Monday March 12, 2007
Does Zawahiri's Attack on Hamas Signal Serious Rupture with the Muslim Brotherhood?
Ayman Zawahiri, al Qaeda's deputy leader, issued an unprecedented and blistering attack against Hamas over the weekend, perhaps signaling a permanent rupture between the armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda-led _jihadist_ movements. The translation I am using was done by Laura Mansfield.
These words will not be easy to retract, and making the dispute public will likely find an echo on the Palestinian street, frustrated by the deepening Palestinian divide.
Not only did Zawahiri, and one has to interpret that he is speaking for bin Laden and the "old guard" al Qaeda as well, disagree with Hamas' decision to join the coalition government with Fatah, he taunted and ridiculed Hamas in some of the most insulting terms possible. He takes the unprecedented step of comparing Hamas's policies to those of the hated Anwar Sadat-who members of the Muslim Brotherhood gunned down. In the end he virtually declares Hamas to be the enemy:
_The HAMAS leadership has finally joined the train of Al Sadat for humiliation and capitulation. The HAMAS leadership has sold out Palestine, and earlier it had sold out referring to Shari'ah as the source of jurisdiction. It has sold all that to be allowed to maintain one-third of the government._
_And what kind of government is this that does not have control over entry or exit, and movement between its two parts without a permit from Israel? It is a government whose prime minister is not allowed to enter his homeland and is not allowed to do so unless the Egyptians mediate between him and the Israeli defense minister. He would stay outside in the cold in front of the Rafah crossing until the Israeli minister gives approval._
_For the sake of retaining one third of the seats in this ridiculous government, HAMAS leadership has abandoned the rule of Shar'iah. It has also ceded most of the Palestinian territories. For one-third of the seats of this ridiculous government, they abandoned the resistance movement and accepted the government of bargaining; they abandoned the movement of martyrdom operations and accepted the government of respect for international resolutions; they abandoned the heroic struggler movement and accepted the domesticated beggar government; they abandoned the movement of penetrating the enemy throngs with explosives and accepted the government of playing with words in the halls of palaces. For a third of the seats in t he government, they abandoned the rule of Shari'ah and bowed to the international legitimacy._
_I appeal to all my Muslim brothers to set themselves free from the shackles of the organizations leading them into the mazes of politics. They should know that their affiliation with Islam is higher, more sublime, and more worthy than their affiliation with any group or organization. The groups that have chosen to reconcile with the hireling governments and work in accordance with their constitutions and laws will continue to revolve in a closed circle, and will move from one concession to another. Despite all this, the wolves of the Crusader campaign will not be satisfied with them._
Given that Hamas is a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and intimately tied to Brotherhood structure, it would seem that this harsh attack may have something to do with the moves by the United States to change its alliances in the Middle East due to Iraq, as outlined by Jonathan Winer on the Counterterrorism Blog.
I have also written earlier about the strains between the International Brotherhood in Europe and the _jihadi_ wing of the Islamist movement, over recruitment and tactics. Those strains have clearly been exacerbated in recent months.
It is also likely tied to the internal disputes covered in the Arab press recently within the International Muslim Brotherhood, largely between the Egyptian old guard and the more internationalist wing of the _Ikwan_.
The long-term ramifications are difficult to predict, as al Qaeda has not had a strong presence in the Palestinian territories. But it has used the Palestinian cause as a rallying point and justification for its existence. Zawahiri ominously warns against trying to keep the _mujahadeen_ out of Palestine.
It is not clear what Hamas' response will be. But this is a useful reminder, to myself in particular, that these groups are made up of human beings, and exceptionally intolerant ones at that. It is easy for me to lose sight of that fact that this is not a monolithic movement marching in lockstep, but a series of people.
In covering the Marxist revolutions in Latin America in the 1980s-1990s, I was always surprised by how vehemently different groups fighting for the same general goal, would denounce each other as traitors, sellouts, counter-revolutionaries, tools of imperialism etc.
Viewed in this context this fracturing between armed Islamist groups can produce potentially useful avenues for exploitation if policy and intelligence leaders prioritize such actions as important goals.
These words will not be easy to retract, and making the dispute public will likely find an echo on the Palestinian street, frustrated by the deepening Palestinian divide.
Not only did Zawahiri, and one has to interpret that he is speaking for bin Laden and the "old guard" al Qaeda as well, disagree with Hamas' decision to join the coalition government with Fatah, he taunted and ridiculed Hamas in some of the most insulting terms possible. He takes the unprecedented step of comparing Hamas's policies to those of the hated Anwar Sadat-who members of the Muslim Brotherhood gunned down. In the end he virtually declares Hamas to be the enemy:
_The HAMAS leadership has finally joined the train of Al Sadat for humiliation and capitulation. The HAMAS leadership has sold out Palestine, and earlier it had sold out referring to Shari'ah as the source of jurisdiction. It has sold all that to be allowed to maintain one-third of the government._
_And what kind of government is this that does not have control over entry or exit, and movement between its two parts without a permit from Israel? It is a government whose prime minister is not allowed to enter his homeland and is not allowed to do so unless the Egyptians mediate between him and the Israeli defense minister. He would stay outside in the cold in front of the Rafah crossing until the Israeli minister gives approval._
_For the sake of retaining one third of the seats in this ridiculous government, HAMAS leadership has abandoned the rule of Shar'iah. It has also ceded most of the Palestinian territories. For one-third of the seats of this ridiculous government, they abandoned the resistance movement and accepted the government of bargaining; they abandoned the movement of martyrdom operations and accepted the government of respect for international resolutions; they abandoned the heroic struggler movement and accepted the domesticated beggar government; they abandoned the movement of penetrating the enemy throngs with explosives and accepted the government of playing with words in the halls of palaces. For a third of the seats in t he government, they abandoned the rule of Shari'ah and bowed to the international legitimacy._
_I appeal to all my Muslim brothers to set themselves free from the shackles of the organizations leading them into the mazes of politics. They should know that their affiliation with Islam is higher, more sublime, and more worthy than their affiliation with any group or organization. The groups that have chosen to reconcile with the hireling governments and work in accordance with their constitutions and laws will continue to revolve in a closed circle, and will move from one concession to another. Despite all this, the wolves of the Crusader campaign will not be satisfied with them._
Given that Hamas is a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and intimately tied to Brotherhood structure, it would seem that this harsh attack may have something to do with the moves by the United States to change its alliances in the Middle East due to Iraq, as outlined by Jonathan Winer on the Counterterrorism Blog.
I have also written earlier about the strains between the International Brotherhood in Europe and the _jihadi_ wing of the Islamist movement, over recruitment and tactics. Those strains have clearly been exacerbated in recent months.
It is also likely tied to the internal disputes covered in the Arab press recently within the International Muslim Brotherhood, largely between the Egyptian old guard and the more internationalist wing of the _Ikwan_.
The long-term ramifications are difficult to predict, as al Qaeda has not had a strong presence in the Palestinian territories. But it has used the Palestinian cause as a rallying point and justification for its existence. Zawahiri ominously warns against trying to keep the _mujahadeen_ out of Palestine.
It is not clear what Hamas' response will be. But this is a useful reminder, to myself in particular, that these groups are made up of human beings, and exceptionally intolerant ones at that. It is easy for me to lose sight of that fact that this is not a monolithic movement marching in lockstep, but a series of people.
In covering the Marxist revolutions in Latin America in the 1980s-1990s, I was always surprised by how vehemently different groups fighting for the same general goal, would denounce each other as traitors, sellouts, counter-revolutionaries, tools of imperialism etc.
Viewed in this context this fracturing between armed Islamist groups can produce potentially useful avenues for exploitation if policy and intelligence leaders prioritize such actions as important goals.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday March 9, 2007
A Crucial Difference in Failed States and Criminal States, and Why it Matters
In academic and policy circles there is growing concern about the phenomena of failed states, fragile states, grey areas, "black holes" or any number of other names for areas that are not in control of a central government.
As the new Congressional Research Service report on North Korea shows, however, there is another phenomena that is just as troubling but is often lumped in pile of failed states-the state as a functioning criminal enterprise.
These two types of states offer different, though complimentary advantages to terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations and non-state insurgencies and militias. I have outlined some of these themes in a recent paper for the International Assessment and Strategy Center..
Failed states, according to the Feb. 27 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
create "terrorist safehavens and ungoverned regions that endanger the international community and its citizens."
That is certainly true, and such spaces present a particular challenge when they offer valuable natural resources. The new reports of illegal uranium sales in the Democratic Republic of Congo is only the latest example of how terrorist or criminal groups can profit in areas where there is no state control. The training of Salafist groups in the the Sahel region is another example.
But the CRS report details a separate though often undistinguished threat of states as criminal enterprises. The report details the North Korean regime's extensive ties to drug trafficking, counterfeiting and other criminal activities used to earn hard currency.
A similar situation developed in Liberia under Charles Taylor. Though consistently described as a failed state, it too was a prime example of a ruthless efficient state at the service of a criminal enterprise. In Taylor's case it was diamonds and timber, primarily.
In both cases the state was, in some ways remarkably efficient. It maintained a virtual monopoly on the use of force, controlled the entry and exit point of the country, could issue diplomatic passports and control a central bank. The states could not feed the people, collect the trash, provide electrical services, health care or education.
But the state in each case was perfectly capable of diverting millions of dollars to the small group running the regimes for their own personal enrichment.
The extraction of resources in Liberia or the control of multiple criminal enterprises operating simultaneously in collaboration with the North Korean regime are of surpassing importance because of the opportunities they offer for transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
In Liberia, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Viktor Bout, Lenoid Minin and other terrorists and transnational criminals were able to function not because the state failed, but because the state could guarantee their safety and well-being. The same is true for AQK network in dealing with North Korean and Libya. Kahn dealt with them not because of the failure of those states, but because those states had the architecture to protect him and make his nuclear sales lucrative.
It is an important distinction to keep in mind as we look to the future of this long war.
As the new Congressional Research Service report on North Korea shows, however, there is another phenomena that is just as troubling but is often lumped in pile of failed states-the state as a functioning criminal enterprise.
These two types of states offer different, though complimentary advantages to terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations and non-state insurgencies and militias. I have outlined some of these themes in a recent paper for the International Assessment and Strategy Center..
Failed states, according to the Feb. 27 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
create "terrorist safehavens and ungoverned regions that endanger the international community and its citizens."
That is certainly true, and such spaces present a particular challenge when they offer valuable natural resources. The new reports of illegal uranium sales in the Democratic Republic of Congo is only the latest example of how terrorist or criminal groups can profit in areas where there is no state control. The training of Salafist groups in the the Sahel region is another example.
But the CRS report details a separate though often undistinguished threat of states as criminal enterprises. The report details the North Korean regime's extensive ties to drug trafficking, counterfeiting and other criminal activities used to earn hard currency.
A similar situation developed in Liberia under Charles Taylor. Though consistently described as a failed state, it too was a prime example of a ruthless efficient state at the service of a criminal enterprise. In Taylor's case it was diamonds and timber, primarily.
In both cases the state was, in some ways remarkably efficient. It maintained a virtual monopoly on the use of force, controlled the entry and exit point of the country, could issue diplomatic passports and control a central bank. The states could not feed the people, collect the trash, provide electrical services, health care or education.
But the state in each case was perfectly capable of diverting millions of dollars to the small group running the regimes for their own personal enrichment.
The extraction of resources in Liberia or the control of multiple criminal enterprises operating simultaneously in collaboration with the North Korean regime are of surpassing importance because of the opportunities they offer for transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
In Liberia, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Viktor Bout, Lenoid Minin and other terrorists and transnational criminals were able to function not because the state failed, but because the state could guarantee their safety and well-being. The same is true for AQK network in dealing with North Korean and Libya. Kahn dealt with them not because of the failure of those states, but because those states had the architecture to protect him and make his nuclear sales lucrative.
It is an important distinction to keep in mind as we look to the future of this long war.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday March 7, 2007
Bush and Latin America: Too Little, Too Late?
The overall agenda for Bush's belated trip to Latin America is clearly to try to counter the influence of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, Iran's new best friend in the hemisphere and weapons purchaser extraordinaire.
As my friend Jorge Castaneda writes, it is an attempt at Chavez containment that is "too little, too late."
I have recently written about the emerging terrorist threats from Latin America, and the potential for alliances among terrorist groups, drug trafficking organizations, Central American gangs and weapons merchants.
By ignoring Latin America for six years, the United States has set the stage for a strong and perhaps irreversible (at least in the short term) trend for which we will pay a steep price-the rise of a nationalist ethos that is rapidly allying with radical Islam, at least on a tactical level. Chavez, flush with oil money, can keep several such government afloat (Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Nicaragua) at least for a while.
He can, and has, given Iran a beach head on the continent. He has also spent almost $5 billion on weapons in two years-surpassing China-and those weapons are unlikely to remain stashed in Venezuela. One of the most worrisome items is the purchase of a Kalashnikov weapons factory from Russia.
Hard to imagine that the weapon of choice by armies and insurgent groups around the world will be used solely to meet Venezuela's internal needs. With the FARC, ELN and narco armies sitting next door in Colombia, it is a worrisome trend that their primary weapon will become even more accessible and cheaper.
There are valid alternatives to the failed economic policies and endemic corruption that ushered in the neo-liberal era in Latin America. The responsible left (Lula in Brazil, Bachelet in Chile) have won some recent elections.
But by ignoring the continent almost entirely for six years, the balance of forces has shifted to Chavez and his allies, peddling cheap oil, unworkable solutions and dangerous alliances.
The long-term consequences of this will be an emboldened Iran and Hezbollah in a region where access to this country is easy, cheap and routine. A few days of meetings by Bush, while perhaps useful in some ways, will not make a significant difference in the long-term unless sustained attention is paid.
As my friend Jorge Castaneda writes, it is an attempt at Chavez containment that is "too little, too late."
I have recently written about the emerging terrorist threats from Latin America, and the potential for alliances among terrorist groups, drug trafficking organizations, Central American gangs and weapons merchants.
By ignoring Latin America for six years, the United States has set the stage for a strong and perhaps irreversible (at least in the short term) trend for which we will pay a steep price-the rise of a nationalist ethos that is rapidly allying with radical Islam, at least on a tactical level. Chavez, flush with oil money, can keep several such government afloat (Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Nicaragua) at least for a while.
He can, and has, given Iran a beach head on the continent. He has also spent almost $5 billion on weapons in two years-surpassing China-and those weapons are unlikely to remain stashed in Venezuela. One of the most worrisome items is the purchase of a Kalashnikov weapons factory from Russia.
Hard to imagine that the weapon of choice by armies and insurgent groups around the world will be used solely to meet Venezuela's internal needs. With the FARC, ELN and narco armies sitting next door in Colombia, it is a worrisome trend that their primary weapon will become even more accessible and cheaper.
There are valid alternatives to the failed economic policies and endemic corruption that ushered in the neo-liberal era in Latin America. The responsible left (Lula in Brazil, Bachelet in Chile) have won some recent elections.
But by ignoring the continent almost entirely for six years, the balance of forces has shifted to Chavez and his allies, peddling cheap oil, unworkable solutions and dangerous alliances.
The long-term consequences of this will be an emboldened Iran and Hezbollah in a region where access to this country is easy, cheap and routine. A few days of meetings by Bush, while perhaps useful in some ways, will not make a significant difference in the long-term unless sustained attention is paid.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday March 5, 2007
Another Step on Iran, Hezbollah and Argentina
Interpol, the international police organization, has finally taken the necessary step of issuing red notices, the equivalent of international arrest warrants, against five senior Iranian and one senior Hezbollah official for the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. It was one of the worst acts of Islamist terrorism in the Western hemisphere.
Interpol has mediated a long dispute between Argentine and Iranian officials over the releasing of the red notices since Argentina requested them last year.
In the end, Interpol agreed to request the arrest of several senior Iranian intelligence officials-including the former commander of the Quds Force, the former minister of intelligence and security, the former commander of the Guardians of the Revolution and two embassy employees-along with Imad Fayez Mughniyah, the chief of Hezbollah's exterior military apparatus.
However, the Interpol decision was not a complete victory for Argentina. The international body ruled that no red notices should be issued for former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who currently chairs Iran’s State Expediency Council and is deputy chair of the Assembly of Experts.
It also ruled against issuing a red notice for Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian Foreign Minister, who is currently the chief foreign policy advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Still, the rulings are important for several reasons. First, it places the current Iranian leadership, which now has the international obligation to arrest those named, further into the outlaw or rogue state standing. It ratifies the findings of clear state sponsorship for the attack, and dismisses Iran's claim in the proceedings that it does not have a relationship with Hezbollah.
As Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said today, "The decision by Interpol to issue capture notices for those implicated in the '94 bombing upholds the integrity of the Argentine judicial inquiry which found sufficient evidence to bring criminal charges against these Iranian officials and their Hezbollah proxies."
Second, it is a stark reminder of the willingness and capability of the Iranian regime and its Hezbollah allies, to carry out attacks in this hemisphere against clearly civilian targets. Those who doubt Hezbollah or Iran are interested in or capable of further attacks have failed to learn the lessons of history.
Third, the "name and shame" efforts by the Argentine officials in pressing for the arrest (they know those names will not be arrested by the current regime) is not a U.S. effort to discredit Iranian officials, but the result of solid police work in Argentina, ratified by an international police organization. It also leaves open a valid arrest warrant for these individuals should the regime implode.
Finally, perhaps, it shows that some cases, where the prosecutors and police are diligent enough and tough enough, heinous crimes are not simply forgotten over time, something terrorists and rogue regimes sometimes hope and often achieve.
Interpol has mediated a long dispute between Argentine and Iranian officials over the releasing of the red notices since Argentina requested them last year.
In the end, Interpol agreed to request the arrest of several senior Iranian intelligence officials-including the former commander of the Quds Force, the former minister of intelligence and security, the former commander of the Guardians of the Revolution and two embassy employees-along with Imad Fayez Mughniyah, the chief of Hezbollah's exterior military apparatus.
However, the Interpol decision was not a complete victory for Argentina. The international body ruled that no red notices should be issued for former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who currently chairs Iran’s State Expediency Council and is deputy chair of the Assembly of Experts.
It also ruled against issuing a red notice for Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian Foreign Minister, who is currently the chief foreign policy advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Still, the rulings are important for several reasons. First, it places the current Iranian leadership, which now has the international obligation to arrest those named, further into the outlaw or rogue state standing. It ratifies the findings of clear state sponsorship for the attack, and dismisses Iran's claim in the proceedings that it does not have a relationship with Hezbollah.
As Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said today, "The decision by Interpol to issue capture notices for those implicated in the '94 bombing upholds the integrity of the Argentine judicial inquiry which found sufficient evidence to bring criminal charges against these Iranian officials and their Hezbollah proxies."
Second, it is a stark reminder of the willingness and capability of the Iranian regime and its Hezbollah allies, to carry out attacks in this hemisphere against clearly civilian targets. Those who doubt Hezbollah or Iran are interested in or capable of further attacks have failed to learn the lessons of history.
Third, the "name and shame" efforts by the Argentine officials in pressing for the arrest (they know those names will not be arrested by the current regime) is not a U.S. effort to discredit Iranian officials, but the result of solid police work in Argentina, ratified by an international police organization. It also leaves open a valid arrest warrant for these individuals should the regime implode.
Finally, perhaps, it shows that some cases, where the prosecutors and police are diligent enough and tough enough, heinous crimes are not simply forgotten over time, something terrorists and rogue regimes sometimes hope and often achieve.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday March 5, 2007
The Downward Spiral of Pakistan
It is difficult in the best of times to get good information from the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but my sources who visit the region regularly say the situation is even worse than the dire situation already written about in numerous publications.
The question is rapidly becoming whether the forced U.S. marriage with Musharraf has reached is useful end, given his constant and not so private dalliance with the Taliban. I would argue it has, but the divorce is likely to be messy.
It seems that Musharraf's perception is that India is his main enemy and the Afghan government, the United States and NATO are heavily tilted toward his enemy. So he has reached out to the Taliban on several fronts. In fact, the ties were never really cut. ISI had a role in protecting the Taliban leadership during the U.S.-led occupation, but were not allowed to help al Qaeda, at least not overtly.
One of the more interesting accounts is in theAsia Times, describing a more or less formal alliance with the Taliban while the Taliban separates itself from al Qaeda. Sources in the region say it is clear that some sort of deal has been struck, broader than just the publicly-acknowledged truce in some of the territories.
Given the relatively lame duck status of the Bush administration and the clear understanding that Iran is going to suck up all the remaining policy oxygen, Musharraf can host VP Cheney, promise whatever needs to be promised and be relatively sure he will not be held accountable in a meaningful way. The arrest of Mullah Obaidullah Akhund may be a bone to throw. As noted on Counterterrorism Blog, he has been captured and freed before. My guess is that, in a few months, the whereabouts of the mullah will be unknown.
Musharraf has his reasons for tolerating or even supporting the Taliban, especially if they can somehow unentangle themselves from al Qaeda's direct presence. Pakistan can keep Kabul constantly on the defensive, control a friendly border force and lessen India's influence in the region.
The geopolitics may make sense from Musharraf's perspective, but all this was tried before, in 1995-96, when the Taliban swept to power the first time. It was an unmitigated disaster and Pakistan found itself losing control over an insurgency that was able to open other lines of resupply and build, through the al Qaeda network, other alliances. This is why Viktor Bout was able to sell aircraft to the Taliban-they were branching out from the ISI-Pakistan networks.
Musharraf, like much of the rest of the world, seems to be willing to bet that U.S. interests and resources cannot cover all the bases out there. Besides, he has the bomb, and no one likes to mess with a nuclear power.
The short-term answer is that the NATO forces will have go it alone along the border. There will be no meaningful Pakistani help, and likely a lot of ISI leaks, blocking moves and clandestine support for the Taliban in the upcoming spring offensive. In the long-term, if the Taliban has a form of state sponsorship and the NATO coalition's will wilts with casualties during the upcoming offensive, the prospects are increasingly grim.
The question is rapidly becoming whether the forced U.S. marriage with Musharraf has reached is useful end, given his constant and not so private dalliance with the Taliban. I would argue it has, but the divorce is likely to be messy.
It seems that Musharraf's perception is that India is his main enemy and the Afghan government, the United States and NATO are heavily tilted toward his enemy. So he has reached out to the Taliban on several fronts. In fact, the ties were never really cut. ISI had a role in protecting the Taliban leadership during the U.S.-led occupation, but were not allowed to help al Qaeda, at least not overtly.
One of the more interesting accounts is in the
Given the relatively lame duck status of the Bush administration and the clear understanding that Iran is going to suck up all the remaining policy oxygen, Musharraf can host VP Cheney, promise whatever needs to be promised and be relatively sure he will not be held accountable in a meaningful way. The arrest of Mullah Obaidullah Akhund may be a bone to throw. As noted on Counterterrorism Blog, he has been captured and freed before. My guess is that, in a few months, the whereabouts of the mullah will be unknown.
Musharraf has his reasons for tolerating or even supporting the Taliban, especially if they can somehow unentangle themselves from al Qaeda's direct presence. Pakistan can keep Kabul constantly on the defensive, control a friendly border force and lessen India's influence in the region.
The geopolitics may make sense from Musharraf's perspective, but all this was tried before, in 1995-96, when the Taliban swept to power the first time. It was an unmitigated disaster and Pakistan found itself losing control over an insurgency that was able to open other lines of resupply and build, through the al Qaeda network, other alliances. This is why Viktor Bout was able to sell aircraft to the Taliban-they were branching out from the ISI-Pakistan networks.
Musharraf, like much of the rest of the world, seems to be willing to bet that U.S. interests and resources cannot cover all the bases out there. Besides, he has the bomb, and no one likes to mess with a nuclear power.
The short-term answer is that the NATO forces will have go it alone along the border. There will be no meaningful Pakistani help, and likely a lot of ISI leaks, blocking moves and clandestine support for the Taliban in the upcoming spring offensive. In the long-term, if the Taliban has a form of state sponsorship and the NATO coalition's will wilts with casualties during the upcoming offensive, the prospects are increasingly grim.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH