Wednesday February 28, 2007
A Small But Important Step on Darfur
The International Criminal Court took the small but important step of naming names in the Darfur atrocities, homing in on the inner circle of president Omar Hassan al-Bashir.
The ICC outlines the clear lines of responsibility of senior government officials in the creation and direction of the _janjaweed_ militias now famous for ravaging their own people, raping women and burning desolate huts in a genocidal effort of ethnic cleansing.
It is not enough, but the name and shame campaign is at least a step. Perhaps the West should go further in naming and shaming, now that the government, while long known to be responsible, is finally being called to some modest account.
Sudan is an Islamic republic, run by leaders of the international Muslim Brotherhood. The Darfur atrocities are as much a religious campaign as it is ethnic. Yet no one asks what, in the name of Allah, gives a government of self-proclaimed Islamists, the right, within its own religious context, to carry out such atrocities?
Mentioning the ties of the Sudanese leadership to radical Islamists, and their support for genocide within their own borders, is, for unfathomable reasons, unmentionable in polite policy circles. Yet it is fundamental to what is happening there.
Sudanese leaders sit on the boards of the large Islamist financial institutions, are welcomed around the Islamic world and host meetings of the international Muslim Brotherhood. They are not outcasts, pariahs or even questioned among their own.
Government officials, who openly define their personal and public lives, as Islamists, are perpetrating, aiding, abetting, protecting, arming, supplying Islamist foot soldiers in a war against unarmed civilians. It is genocide.
If it were a Christian theocracy doing this that, claiming to be ruling on biblical principles, the my condemnation would be the same and the world would be in an uproar over the Crusaders rise.
Yet the Islamic world, where almost every government claims the same principles as the _Iqwan_ leadership of Sudan, has done NOTHING to stop the genocide. The rest of the world has done little enough. They have done nothing but condone the actions with their silence.
No condemnation of a group acting in the name of their God, no secret talks, no pressure of any sort. Does that strike only me as other-worldly?
It is time to stop the partial condemnations of the Sudanese Islamist leaders, and talk about what is really happening there, and why. The Stop Darfur campaigns, while commendable, need to broaden their efforts.
The Bush administration does not have the attention span or stomach for it. Mentioning the Islamist aspect of the conflict is still not polite. But it is real, and the atrocities cannot be stopped until that element is acknowledged and dealt with, preferably by some of the great Muslim majority that must hate to see these atrocities done in their name.
The ICC outlines the clear lines of responsibility of senior government officials in the creation and direction of the _janjaweed_ militias now famous for ravaging their own people, raping women and burning desolate huts in a genocidal effort of ethnic cleansing.
It is not enough, but the name and shame campaign is at least a step. Perhaps the West should go further in naming and shaming, now that the government, while long known to be responsible, is finally being called to some modest account.
Sudan is an Islamic republic, run by leaders of the international Muslim Brotherhood. The Darfur atrocities are as much a religious campaign as it is ethnic. Yet no one asks what, in the name of Allah, gives a government of self-proclaimed Islamists, the right, within its own religious context, to carry out such atrocities?
Mentioning the ties of the Sudanese leadership to radical Islamists, and their support for genocide within their own borders, is, for unfathomable reasons, unmentionable in polite policy circles. Yet it is fundamental to what is happening there.
Sudanese leaders sit on the boards of the large Islamist financial institutions, are welcomed around the Islamic world and host meetings of the international Muslim Brotherhood. They are not outcasts, pariahs or even questioned among their own.
Government officials, who openly define their personal and public lives, as Islamists, are perpetrating, aiding, abetting, protecting, arming, supplying Islamist foot soldiers in a war against unarmed civilians. It is genocide.
If it were a Christian theocracy doing this that, claiming to be ruling on biblical principles, the my condemnation would be the same and the world would be in an uproar over the Crusaders rise.
Yet the Islamic world, where almost every government claims the same principles as the _Iqwan_ leadership of Sudan, has done NOTHING to stop the genocide. The rest of the world has done little enough. They have done nothing but condone the actions with their silence.
No condemnation of a group acting in the name of their God, no secret talks, no pressure of any sort. Does that strike only me as other-worldly?
It is time to stop the partial condemnations of the Sudanese Islamist leaders, and talk about what is really happening there, and why. The Stop Darfur campaigns, while commendable, need to broaden their efforts.
The Bush administration does not have the attention span or stomach for it. Mentioning the Islamist aspect of the conflict is still not polite. But it is real, and the atrocities cannot be stopped until that element is acknowledged and dealt with, preferably by some of the great Muslim majority that must hate to see these atrocities done in their name.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday February 26, 2007
Iran's Growing Levers for Counter-Attacking
It is clear that Iran will not halt its nuclear program. How far away the nation is to being able to build a bomb is the subject of much debate, and I don't know enough to opine.
But one thing makes attacking Iran far more difficult and dangerous on a global level than attacking Iraq or Afghanistan because Iran can strike back in many places around the world.
It has a network of well-trained operatives, in the form of Hezbollah operatives and small numbers of Quds forces, already in place, trained in the arts of sabotage, demolitions and intelligence gathering. This network can be activated quickly, if Iran feels the need to retaliate against U.S or European targets.
These groups, in turn, have access to economic resources that make cutting off, even with concerted efforts, because they are deeply entrenched in the grey economies of Africa and Latin America that have been relatively impervious to previous crackdown efforts.
Iran will not be occupied militarily, and will likely be able to continue to function as a state after any possible attack-a state under sanction and pressure, but a state nonetheless, with all the trappings that go with it.
Iraq was destroyed as a functioning state and did not have an outside military wing working for decades to establish itself in the far corners of the world and that retained an independent source of financing.
But the Hezbollah network, which I have written about before, can generate up to $200 million a year, according to intelligence estimates by serious people with significant experience on the ground. This comes not only from the illicit trade and taxes contributed by the Lebanese diasporas in Africa and Latin America, but from legitimate businesses and front companies.
In addition, Hezbollah has won hard-earned credibility by taking on the Israelis last summer and, while not achieving a victory, holding ground and not collapsing, as Arab armies have traditionally done. Despite the Shia-Sunni divide, Hezbollah was seen on the Arab street as at least standing for something, unlike the corrupt and quiescent Arab regimes in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf.
The money flow for Hezbollah is not enough to sustain a state, but more than enough to a keep a non-state actor operational. While some crackdown would likely diminish the flow of money, Hezbollah's financial stream is deeply embedded in the economy, not entirely dependent on donations, as al Qaeda has traditionally been. (This may be changing if al Qaeda is as deeply involved in the drug trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the Taliban is.)
Hezbollah has also carried out sophisticated attacks in the Western Hemisphere (the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires), a model of attacks that could come. Iranian diplomats facilitated the movement of weapons and personnel of Hezbollah to carry out the attack.
There have also been arrests of Hezbollah operatives in the United States, both for financing and in operations personnel stopped at the border. (The latter was revealed in a little-noticed bit of Congressional testimony by Robert Mueller in March 2006. That is something that never happened with al Qaeda.
It seems to me that building and expanding this network has to be one of the key reasons Iran has spent so much time, energy and money courting Latin American leaders. Proximity is extremely important, as is the ability to blend in and cross relatively unsecured borders. Latin American networks have a long history of smuggling people across, with a success rate of about 90 percent. The risk is low and so is the cost.
It seems to me that Venezuela's $4 billion in weapons purchases in two years is also probably not entirely unrelated to Iran and Hezbollah's need to create the ability to strike back at the United States should the need arise.
There is, perhaps, strategic thinking going on into how to deal with this threat if the decision is made to attack Iran. Or if Iran decides to strike preemptively. It seems to me that the way Iran has configured the map to favorably suit its interests should give policy makers a great deal of pause.
But one thing makes attacking Iran far more difficult and dangerous on a global level than attacking Iraq or Afghanistan because Iran can strike back in many places around the world.
It has a network of well-trained operatives, in the form of Hezbollah operatives and small numbers of Quds forces, already in place, trained in the arts of sabotage, demolitions and intelligence gathering. This network can be activated quickly, if Iran feels the need to retaliate against U.S or European targets.
These groups, in turn, have access to economic resources that make cutting off, even with concerted efforts, because they are deeply entrenched in the grey economies of Africa and Latin America that have been relatively impervious to previous crackdown efforts.
Iran will not be occupied militarily, and will likely be able to continue to function as a state after any possible attack-a state under sanction and pressure, but a state nonetheless, with all the trappings that go with it.
Iraq was destroyed as a functioning state and did not have an outside military wing working for decades to establish itself in the far corners of the world and that retained an independent source of financing.
But the Hezbollah network, which I have written about before, can generate up to $200 million a year, according to intelligence estimates by serious people with significant experience on the ground. This comes not only from the illicit trade and taxes contributed by the Lebanese diasporas in Africa and Latin America, but from legitimate businesses and front companies.
In addition, Hezbollah has won hard-earned credibility by taking on the Israelis last summer and, while not achieving a victory, holding ground and not collapsing, as Arab armies have traditionally done. Despite the Shia-Sunni divide, Hezbollah was seen on the Arab street as at least standing for something, unlike the corrupt and quiescent Arab regimes in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf.
The money flow for Hezbollah is not enough to sustain a state, but more than enough to a keep a non-state actor operational. While some crackdown would likely diminish the flow of money, Hezbollah's financial stream is deeply embedded in the economy, not entirely dependent on donations, as al Qaeda has traditionally been. (This may be changing if al Qaeda is as deeply involved in the drug trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the Taliban is.)
Hezbollah has also carried out sophisticated attacks in the Western Hemisphere (the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires), a model of attacks that could come. Iranian diplomats facilitated the movement of weapons and personnel of Hezbollah to carry out the attack.
There have also been arrests of Hezbollah operatives in the United States, both for financing and in operations personnel stopped at the border. (The latter was revealed in a little-noticed bit of Congressional testimony by Robert Mueller in March 2006. That is something that never happened with al Qaeda.
It seems to me that building and expanding this network has to be one of the key reasons Iran has spent so much time, energy and money courting Latin American leaders. Proximity is extremely important, as is the ability to blend in and cross relatively unsecured borders. Latin American networks have a long history of smuggling people across, with a success rate of about 90 percent. The risk is low and so is the cost.
It seems to me that Venezuela's $4 billion in weapons purchases in two years is also probably not entirely unrelated to Iran and Hezbollah's need to create the ability to strike back at the United States should the need arise.
There is, perhaps, strategic thinking going on into how to deal with this threat if the decision is made to attack Iran. Or if Iran decides to strike preemptively. It seems to me that the way Iran has configured the map to favorably suit its interests should give policy makers a great deal of pause.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday February 23, 2007
Iran Moving Aggressively in Latin America
Seems like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela is not the only one who is entering into new strategic alliances with Iran while much of the world is backing away.
It is not much of a surprise that Nicaragua's new/old president Daniel Ortega has, according to my sources who have seen the documents, already signed agreements to send a small group of "diplomats" to Tehran for intelligence training.
In addition, Nicaragua will support Iran's nuclear ambitions and other Iranian positions. In exchange, Nicaragua will get a hydroelectric plant, a motorcycle factory and other economic toys. This is all in concert with Venezuela, who, as today's Washington Post reports, Chavez is consolidating his control in Venezuela while buying support of other nations. Along with his "brother" Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Chavez is pledging a $2 billion investment fund for the region.
Chavez and Ahmadinejad are certainly free to spend their money as they see fit. The aid is given without the stringent marco economic conditions of the loans from the World Bank and IMF. Fine.
But there are conditions nonetheless, and it is truly unbelievable to read that there are those who think this is all done from the altruistic natures of Chavez and Ahmadinejad.
The deals will include support for Iran in myriad forms. One of them is expanding Iranian influence (and hence the influence of Hezbollah and other radical Shiite groups) through intelligence penetrations, "cultural" exchanges and general access to these countries.
Iran is likely to strike similar deals with Ecuador and Bolivia. While training is fine, it is unlikely the schools to be attended are on the niceties of diplomatic ins and outs. As far as I can tell, that is not a notable forte of Iran, at least as it relates to diplomatic activities in the Western Hemisphere.
The deal with Ortega, whom I covered extensively in the 1980s and 1990s is particularly troubling because of Ortega's long history in facilitating the clandestine movement of terrorists and his willingness to grant citizenship to members of the Red Brigade, under assumed names, along with more than 100 known terrorists and criminals. (This is amply documented in reports just after Ortega left office in 1990, when the massive, illegal granting of citizenship was discovered).
But one of my most vivid memories, and most interesting stories I investigated at the time, was the massive underground bunker that Ortega and his intelligence apparatus kept in the heart of Managua. Its existence became known in 1992 when some of the explosives inside blew up, causing a fire and prompting an investigation Ortega could not control.
Inside were literally hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of false IDs, blank passports (including diplomatic), money, weapons-everything needed to aid a non-state group if needed. Much of it been used by the FMLN in El Salvador, but there were records going to international terrorist organizations around the world.
Ortega's brother Humberto was so alarmed by the explosion that he showed up in the darkness of the early morning, in his pajamas, to try to begin a cover-up.
Ultimately, what was most dangerous was not that the Sandinistas and Ortega had mounted the infrastructure, with help from the Cubans and Soviet bloc, to maintain links to like-minded groups.
It was that, two years after losing the elections and long after the Contra wars ended, no one in the Sandinista leadership, certainly not Ortega, had ever told the new government of the existence of the cache, or moved to remove either the documents or the weapons.
Ortega, through years of struggle, and later as president of a government that grew increasingly repressive, learned how to build clandestine operations as well as how to run sophisticated intelligence apparatuses. That apparatus has been largely dismantled, but the knowledge and training remain.
It is hard to imagine those going to Iran will not come back with more of the latest intelligence hardware, software and training. And it is hard to imagine that Hezbollah and the Quds Forces operatives will not enjoy the facilities that Ortega has put at the disposal of terrorist groups in his past presidency.
It is not much of a surprise that Nicaragua's new/old president Daniel Ortega has, according to my sources who have seen the documents, already signed agreements to send a small group of "diplomats" to Tehran for intelligence training.
In addition, Nicaragua will support Iran's nuclear ambitions and other Iranian positions. In exchange, Nicaragua will get a hydroelectric plant, a motorcycle factory and other economic toys. This is all in concert with Venezuela, who, as today's Washington Post reports, Chavez is consolidating his control in Venezuela while buying support of other nations. Along with his "brother" Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Chavez is pledging a $2 billion investment fund for the region.
Chavez and Ahmadinejad are certainly free to spend their money as they see fit. The aid is given without the stringent marco economic conditions of the loans from the World Bank and IMF. Fine.
But there are conditions nonetheless, and it is truly unbelievable to read that there are those who think this is all done from the altruistic natures of Chavez and Ahmadinejad.
The deals will include support for Iran in myriad forms. One of them is expanding Iranian influence (and hence the influence of Hezbollah and other radical Shiite groups) through intelligence penetrations, "cultural" exchanges and general access to these countries.
Iran is likely to strike similar deals with Ecuador and Bolivia. While training is fine, it is unlikely the schools to be attended are on the niceties of diplomatic ins and outs. As far as I can tell, that is not a notable forte of Iran, at least as it relates to diplomatic activities in the Western Hemisphere.
The deal with Ortega, whom I covered extensively in the 1980s and 1990s is particularly troubling because of Ortega's long history in facilitating the clandestine movement of terrorists and his willingness to grant citizenship to members of the Red Brigade, under assumed names, along with more than 100 known terrorists and criminals. (This is amply documented in reports just after Ortega left office in 1990, when the massive, illegal granting of citizenship was discovered).
But one of my most vivid memories, and most interesting stories I investigated at the time, was the massive underground bunker that Ortega and his intelligence apparatus kept in the heart of Managua. Its existence became known in 1992 when some of the explosives inside blew up, causing a fire and prompting an investigation Ortega could not control.
Inside were literally hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of false IDs, blank passports (including diplomatic), money, weapons-everything needed to aid a non-state group if needed. Much of it been used by the FMLN in El Salvador, but there were records going to international terrorist organizations around the world.
Ortega's brother Humberto was so alarmed by the explosion that he showed up in the darkness of the early morning, in his pajamas, to try to begin a cover-up.
Ultimately, what was most dangerous was not that the Sandinistas and Ortega had mounted the infrastructure, with help from the Cubans and Soviet bloc, to maintain links to like-minded groups.
It was that, two years after losing the elections and long after the Contra wars ended, no one in the Sandinista leadership, certainly not Ortega, had ever told the new government of the existence of the cache, or moved to remove either the documents or the weapons.
Ortega, through years of struggle, and later as president of a government that grew increasingly repressive, learned how to build clandestine operations as well as how to run sophisticated intelligence apparatuses. That apparatus has been largely dismantled, but the knowledge and training remain.
It is hard to imagine those going to Iran will not come back with more of the latest intelligence hardware, software and training. And it is hard to imagine that Hezbollah and the Quds Forces operatives will not enjoy the facilities that Ortega has put at the disposal of terrorist groups in his past presidency.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 21, 2007
Problems with the DOJ Numbers
The Washington Post today carried a look at problems with the Justice Department's accounting of the number of terrorism cases it handles and other issues.
One thing stands out: the statement that U.S. attorneys "counted hundreds of terrorism cases that did not qualify for the designation because they involved minor crimes with no connection to terrorist activities."
This may be true in a technical sense, and there may be some deep problems with DOJ record keeping. As the Inspector General said, it may be decentralized, haphazard and in need of an overhaul.
But it is also wrong to summarily discount the cases made against suspected terrorists on other charges, because those are the charges that could be brought.
The notion that cases involving drug trafficking, marriage fraud and other things are unrelated to terrorism is simply naive and legalistic. Any of these crimes can (an perhaps have been) used to further terrorist activities in this country.
Under the IG's thinking, Al Capone would have counted as a tax case, not an organized crime case, because he was put out of business on tax charges. He would have been convicted of only minor crimes with no connection to organized criminal activity.
Making terrorism cases stick is difficult, time consuming and expensive. The practitioners of terrorism are well versed in denial and deception, covering their tracks and skirting the law. This leaves DOJ often with the option of going for what it can get rather than what it would like in a perfect world.
DOJ may have some serious problems, every agency does. But the standardization of accounting of terrorist cases should not simply throw out every other type of prosecution because it does not fit the preconceived notion of what terrorism crimes really entail.
One thing stands out: the statement that U.S. attorneys "counted hundreds of terrorism cases that did not qualify for the designation because they involved minor crimes with no connection to terrorist activities."
This may be true in a technical sense, and there may be some deep problems with DOJ record keeping. As the Inspector General said, it may be decentralized, haphazard and in need of an overhaul.
But it is also wrong to summarily discount the cases made against suspected terrorists on other charges, because those are the charges that could be brought.
The notion that cases involving drug trafficking, marriage fraud and other things are unrelated to terrorism is simply naive and legalistic. Any of these crimes can (an perhaps have been) used to further terrorist activities in this country.
Under the IG's thinking, Al Capone would have counted as a tax case, not an organized crime case, because he was put out of business on tax charges. He would have been convicted of only minor crimes with no connection to organized criminal activity.
Making terrorism cases stick is difficult, time consuming and expensive. The practitioners of terrorism are well versed in denial and deception, covering their tracks and skirting the law. This leaves DOJ often with the option of going for what it can get rather than what it would like in a perfect world.
DOJ may have some serious problems, every agency does. But the standardization of accounting of terrorist cases should not simply throw out every other type of prosecution because it does not fit the preconceived notion of what terrorism crimes really entail.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday February 20, 2007
It Is Time to Face the Russia's Real Agenda
Secretary of State Rice seems baffled by Vladimir Putin's recent speech denouncing the United States in some of the harshest terms possible, as Anne Applebaum eloquently points out in the Washington Post.
But the time for treating Russia like a trustworthy ally in fighting global terror, or having common interests with the United States in Latin America, Africa or Europe has long passed. Only the administration, perhaps still tied by Bush's peering into Putin's soul, seems oblivious to what Russia really wants-to reestablish itself as a world power whose interests will often collide directly with the interests of the United States and its allies.
Russia is a sovereign state, and most (with important exceptions) of its clients are also sovereign states, with the right to enter into these international agreements. But it is time to stop pretending Russia's interests are anything but extremely hostile to combatting Islamist terrorism, stabilizing key regions and ending regional conflicts that pose the real threat of becoming much broader wars.
The first is Russia's ongoing supply of weapons to Iran and Hezbollah at a time when both are posing direct threats to U.S. interests in several regions, including Iraq and Lebanon. This has been well documented, including senior Israeli officials' formal protest to Russia over the sale of sophisticated anti-tank weapons that Hezbollah used with great effect in last summer's war.
This link to Hezbollah, in which Viktor Bout is alleged by U.S. and foreign intelligence officials to be directly involved, has drawn little public comment from U.S. officials.
There are other cases cases much closer to home that have drawn little response from the Bush administration. The Chavez government in Venezuela has spent some $4.3 billion on weapons since 2005, placing it ahead of China ($3.4 billion); Pakistan ($3 billion); and Iran ($1.7 billion), according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Most of those weapons come from Russia, including the construction of a Kalashnikov (AK-103) assault rifle factory, combat helicopters, missiles and fighter jets. I recently wrote a paper on it for the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
The sales come as Chavez has gone out of his way to court Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran. The two presidents have held at least three face-to-face meetings in the past six months, and address each other as "brother."
The growing economic ties between the two nations can be seen in the dozens of economic agreements the two leaders have signed in that time, and the mutual support for cutting OPEC’s oil production, which is significant given that the two countries are OPEC’s second and fourth largest oil producers, respectively.
The real impact of Russia's weapons sales to Venezuela and Iran will be felt in several regions.
Chavez has long had at least tacitly support the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the major drug trafficking organizations in the world. The FARC, when I used to deal with its members in the early 1990s as a _Washington Post_ reporter, retained some vestiges of a true insurrection, whether one agreed with them or not. There was an ideological cohesion.
That has now devolved into an organization with little political agenda beyond making billions of dollars from protecting coca and poppy fields, moving cocaine and heroin and supporting the major cartels. They need weapons, and one can safely assume, I believe, that Chavez's revolutionary support will extend beyond his own borders.
This risks destabilizing not only Colombia, but the rest of the Andean ridge, from Ecuador through Peru and to Bolivia.
The Chavez-Ahmadinejad axis, with Russian weapons and support, will likely also have a direct impact on supporting the extensive Hezbollah network of money and operatives that flow through Latin America. Iran directly sponsors the group, Russia arms the group and Venezuela offers the friendly ground for operations. Not a pretty picture.
It is hard to imagine Secretary Rice really meaning what she said on Feb. 15: "I have a difficult time explaining that (Putin) speech. It doesn't accord with either the world as we see it nor with the character of our interactions with the Russians."
Unfortunately, the speech was a clear articulation of what Russia is doing around the world. Perhaps that is not the world Secretary Rice sees, but it is visible to almost anyone else.
But the time for treating Russia like a trustworthy ally in fighting global terror, or having common interests with the United States in Latin America, Africa or Europe has long passed. Only the administration, perhaps still tied by Bush's peering into Putin's soul, seems oblivious to what Russia really wants-to reestablish itself as a world power whose interests will often collide directly with the interests of the United States and its allies.
Russia is a sovereign state, and most (with important exceptions) of its clients are also sovereign states, with the right to enter into these international agreements. But it is time to stop pretending Russia's interests are anything but extremely hostile to combatting Islamist terrorism, stabilizing key regions and ending regional conflicts that pose the real threat of becoming much broader wars.
The first is Russia's ongoing supply of weapons to Iran and Hezbollah at a time when both are posing direct threats to U.S. interests in several regions, including Iraq and Lebanon. This has been well documented, including senior Israeli officials' formal protest to Russia over the sale of sophisticated anti-tank weapons that Hezbollah used with great effect in last summer's war.
This link to Hezbollah, in which Viktor Bout is alleged by U.S. and foreign intelligence officials to be directly involved, has drawn little public comment from U.S. officials.
There are other cases cases much closer to home that have drawn little response from the Bush administration. The Chavez government in Venezuela has spent some $4.3 billion on weapons since 2005, placing it ahead of China ($3.4 billion); Pakistan ($3 billion); and Iran ($1.7 billion), according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Most of those weapons come from Russia, including the construction of a Kalashnikov (AK-103) assault rifle factory, combat helicopters, missiles and fighter jets. I recently wrote a paper on it for the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
The sales come as Chavez has gone out of his way to court Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran. The two presidents have held at least three face-to-face meetings in the past six months, and address each other as "brother."
The growing economic ties between the two nations can be seen in the dozens of economic agreements the two leaders have signed in that time, and the mutual support for cutting OPEC’s oil production, which is significant given that the two countries are OPEC’s second and fourth largest oil producers, respectively.
The real impact of Russia's weapons sales to Venezuela and Iran will be felt in several regions.
Chavez has long had at least tacitly support the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the major drug trafficking organizations in the world. The FARC, when I used to deal with its members in the early 1990s as a _Washington Post_ reporter, retained some vestiges of a true insurrection, whether one agreed with them or not. There was an ideological cohesion.
That has now devolved into an organization with little political agenda beyond making billions of dollars from protecting coca and poppy fields, moving cocaine and heroin and supporting the major cartels. They need weapons, and one can safely assume, I believe, that Chavez's revolutionary support will extend beyond his own borders.
This risks destabilizing not only Colombia, but the rest of the Andean ridge, from Ecuador through Peru and to Bolivia.
The Chavez-Ahmadinejad axis, with Russian weapons and support, will likely also have a direct impact on supporting the extensive Hezbollah network of money and operatives that flow through Latin America. Iran directly sponsors the group, Russia arms the group and Venezuela offers the friendly ground for operations. Not a pretty picture.
It is hard to imagine Secretary Rice really meaning what she said on Feb. 15: "I have a difficult time explaining that (Putin) speech. It doesn't accord with either the world as we see it nor with the character of our interactions with the Russians."
Unfortunately, the speech was a clear articulation of what Russia is doing around the world. Perhaps that is not the world Secretary Rice sees, but it is visible to almost anyone else.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH