Wednesday April 25, 2007
A Fascinating Look At a Village That Produces Suicide Bombers
There is no doubt that suicide bombers, routinely used now in the Islamist struggles in Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Bank and elsewhere, have radically changed the face of modern warfare.
Figuring out what moves people to self-select into the group, almost always men in the current context, who are willing to kill themselves in the struggle, is of primary importance.
Obtaining answers is both as a military imperative and a broader necessity to understand the driving forces of _jihad_.
On NPR today, there is a fascinating story about research into a single neighborhood in the Moroccan village of Tetuan that has produced more than 30 suicide bombers, funneled to different parts of the world, primarily Iraq and earlier, to Spain.
The reporting provides not just insights into why these people kill themselves, but a disturbing look at the dangers of the growing criminal-terrorist nexus in different parts of the world. This includes groups specializing in crossing the U.S. border.
As researcher Scott Atran, a senior fellow at City University of New York's Center on Terrorism notes, while there are tens of millions of people who sympathize with the concept of _jihad_, there are relatively few who actually carry out violent acts.
Feeding the ability to move disaffected young men from Morocco to Damascus or Istanbul, before crossing over the border to kill themselves in Iraq, is the area's vast underground economy.
The economy around Tetuan is primarily the illicit trade of many commodities, including drugs, to Europe. The men are able to piggy back on those same routes to move themselves.
This is similar to the situation on our own border, where criminal gangs, allied with drug trafficking organizations and the _maras_ of Central America, provide the same type of illicit economy, and on a grander scale.
Those who move drugs can move people, stolen cars, weapons and virtually anything else through the pipelines that exist. The transnational pipelines to our countries have been operational for decades.
There is still a school of thought in the Intelligence Community that terrorists don't or won't deal with unbelievers, including criminals. The belief persists despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, of which is only the latest bit. The convergence of factors in Tetuan should give us pause, if only because of their similarity to the factors at play along much of our southern border.
Perhaps Atran's most disturbing conclusion is that the concept of violent _jihad_ is now part of of the political landscape and growing in its appeal across norther Africa.
Atran called _jihad_ the "big dream out there now. There is a massive, media-driven political awakening of which _jihad_ is the vanguard...At least in these young people's minds, they are looking for a dream and they want to be heros."
Figuring out what moves people to self-select into the group, almost always men in the current context, who are willing to kill themselves in the struggle, is of primary importance.
Obtaining answers is both as a military imperative and a broader necessity to understand the driving forces of _jihad_.
On NPR today, there is a fascinating story about research into a single neighborhood in the Moroccan village of Tetuan that has produced more than 30 suicide bombers, funneled to different parts of the world, primarily Iraq and earlier, to Spain.
The reporting provides not just insights into why these people kill themselves, but a disturbing look at the dangers of the growing criminal-terrorist nexus in different parts of the world. This includes groups specializing in crossing the U.S. border.
As researcher Scott Atran, a senior fellow at City University of New York's Center on Terrorism notes, while there are tens of millions of people who sympathize with the concept of _jihad_, there are relatively few who actually carry out violent acts.
Feeding the ability to move disaffected young men from Morocco to Damascus or Istanbul, before crossing over the border to kill themselves in Iraq, is the area's vast underground economy.
The economy around Tetuan is primarily the illicit trade of many commodities, including drugs, to Europe. The men are able to piggy back on those same routes to move themselves.
This is similar to the situation on our own border, where criminal gangs, allied with drug trafficking organizations and the _maras_ of Central America, provide the same type of illicit economy, and on a grander scale.
Those who move drugs can move people, stolen cars, weapons and virtually anything else through the pipelines that exist. The transnational pipelines to our countries have been operational for decades.
There is still a school of thought in the Intelligence Community that terrorists don't or won't deal with unbelievers, including criminals. The belief persists despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, of which is only the latest bit. The convergence of factors in Tetuan should give us pause, if only because of their similarity to the factors at play along much of our southern border.
Perhaps Atran's most disturbing conclusion is that the concept of violent _jihad_ is now part of of the political landscape and growing in its appeal across norther Africa.
Atran called _jihad_ the "big dream out there now. There is a massive, media-driven political awakening of which _jihad_ is the vanguard...At least in these young people's minds, they are looking for a dream and they want to be heros."
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday April 23, 2007
What is Missing From Chertoff's War Assessment
It was heartening to see Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff clear-eyed view of al Qaeda's objectives.. The administration has often not articulated such a vision with such clarity.
But there is a disturbing absence in his analysis, one that has been largely absent since David Aufhauser left the Treasury Department three years ago. That is the support role that the Islamists, _wahhabists_ and _salafists_, along with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, play in this conflict.
Chertoff is correct is saying that "Today's extreme Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda do not merely seek political revolution in their own countries. They aspire to dominate all countries. Their goal is a totalitarian, theocratic empire to be achieved by waging perpetual war on soldiers and civilians alike."
All of that statement is true of the Saudi leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR, the Muslim Student Association and the Qaradawi-led groups across Europe that share the _Ikhwan_ theology.
The _jihadists_ that Chertoff notes are also bent on getting weapons of mass destruction, the ultimate goal of these groups is no different from the "moderate" groups that seek political legitimacy here and in Europe. There is a clear strategic difference, of course. But one does not negate the other.
It is the failure to recognize the supporting role the Saudi theological structure-financed, sheltered and protected by the senior levels of the Saudi royal family,-the Muslim Brotherhood's international outreach structure, and other structures, that makes it difficult to take the talk of war too seriously.
One cannot come up with a successful strategy for dealing with radical Islamist structures without taking on the support structures, any more than one can successfully combat lung cancer while continuing to maintain a two pack a day habit. One can remove some tumors for a brief reprieve, but cannot eliminate the cancer that way.
That, in effect, is the current strategy-deal with the easily visible symptoms, declare war, and ignore the broader causes.
The rivers of money, hate speech, recruitment aimed at, as Chertoff rightly notes, a world totalitarian, theocratic empire, will continue to spread violence, regardless of the individual successes and failures of al Qaeda and its current allies.
Until this far broader problem is understood, the war suffers from a lopsided emphasis on military action against a mobile and adaptable military enemy. But it offers nothing on the political front, on examining options on developing a more coherent, broader strategy to deal with a broader, more nuanced enemy.
The war in Iraq has largely made other actions, even military actions, impossible. One can see the consequence in Afghanistan. The public diplomacy initiatives seem more designed to show we can be nice to those who want our destruction than in clearly defining what our vision of the future is and asking the vast majority of Muslims to join us in a coherent effort to roll back the intellectual, financial and military gains of those who carry out their campaign in the name of Islam.
Until then, we are fighting symptoms, not the disease.
But there is a disturbing absence in his analysis, one that has been largely absent since David Aufhauser left the Treasury Department three years ago. That is the support role that the Islamists, _wahhabists_ and _salafists_, along with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, play in this conflict.
Chertoff is correct is saying that "Today's extreme Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda do not merely seek political revolution in their own countries. They aspire to dominate all countries. Their goal is a totalitarian, theocratic empire to be achieved by waging perpetual war on soldiers and civilians alike."
All of that statement is true of the Saudi leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR, the Muslim Student Association and the Qaradawi-led groups across Europe that share the _Ikhwan_ theology.
The _jihadists_ that Chertoff notes are also bent on getting weapons of mass destruction, the ultimate goal of these groups is no different from the "moderate" groups that seek political legitimacy here and in Europe. There is a clear strategic difference, of course. But one does not negate the other.
It is the failure to recognize the supporting role the Saudi theological structure-financed, sheltered and protected by the senior levels of the Saudi royal family,-the Muslim Brotherhood's international outreach structure, and other structures, that makes it difficult to take the talk of war too seriously.
One cannot come up with a successful strategy for dealing with radical Islamist structures without taking on the support structures, any more than one can successfully combat lung cancer while continuing to maintain a two pack a day habit. One can remove some tumors for a brief reprieve, but cannot eliminate the cancer that way.
That, in effect, is the current strategy-deal with the easily visible symptoms, declare war, and ignore the broader causes.
The rivers of money, hate speech, recruitment aimed at, as Chertoff rightly notes, a world totalitarian, theocratic empire, will continue to spread violence, regardless of the individual successes and failures of al Qaeda and its current allies.
Until this far broader problem is understood, the war suffers from a lopsided emphasis on military action against a mobile and adaptable military enemy. But it offers nothing on the political front, on examining options on developing a more coherent, broader strategy to deal with a broader, more nuanced enemy.
The war in Iraq has largely made other actions, even military actions, impossible. One can see the consequence in Afghanistan. The public diplomacy initiatives seem more designed to show we can be nice to those who want our destruction than in clearly defining what our vision of the future is and asking the vast majority of Muslims to join us in a coherent effort to roll back the intellectual, financial and military gains of those who carry out their campaign in the name of Islam.
Until then, we are fighting symptoms, not the disease.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday April 20, 2007
The Changing Panorama Across Africa and the World
As Islamists continue their offensive in Somalia,
there are several other key indicators that the violent _wahhabist_ movement across Africa is growing.
The deteriorating situation in Somalia and Africa is symptomatic of other setbacks in fighting the Islamists on numerous fronts. Taken together, the recent developments of 2007 show that:
1) Neither Sunni nor Shi'ite terrorist networks are suffering from any shortage of funds or recruits, but rather seem awash in resources,
2) the increased decentralization of al Qaeda-related groups is a strategy that is paying off well for the _salafist_ movements, which are slowly establishing viable networks in areas where not long ago they had none, and
3) that Islamists have begun a well-financed and sophisticated propaganda offensive, coupled with a political strategy of appearing to soften on some issues (ie Sudan) aimed at presenting a negotiating partner(s) to the West in an effort to forestall decisive action. So far it has been remarkably successful.
Coupled with the deteriorating situation in Nigeria, with a militant and violent Salafist movement in the north; the continued genocide in Sudan, perpetrated by Islamic radicals; and the increasing activity of Al Qaeda's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa, the situation across continent is growing increasingly complex and favorable to the _jihadists_.
When taken in the broader context of the Taliban renewal in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the ability of al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq to inflict serious casualties despite the troop surge, there seems to be little to cheer in the year's first quarter.
At the same time the _Salafist_ armies are opening different fronts in the region, the _Shi'ite_ groups have not remained idle. A recent study based on field research, which I will post when I can, estimates that Hezbollah is receiving up to $1 billion a year from Iran for its military activities, while expanding its fund-raising among the Lebanese _diaspora_.
This bodes ill on several fronts, particularly for networks embedded in Latin America and, again, Africa.
Taken together, it is not hard to connect the dots of what the enemy is doing. What is much harder to see the contours of is a counter-strategy that uses not just military force but the tools our enemy use. These include outreach, information, engagement in the political field and a serious effort to give the non-Islamist Muslims a modicum of support.
With Iraq sucking the oxygen out of the possibility of focusing on a longer-range and more varied counter-strategy, we are badly hamstrung. We have little or no resources to fight a broader war that is already knocking on our doorstep.
there are several other key indicators that the violent _wahhabist_ movement across Africa is growing.
The deteriorating situation in Somalia and Africa is symptomatic of other setbacks in fighting the Islamists on numerous fronts. Taken together, the recent developments of 2007 show that:
1) Neither Sunni nor Shi'ite terrorist networks are suffering from any shortage of funds or recruits, but rather seem awash in resources,
2) the increased decentralization of al Qaeda-related groups is a strategy that is paying off well for the _salafist_ movements, which are slowly establishing viable networks in areas where not long ago they had none, and
3) that Islamists have begun a well-financed and sophisticated propaganda offensive, coupled with a political strategy of appearing to soften on some issues (ie Sudan) aimed at presenting a negotiating partner(s) to the West in an effort to forestall decisive action. So far it has been remarkably successful.
Coupled with the deteriorating situation in Nigeria, with a militant and violent Salafist movement in the north; the continued genocide in Sudan, perpetrated by Islamic radicals; and the increasing activity of Al Qaeda's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa, the situation across continent is growing increasingly complex and favorable to the _jihadists_.
When taken in the broader context of the Taliban renewal in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the ability of al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq to inflict serious casualties despite the troop surge, there seems to be little to cheer in the year's first quarter.
At the same time the _Salafist_ armies are opening different fronts in the region, the _Shi'ite_ groups have not remained idle. A recent study based on field research, which I will post when I can, estimates that Hezbollah is receiving up to $1 billion a year from Iran for its military activities, while expanding its fund-raising among the Lebanese _diaspora_.
This bodes ill on several fronts, particularly for networks embedded in Latin America and, again, Africa.
Taken together, it is not hard to connect the dots of what the enemy is doing. What is much harder to see the contours of is a counter-strategy that uses not just military force but the tools our enemy use. These include outreach, information, engagement in the political field and a serious effort to give the non-Islamist Muslims a modicum of support.
With Iraq sucking the oxygen out of the possibility of focusing on a longer-range and more varied counter-strategy, we are badly hamstrung. We have little or no resources to fight a broader war that is already knocking on our doorstep.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Thursday April 19, 2007
The Wrong Decision on Sudan
Yesterday President Bush was to unveil the long-anticipated "Plan B" for sanctioning the Sudanese regime for the genocide in Darfur. But at the last minute Bush accepted a plea to wait. The Sudanese government had again asked for more time to allow U.N. peacekeepers to arrive.
It is a trick that the Sudanese have successfully used for four years to avoid ending the slaughter of civilians, with the Islamist government's blessing, guidance and support. It simply means more people will die while the regime of Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir drags its feet, backtracks, promises, hems, haws and generally buys several more months. Sooner or later, if he can drag it out long enough, there will be no one left to ethnically cleanse, and then peacekeepers can disembark without opposition.
After at least 450,000 killed and 2 million displaced, why does anyone take Bashir's word on anything? He hasn't done anything to lessen the slaughter since the carnage began. He has repeatedly promised, then retracted, support of peacekeepers.
"The brutal treatment of innocent civilians in Darfur is unacceptable," Bush said. "The status quo must not continue." And yet it is entirely acceptable. For a few weeks, then months, then years.
The irony is that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asked the sanctions be postponed, even as he was presented with concrete evidence the Bashir government was illegally flying weapons to its forces and the _janjaweed_ in Darfur. A U.N. Panel of Experts two days ago presented the UN Security Council with a report outlining the use of Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunships in the region.
In an MO that is the same as Viktor Bout used in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the aircraft were painted white with UN markings on the side. (Coincidence??)
It seems to me the solution is fairly simple. Slap the sanctions on (and even these are weak), with the promise to lift them as soon as the peacekeepers are on the ground. Enforce a no-fly zone. Are we afraid Viktor Bout will lose some old Antonovs?
Go after those who support genocide and terrorism, using the justification of Islam as a gruesome justification. (For a more complete look at Sudan's support of terrorism, see: my recent paper for IASC.
Expose the shameless pandering and spineless refusal to condemn Darfur by Islamists and world power who put their economic interests (China, Russia) above the suffering of the region.
Most troubling to me is the unwillingness of South Africa to support sanctions. Islamist states are protecting friends. China and Russia their investments. South Africa, once a beacon of true liberation, is protecting nothing other than a corrupt and brutal regime, as the Mbeki regime has continued to do in Zimbabwe as well.
The South African government's behavior is a slap in the face not only to its own courageous people who struggled for freedom, but to all who supported that struggle.
It is a trick that the Sudanese have successfully used for four years to avoid ending the slaughter of civilians, with the Islamist government's blessing, guidance and support. It simply means more people will die while the regime of Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir drags its feet, backtracks, promises, hems, haws and generally buys several more months. Sooner or later, if he can drag it out long enough, there will be no one left to ethnically cleanse, and then peacekeepers can disembark without opposition.
After at least 450,000 killed and 2 million displaced, why does anyone take Bashir's word on anything? He hasn't done anything to lessen the slaughter since the carnage began. He has repeatedly promised, then retracted, support of peacekeepers.
"The brutal treatment of innocent civilians in Darfur is unacceptable," Bush said. "The status quo must not continue." And yet it is entirely acceptable. For a few weeks, then months, then years.
The irony is that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asked the sanctions be postponed, even as he was presented with concrete evidence the Bashir government was illegally flying weapons to its forces and the _janjaweed_ in Darfur. A U.N. Panel of Experts two days ago presented the UN Security Council with a report outlining the use of Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunships in the region.
In an MO that is the same as Viktor Bout used in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the aircraft were painted white with UN markings on the side. (Coincidence??)
It seems to me the solution is fairly simple. Slap the sanctions on (and even these are weak), with the promise to lift them as soon as the peacekeepers are on the ground. Enforce a no-fly zone. Are we afraid Viktor Bout will lose some old Antonovs?
Go after those who support genocide and terrorism, using the justification of Islam as a gruesome justification. (For a more complete look at Sudan's support of terrorism, see: my recent paper for IASC.
Expose the shameless pandering and spineless refusal to condemn Darfur by Islamists and world power who put their economic interests (China, Russia) above the suffering of the region.
Most troubling to me is the unwillingness of South Africa to support sanctions. Islamist states are protecting friends. China and Russia their investments. South Africa, once a beacon of true liberation, is protecting nothing other than a corrupt and brutal regime, as the Mbeki regime has continued to do in Zimbabwe as well.
The South African government's behavior is a slap in the face not only to its own courageous people who struggled for freedom, but to all who supported that struggle.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday April 18, 2007
Taliban Resurgent in Nigeria?
News reports from northern Nigeria indicate that a group of Islamist radicals have executed some 13 policemen in what could be a resurgence of the Nigerian "Taliban" or other al Qaeda-affiliated group.
The movement is not new. It first surfaced in 2003, but was widely believed to be eradicated. However, there have been many indications in recent months that radical Islamists were regrouping. The attack is the first fruit of that resurgence.
I tip my hat to J. Peter Pham, who earlier this year wrote about the Return of the Nigerian Taliban.
In his piece he commented on the January trial of a group called Media Trust Ltd., on trial in Abuja on three counts of terrorism. According to the indictment, the Trust director, Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun received $300,000 from al Qaeda accounts in Sudan with the intent that "said money shall be used in the execution of acts of terrorism."
The attacks come as Nigeria is undergoing two-part elections: for the parliament last weekend and, this weekend, for the successor of president Obasanjo. Violence is already flaring following credible reports of massive voter fraud and registration irregularities.
There is no doubting the strategic interest in Nigeria. It produces more than 12 percent of U.S. oil supplies, is the dominant regional economy in West Africa and a potential base for terrorist expansion across West Africa. In addition to radical Islamists in the north, the Niger Delta, where the oil is pumped, is constantly on edge because of the numerous well-armed gangs in the region who routinely kidnap foreign workers and have a running battle with the government.
The electoral process has exacerbated a precarious environment in the northern part of the country, where 12 of the states (out of 36) are already under strict _sharia_ law. It is also an region that has been particularly targeted and talked about by Osama bin Laden as an area for al Qaeda expansion. In his 2003 al Jazeera broadcast, bin Laden specifically mentioned Nigeria as ripe for jihad and deemed the secular government there to be apostate.
As Pham reports:
_The "Nigerian Taliban," which refers to itself as the Muhajirun ("migrants") movement, first appeared around 2003 and was composed, like the Afghan group whose name they adopted, primarily of religious students. Inspired by the latter's vision of an Islamic state run in accord with an extremist interpretation of the Muslim faith, the Nigerian radicals abandoned Maiduguri and, like the prophet of Islam Muhammad who left Mecca for Media, "migrated" away – although in this case the "migration" (hijra) meant moving from the city to the rough bush of Yobe state near the border with Niger._
_Descending from their wilderness retreat, the young militants raided the Yobe state capital of Damaturu in early 2004, attacking police stations. Later that same year, the militants tried to launch a guerrilla campaign around Gwoza, in Borno state near the Cameroonian border. According to press reports – interestingly, the most extensive "inside access" articles were by written by a certain Abdullahi Bego who published in the Weekly Trust – the Nigerian insurgents wanted to establish an Islamic state and pronounced Muslims who opposed them to be "unbelievers" deserving of death._
All of this points to efforts, like those in Somalia, of the _jihadist_ forces to create new fronts in an effort to bleed us dry. Nigeria, with its oil production and acceptance of strict _sharia_ law in part of its territory, is a particularly attractive target with a potentially hospitable base.
The establishing of new fronts, and the potential for Islamists in Nigeria to ally with the GSPC and other militant groups on the continent, are dangerous developments that have profound and far-reaching policy implications.
The movement is not new. It first surfaced in 2003, but was widely believed to be eradicated. However, there have been many indications in recent months that radical Islamists were regrouping. The attack is the first fruit of that resurgence.
I tip my hat to J. Peter Pham, who earlier this year wrote about the Return of the Nigerian Taliban.
In his piece he commented on the January trial of a group called Media Trust Ltd., on trial in Abuja on three counts of terrorism. According to the indictment, the Trust director, Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun received $300,000 from al Qaeda accounts in Sudan with the intent that "said money shall be used in the execution of acts of terrorism."
The attacks come as Nigeria is undergoing two-part elections: for the parliament last weekend and, this weekend, for the successor of president Obasanjo. Violence is already flaring following credible reports of massive voter fraud and registration irregularities.
There is no doubting the strategic interest in Nigeria. It produces more than 12 percent of U.S. oil supplies, is the dominant regional economy in West Africa and a potential base for terrorist expansion across West Africa. In addition to radical Islamists in the north, the Niger Delta, where the oil is pumped, is constantly on edge because of the numerous well-armed gangs in the region who routinely kidnap foreign workers and have a running battle with the government.
The electoral process has exacerbated a precarious environment in the northern part of the country, where 12 of the states (out of 36) are already under strict _sharia_ law. It is also an region that has been particularly targeted and talked about by Osama bin Laden as an area for al Qaeda expansion. In his 2003 al Jazeera broadcast, bin Laden specifically mentioned Nigeria as ripe for jihad and deemed the secular government there to be apostate.
As Pham reports:
_The "Nigerian Taliban," which refers to itself as the Muhajirun ("migrants") movement, first appeared around 2003 and was composed, like the Afghan group whose name they adopted, primarily of religious students. Inspired by the latter's vision of an Islamic state run in accord with an extremist interpretation of the Muslim faith, the Nigerian radicals abandoned Maiduguri and, like the prophet of Islam Muhammad who left Mecca for Media, "migrated" away – although in this case the "migration" (hijra) meant moving from the city to the rough bush of Yobe state near the border with Niger._
_Descending from their wilderness retreat, the young militants raided the Yobe state capital of Damaturu in early 2004, attacking police stations. Later that same year, the militants tried to launch a guerrilla campaign around Gwoza, in Borno state near the Cameroonian border. According to press reports – interestingly, the most extensive "inside access" articles were by written by a certain Abdullahi Bego who published in the Weekly Trust – the Nigerian insurgents wanted to establish an Islamic state and pronounced Muslims who opposed them to be "unbelievers" deserving of death._
All of this points to efforts, like those in Somalia, of the _jihadist_ forces to create new fronts in an effort to bleed us dry. Nigeria, with its oil production and acceptance of strict _sharia_ law in part of its territory, is a particularly attractive target with a potentially hospitable base.
The establishing of new fronts, and the potential for Islamists in Nigeria to ally with the GSPC and other militant groups on the continent, are dangerous developments that have profound and far-reaching policy implications.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH