous in nature but costly to defend against, have become one of the new, favorite weapons of these groups.
Unfortunately, there is some effect. People get tired of the cost and the hassle and simply shut up.
Not so this time, where the IP and media outlets launched an aggressive and ultimately completely successful counterattack. The Islamist groups are used to bullying their way into the political dialogue, corridors of power and the media. They don't like push back. Every time it has come the groups have walked away because to proceed their true ties would be placed under public scrutiny, not something any of those groups want.
If history in these cases is any guide, the possible financial ties of the ISB and the mosque to individuals in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf were not something they wanted disclosed in open court or entering the public record.
The root of the suit, filed in 2005, was the IP and media coverage of the building of the largest mosque on the East Coast by the ISB. Turns out the investigations turned up some interesting relationships to convicted terrorist financiers, hate-spouters and other such types to the ISB and the proposed mosque.
The ISB sued for defamation when the information became public. They will get not one penny or a retraction from anyone.
Maybe the ISB did not like to be reminded that convicted al Qaeda and Hamas financier Aburahman Alamoudi was a founder. Maybe they had a hard time with the promotional video Sheikh Youseff al Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood's chief theologian and justifier of suicide bombings, made on behalf of the ISB mosque. Or maybe that he appeared on the organization's list of directors. (A clerical mistake, according to ISB).
Maybe they didn't like having to turn over financial records that could show extensive financial gifts from the Arab Peninsula while claiming to be largely funded by the Islamic community in the United States.
In the end, it doesn't matter. What matters is that the frivolous attempt at intimidation did not succeed.
"The ISB's abandonment of all of its claims against citizens and against journalists for not one dollar speaks volumes about the validity of the concerns expressed by the citizens and the accuracy of the articles published about the ISB,"
said Jeffrey Robbins , a lawyer for The David Project, one of the defendants.
Boston Herald Publisher Patrick J. Purcell issued a statement saying the newspaper's coverage was "detailed, well-researched, quality journalism."
"The First Amendment protects the rights of journalists to gather and disseminate news and today's dismissal of the lawsuits brought by the Islamic Society of Boston and others reinforces our conviction that we must stand fast against any erosion of the inherent right to report on important issues," Purcell said in the statement.
Like CAIR and other groups before it who have brought law suits primarily aimed at silencing their critics through legal intimidation, the ISB found that, unlike Saudi Arabia and other Wahhabist/Salafist societies, there are still some principles underlying U.S. law that make bullying more difficult, whether the name of Allah is invoked or not.
It is an expensive proposition to defend oneself against the harassment lawsuits of the Islamists, and they have clearly figured that out. The threat of lawsuits, or real lawsuits that are frivolous in nature but costly to defend against, have become one of the new, favorite weapons of these groups.
Unfortunately, there is some effect. People get tired of the cost and the hassle and simply shut up.
Not so this time, where the IP and media outlets launched an aggressive and ultimately completely successful counterattack. The Islamist groups are used to bullying their way into the political dialogue, corridors of power and the media. They don't like push back. Every time it has come the groups have walked away because to proceed their true ties would be placed under public scrutiny, not something any of those groups want.
If history in these cases is any guide, the possible financial ties of the ISB and the mosque to individuals in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf were not something they wanted disclosed in open court or entering the public record.
The root of the suit, filed in 2005, was the IP and media coverage of the building of the largest mosque on the East Coast by the ISB. Turns out the investigations turned up some interesting relationships to convicted terrorist financiers, hate-spouters and other such types to the ISB and the proposed mosque.
The ISB sued for defamation when the information became public. They will get not one penny or a retraction from anyone.
Maybe the ISB did not like to be reminded that convicted al Qaeda and Hamas financier Aburahman Alamoudi was a founder. Maybe they had a hard time with the promotional video Sheikh Youseff al Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood's chief theologian and justifier of suicide bombings, made on behalf of the ISB mosque. Or maybe that he appeared on the organization's list of directors. (A clerical mistake, according to ISB).
Maybe they didn't like having to turn over financial records that could show extensive financial gifts from the Arab Peninsula while claiming to be largely funded by the Islamic community in the United States.
In the end, it doesn't matter. What matters is that the frivolous attempt at intimidation did not succeed.
"The ISB's abandonment of all of its claims against citizens and against journalists for not one dollar speaks volumes about the validity of the concerns expressed by the citizens and the accuracy of the articles published about the ISB,"
said Jeffrey Robbins , a lawyer for The David Project, one of the defendants.
Boston Herald Publisher Patrick J. Purcell issued a statement saying the newspaper's coverage was "detailed, well-researched, quality journalism."
"The First Amendment protects the rights of journalists to gather and disseminate news and today's dismissal of the lawsuits brought by the Islamic Society of Boston and others reinforces our conviction that we must stand fast against any erosion of the inherent right to report on important issues," Purcell said in the statement.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday May 29, 2007
What is Missing in the Sudan Sanctions
The Treasury Department sanctions on Sudan announced today are an important and long-overdue effort to ratchet up pressure on the Islamist government of that nation to halt the genocide aimed at cleansing the non-Muslim population from Darfur.
The sanctions, part of the much-anticipated and delayed Plan B, target three individuals and 30 companies, cutting them off from doing business through the U.S. banking system and making it illegal for U.S. companies or individuals to do any business with them.
The sanctions were promised last month, only to be postponed at the request of the United Nations, which, despite Sudan's years of reneging on promises, thought the Bashir regime might actually keep its word and stop the murder.
But there is one huge hole in the sanctions regime announced today by President Bush. It is that none of the 30 companies targeted by OFAC in the Treasury Department touch businesses used by the Chinese government to prop up the murderous Sudanese regime.
That is part of the real economic underpinning of the regime, abetted by a Chinese government that cannot see any rationale for imposing conditions on its investments, especially in the energy sector. As a result, China aid and investment has become one of the most corrosive forces on the African continent, a free and almost unlimited supplies of cash for dictators, thugs and murderous regimes.
There are some significant hits on the list, despite appeals that went on to the very end to weaken the sanctions even further by arguing Sudan was helping in the war on terror.
The OFAC actions at least send a stronger message that those responsible for the genocide are known and can be named. In real life, it is difficult to imagine that the targeted individuals-Ahmad Muhammad Harun (minister for humanitarian affairs); Awad ibn Auf (head of military intelligence and security); and Khalil Ibrahim (former rebel leader) have any accounts in the U.S. banking system.
The most significant potential target is Sudatel, the national telecommunications company. This would be particularly effective if the EU decided to join the sanctions regime on Sudan, as by its nature the telecommunications networks deal with the United States and Europe.
Another interesting target is Azza Air Transport Company, an obscure company using Soviet-bloc aircraft to deliver "small arms, ammunition and artillery to Sudanese government forces and the Janjaweed militia in Darfur."
President Bush took an appropriately harsh tone in announcing the sanctions, capturing the Sudanese intransigent stance in stating that:
"Unfortunately, he (Bashir) hasn't met those obligations. President Bashir's actions over the past few weeks follow a long pattern of promising cooperation while finding new methods for obstruction.
"One day after I spoke they bombed a meeting of rebel commanders designed to discuss a possible peace deal with the government.
"In the following weeks he used his army and government- sponsored militias to attack rebels and civilians in south Darfur. He's taken no steps to disarm these militias in the year since the Darfur peace agreement was signed. Senior officials continue to oppose the deployment of the U.N. peacekeeping force.
"The result is that the dire security situation on the ground in Darfur has not changed. And so, today, at my instruction, the United States is taking the steps I announced in April."
The tragedy is that it has taken years to reach the point of beginning to take action against a regime whose direct participation in genocide has been widely documented and officially denounced. Bashir et al must know they have several more years to run before the next shoe drops. And that is a tragedy for the people of Darfur and beyond.
The sanctions, part of the much-anticipated and delayed Plan B, target three individuals and 30 companies, cutting them off from doing business through the U.S. banking system and making it illegal for U.S. companies or individuals to do any business with them.
The sanctions were promised last month, only to be postponed at the request of the United Nations, which, despite Sudan's years of reneging on promises, thought the Bashir regime might actually keep its word and stop the murder.
But there is one huge hole in the sanctions regime announced today by President Bush. It is that none of the 30 companies targeted by OFAC in the Treasury Department touch businesses used by the Chinese government to prop up the murderous Sudanese regime.
That is part of the real economic underpinning of the regime, abetted by a Chinese government that cannot see any rationale for imposing conditions on its investments, especially in the energy sector. As a result, China aid and investment has become one of the most corrosive forces on the African continent, a free and almost unlimited supplies of cash for dictators, thugs and murderous regimes.
There are some significant hits on the list, despite appeals that went on to the very end to weaken the sanctions even further by arguing Sudan was helping in the war on terror.
The OFAC actions at least send a stronger message that those responsible for the genocide are known and can be named. In real life, it is difficult to imagine that the targeted individuals-Ahmad Muhammad Harun (minister for humanitarian affairs); Awad ibn Auf (head of military intelligence and security); and Khalil Ibrahim (former rebel leader) have any accounts in the U.S. banking system.
The most significant potential target is Sudatel, the national telecommunications company. This would be particularly effective if the EU decided to join the sanctions regime on Sudan, as by its nature the telecommunications networks deal with the United States and Europe.
Another interesting target is Azza Air Transport Company, an obscure company using Soviet-bloc aircraft to deliver "small arms, ammunition and artillery to Sudanese government forces and the Janjaweed militia in Darfur."
President Bush took an appropriately harsh tone in announcing the sanctions, capturing the Sudanese intransigent stance in stating that:
"Unfortunately, he (Bashir) hasn't met those obligations. President Bashir's actions over the past few weeks follow a long pattern of promising cooperation while finding new methods for obstruction.
"One day after I spoke they bombed a meeting of rebel commanders designed to discuss a possible peace deal with the government.
"In the following weeks he used his army and government- sponsored militias to attack rebels and civilians in south Darfur. He's taken no steps to disarm these militias in the year since the Darfur peace agreement was signed. Senior officials continue to oppose the deployment of the U.N. peacekeeping force.
"The result is that the dire security situation on the ground in Darfur has not changed. And so, today, at my instruction, the United States is taking the steps I announced in April."
The tragedy is that it has taken years to reach the point of beginning to take action against a regime whose direct participation in genocide has been widely documented and officially denounced. Bashir et al must know they have several more years to run before the next shoe drops. And that is a tragedy for the people of Darfur and beyond.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday May 25, 2007
The Looming Confrontation
The panorama of Islamist violence and activism that is surging in several places in the world is not encouraging:
The deteriorating situation in Lebanon, where al Qaeda threatens to retaliate if the Lebanese army attacks Fatah al Islam in the refugee camp; the emergence itself of Fatah al Islam, a Sunni/Salafist group operational in Lebanon;
Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'ite cleric in Iraq, re-emerges after months of silence, to give a fiery sermon denouncing the United States and fanning the flames of Shi'ite violence.
In the Palestinian territories, Hamas is again encouraging suicide bombings in Israel and launching daily missile attacks, while waging a parallel war against the secular Fatah government.
In Afghanistan, a new al Qaeda leader is named, perhaps signaling a new version of the core al Qaeda leadership that is emerging (what Peter Bergen would call al Qaeda 3.0)
There is one interesting thing to remember in this panorama, however. Ultimately, as both Shi'ite and Sunni groups grow more confident in their ability to impose a solution by force, their desire to kill each other will likely come to the fore, pitting them against each other and inflicting more damage than the United States could ever hope to do.
One of the few advantages the non-Muslim world has in the current war is that the ideology and theology of hate preached by both the most radical elements in the Shi'ite and Salafist is so exclusive that they will eventually feel the need to heed the command to kill each other as infidels.
One retired former senior CIA official recently described this as akin to the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War. What ultimately allowed for the fall of Communism was the inability of the two major Communist powers to get past their differences, no matter how petty and obscure those ideological difference appeared to the outside world.
So it is in violent Islamist theological wars. Killing fellow Muslims over a disagreement over who should have led the religion centuries ago strikes many of us outside the religion as still killing people over the papal successions in the Middle Ages. But it is very real to those involved.
This was perhaps among the great contribution of Sayyed Qutb, the theology of being able declare other Muslims _takfir_ or an apostate. As an apostate, one is a legitimate target for divine sanction, including execution.
Iran, through Moqtada al-Sadr and multiple other channels, seeks to create a Shi'ite state in Iraq. Iran, although far behind the Chinese, is trying to invest in Shi'ite outreach programs in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.
It was the establishment of a Shi'ite theocratic state in Iran in 1979 that triggered Saudi Arabia's massive global _wahhabist_ campaign. Iran was seen (and is still seen) as a mortal enemy of the Sunni _salafist/wahhabist_ theology. The fear of Iranian/Shi'ite expansion is a major driving force in Middle Eastern politics now.
At the same time, al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly spoken against Shi'ites as apostates. There have been tactical alliances and Iran still protects some senior al Qaeda officials, but that should not be confused with love or friendship. To many in the al Qaeda camp, the Shi'ites are a dangerous enemy. The debate has not been over whether to kill Shi'ites, but whether one should first get rid of the "far enemy" in the United States or the "near enemy" in the form of the corrupted Islamist government in Saudi Arabia.
But make no mistake. Ultimately the _wahhabists_ view the Shi'ites as _takfir_, who must be wiped out or brought into submission. The Shi'ite theocrats feel the same way about the Sunni. This close-minded religious hatred may weaken the movement that, writ large, wants to destroy us. Perhaps they will destroy each other instead.
The deteriorating situation in Lebanon, where al Qaeda threatens to retaliate if the Lebanese army attacks Fatah al Islam in the refugee camp; the emergence itself of Fatah al Islam, a Sunni/Salafist group operational in Lebanon;
Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'ite cleric in Iraq, re-emerges after months of silence, to give a fiery sermon denouncing the United States and fanning the flames of Shi'ite violence.
In the Palestinian territories, Hamas is again encouraging suicide bombings in Israel and launching daily missile attacks, while waging a parallel war against the secular Fatah government.
In Afghanistan, a new al Qaeda leader is named, perhaps signaling a new version of the core al Qaeda leadership that is emerging (what Peter Bergen would call al Qaeda 3.0)
There is one interesting thing to remember in this panorama, however. Ultimately, as both Shi'ite and Sunni groups grow more confident in their ability to impose a solution by force, their desire to kill each other will likely come to the fore, pitting them against each other and inflicting more damage than the United States could ever hope to do.
One of the few advantages the non-Muslim world has in the current war is that the ideology and theology of hate preached by both the most radical elements in the Shi'ite and Salafist is so exclusive that they will eventually feel the need to heed the command to kill each other as infidels.
One retired former senior CIA official recently described this as akin to the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War. What ultimately allowed for the fall of Communism was the inability of the two major Communist powers to get past their differences, no matter how petty and obscure those ideological difference appeared to the outside world.
So it is in violent Islamist theological wars. Killing fellow Muslims over a disagreement over who should have led the religion centuries ago strikes many of us outside the religion as still killing people over the papal successions in the Middle Ages. But it is very real to those involved.
This was perhaps among the great contribution of Sayyed Qutb, the theology of being able declare other Muslims _takfir_ or an apostate. As an apostate, one is a legitimate target for divine sanction, including execution.
Iran, through Moqtada al-Sadr and multiple other channels, seeks to create a Shi'ite state in Iraq. Iran, although far behind the Chinese, is trying to invest in Shi'ite outreach programs in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.
It was the establishment of a Shi'ite theocratic state in Iran in 1979 that triggered Saudi Arabia's massive global _wahhabist_ campaign. Iran was seen (and is still seen) as a mortal enemy of the Sunni _salafist/wahhabist_ theology. The fear of Iranian/Shi'ite expansion is a major driving force in Middle Eastern politics now.
At the same time, al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly spoken against Shi'ites as apostates. There have been tactical alliances and Iran still protects some senior al Qaeda officials, but that should not be confused with love or friendship. To many in the al Qaeda camp, the Shi'ites are a dangerous enemy. The debate has not been over whether to kill Shi'ites, but whether one should first get rid of the "far enemy" in the United States or the "near enemy" in the form of the corrupted Islamist government in Saudi Arabia.
But make no mistake. Ultimately the _wahhabists_ view the Shi'ites as _takfir_, who must be wiped out or brought into submission. The Shi'ite theocrats feel the same way about the Sunni. This close-minded religious hatred may weaken the movement that, writ large, wants to destroy us. Perhaps they will destroy each other instead.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday May 23, 2007
A Look At the Polls, Some Good News, Some Not
The recently released Pew poll of Muslims living in the United States has come up with some interesting numbers that are both heartening and scary.
One of the finding, not related to the content of the poll, is that the Muslim population is about 2.35 million. This should help push back with the numbers that CAIR and other groups have been using to justify their demands for special treatment.
CAIR and others in its orbit throw around numbers double or triple the Pew findings, with no accounting of the methodology of how their figures are arrived at, and it is good to have a solid response to that part of their ongoing campaign.
The good news, as noted by the Washington Post and others, is that the Muslim community, unlike those of much of Europe, are assimilated and generally feel positively toward the the United States.
Much has been written about the percentage of young Muslims who believe suicide bombing is acceptable at least under some circumstances.
To me, a more alarming number is the 47 percent of those surveyed who viewed themselves as Muslims first, then Americans or other nationalities. This is far from the 81 percent who feel the same way in Britain and the 69 percent who feel that way in Spain. But still, it is almost half of the population.
I am not disturbed that they may not like American policies and would work within the system to change it. I am not disturbed that they are not deeply nationalistic, particularly given that 65 percent were not born in this country.
What does disturb me is that almost half of those surveyed view their first allegiance to a creed that calls clearly for the implementation of _sharia_ law and the dissolution of the secular state, making the government in essence a theocracy.
We have seen what fun that is, from Afghanistan under the Taliban to Iran today, and seems to me to be fundamentally at odds with the concept of a secular state in which all religions are treated equally and with respect.
Perhaps if one were to ask born-again Christians or other fundamentalist groups if they were Christians or whatever the religious belief is, first or Americans, they would answer the same way, I don't know.
It is also alarming to me that the younger generation, rather than becoming more integrated into their surrounding society, are measurably less tolerant and more radicalized than the older generations. This seems to me intuitively to be a function of what the younger generation is hearing in the mosques and through their religious training.
Clearly it is not what they get at home, where the older people tend to be more integrated and less radicalized. Outside of the home and the mosque, it is hard to imagine where this new generation is getting its orientation.
So the question is, who owns most of the mosques, and has taken them over in the past decade or so, and radically changed the teachings and worship patterns across America? Perhaps...NAIT, ISNA, CAIR and the Saudi religious materials that now dominate?
But the dangers of this conceptualization can be seen in the story of Islamabad's oldest mosque, now in the hands of radicals.
A small group took over the mosque, changed the teachings to radical _wahhabist_ doctrines embraced by the Taliban, and is now holding a part of the city essentially hostage.
We are fortunate that our system has worked better than most to absorb different groups. But the groups have to want to assimilate, as well. So far, things have gone better than most other places. But the voices for Islamist separatism are gaining some ground, and that should concern us all.
One of the finding, not related to the content of the poll, is that the Muslim population is about 2.35 million. This should help push back with the numbers that CAIR and other groups have been using to justify their demands for special treatment.
CAIR and others in its orbit throw around numbers double or triple the Pew findings, with no accounting of the methodology of how their figures are arrived at, and it is good to have a solid response to that part of their ongoing campaign.
The good news, as noted by the Washington Post and others, is that the Muslim community, unlike those of much of Europe, are assimilated and generally feel positively toward the the United States.
Much has been written about the percentage of young Muslims who believe suicide bombing is acceptable at least under some circumstances.
To me, a more alarming number is the 47 percent of those surveyed who viewed themselves as Muslims first, then Americans or other nationalities. This is far from the 81 percent who feel the same way in Britain and the 69 percent who feel that way in Spain. But still, it is almost half of the population.
I am not disturbed that they may not like American policies and would work within the system to change it. I am not disturbed that they are not deeply nationalistic, particularly given that 65 percent were not born in this country.
What does disturb me is that almost half of those surveyed view their first allegiance to a creed that calls clearly for the implementation of _sharia_ law and the dissolution of the secular state, making the government in essence a theocracy.
We have seen what fun that is, from Afghanistan under the Taliban to Iran today, and seems to me to be fundamentally at odds with the concept of a secular state in which all religions are treated equally and with respect.
Perhaps if one were to ask born-again Christians or other fundamentalist groups if they were Christians or whatever the religious belief is, first or Americans, they would answer the same way, I don't know.
It is also alarming to me that the younger generation, rather than becoming more integrated into their surrounding society, are measurably less tolerant and more radicalized than the older generations. This seems to me intuitively to be a function of what the younger generation is hearing in the mosques and through their religious training.
Clearly it is not what they get at home, where the older people tend to be more integrated and less radicalized. Outside of the home and the mosque, it is hard to imagine where this new generation is getting its orientation.
So the question is, who owns most of the mosques, and has taken them over in the past decade or so, and radically changed the teachings and worship patterns across America? Perhaps...NAIT, ISNA, CAIR and the Saudi religious materials that now dominate?
But the dangers of this conceptualization can be seen in the story of Islamabad's oldest mosque, now in the hands of radicals.
A small group took over the mosque, changed the teachings to radical _wahhabist_ doctrines embraced by the Taliban, and is now holding a part of the city essentially hostage.
We are fortunate that our system has worked better than most to absorb different groups. But the groups have to want to assimilate, as well. So far, things have gone better than most other places. But the voices for Islamist separatism are gaining some ground, and that should concern us all.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH