Monday May 21, 2007
The Shifting Balance in the al Qaeda/Salafist Structure
The Los Angeles Times has a story laying out what my sources have been saying for some time: The al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq are now in a more dominant position within the overall al Qaeda structure, in part because of the Iraq organization's ability to generate funds.
While there are still foreign fighters in the Afghan-Pakistan region, most foreign combatant are choosing Iraq for their combat experience. The Afghanistan conflict is dominated by the Taliban, and there is tension between the Arab fighters and the resurgent Pashtun-dominated group.
This is in part because the Taliban remains focused on its local conflict rather than global _jihad_ objectives. The Taliban is not overly welcoming of outsiders, with many feeling they lost their control of Afghanistan because of al Qaeda.
Yes, the groups are still willing to protect bin Laden, Zawahiri et al, out of loyalty and the recognition that their capture would be a blow, at least psychologically, to the entire range of _jihadist_ movements. As a result, the bin Laden/Zawahiri trail appears to have gone completely cold.
In contrast, the Iraq-based al Qaeda groups are the vanguard of the violent international _jihadist_ movement that is directly fighting American troops in a battle that has attracted the eyes of the world.
As a result, the Iraqi movements are drawing the financial backing of supporters across the Gulf as well as the new recruits. Financial backers like visible results, and Iraq is where there is a bigger bang for the buck, so to speak.
As I have noted previously, this ability to attract the best and brightest recruits, as well as cash, is also causing tension with the international Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Europe.
The more politically-oriented Brotherhood, intent on establishing political enclaves and pushing an Islamist political agenda, is often losing the recruitment battle to groups who can promise combat experience in Iraq and a chance to kill infidels.
This income of the Iraqi groups may be supplemented by other criminal activities such as kidnappings and robberies, although there is no consensus on how engaged the al Qaeda forces are in this.
This shift has far-reaching implications, some of which were touched on by my friend Jonathan Winer.
I would add that this shift, given the fluidity of movement and technology transfers among the _jihadist_ groups will favor the strategy of starting many different wars and small, semi-autonomous, radicalized groups, as opposed to large-scale, mass attacks.
That would hold true unless one of the emerging groups decided to shoot to the top of the "branding game" as Winer outlines by trying something spectacular. This could change the _jihadi_ landscape quickly and radically.
Within the past six years the Salafist/jihadi movement has gone through several interations that show how flexible and adaptable the global movement is. The question is whether we are anywhere near being able to keep up.
While there are still foreign fighters in the Afghan-Pakistan region, most foreign combatant are choosing Iraq for their combat experience. The Afghanistan conflict is dominated by the Taliban, and there is tension between the Arab fighters and the resurgent Pashtun-dominated group.
This is in part because the Taliban remains focused on its local conflict rather than global _jihad_ objectives. The Taliban is not overly welcoming of outsiders, with many feeling they lost their control of Afghanistan because of al Qaeda.
Yes, the groups are still willing to protect bin Laden, Zawahiri et al, out of loyalty and the recognition that their capture would be a blow, at least psychologically, to the entire range of _jihadist_ movements. As a result, the bin Laden/Zawahiri trail appears to have gone completely cold.
In contrast, the Iraq-based al Qaeda groups are the vanguard of the violent international _jihadist_ movement that is directly fighting American troops in a battle that has attracted the eyes of the world.
As a result, the Iraqi movements are drawing the financial backing of supporters across the Gulf as well as the new recruits. Financial backers like visible results, and Iraq is where there is a bigger bang for the buck, so to speak.
As I have noted previously, this ability to attract the best and brightest recruits, as well as cash, is also causing tension with the international Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Europe.
The more politically-oriented Brotherhood, intent on establishing political enclaves and pushing an Islamist political agenda, is often losing the recruitment battle to groups who can promise combat experience in Iraq and a chance to kill infidels.
This income of the Iraqi groups may be supplemented by other criminal activities such as kidnappings and robberies, although there is no consensus on how engaged the al Qaeda forces are in this.
This shift has far-reaching implications, some of which were touched on by my friend Jonathan Winer.
I would add that this shift, given the fluidity of movement and technology transfers among the _jihadist_ groups will favor the strategy of starting many different wars and small, semi-autonomous, radicalized groups, as opposed to large-scale, mass attacks.
That would hold true unless one of the emerging groups decided to shoot to the top of the "branding game" as Winer outlines by trying something spectacular. This could change the _jihadi_ landscape quickly and radically.
Within the past six years the Salafist/jihadi movement has gone through several interations that show how flexible and adaptable the global movement is. The question is whether we are anywhere near being able to keep up.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday May 18, 2007
A Reprise on Sheikh al-Qaradawi
It is always interesting to me to see what the supposed "moderates" with whom so many want an "interfaith dialogue" really have to say, in their own words, to their preferred audiences.
Because we are largely unable to grasp the concept of _taqiyya_ or spiritually-sanctioned deception of unbelievers, we always seem shocked when things and people are not what they appear on the Islamist side.
Yet it happens every day. The statements below have appeared, in varying forms, by Sheikh al Qaradawi and others, but I find it useful to remind myself of what we are really dealing with in the case of the Brotherhood and its attempt to straddle two worlds-the West through denial and deception campaigns, and its base of Islamists with a far different message than what we usually hear.
Thanks to the Middle East Media Research Institute's TV Monitoring Project, we have the tape and translation of Youseff al Qaradawi,-the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and revered cleric in the Islamist movements-at his most comfortable, speaking on Qatar TV on Feb. 25, 2006.
This is not a marginal man on a speaking to the fringes. His books, sermons and interviews abound on the Brotherhood's official sites. By his own admission, he turned down the Brotherhood's top job , that of chairman. His TV call in shows and televised sermons are extremely popular in the Middle East, as are his online comments.
.
Let's go to the tape, as it directly relates to the physical, earthly Caliphate and the conflict in the Middle East:
"They must not allow anyone to take a single piece of land away from Islam. That is what we are fighting the Jews for...Our religion commands us, we are fighting in the name of religion, in the name of Islam, which makes this jihad an individual duty in which the entire nation takes part, and whoever is killed in this (Jihad) is a martyr. That is why I ruled that martyrdom operations are permitted, because he commits martyrdom for the sake of Allah and sacrifices his soul for the sake of Allah."
Perhaps those who have written and said it was not clear the Sheikh endorsed suicide bombing would reconsider. And those who seem to deliberately leave him out of their discussion of the Brotherhood do so, it is pretty clear why they do. But that is only the beginning.
Al Qaradawi gets to the heart of the matter in his sermon, Islam and war a little later. Again, to the tape:
"We do not disassociate Islam from war. On the contrary, disassociating Islam from war is the reason for our defeat. We are fighting in the name of Islam. Religion must lead to war. This is the only way we can win."
No further comment necessary.
Because we are largely unable to grasp the concept of _taqiyya_ or spiritually-sanctioned deception of unbelievers, we always seem shocked when things and people are not what they appear on the Islamist side.
Yet it happens every day. The statements below have appeared, in varying forms, by Sheikh al Qaradawi and others, but I find it useful to remind myself of what we are really dealing with in the case of the Brotherhood and its attempt to straddle two worlds-the West through denial and deception campaigns, and its base of Islamists with a far different message than what we usually hear.
Thanks to the Middle East Media Research Institute's TV Monitoring Project, we have the tape and translation of Youseff al Qaradawi,-the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and revered cleric in the Islamist movements-at his most comfortable, speaking on Qatar TV on Feb. 25, 2006.
This is not a marginal man on a speaking to the fringes. His books, sermons and interviews abound on the Brotherhood's official sites. By his own admission, he turned down the Brotherhood's top job , that of chairman. His TV call in shows and televised sermons are extremely popular in the Middle East, as are his online comments.
.
Let's go to the tape, as it directly relates to the physical, earthly Caliphate and the conflict in the Middle East:
"They must not allow anyone to take a single piece of land away from Islam. That is what we are fighting the Jews for...Our religion commands us, we are fighting in the name of religion, in the name of Islam, which makes this jihad an individual duty in which the entire nation takes part, and whoever is killed in this (Jihad) is a martyr. That is why I ruled that martyrdom operations are permitted, because he commits martyrdom for the sake of Allah and sacrifices his soul for the sake of Allah."
Perhaps those who have written and said it was not clear the Sheikh endorsed suicide bombing would reconsider. And those who seem to deliberately leave him out of their discussion of the Brotherhood do so, it is pretty clear why they do. But that is only the beginning.
Al Qaradawi gets to the heart of the matter in his sermon, Islam and war a little later. Again, to the tape:
"We do not disassociate Islam from war. On the contrary, disassociating Islam from war is the reason for our defeat. We are fighting in the name of Islam. Religion must lead to war. This is the only way we can win."
No further comment necessary.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday May 16, 2007
Colombia's Mounting Troubles
Things are going from bad to worse in Colombia at a time when we can ill afford further exposure on the southern flank. As the Washington Post reports today, the reform of the police and military is far from completed.
President Alvaro Uribe, locked in a costly and protracted war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has failed to adequately gauge the dangers posed by the paramilitary groups on the other side. They are just as brutal and perhaps even more involved in cocaine trafficking than the FARC. (To its credit, the Bush administration has declared both the FARC and Self Defense groups terrorist organizations).
Uribe's inability to confront the paramilitary groups, initially formed to fight the FARC and other Marxist-led rebel groups, has been a disaster for his government, and could well turn into a disaster for his neighbors and the United States as well.
The consequences will be severe, particularly for "Plan Colombia." The Congress will cut or condition aid, and the tolerance of Colombia's political class for the paramilitary groups and their money will mean that little true reform will come, at least not quickly. That could kill the Congressional tolerance for spending close to a billion dollars a year on a plan that is running out of steam.
The conditionality of aid is often useful, and there is no doubt that the Uribe government set itself up for much of the current difficulties it faces. Uribe appears to have learned little from the bloody experiences of fighting the drug cartels, where jailed leaders routinely directed their organizations from prison, bought politicians and engaged in endless negotiating tactics and false truces with the government.
The paramilitary groups are using all the same tactics, with the same result-a grotesque undermining of the Colombian state's authority and the consequent delegitimization of the state itself in the eyes of many Colombians.
This is a clear danger to the Colombian state. But the broader strategic danger to the United States, it seems to me, remains the FARC, and their protector in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez.
The threat stems in part from Chavez's ability to broker mutually-beneficial contacts between the FARC and Hezbollah operatives in the region. As a joint NBC/Telemundo investigation shows, Hezbollah is well organized and well financed in much of the Triborder area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil.
What it does not note is how widespread Hezbollah's cyper presence and fund raising activities are across much of South America, where the presence in relatively new. See my IASC paper paper for more in depth discussion of this issue
There seems to be some modest hope. The new Colombian police commander, Oscar Naranjo, is an old friend of mine and one of the best in his business. Like Jose Serrano, who stepped in at a crucial time in fighting the cartels and met his historic challenge, Naranjo brings the honesty and courage necessary to fight the cancer inside the government while keeping an careful eye on the broader picture.
The police and military would rather take the fight to the FARC, and when they do, they have had some success. It is to Uribe's shame that he has allowed the paramilitary mess to flourish to the degree that it threatens to undermine all of the hard-won progress of recent years.
President Alvaro Uribe, locked in a costly and protracted war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has failed to adequately gauge the dangers posed by the paramilitary groups on the other side. They are just as brutal and perhaps even more involved in cocaine trafficking than the FARC. (To its credit, the Bush administration has declared both the FARC and Self Defense groups terrorist organizations).
Uribe's inability to confront the paramilitary groups, initially formed to fight the FARC and other Marxist-led rebel groups, has been a disaster for his government, and could well turn into a disaster for his neighbors and the United States as well.
The consequences will be severe, particularly for "Plan Colombia." The Congress will cut or condition aid, and the tolerance of Colombia's political class for the paramilitary groups and their money will mean that little true reform will come, at least not quickly. That could kill the Congressional tolerance for spending close to a billion dollars a year on a plan that is running out of steam.
The conditionality of aid is often useful, and there is no doubt that the Uribe government set itself up for much of the current difficulties it faces. Uribe appears to have learned little from the bloody experiences of fighting the drug cartels, where jailed leaders routinely directed their organizations from prison, bought politicians and engaged in endless negotiating tactics and false truces with the government.
The paramilitary groups are using all the same tactics, with the same result-a grotesque undermining of the Colombian state's authority and the consequent delegitimization of the state itself in the eyes of many Colombians.
This is a clear danger to the Colombian state. But the broader strategic danger to the United States, it seems to me, remains the FARC, and their protector in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez.
The threat stems in part from Chavez's ability to broker mutually-beneficial contacts between the FARC and Hezbollah operatives in the region. As a joint NBC/Telemundo investigation shows, Hezbollah is well organized and well financed in much of the Triborder area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil.
What it does not note is how widespread Hezbollah's cyper presence and fund raising activities are across much of South America, where the presence in relatively new. See my IASC paper paper for more in depth discussion of this issue
There seems to be some modest hope. The new Colombian police commander, Oscar Naranjo, is an old friend of mine and one of the best in his business. Like Jose Serrano, who stepped in at a crucial time in fighting the cartels and met his historic challenge, Naranjo brings the honesty and courage necessary to fight the cancer inside the government while keeping an careful eye on the broader picture.
The police and military would rather take the fight to the FARC, and when they do, they have had some success. It is to Uribe's shame that he has allowed the paramilitary mess to flourish to the degree that it threatens to undermine all of the hard-won progress of recent years.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday May 14, 2007
Once Again, the Caliphate
The Times of London notes the increasing importance the al Qaeda-affiliated groups on Iraq are placing on establishing a militant Islamist state in the Sunni regions of Iraq.
My colleague Evan Kohlmann has a translation of a leader of al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, where an important theme is, again, the conquest of specific territory in order to establish the beginnings of God's kingdom on earth.
These two fragments are but a small sampling of the growing, overt emphasis that the _jihadists_ place on establishing the physical caliphate on earth. It is not, in their minds, a fantasy, but a real and concrete objective to be achieved in conjunction with the divinely-blessed move toward spreading _jihad_ across the globe.
This emphasis on the caliphate is something that has the U.S. military deeply concerned, and, at the same time, has the _jihadi_ forces highly motivated. (Some interesting comments, possibly for public consumption, were that the movements in Iraq did not need outside money at this time, and that there are sufficient combatants for the current operational level).
"The US conviction that the Islamic State could seize power is based on its use of classic Al-Qaeda tactics and its adoption last October of a draft constitution," the Times says. "This was entitled Notifying Mankind of the Birth of the Islamic State and was posted on a website based in Britain. The group named 10 ministers under its emir, Abu Amer Al-Baghdadi. They included a war minister, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer who is also known as Abu Ayub al-Masri and is Al-Qaeda’s commander in Iraq."
This analysis is borne out in the al Qaeda leader's comments, where he says that "our goal is to establish an Islamic state. We will start by freeing all the Muslim lands from the oppressor regimes..The Islamic State of Iraq is seeking to export the jihad to neighboring countries, primarily in ideological form and by inspiring jihad, as opposed to physical jihad activities."
It is our good fortune that the al Qaeda groups remain so uncompromising that they are alienating both other Sunni armed groups and local tribal leaders.
They are, at least for public consumption, largely unwilling to deal with Shi'ites. The al Qaeda representative goes so far as to affirm that "The Islamic State of Iraq has no connection to that atheistic country known as Iran," and he blasts Hamas as not sufficiently religious to merit help.
He also acknowledges that, while some tribal leaders support al Qaeda in Iraq, many "hate" the movement. These divides offer opportunities to weaken the _jihadi_ movement, although some of the tactical alliances that might be most useful are also the ones that would be most difficult to engineer or control.
The _jihadis_ are not destined to win. But what they have is a clarity of vision while facing an array of adversaries who do not have either particularly clear individual visions and nothing approaching a unified vision against the _jihadis_. That gives the _jihadis_ a very clear advantage.
My colleague Evan Kohlmann has a translation of a leader of al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, where an important theme is, again, the conquest of specific territory in order to establish the beginnings of God's kingdom on earth.
These two fragments are but a small sampling of the growing, overt emphasis that the _jihadists_ place on establishing the physical caliphate on earth. It is not, in their minds, a fantasy, but a real and concrete objective to be achieved in conjunction with the divinely-blessed move toward spreading _jihad_ across the globe.
This emphasis on the caliphate is something that has the U.S. military deeply concerned, and, at the same time, has the _jihadi_ forces highly motivated. (Some interesting comments, possibly for public consumption, were that the movements in Iraq did not need outside money at this time, and that there are sufficient combatants for the current operational level).
"The US conviction that the Islamic State could seize power is based on its use of classic Al-Qaeda tactics and its adoption last October of a draft constitution," the Times says. "This was entitled Notifying Mankind of the Birth of the Islamic State and was posted on a website based in Britain. The group named 10 ministers under its emir, Abu Amer Al-Baghdadi. They included a war minister, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer who is also known as Abu Ayub al-Masri and is Al-Qaeda’s commander in Iraq."
This analysis is borne out in the al Qaeda leader's comments, where he says that "our goal is to establish an Islamic state. We will start by freeing all the Muslim lands from the oppressor regimes..The Islamic State of Iraq is seeking to export the jihad to neighboring countries, primarily in ideological form and by inspiring jihad, as opposed to physical jihad activities."
It is our good fortune that the al Qaeda groups remain so uncompromising that they are alienating both other Sunni armed groups and local tribal leaders.
They are, at least for public consumption, largely unwilling to deal with Shi'ites. The al Qaeda representative goes so far as to affirm that "The Islamic State of Iraq has no connection to that atheistic country known as Iran," and he blasts Hamas as not sufficiently religious to merit help.
He also acknowledges that, while some tribal leaders support al Qaeda in Iraq, many "hate" the movement. These divides offer opportunities to weaken the _jihadi_ movement, although some of the tactical alliances that might be most useful are also the ones that would be most difficult to engineer or control.
The _jihadis_ are not destined to win. But what they have is a clarity of vision while facing an array of adversaries who do not have either particularly clear individual visions and nothing approaching a unified vision against the _jihadis_. That gives the _jihadis_ a very clear advantage.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday May 11, 2007
Nigeria Faces Growing Hurdles
Nigeria seems to be constantly on the brink of implosion. The recent elections, badly marred by fraud and a distinct lack of transparency, moved the nation on step closer to a conflict that would have direct security implications for the United States, as well as opportunity for Islamist terrorists and other non-state actors seeking to destabilize the region.
The most vocal and militant of the armed groups now waging a campaign of kidnapping and mayhem in the oil rich Niger Delta, has announced plans to step up its actions to pressure the government-elect of Umaru Yar'Adua, successor to president Obasanjo and of the same People's Democratic Party (PDP).
Yar'Adua has chosen Goodluck Jonathan, a state governor from the delta, as his vice president and the new government is due to be inaugurated on May 29. But that does not sit well with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), who view him as another crooked politician.
The almost-daily kidnappings of foreign oil workers (though most are let go in a matter of days) and destruction of the oil pipelines and the ensuing ecological damage, are among the most visible challenges to the new government.
There is also the growing militancy of the Taliban in Nigeria, in the north, the Saudi-funded mosque-building and _wahhabi_ outreach efforts, and the spread southward of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (former GSPC).
The message of these groups is likely to find an echo as the social and economic situation of most of the Nigerians, especially those in the Muslim north, continue to deteriorate.
Yar'Adua faces formidable challenges across the board.
Under elected governments, the average life expectancy has dropped and most other indicators of well being have plummeted. This include access to health care, infant mortality and access to potable water.
Hardly a way to win the hearts and minds of a population that has spent most of the past 30 years under brutal regimes that have raised kleptocracy to a new art form.
There is no indication that the Niger Delta armed groups have made contact with or are allied with the Islamist radicals in the north. But the twin pressures will make it extremely difficult for the new government, whose legitimacy has been questioned at home and abroad, to move forward on virtually any front.
Unfortunately, as the largest economy in West Africa and the largest oil producer, what happens there is more than just a humanitarian concern. Nigeria is constantly teetering on the edge of disaster. It if finally plunges over, we will all pay a price.
The most vocal and militant of the armed groups now waging a campaign of kidnapping and mayhem in the oil rich Niger Delta, has announced plans to step up its actions to pressure the government-elect of Umaru Yar'Adua, successor to president Obasanjo and of the same People's Democratic Party (PDP).
Yar'Adua has chosen Goodluck Jonathan, a state governor from the delta, as his vice president and the new government is due to be inaugurated on May 29. But that does not sit well with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), who view him as another crooked politician.
The almost-daily kidnappings of foreign oil workers (though most are let go in a matter of days) and destruction of the oil pipelines and the ensuing ecological damage, are among the most visible challenges to the new government.
There is also the growing militancy of the Taliban in Nigeria, in the north, the Saudi-funded mosque-building and _wahhabi_ outreach efforts, and the spread southward of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (former GSPC).
The message of these groups is likely to find an echo as the social and economic situation of most of the Nigerians, especially those in the Muslim north, continue to deteriorate.
Yar'Adua faces formidable challenges across the board.
Under elected governments, the average life expectancy has dropped and most other indicators of well being have plummeted. This include access to health care, infant mortality and access to potable water.
Hardly a way to win the hearts and minds of a population that has spent most of the past 30 years under brutal regimes that have raised kleptocracy to a new art form.
There is no indication that the Niger Delta armed groups have made contact with or are allied with the Islamist radicals in the north. But the twin pressures will make it extremely difficult for the new government, whose legitimacy has been questioned at home and abroad, to move forward on virtually any front.
Unfortunately, as the largest economy in West Africa and the largest oil producer, what happens there is more than just a humanitarian concern. Nigeria is constantly teetering on the edge of disaster. It if finally plunges over, we will all pay a price.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH