Wednesday May 9, 2007
Losing the Very Young
There is a deeply disturbing story from AP on how Hamas reaches the youngest children for recruitment. The results, in the form of suicide bombers and the spiral of violence, are hard to miss.
Using a Mickey Mouse knock-off called "Farfour," meaning Butterfly, the al Aqsa TV station airs a program each Friday lays down the broad hate speech that Islamist groups are so adept at.
Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood in the area, according to its own statements. And Hamas runs al Aqsa. The Brotherhood's supreme guide, Mohammed Akef said of Hamas: "Its principles, methods and programs are derived from true Islam."
The TV cartoon program is not subtle in its message.
"You and I are laying the foundation for a world led by Islamists," Farfour said. And then: "We will return the Islamic community to its former greatness, an liberate Jerusalem, God willing, liberate Iraq, God willing, and liberate all the countries of the Muslims invaded by the murderers."
There a many legitimate grievances on all sides of the Middle East conflict. But this, in a nutshell, creates, among the youngest on the West Bank, the mind-set of the _caliphate_ and the deep sense of Islam being stripped of its rightful place in the world.
The focus on the young is not unusual. What is unusual in the inculcation of the values of _jihad_ and the entitlement to Islam as a political system to govern the world. It is the naked incitement to violence, hatred of the West and Israel, and the glorification of murder.
Catholic priests used to say that if they had a child going to Mass until the age of five, they had a life-long Catholic. Protestant groups, particularly fundamentalists, focus heavily on reaching the very young, understanding that what one learns in the early, formative years, are likely to stick for life.
But seldom do these groups, which can often be deeply intolerant, glorify violence or preach armed warfare against Islam or anyone else.
This is part of the river of hate speech, funded by _wahhabists_ and often flowing through groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, that are the push factor in violent _jihad._ Unless this type of inculcation ceases, we are guaranteed many generations of violent _jihadists_ who were formed in these schools.
Using a Mickey Mouse knock-off called "Farfour," meaning Butterfly, the al Aqsa TV station airs a program each Friday lays down the broad hate speech that Islamist groups are so adept at.
Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood in the area, according to its own statements. And Hamas runs al Aqsa. The Brotherhood's supreme guide, Mohammed Akef said of Hamas: "Its principles, methods and programs are derived from true Islam."
The TV cartoon program is not subtle in its message.
"You and I are laying the foundation for a world led by Islamists," Farfour said. And then: "We will return the Islamic community to its former greatness, an liberate Jerusalem, God willing, liberate Iraq, God willing, and liberate all the countries of the Muslims invaded by the murderers."
There a many legitimate grievances on all sides of the Middle East conflict. But this, in a nutshell, creates, among the youngest on the West Bank, the mind-set of the _caliphate_ and the deep sense of Islam being stripped of its rightful place in the world.
The focus on the young is not unusual. What is unusual in the inculcation of the values of _jihad_ and the entitlement to Islam as a political system to govern the world. It is the naked incitement to violence, hatred of the West and Israel, and the glorification of murder.
Catholic priests used to say that if they had a child going to Mass until the age of five, they had a life-long Catholic. Protestant groups, particularly fundamentalists, focus heavily on reaching the very young, understanding that what one learns in the early, formative years, are likely to stick for life.
But seldom do these groups, which can often be deeply intolerant, glorify violence or preach armed warfare against Islam or anyone else.
This is part of the river of hate speech, funded by _wahhabists_ and often flowing through groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, that are the push factor in violent _jihad._ Unless this type of inculcation ceases, we are guaranteed many generations of violent _jihadists_ who were formed in these schools.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday May 7, 2007
The Amazing Deception in the Muslim Brotherhood's Charm Offensive
Almost since the beginning of the current debate over the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood and engagement vs. confrontation policy with the "moderate" group, one theme has been repeated by those who favor dialogue with the group. Unfortunately, the central argument is a fabrication, spun by the Muslim Brothers seeking to blunt the history of its support for violent _jihad_.
The campaign to portray the Brotherhood as a moderate, non-violent political force is predicated on the notion that the Brotherhood has turned away from the radical teaching of Sayyid Qutb and embraced a more moderate theology that now supposedly holds sway. Unfortunately, this line, while demonstrably untrue, has been seized on by academics and policy makers anxious for some type of engagement with the "moderate" Muslim world.
In a nutshell, the argument, put forth by Leiken and Brooke in their controversial Foreign Affairs piece, as well as James Traub in the New York Times Magazine and others is this: That the radical tract _Milestones_ , written from prison by Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb calling for violent _jihad_ against non-Muslims, particularly the West, and apostate Muslim regimes, has been repudiated, at least tacitly, by the current Brotherhood.
Replacing _Milestones_, the argument goes, was a book written by a fellow prisoner named Hassan al-Hudaybi called _Preachers, Not Judges_.
As Leiken and Brooke wrote, "But from his own (prison) cell, Hudaybi disputed Qutb's conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith...Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi's tolerant view, in line with (Hassan al-Banna's) founding vision-prevailed, cementin the group's moderate vocation."
This is a strange argument, given that _Milestones_ has been in print since 1964, in many languages. It is printed in the United States, taught as part of curriculum of various Islamist groups here, and has been one of the best selling books of all time in Arabic.
In contrast, _Preachers_ was printed twice, in 1977 and 1985, in Arabic, was not printed in other languages and has not appeared anywhere in Arabic world since 1985.
(Much of the following, including finding and passing on the key texts, was initially done by Patrick Poole, whose research, who went further and faster on the topic than I did and will have a more lengthy piece forthcoming shortly. Additional information and insights were provided by other readers, who found what I had, and what Patrick elaborated on).
But there is a far larger problem with _Preachers_. Hudaybi never wrote _Preachers._ Poole and others have unearthed academic findings written before 9-11, that is, before the Brotherhood was fighting the image of the primary organization from which almost all violent Islamist movements spring, showing that _Preachers_ can credibly be attributed to Egyptian intelligence, written to divide the Brotherhood members jailed by the Egyptian regime.
At a conference held at Georgetown University in March on the theme of Islamist Politics: Contemporary Trajectories in the Arab World, Barbara Zollner, Director of Islamic Studies at Birbeck College, University of London, summarize her extensive research on the subject of Hudaybi and his role, as follows:
"There are a number of writers who argue that Du'at la Qudat, (Preachers, not Prophets), when it was published in the 1970s... that it is an evidence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn away from radical thinking, and that it evidences a shift of the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance towards a centrist Islamist ideology…What I want to say today are two things. Overall my argument is that Preachers, Not Judges was not written by Hassan al-Hudaybi, and secondly, it is not written as a response to Sayyid Qutb."
Dr. Zollner noted that:
"As we know all you have to do is go on their [the Muslim Brotherhood] website today you still have a sub-section where Qutb is referred to and reference is made to his work; Qutb is still held in the Brotherhood’s memory, the Brotherhood did not turn away or against Qutb. To say that it that the Muslim Brotherhood issued a refutation in the 1970s rejecting Qutbian thinking, that would contradict exactly that."
Zollner’s research, along with that of Sayed Khatab of the University of Melbourne, Australia, found is that rather than being the product of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, the book was most likely a collaborative effort by the Egyptian security apparatus and scholars of Al-Azhar University.
In his 2001 work titled "Al-Hudaybi's Influence on the Development of Islamist Movements in Egypt," (The Muslim World, Fall, 2001) , Khatab quotes a series of 1995 interviews by Brig. Gen. Fu'ad Allam, an official of the Security Apparatus of the (Egyptian) State from 1962-1971. In it, Allam describes how the state security apparatus wrote the book in part to divide the Brotherhood members in prison, using Khatab's son as a key interlocutor.
As Khatab wrote: "With regard to the reliability of Allam's claims, neither Hudaybi, his son nor al Azhar have decided to challene Allam's account. We may thus presume it is accurate."
I would argue that the Brotherhood, in granting access to selected scholars and journalists in an effort to make their case for moderation, planted the _Preachers_ story of rejection of radicalism as a deliberate part of their ongoing campaign of deception. They were banking, correctly in the initial phases, that no one could dig up the relatively obscure text that is in Arabic and long out of circulation, and so would simply take the Brotherhood statements as fact.
A good strategy, as it netted them the results they hoped for. A lie exposed late will often live on. I would bet we see the Brotherhood canard repeated again and again. Denial and deception on our part is a lost art. Too bad the Brotherhood keeps honing its skills in that department.
The campaign to portray the Brotherhood as a moderate, non-violent political force is predicated on the notion that the Brotherhood has turned away from the radical teaching of Sayyid Qutb and embraced a more moderate theology that now supposedly holds sway. Unfortunately, this line, while demonstrably untrue, has been seized on by academics and policy makers anxious for some type of engagement with the "moderate" Muslim world.
In a nutshell, the argument, put forth by Leiken and Brooke in their controversial Foreign Affairs piece, as well as James Traub in the New York Times Magazine and others is this: That the radical tract _Milestones_ , written from prison by Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb calling for violent _jihad_ against non-Muslims, particularly the West, and apostate Muslim regimes, has been repudiated, at least tacitly, by the current Brotherhood.
Replacing _Milestones_, the argument goes, was a book written by a fellow prisoner named Hassan al-Hudaybi called _Preachers, Not Judges_.
As Leiken and Brooke wrote, "But from his own (prison) cell, Hudaybi disputed Qutb's conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith...Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi's tolerant view, in line with (Hassan al-Banna's) founding vision-prevailed, cementin the group's moderate vocation."
This is a strange argument, given that _Milestones_ has been in print since 1964, in many languages. It is printed in the United States, taught as part of curriculum of various Islamist groups here, and has been one of the best selling books of all time in Arabic.
In contrast, _Preachers_ was printed twice, in 1977 and 1985, in Arabic, was not printed in other languages and has not appeared anywhere in Arabic world since 1985.
(Much of the following, including finding and passing on the key texts, was initially done by Patrick Poole, whose research, who went further and faster on the topic than I did and will have a more lengthy piece forthcoming shortly. Additional information and insights were provided by other readers, who found what I had, and what Patrick elaborated on).
But there is a far larger problem with _Preachers_. Hudaybi never wrote _Preachers._ Poole and others have unearthed academic findings written before 9-11, that is, before the Brotherhood was fighting the image of the primary organization from which almost all violent Islamist movements spring, showing that _Preachers_ can credibly be attributed to Egyptian intelligence, written to divide the Brotherhood members jailed by the Egyptian regime.
At a conference held at Georgetown University in March on the theme of Islamist Politics: Contemporary Trajectories in the Arab World, Barbara Zollner, Director of Islamic Studies at Birbeck College, University of London, summarize her extensive research on the subject of Hudaybi and his role, as follows:
"There are a number of writers who argue that Du'at la Qudat, (Preachers, not Prophets), when it was published in the 1970s... that it is an evidence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn away from radical thinking, and that it evidences a shift of the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance towards a centrist Islamist ideology…What I want to say today are two things. Overall my argument is that Preachers, Not Judges was not written by Hassan al-Hudaybi, and secondly, it is not written as a response to Sayyid Qutb."
Dr. Zollner noted that:
"As we know all you have to do is go on their [the Muslim Brotherhood] website today you still have a sub-section where Qutb is referred to and reference is made to his work; Qutb is still held in the Brotherhood’s memory, the Brotherhood did not turn away or against Qutb. To say that it that the Muslim Brotherhood issued a refutation in the 1970s rejecting Qutbian thinking, that would contradict exactly that."
Zollner’s research, along with that of Sayed Khatab of the University of Melbourne, Australia, found is that rather than being the product of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, the book was most likely a collaborative effort by the Egyptian security apparatus and scholars of Al-Azhar University.
In his 2001 work titled "Al-Hudaybi's Influence on the Development of Islamist Movements in Egypt," (The Muslim World, Fall, 2001) , Khatab quotes a series of 1995 interviews by Brig. Gen. Fu'ad Allam, an official of the Security Apparatus of the (Egyptian) State from 1962-1971. In it, Allam describes how the state security apparatus wrote the book in part to divide the Brotherhood members in prison, using Khatab's son as a key interlocutor.
As Khatab wrote: "With regard to the reliability of Allam's claims, neither Hudaybi, his son nor al Azhar have decided to challene Allam's account. We may thus presume it is accurate."
I would argue that the Brotherhood, in granting access to selected scholars and journalists in an effort to make their case for moderation, planted the _Preachers_ story of rejection of radicalism as a deliberate part of their ongoing campaign of deception. They were banking, correctly in the initial phases, that no one could dig up the relatively obscure text that is in Arabic and long out of circulation, and so would simply take the Brotherhood statements as fact.
A good strategy, as it netted them the results they hoped for. A lie exposed late will often live on. I would bet we see the Brotherhood canard repeated again and again. Denial and deception on our part is a lost art. Too bad the Brotherhood keeps honing its skills in that department.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday May 4, 2007
Death, Confusion and Networks
The recent announcement of the death of Muharib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri in Iraq, and the confusion surrounding the possible deaths of other leaders, highlight the importance of the network-based Islamist insurgencies in Iraq and elsewhere.
As the deaths of Zarqawi and much of the senior leadership of the core al Qaeda and Al Qaeda in Iraq have shown, individual deaths have a short-term impact.
But in the mid to long term, these deaths, while necessary in the struggle, do not do away with the underlying structures that give the groups' their viability. Al-Jubouri's alleged direct involvement in the killing of a journalist and others, and his directorship of the propaganda machine make him a valuable target, no doubt. But he was likely replaced before his body was cold.
As a (much) younger person covering the cartel wars in Colombia, I initially fully bought the DEA and CIA's line that killing Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, then Pablo Escobar, then the arrest of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, who have a direct impact on the cocaine trade.
Of course, none of those activities did diminish the flow of cocaine, and it was evident after a while that the structures had almost a life of their own, independent of the individuals involved at any particular time.
The killings and arrests were not useless and they forced the cartels to adapt. But the volume of money in the drug business was such that there was always someone else to step up.
I would argue that, in the _jihadist_ structures, the ideological and theological imperative driving the groups is such that there is little trouble in replacing those that fall. The deaths and/or arrests cause hiccups along the way, and the replacements may not be, at least initially, as adept as their predecessors. But they get there.
Hence the argument for a network-based strategy rather than a strategy that primarily targets individuals. The U.S. military is getting better at this, often viewing the _jihadi_ organizations as flat rather than pyramical. But there is still a long way to go in implementing a strategy that directly targets networks.
Getting one person with an IED is good and useful. Getting the cohort that provides the devices from Iran, across the border to the cell that planned to carry out the attack is much better.
The same is true on the financial front. Catching the person with the suitcase full of cash crossing the Syrian border is good for stopping an attack. Pressuring the infrastructure that raises the money in Saudi Arabia from individuals and charities, will likely stop several attacks. Hence my constant harping on the need to go after the underlying financial structure of the _wahhabist_ groups, rather than just shutting down one individual charity.
It is the nature of this type of warfare that new routes and new networks will constantly be evolving. Like water running down hill, they look for the paths of least resistance.
Given that, the central idea has to be to raise the cost of doing operations to those networks, force them to be less efficient and force them to make mistakes, increase the risks and maximize the possible cracks in the system.
The more pressure networks experience, the greater the potential for disrupting it. The more the network has to spend to operate, the fewer resources it has to actually attack.
One of the keys to a network's survival is the support of the civilian population. The fact that a large crowd was openly gathering for the funeral rites of al-Jubouri highlights just how much remains to be done in that field.
As the deaths of Zarqawi and much of the senior leadership of the core al Qaeda and Al Qaeda in Iraq have shown, individual deaths have a short-term impact.
But in the mid to long term, these deaths, while necessary in the struggle, do not do away with the underlying structures that give the groups' their viability. Al-Jubouri's alleged direct involvement in the killing of a journalist and others, and his directorship of the propaganda machine make him a valuable target, no doubt. But he was likely replaced before his body was cold.
As a (much) younger person covering the cartel wars in Colombia, I initially fully bought the DEA and CIA's line that killing Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, then Pablo Escobar, then the arrest of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, who have a direct impact on the cocaine trade.
Of course, none of those activities did diminish the flow of cocaine, and it was evident after a while that the structures had almost a life of their own, independent of the individuals involved at any particular time.
The killings and arrests were not useless and they forced the cartels to adapt. But the volume of money in the drug business was such that there was always someone else to step up.
I would argue that, in the _jihadist_ structures, the ideological and theological imperative driving the groups is such that there is little trouble in replacing those that fall. The deaths and/or arrests cause hiccups along the way, and the replacements may not be, at least initially, as adept as their predecessors. But they get there.
Hence the argument for a network-based strategy rather than a strategy that primarily targets individuals. The U.S. military is getting better at this, often viewing the _jihadi_ organizations as flat rather than pyramical. But there is still a long way to go in implementing a strategy that directly targets networks.
Getting one person with an IED is good and useful. Getting the cohort that provides the devices from Iran, across the border to the cell that planned to carry out the attack is much better.
The same is true on the financial front. Catching the person with the suitcase full of cash crossing the Syrian border is good for stopping an attack. Pressuring the infrastructure that raises the money in Saudi Arabia from individuals and charities, will likely stop several attacks. Hence my constant harping on the need to go after the underlying financial structure of the _wahhabist_ groups, rather than just shutting down one individual charity.
It is the nature of this type of warfare that new routes and new networks will constantly be evolving. Like water running down hill, they look for the paths of least resistance.
Given that, the central idea has to be to raise the cost of doing operations to those networks, force them to be less efficient and force them to make mistakes, increase the risks and maximize the possible cracks in the system.
The more pressure networks experience, the greater the potential for disrupting it. The more the network has to spend to operate, the fewer resources it has to actually attack.
One of the keys to a network's survival is the support of the civilian population. The fact that a large crowd was openly gathering for the funeral rites of al-Jubouri highlights just how much remains to be done in that field.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday May 7, 2007
Qutbism and the Muslim Brotherhood
One of the interesting threads emerging on the debate over the Muslim Brotherhood is the comparative weight of the "reformist" wing of the _Ikhwan_ versus the "Qutbists" who follow Sayyid Qutb's teachings on the need to destroy the West and create a Muslim world, governed by _sharia_ law.
Qutub's works, particularly "Milestones," are widely cited by Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the _jihadist_ camp as the theological justification and roadmap for their attacks.
One of Qutb's breakthroughs, theologically, was the justification of the concept of "offensive jihad," the proclamation of the right to wage jihad in conquest.
"Those who say islamic Jihad was merely for the defense of the "home land of Islam" diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life and consider it less important than their homeland," Qutb wrote. "However, defense (of the Islamic community) is not the ultimate objective of the Islamic movement of jihad but it is a means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters of the movement of Islam, which is then to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind."
Qutb is also routinely praised by Brotherhood leaders, and his work, to the best of my searches, has never been denounced or publicly questioned by Brotherhood leaders in any forum.
One of the arguments consistently made by those defending dialogue with the Brotherhood, and advanced by some in the Brotherhood itself, is that there is an important counter work put out by Hasan al Hudaybi, called "Preachers not Judges." Leiken and Brooke, in their Foreign Affairs piece on the Brotherhood describe the work as "the historical and theological refutation of the jihadist arguments of Sayyid Qutb," and "an historical milestone, the beginning of the parting of the ways between the Muslim Brotherhood mainstream and the jihadists who began to leave the organization soon after."
Yet the relative weight of "Preachers," compared to "Milestones," is far less. "Milestones" has been in print continuously for some 50 years now, readily available on line and in bookstores. The same cannot be said for "Preachers."
Until the Brotherhood is willing to publicly break with the Qutbism that drives the violence against the West, I am hard pressed to see the moderation of the movement.
In the end, the Brotherhood cannot break with Qutb because the fundamental objectives he lays down are part of their fundamental beliefs: the establishment of Islam across the world.
As Martin Kramer so aptly writes:
"The most pressing question that has faced Islamists has been how to pursue rulership. The rule of thumb here is that Islamist movements usually follow what looks to their leaders like the path of least resistance.
"They are not committed to any one strategy in the pursuit of their ends, and any means are legitimate as long as they accord with Islamic law, the shari'a._
"This law is not pacifist. It sanctions violence for the legitimate purposes of defending Muslims and establishing the rule of Islam. This explains why Islamist movements have slipped so readily into violence whenever it has seemed like a shortcut to power. In such circumstances, the use of force is not deemed a deviation, but an obligation."
In other words, war by whatever means available. But it is war nonetheless.
Qutub's works, particularly "Milestones," are widely cited by Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the _jihadist_ camp as the theological justification and roadmap for their attacks.
One of Qutb's breakthroughs, theologically, was the justification of the concept of "offensive jihad," the proclamation of the right to wage jihad in conquest.
"Those who say islamic Jihad was merely for the defense of the "home land of Islam" diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life and consider it less important than their homeland," Qutb wrote. "However, defense (of the Islamic community) is not the ultimate objective of the Islamic movement of jihad but it is a means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters of the movement of Islam, which is then to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind."
Qutb is also routinely praised by Brotherhood leaders, and his work, to the best of my searches, has never been denounced or publicly questioned by Brotherhood leaders in any forum.
One of the arguments consistently made by those defending dialogue with the Brotherhood, and advanced by some in the Brotherhood itself, is that there is an important counter work put out by Hasan al Hudaybi, called "Preachers not Judges." Leiken and Brooke, in their Foreign Affairs piece on the Brotherhood describe the work as "the historical and theological refutation of the jihadist arguments of Sayyid Qutb," and "an historical milestone, the beginning of the parting of the ways between the Muslim Brotherhood mainstream and the jihadists who began to leave the organization soon after."
Yet the relative weight of "Preachers," compared to "Milestones," is far less. "Milestones" has been in print continuously for some 50 years now, readily available on line and in bookstores. The same cannot be said for "Preachers."
Until the Brotherhood is willing to publicly break with the Qutbism that drives the violence against the West, I am hard pressed to see the moderation of the movement.
In the end, the Brotherhood cannot break with Qutb because the fundamental objectives he lays down are part of their fundamental beliefs: the establishment of Islam across the world.
As Martin Kramer so aptly writes:
"The most pressing question that has faced Islamists has been how to pursue rulership. The rule of thumb here is that Islamist movements usually follow what looks to their leaders like the path of least resistance.
"They are not committed to any one strategy in the pursuit of their ends, and any means are legitimate as long as they accord with Islamic law, the shari'a._
"This law is not pacifist. It sanctions violence for the legitimate purposes of defending Muslims and establishing the rule of Islam. This explains why Islamist movements have slipped so readily into violence whenever it has seemed like a shortcut to power. In such circumstances, the use of force is not deemed a deviation, but an obligation."
In other words, war by whatever means available. But it is war nonetheless.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday April 30, 2007
Military Problems on the Horizon
I have spent time with military officials and civilian DOD officials in different parts of the country in recent weeks, and found a disturbing consensus on events, which, if correct, will have long-term implications for our national security.
The first is the broad feeling that the military is being asked to do everyone else's job in government, particularly the job of the State Department.
The public diplomacy wing of the State Department seems to have virtually disappeared (except for the little shop run by Shaha Riza, Paul Wolfowitz's girlfriend, and a shop that has a $45 million annual budget but has made no grants in 18 months of existence).
Partly because of the security conditions and partly because the army is already on the ground, many of the leaders feel they are being ordered to do things they are not trained for, have no resources for, and that take them away from crucial missions.
The second is that, as a result of the massive strain on human and physical resources of the Iraq conflict, the military and the rest of the Intelligence Community are falling further and further behind in monitoring vital events in the rest of the world.
This is not entirely the fault of this administration, of course. The hollowing out of the military and the drastic reduction of human intelligence capabilities began under Bush I, was continued under Clinton and not adequately addressed by the current administration. So there are plenty of people responsible.
One area of acute concern in the intelligence community is Venezuela and its growing orbit in Latin America, thanks largely to the close ties of Hugo Chavez to Iran.
Another area where intelligence, both military and civilian, has huge gaps, is most of sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the plans to stand up the Africa Command, it will take years before the new command is operational. There is still no consensus on where the headquarters should be located IF the command is based outside of Germany, where it currently is housed as part of the European Command.
This means that, even as lip service is paid to the rapid emergence of non-state armed actors, the unnerving rise in the number of failed and failing states and the clearly-demonstrated threat to national security these factors represent, there are few resources to actually DO anything about the challenges. This includes studying and training for different types of emerging threats.
The third thing is that those officers with hard-earned experience and knowledge, the captains and the majors, are leaving in droves because of the heavy rotations away from home in combat zones.
This is leaving a huge hole between the fresh, young officers with little or no experience and the colonels who see little field action. This loss of experience on the ground is compounded by a similar phenomenon in the upper ranks of enlisted men.
The final point was the feeling that public support for the military is eroding because the political establishment has done little to prepare the public for extended military commitments. There is broad recognition that, under ideal circumstances, the stabilization of Iraq would have taken a decade. Now, if it is possible at all, it will take far longer. Yet no one wanted to say that publicly or lay out the case for such an engagement.
All this adds up to the possibility of even more acute shortages in the near future, both in terms of personnel and capacity. The men and women of the armed forces are professionals, doing the heavy lifting in an ill-defined war against Islamist militants. They deserve better.
The first is the broad feeling that the military is being asked to do everyone else's job in government, particularly the job of the State Department.
The public diplomacy wing of the State Department seems to have virtually disappeared (except for the little shop run by Shaha Riza, Paul Wolfowitz's girlfriend, and a shop that has a $45 million annual budget but has made no grants in 18 months of existence).
Partly because of the security conditions and partly because the army is already on the ground, many of the leaders feel they are being ordered to do things they are not trained for, have no resources for, and that take them away from crucial missions.
The second is that, as a result of the massive strain on human and physical resources of the Iraq conflict, the military and the rest of the Intelligence Community are falling further and further behind in monitoring vital events in the rest of the world.
This is not entirely the fault of this administration, of course. The hollowing out of the military and the drastic reduction of human intelligence capabilities began under Bush I, was continued under Clinton and not adequately addressed by the current administration. So there are plenty of people responsible.
One area of acute concern in the intelligence community is Venezuela and its growing orbit in Latin America, thanks largely to the close ties of Hugo Chavez to Iran.
Another area where intelligence, both military and civilian, has huge gaps, is most of sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the plans to stand up the Africa Command, it will take years before the new command is operational. There is still no consensus on where the headquarters should be located IF the command is based outside of Germany, where it currently is housed as part of the European Command.
This means that, even as lip service is paid to the rapid emergence of non-state armed actors, the unnerving rise in the number of failed and failing states and the clearly-demonstrated threat to national security these factors represent, there are few resources to actually DO anything about the challenges. This includes studying and training for different types of emerging threats.
The third thing is that those officers with hard-earned experience and knowledge, the captains and the majors, are leaving in droves because of the heavy rotations away from home in combat zones.
This is leaving a huge hole between the fresh, young officers with little or no experience and the colonels who see little field action. This loss of experience on the ground is compounded by a similar phenomenon in the upper ranks of enlisted men.
The final point was the feeling that public support for the military is eroding because the political establishment has done little to prepare the public for extended military commitments. There is broad recognition that, under ideal circumstances, the stabilization of Iraq would have taken a decade. Now, if it is possible at all, it will take far longer. Yet no one wanted to say that publicly or lay out the case for such an engagement.
All this adds up to the possibility of even more acute shortages in the near future, both in terms of personnel and capacity. The men and women of the armed forces are professionals, doing the heavy lifting in an ill-defined war against Islamist militants. They deserve better.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH