Wednesday February 21, 2007
The Islamist Media Campaign Kicks Into High Gear
This past week has been interesting for the sudden re-emergence of the high-profile al Qaeda/salafist propaganda machine, showing a broad range of Islamist actions to demonstrate the movement is alive and well, and triumph is inevitable.
The different fronts in the propaganda war are interesting and seem to have some coordination, at least the timing if not the entire scope of all the messages.
We get the publishing a slick web zine, the "Voice of Jihad," after a two-year hiatus, including directions from Osama bin Laden to attack oil facilities; a Zawahiri interview blasting Bush for fairly current events; the release of videos by al Qaeda in Afghanistan, supposedly showing attacks on Coalition forces; and, as Evan Kohlmann finds new video releases by Al Qaeda in Iraq, including the biographies of foreign troops killed there.
This media onslaught is not a small accomplishment, especially given the relatively good quality of the products. They are far better than some of the recent _jihadi_ websites out of the _salafist_ forces in Somalia, for example.
Much of what is said in this recent spate is entirely propaganda, but it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. It shows those who visit the _jihadi_ sites that the Islamist movement is alive and well, capable of delivering messages and combating the enemy on a sustained basis.
These are no longer the hurried communiques and grainy videos of the not-so-distant past. It shows the priority these groups place on communicating, not just with fellow _jihadis_ but with the world at large.
That may be one reason why bin Laden asks that all attacks be documented and filmed from beginning to end: "Sheikh Usama's directions are clear and frank in targeting the oil interests ... and the beauty of the target choice, and the collection of the documentary media materials of the operation, to be complete to all operation stages from the planning, the preparation and the execution," the article states.
The message on attacking oil facilities, as Daveed Gartenstein-Ross notes, is a significant shift from earlier positions on the desirability of keeping the oil wealth to establish the future Caliphate.
As has long been the case, the _Salafists_ have been keenly aware of value of protecting their image. This is shown by the resources dedicated to writing their own narrative. It does not have to be true or accurate, but it has to be close enough so it is credible and support the main theme of the narrative being woven.
In this case the narrative is that Islam is on the rise, the West is in retreat, and that Allah has already granted victory to the faithful. All that is lacking are more willing recruits.
Any insurgent group, fighting in an asymmetrical context for the long term, has to develop a narrative to justify itself, comfort its often-beleaguered members and attract new members.
What must be developed is the counter-narrative, one that resonates, explains the weaknesses and defeats, and can help drive away new recruits. It is hard, but not impossible. Multiple insurgencies have faced, and suffered from, effective counter-narratives that were culturally appropriate and accessible to the right population. It is not clear we have a counter-narrative, in part because we still do not agree 1) one who the enemy is and 2) that we really are in a war.
The different fronts in the propaganda war are interesting and seem to have some coordination, at least the timing if not the entire scope of all the messages.
We get the publishing a slick web zine, the "Voice of Jihad," after a two-year hiatus, including directions from Osama bin Laden to attack oil facilities; a Zawahiri interview blasting Bush for fairly current events; the release of videos by al Qaeda in Afghanistan, supposedly showing attacks on Coalition forces; and, as Evan Kohlmann finds new video releases by Al Qaeda in Iraq, including the biographies of foreign troops killed there.
This media onslaught is not a small accomplishment, especially given the relatively good quality of the products. They are far better than some of the recent _jihadi_ websites out of the _salafist_ forces in Somalia, for example.
Much of what is said in this recent spate is entirely propaganda, but it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. It shows those who visit the _jihadi_ sites that the Islamist movement is alive and well, capable of delivering messages and combating the enemy on a sustained basis.
These are no longer the hurried communiques and grainy videos of the not-so-distant past. It shows the priority these groups place on communicating, not just with fellow _jihadis_ but with the world at large.
That may be one reason why bin Laden asks that all attacks be documented and filmed from beginning to end: "Sheikh Usama's directions are clear and frank in targeting the oil interests ... and the beauty of the target choice, and the collection of the documentary media materials of the operation, to be complete to all operation stages from the planning, the preparation and the execution," the article states.
The message on attacking oil facilities, as Daveed Gartenstein-Ross notes, is a significant shift from earlier positions on the desirability of keeping the oil wealth to establish the future Caliphate.
As has long been the case, the _Salafists_ have been keenly aware of value of protecting their image. This is shown by the resources dedicated to writing their own narrative. It does not have to be true or accurate, but it has to be close enough so it is credible and support the main theme of the narrative being woven.
In this case the narrative is that Islam is on the rise, the West is in retreat, and that Allah has already granted victory to the faithful. All that is lacking are more willing recruits.
Any insurgent group, fighting in an asymmetrical context for the long term, has to develop a narrative to justify itself, comfort its often-beleaguered members and attract new members.
What must be developed is the counter-narrative, one that resonates, explains the weaknesses and defeats, and can help drive away new recruits. It is hard, but not impossible. Multiple insurgencies have faced, and suffered from, effective counter-narratives that were culturally appropriate and accessible to the right population. It is not clear we have a counter-narrative, in part because we still do not agree 1) one who the enemy is and 2) that we really are in a war.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 21, 2007
Some Straight Talk on Afghanistan and an Interesting Arrest in Texas
Two very pessimistic reports on the combat situation in Afghanistan point to the fundamental risk there of failure, a risk that is also very high in Somalia, where the same mistakes are being repeated by the United States, the local government and the international community.
The danger in Somalia is borne out by the Texas arrest of U.S. citizen who was trained in Somalia and acknowledges spending time with al Qaeda operatives there, according to an FBI affidavit. Along with numerous Europeans and other Africans, Daniel Maldanado went to Somalia to fight for a true Islamic republic, the affidavit says.
Two things are distressing about the bleak assessments, although they are welcome for their uncharacteristic candor. The first is that the lessons of Afghanistan appear to have not been assimilated at all in the policy community.
That is, the lessons of the first Afghanistan fiasco, when, following the Soviet retreat, little attention was paid to developments there.
The resulting Taliban triumph within a few years, and the rise of the radical _salafist_ theology that seeks to obliterate us, should have been as much of prod to learn lessons as there can be. Yet, despite the loss of blood and treasure there since 9-11, virtually nothing appears to have been learned. And that is indeed tragic.
The second is that, unable to assimilate those lessons in the most urgent of times, there is little learning that can be applied to situations like Somalia. In other words, we are, as we currently sit, as vulnerable or more than we were prior to 9-11 from those non-state actors operating in stateless areas, failed states and criminal states.
First, Army Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry warned of the entrenched Taliban network in Pakistan, with renewed command and control capabilities, under the protection of Pakistani security forces.
He also warned in stark terms that the Karzai government is faced with the strong possibility of an irreversible loss of legitimacy, one that will give the Taliban the opening it craves to return to power.
This came as the Canadian senate issued a gloomy report on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, warning that the mission will fail unless significantly more resources are dedicated to the struggle there.
It is clear in Afghanistan that the coalition forces won the military war and set the stage for the civilians to follow suit in the political and psychological wars that would inevitably follow. In Somalia, the Ethiopians, at great cost and some risk, removed the Union of Islamic Courts, setting the stage for similar follow-up.
In both cases the civilian governments have failed miserably. But our policy has reflected no anticipation of events that were not difficult to anticipate. The constant short-term tradeoffs in Afghanistan with the warlords, the unwillingness to confront Pakistan over the entrenched Islamist presence in the territories, the inability come up with mechanisms to induce the interim Somali government to form a truly broad-based, national government, have all undermined the chances for long-term success.
The problem is that these regions are a direct threat to us, and reversing these reversals will cost human lives, perhaps many of them. These will be primarily of the troops who will have to be dispatched again to stabilize the situation, and perhaps those of our citizens and allies here and abroad who will suffer from the attacks that will be launched from there.
They will be launched. But we will likely have learned little.
The danger in Somalia is borne out by the Texas arrest of U.S. citizen who was trained in Somalia and acknowledges spending time with al Qaeda operatives there, according to an FBI affidavit. Along with numerous Europeans and other Africans, Daniel Maldanado went to Somalia to fight for a true Islamic republic, the affidavit says.
Two things are distressing about the bleak assessments, although they are welcome for their uncharacteristic candor. The first is that the lessons of Afghanistan appear to have not been assimilated at all in the policy community.
That is, the lessons of the first Afghanistan fiasco, when, following the Soviet retreat, little attention was paid to developments there.
The resulting Taliban triumph within a few years, and the rise of the radical _salafist_ theology that seeks to obliterate us, should have been as much of prod to learn lessons as there can be. Yet, despite the loss of blood and treasure there since 9-11, virtually nothing appears to have been learned. And that is indeed tragic.
The second is that, unable to assimilate those lessons in the most urgent of times, there is little learning that can be applied to situations like Somalia. In other words, we are, as we currently sit, as vulnerable or more than we were prior to 9-11 from those non-state actors operating in stateless areas, failed states and criminal states.
First, Army Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry warned of the entrenched Taliban network in Pakistan, with renewed command and control capabilities, under the protection of Pakistani security forces.
He also warned in stark terms that the Karzai government is faced with the strong possibility of an irreversible loss of legitimacy, one that will give the Taliban the opening it craves to return to power.
This came as the Canadian senate issued a gloomy report on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, warning that the mission will fail unless significantly more resources are dedicated to the struggle there.
It is clear in Afghanistan that the coalition forces won the military war and set the stage for the civilians to follow suit in the political and psychological wars that would inevitably follow. In Somalia, the Ethiopians, at great cost and some risk, removed the Union of Islamic Courts, setting the stage for similar follow-up.
In both cases the civilian governments have failed miserably. But our policy has reflected no anticipation of events that were not difficult to anticipate. The constant short-term tradeoffs in Afghanistan with the warlords, the unwillingness to confront Pakistan over the entrenched Islamist presence in the territories, the inability come up with mechanisms to induce the interim Somali government to form a truly broad-based, national government, have all undermined the chances for long-term success.
The problem is that these regions are a direct threat to us, and reversing these reversals will cost human lives, perhaps many of them. These will be primarily of the troops who will have to be dispatched again to stabilize the situation, and perhaps those of our citizens and allies here and abroad who will suffer from the attacks that will be launched from there.
They will be launched. But we will likely have learned little.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 21, 2007
The More Things Change...
Several recent events show just how little the world has changed since 9-11, despite promises, proclamations, and flat-out falsehoods that try to paint a different picture.
The two incidents that stand out are the Saudi arrests of 10 "terrorist financiers," and the continued hate that appears in Saudi and Iranian textbooks.
The charade has gone on since 9-11, and is unlikely to change anytime soon. The current reason that the actions are likely to continue unabated is the Shi'ite resurgence, which is shaking the Sunni regimes of the Gulf to their core. The escalating conflict between Sunni and Shi'ite seems to have launched a new wave of sectarian attacks between the two, carried out in newspapers, TV shows and textbooks so that children learn to hate early.
Since 9-11 the pattern with the Saudi on these issues has been unchanging. Protests are raised, the Saudi say they are changing and/or cracking down, criticism subsides and then life goes back to normal. Adel Al Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador-designate to the U.S., is a true master of offering the various and shifting Saudi defenses of the indefensible. Let's hope the Congress keeps him plenty busy by continuing to ask the necessary questions and demanding the administration follow up.
At the same time the Saudis are touting the arrest of mostly political dissidents as terrorist sponsors, the elites of Saudi society are working extremely hard to get the few designated terror supporters (Wa'el Julaidan, Yasin al Qadi et al) off the U.N. and U.S. sanctions list. Others are being rehabilitated in other ways. My friends following this closely say the Saudi government has given virtually everyone designated a clean bill of health, allowing them to again write in Saudi newspapers and lifting whatever minor restrictions may have existed on their activities.
The case of the textbooks, to me, is the most disturbing and not unrelated to the terror financing issues. Both go to the core of the _wahhabist_ belief that any compromise with any other group, even if they are Muslims, is forbidden by Allah. These are deeply theological issues, not simple policy options one can choose to change at some point for political reasons. This is the fundamental issue that U.S. and European foreign policy does not yet take into account. You cannot negotiate with Allah's immutable word. But we keep trying in the mistaken belief there can be trade offs, compromises and a tactical decisions that are based on worldly considerations.
To keep succeeding generations on board, this stereotyping of Jews, Christians (and Shi'ites), the indoctrination must start at a very young age. This cannot change if the _wahhabi_ grip is to maintain its hold. The schools are the necessary venue for sowing these seeds. Likewise, financing _jihad_ is crucial to the Saudi interpretation of theology. You cannot stop people from spending for Allah's cause. It simply will not happen.
So the prospects for any sort of real change are not good, and falling as the Sunnis feel threatened. It is time to recognize that within our policy. There are absolutes that will not change until the _wahhabis_ are gone. Al Jubeir can talk for years about the changes taking place, but they are words who can package the unacceptable for a Western audience. It doesn't mean anything is going to change. Little has since 9-11.
The two incidents that stand out are the Saudi arrests of 10 "terrorist financiers," and the continued hate that appears in Saudi and Iranian textbooks.
The charade has gone on since 9-11, and is unlikely to change anytime soon. The current reason that the actions are likely to continue unabated is the Shi'ite resurgence, which is shaking the Sunni regimes of the Gulf to their core. The escalating conflict between Sunni and Shi'ite seems to have launched a new wave of sectarian attacks between the two, carried out in newspapers, TV shows and textbooks so that children learn to hate early.
Since 9-11 the pattern with the Saudi on these issues has been unchanging. Protests are raised, the Saudi say they are changing and/or cracking down, criticism subsides and then life goes back to normal. Adel Al Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador-designate to the U.S., is a true master of offering the various and shifting Saudi defenses of the indefensible. Let's hope the Congress keeps him plenty busy by continuing to ask the necessary questions and demanding the administration follow up.
At the same time the Saudis are touting the arrest of mostly political dissidents as terrorist sponsors, the elites of Saudi society are working extremely hard to get the few designated terror supporters (Wa'el Julaidan, Yasin al Qadi et al) off the U.N. and U.S. sanctions list. Others are being rehabilitated in other ways. My friends following this closely say the Saudi government has given virtually everyone designated a clean bill of health, allowing them to again write in Saudi newspapers and lifting whatever minor restrictions may have existed on their activities.
The case of the textbooks, to me, is the most disturbing and not unrelated to the terror financing issues. Both go to the core of the _wahhabist_ belief that any compromise with any other group, even if they are Muslims, is forbidden by Allah. These are deeply theological issues, not simple policy options one can choose to change at some point for political reasons. This is the fundamental issue that U.S. and European foreign policy does not yet take into account. You cannot negotiate with Allah's immutable word. But we keep trying in the mistaken belief there can be trade offs, compromises and a tactical decisions that are based on worldly considerations.
To keep succeeding generations on board, this stereotyping of Jews, Christians (and Shi'ites), the indoctrination must start at a very young age. This cannot change if the _wahhabi_ grip is to maintain its hold. The schools are the necessary venue for sowing these seeds. Likewise, financing _jihad_ is crucial to the Saudi interpretation of theology. You cannot stop people from spending for Allah's cause. It simply will not happen.
So the prospects for any sort of real change are not good, and falling as the Sunnis feel threatened. It is time to recognize that within our policy. There are absolutes that will not change until the _wahhabis_ are gone. Al Jubeir can talk for years about the changes taking place, but they are words who can package the unacceptable for a Western audience. It doesn't mean anything is going to change. Little has since 9-11.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 21, 2007
The Muslim Brotherhood Makes its Move in Palestinian Territories
The big winner in the Hamas-Fatah peace pact appears to be the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is an armed branch.
While giving up very little Hamas, through the intercession of leaders of the Brotherhood, has sidestepped the issue of recognizing Israel while ceding little to Fatah and opening the way, they hope, for international recognition. This is a common tactical decision by the Brotherhood, which is often willing to trade off short-term contradictions for long-term gains, with the clear understanding that anything written now can be rewritten later.
But the fundamental issue between Fatah and Hamas ( and the Brotherhood) is deep and perhaps irreconcilable, and goes to the heart of the Islamist project. For Hamas, it is a religious matter of faith that Israel cannot be recognized and the Caliphate must be reestablished. Fatah, for all its bumbling incompetence, sees the territorial issues as a matter of policy and politics.
The noted scholar Mamaoun Fandy, recently warned in an article excerpted in the Middle East Media Research Institute, the Muslim Brotherhood has now conquered Palestine as a symbol in the Arab world.
This conquest "will transform [the Palestinian problem] from a resolvable territorial struggle into a religious struggle that cannot be resolved," he wrote. A reversal of this trend is highly unlikely because al Jazeera is, at least in large part, controlled by the Mulim Brotherhood, giving it the dominant medium in the region.
Here is a further excerpt that captures the dilemma, both for secular Palestinians and outside policy makers:
"At the time, the incitement was nationalist [in character], while today - after the Muslim Brotherhood has conquered a significant part of the symbolic Palestine - the incitement has become Islamist, and the domestic has become commingled with the external. This is because the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological discourse is not based on the separation of the domestic and the external, and because their ideology transcends the borders of [particular Arab] states.
"Hasn't the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt said that he had no objection to having [even] a Malaysian Muslim rule Egypt, as long as it was not ruled by a Coptic Egyptian? Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood conquest of the symbolic Palestine means giving the [Palestinian] problem a religious character - and herein lies the danger.
"First of all, giving the Palestinian problem a religious character will lead to a Malaysian Muslim having more rights in Palestine than a Christian Palestinian. Likewise, it will transform [the Palestinian problem] from a resolvable territorial struggle into a religious struggle that cannot be resolved."
This move by the Brotherhood, as it strengthens its hand in Egypt and grows in influence in Europe and the United States, has gone largely unnoticed and is likely not clearly understood by U.S. policy makers. The focus is almost entirely on Hamas' unwillingness to recognize Israel, which is a valid point.
But the much larger point is that the Brotherhood is succeeding in creating a governed space, making the already-difficult resolution of any conflict impossible.
Fatah has led in the Hamas electoral victory through kleptocracy, nepotism, corruption, human rights abuse and sheer incompetence. There is little that can be in its defense. Except that the alternative will be far worse.
While giving up very little Hamas, through the intercession of leaders of the Brotherhood, has sidestepped the issue of recognizing Israel while ceding little to Fatah and opening the way, they hope, for international recognition. This is a common tactical decision by the Brotherhood, which is often willing to trade off short-term contradictions for long-term gains, with the clear understanding that anything written now can be rewritten later.
But the fundamental issue between Fatah and Hamas ( and the Brotherhood) is deep and perhaps irreconcilable, and goes to the heart of the Islamist project. For Hamas, it is a religious matter of faith that Israel cannot be recognized and the Caliphate must be reestablished. Fatah, for all its bumbling incompetence, sees the territorial issues as a matter of policy and politics.
The noted scholar Mamaoun Fandy, recently warned in an article excerpted in the Middle East Media Research Institute, the Muslim Brotherhood has now conquered Palestine as a symbol in the Arab world.
This conquest "will transform [the Palestinian problem] from a resolvable territorial struggle into a religious struggle that cannot be resolved," he wrote. A reversal of this trend is highly unlikely because al Jazeera is, at least in large part, controlled by the Mulim Brotherhood, giving it the dominant medium in the region.
Here is a further excerpt that captures the dilemma, both for secular Palestinians and outside policy makers:
"At the time, the incitement was nationalist [in character], while today - after the Muslim Brotherhood has conquered a significant part of the symbolic Palestine - the incitement has become Islamist, and the domestic has become commingled with the external. This is because the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological discourse is not based on the separation of the domestic and the external, and because their ideology transcends the borders of [particular Arab] states.
"Hasn't the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt said that he had no objection to having [even] a Malaysian Muslim rule Egypt, as long as it was not ruled by a Coptic Egyptian? Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood conquest of the symbolic Palestine means giving the [Palestinian] problem a religious character - and herein lies the danger.
"First of all, giving the Palestinian problem a religious character will lead to a Malaysian Muslim having more rights in Palestine than a Christian Palestinian. Likewise, it will transform [the Palestinian problem] from a resolvable territorial struggle into a religious struggle that cannot be resolved."
This move by the Brotherhood, as it strengthens its hand in Egypt and grows in influence in Europe and the United States, has gone largely unnoticed and is likely not clearly understood by U.S. policy makers. The focus is almost entirely on Hamas' unwillingness to recognize Israel, which is a valid point.
But the much larger point is that the Brotherhood is succeeding in creating a governed space, making the already-difficult resolution of any conflict impossible.
Fatah has led in the Hamas electoral victory through kleptocracy, nepotism, corruption, human rights abuse and sheer incompetence. There is little that can be in its defense. Except that the alternative will be far worse.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday February 21, 2007
What is Going on in Madagascar?
It is passing strange that Madagascar, the large island off of East Africa, has come up several times in the past week in relation to terrorism and terror finance.
The first was the death of Osma bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, well-known for his support of radical Islamists. He happened to be on the island as a gemstone dealer.
Seems as though the group that killed him took his computer and some personal belongings, but not the stones that were there. Somewhat unlikely for a robbery. Given Khalifa's extensive ties to al Qaeda financial activities and various designated terrorist financiers and charities, the connection to the gemstone trade is tantalizing.
From the earliest days of my diamond coverage I was told of a strong al Qaeda connection to rubies and sapphires in Madagascar, begun at about the same time as al Qaeda's interest in diamonds in West Africa and tanzanite in Tanzania.
This fits with the timeframe of al Qaeda making a concerted move to put their assets into commodities. The move came after the August 1998 bombing of two American embassies in East Africa and the subsequent freezing of some $220 million of Taliban and al Qaeda gold in the Federal Reserve system by the Clinton administration.
(The freezing was almost accidental, as the Clinton people had no idea the gold was here. But sometimes it is better to be lucky than have good intelligence, perhaps.)
Sapphires led to a mining boom in Madagascar, beginning in 1998, drawing a large influx of foreigners, including a large contingent of Islamists from Pakistan and the Arab Peninsula eager to cash in.
There are folks in the intelligence community that do not agree with my findings on this issue, but there are also senior folks in the community who not only believe it to be true, but who believe Khalifa was involved in the gemstone trade on behalf of al Qaeda and/or other Islamist groups.
What is interesting is the surfacing in Madagascar of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of the architects of the 1998 bombings of two U.S. Embassies in East Africa, as well as one of the three main al Qaeda operatives identified by my sources as being in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000-2001 to buy diamonds.
Fazul is from the nearby Comoros Islands, as was reportedly on the ground in Liberia, staying at a guest house rented by Ibrahim Bah, during the time al Qaeda was buying diamonds.
Fazul is also believed by the intelligence community to be directly involved with the Islamists in Somalia, now driven from power but trying to make a come back.
I find all of this too much to be a coincidence. Draw your own conclusions.
The first was the death of Osma bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, well-known for his support of radical Islamists. He happened to be on the island as a gemstone dealer.
Seems as though the group that killed him took his computer and some personal belongings, but not the stones that were there. Somewhat unlikely for a robbery. Given Khalifa's extensive ties to al Qaeda financial activities and various designated terrorist financiers and charities, the connection to the gemstone trade is tantalizing.
From the earliest days of my diamond coverage I was told of a strong al Qaeda connection to rubies and sapphires in Madagascar, begun at about the same time as al Qaeda's interest in diamonds in West Africa and tanzanite in Tanzania.
This fits with the timeframe of al Qaeda making a concerted move to put their assets into commodities. The move came after the August 1998 bombing of two American embassies in East Africa and the subsequent freezing of some $220 million of Taliban and al Qaeda gold in the Federal Reserve system by the Clinton administration.
(The freezing was almost accidental, as the Clinton people had no idea the gold was here. But sometimes it is better to be lucky than have good intelligence, perhaps.)
Sapphires led to a mining boom in Madagascar, beginning in 1998, drawing a large influx of foreigners, including a large contingent of Islamists from Pakistan and the Arab Peninsula eager to cash in.
There are folks in the intelligence community that do not agree with my findings on this issue, but there are also senior folks in the community who not only believe it to be true, but who believe Khalifa was involved in the gemstone trade on behalf of al Qaeda and/or other Islamist groups.
What is interesting is the surfacing in Madagascar of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of the architects of the 1998 bombings of two U.S. Embassies in East Africa, as well as one of the three main al Qaeda operatives identified by my sources as being in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000-2001 to buy diamonds.
Fazul is from the nearby Comoros Islands, as was reportedly on the ground in Liberia, staying at a guest house rented by Ibrahim Bah, during the time al Qaeda was buying diamonds.
Fazul is also believed by the intelligence community to be directly involved with the Islamists in Somalia, now driven from power but trying to make a come back.
I find all of this too much to be a coincidence. Draw your own conclusions.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH