Wednesday February 21, 2007
A More Accurate Face of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia
The Washington Post carries on a prominent academic who argues that _wahhabism_ in Saudi Arabia emerged not solely from religious motivation, but from political considerations as well.
This reinterpretation core Saudi history by Khalid al-Dakhil has been largely blocked from publication in Saudi Arabia and around the Gulf because it weakens one of the fundamental articles of faith of _Wahhabi_ legitimacy: that the _Wahhabi_ movement was purely and divinely a relgious movement ordained to bring wandering Muslims back to the true way.
Al-Dakhil argues that the religious component of the _Wahhabists_ was a supplement to their political motives of establishing a single state on the Arab peninsula at at time when the region was governed by dozens of micro-states.
As one analyst told the _Post_, such a fundamental questioning of the divine origins of _wahhabism_ would be akin to finding that the Pilgrims were in fact atheists.
Khalid al-Dakhil's research shows that the early _wahhabists_ used religion as a political tool to force cohesion. In order to do that, they had to create the "us" and "them," with the "us" having a divine mandate to exclude all others under penalty of death.
The concept is not new, but al-Dakhil's willingness to articulate it is perhaps a small sign of hope of change in countries under _wahhabist_ regimes. He has survived, although he has been put on leave from his university position. Some, but not all of his writings have been published on the peninsula.
It takes unusual courage to question, and ultimately try to rewrite, the history of one's own country. This is especially true when it goes directly to the religious core of a society.
As I have heard on numerous occassions from courageous Muslim speakers in this country, most of the problem of _wahhabism_ is a problem within Islam. It is not something non-believers can debate or resolve.
Only when the non-_wahhabists_ find the courage and space to speak up can that battle be engaged. So far the Islamists, in the form of the clergy on the Arab peninsula, the international Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and the Brotherhood's affiliates in the United States, have set almost all the terms of the debate.
Not only that, they have monopolized, to the exclusion of every other Muslim group, the political space and political organizations that are deemed competent to deal with the U.S. and European governments.
Change is slow and hard. But it may be happening.
Sen. Barbara Boxer, by revoking an award given to CAIR, showed it is possible, and perhaps represents a sea change in the political establishment's willingness to deal with Islamist groups.
Khalid al-Dakhil is shaking up another part of the world and pushing back. These are thin reeds that need to be nurished, but reeds none the less.
This reinterpretation core Saudi history by Khalid al-Dakhil has been largely blocked from publication in Saudi Arabia and around the Gulf because it weakens one of the fundamental articles of faith of _Wahhabi_ legitimacy: that the _Wahhabi_ movement was purely and divinely a relgious movement ordained to bring wandering Muslims back to the true way.
Al-Dakhil argues that the religious component of the _Wahhabists_ was a supplement to their political motives of establishing a single state on the Arab peninsula at at time when the region was governed by dozens of micro-states.
As one analyst told the _Post_, such a fundamental questioning of the divine origins of _wahhabism_ would be akin to finding that the Pilgrims were in fact atheists.
Khalid al-Dakhil's research shows that the early _wahhabists_ used religion as a political tool to force cohesion. In order to do that, they had to create the "us" and "them," with the "us" having a divine mandate to exclude all others under penalty of death.
The concept is not new, but al-Dakhil's willingness to articulate it is perhaps a small sign of hope of change in countries under _wahhabist_ regimes. He has survived, although he has been put on leave from his university position. Some, but not all of his writings have been published on the peninsula.
It takes unusual courage to question, and ultimately try to rewrite, the history of one's own country. This is especially true when it goes directly to the religious core of a society.
As I have heard on numerous occassions from courageous Muslim speakers in this country, most of the problem of _wahhabism_ is a problem within Islam. It is not something non-believers can debate or resolve.
Only when the non-_wahhabists_ find the courage and space to speak up can that battle be engaged. So far the Islamists, in the form of the clergy on the Arab peninsula, the international Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and the Brotherhood's affiliates in the United States, have set almost all the terms of the debate.
Not only that, they have monopolized, to the exclusion of every other Muslim group, the political space and political organizations that are deemed competent to deal with the U.S. and European governments.
Change is slow and hard. But it may be happening.
Sen. Barbara Boxer, by revoking an award given to CAIR, showed it is possible, and perhaps represents a sea change in the political establishment's willingness to deal with Islamist groups.
Khalid al-Dakhil is shaking up another part of the world and pushing back. These are thin reeds that need to be nurished, but reeds none the less.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday February 2, 2007
The Hamas Verdicts and New Methods
As Matt Levitt wrote of yesteray's verdict in the Hamas trial: "The case highlights the difficulty of prosecuting individuals for their support to terrorist groups when that support is conducted under the cover of humanitarian or political activity."
This is why new methods of tracing potential terrorist finance activity is so crucial. The Justice Department and IRS are finally breaking new ground in this type of investigation, as shown by the Overland-DMI case now before a grand jury in Boston.
It is almost always impossible to prove that one action (fund raising, hate preaching etc.) leads directly to another (bus bombs, suicide bombs, airplane hijackings). _Jihadi_ internet sites praise these actions, call for the death of Muslim British soldiers and urge the killing of infidels. But can you prove that one specific message on a website led one person to carry out a suicide bombing or plot the assassination of British soldiers?
Very difficult, if not impossible. Radicalization is seldom an overnight event. It is the product of environment, constant messages affirming _jihad_ as Allah's will, and countless other factors that build up over time. This is why the structure, funded by radical _salafist_ blessing in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations, has to be the real target. Isolating individual acts within that will almost always lead to charges (as we have recently seen in Britain, and see here with CAIR, ISNA and others) of "taking statements out of context," "Islamophobia" etc.
The material support laws on terrorism were changed after 9-11 but seem to be little understood or used, and juries seem to have a hard time incorporating the less stringent standards into their verdicts.
But potential tax fraud (no one has been charged and the presumption of innocence is important) is a different matter. So is undeclared membership in political groups, even if those groups are not deemed illegal or terrorist. It is vital that the full range of tools be used wherever they can be.
These types of cases are far easier to prove, and far easier for jurors to understand. It does not involve when a group was declared a terrorist entity or whether the money moved was used for "political" or "military" purposes.
This is also why the money trail is a vulnerable part, if it surfaces in the formal financial sector (as opposed to the Islamic banking system, charities or gem stones). There is almost always something illegal in how the money is moved, declared or taxed. Applying these tools is vitally necessary.
Within the IRS and DOJ there is a cadre of trained investigators and prosecutors that are finally beginning to see the potential contours of myriad money trails that run through the United States. It is clear from the Hezbollah-North Carolina case and many others that the United States is fertile ground for money raising activities.
It is also clear that Islmist groups like DMI and several others, have widespread investments in the United States, often through proxie offshore companies with overlapping directorships. They seem to be especially fond of commercial real estate ventures.
That is not illegal (unless the entity states in judicial proceedings that it has no such investments), and many other people do the same thing. But if there is any chance these groups are using illicit methods that could go to help people who want to kill us, they should be investigated, and, if merited, prosecuted.
This is why new methods of tracing potential terrorist finance activity is so crucial. The Justice Department and IRS are finally breaking new ground in this type of investigation, as shown by the Overland-DMI case now before a grand jury in Boston.
It is almost always impossible to prove that one action (fund raising, hate preaching etc.) leads directly to another (bus bombs, suicide bombs, airplane hijackings). _Jihadi_ internet sites praise these actions, call for the death of Muslim British soldiers and urge the killing of infidels. But can you prove that one specific message on a website led one person to carry out a suicide bombing or plot the assassination of British soldiers?
Very difficult, if not impossible. Radicalization is seldom an overnight event. It is the product of environment, constant messages affirming _jihad_ as Allah's will, and countless other factors that build up over time. This is why the structure, funded by radical _salafist_ blessing in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations, has to be the real target. Isolating individual acts within that will almost always lead to charges (as we have recently seen in Britain, and see here with CAIR, ISNA and others) of "taking statements out of context," "Islamophobia" etc.
The material support laws on terrorism were changed after 9-11 but seem to be little understood or used, and juries seem to have a hard time incorporating the less stringent standards into their verdicts.
But potential tax fraud (no one has been charged and the presumption of innocence is important) is a different matter. So is undeclared membership in political groups, even if those groups are not deemed illegal or terrorist. It is vital that the full range of tools be used wherever they can be.
These types of cases are far easier to prove, and far easier for jurors to understand. It does not involve when a group was declared a terrorist entity or whether the money moved was used for "political" or "military" purposes.
This is also why the money trail is a vulnerable part, if it surfaces in the formal financial sector (as opposed to the Islamic banking system, charities or gem stones). There is almost always something illegal in how the money is moved, declared or taxed. Applying these tools is vitally necessary.
Within the IRS and DOJ there is a cadre of trained investigators and prosecutors that are finally beginning to see the potential contours of myriad money trails that run through the United States. It is clear from the Hezbollah-North Carolina case and many others that the United States is fertile ground for money raising activities.
It is also clear that Islmist groups like DMI and several others, have widespread investments in the United States, often through proxie offshore companies with overlapping directorships. They seem to be especially fond of commercial real estate ventures.
That is not illegal (unless the entity states in judicial proceedings that it has no such investments), and many other people do the same thing. But if there is any chance these groups are using illicit methods that could go to help people who want to kill us, they should be investigated, and, if merited, prosecuted.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday January 31, 2007
A Serious Look at Islamist Banking in the United States
The Wall Street Journal has a fascinating story (viewable for free for a few days) on the criminal tax investigation launched by the Justice Department into the activities of one of the largest Islamist banking entities-Dar al-Maal Al- Islami Trust (DMI).
The case centers on investments made through a company called Overland Capital Group Inc. Two of Overland's offices in Boston were searched last week by IRS officials, according filings by federal prosecutors.
No one has been charged with any offense and the search warrant remains under seal. What is interesting is that the motion disclosing the investigation was filed by a prosecutor from the DOJ's Counterterrorism division.
Might this be the Al Capone method of getting at opaque Islamist financial structures in the United States?
As is often the case with Islamic banking institutions, the route to DMI is circuitous and not designed to be easily followed. DMI was founded in 1981 by the Arab Gulf elite as an Islamist alternative to the Western banking system.
It is one of the main financial institutions used by the international Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Turabi, Osama bin Laden's benefactor in Sudan, sat on the board for almost a decade, and Yousef al-Qaradawi, one of the chief Brotherhood theologians has also been associated with the financial institution.
While DMI and several of its subsidiaries (including, as the Journal points out, Faisal Private Bank, Switzerland aka Faisal Finance) have been investigated for issues related to alleged terror finance, no charges were filed. This is the first criminal investigation made public against an Islamic banking institution in the United States.
In the forward to a 1981 booklet by DMI entitled "Studies on Islamic Economy and Contemporary Transactions," Dr. Ibrahim Mustapha Kamel wrote that DMI was "founded my desire to engage a Jihad to lift the flaw on Islamic financial and economic transactions". "Among this group of Mujahideen, Dr Ali Abdel Kader [author of the book] remains what he also was, a lighthouse...We are following Jihad in our modern times."
The actual money under investigation came through a DMI subsidiary based in the Bahamas called the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (IICG), who appear on DMI annual reports as wholly-owned subsidiaries of DMI.
What is interesting is that, in its motion to be dismissed from the 9-11 civil law suit, DMI filed a statement saying U.S courts had no jurisidiction over DMI because "DMI S.A. has no substantive contacts at all with this country (the United States). DMI S.A. has never done business, maintained a place of business or been licensed to do business in any U.S. jurisdiction." However, it now appears that its wholly-owned subsidiary did. The _Journal_ quotes a senior DMI official as saying that "DMI has sister companies and those sister companies have retained Overland occassionally as investment advisers."
DOJ's public motion came as the response to IICG's request for discovery in an civil arbitration hearing with disgruntled Overland employees. The judge's ruling granting the stay of discovery says that the "grand jury investigation of Overland Capital will be irreparably harmed" if discovery proceeds in the arbitration case.
The _Journal_ says that, according to corporate and legal records, Overaland's foreign backers have structured many of their U.S. investments through a network of shell companies in offshore havens such as the Cayman Islands. This allows the investors to to structure the investments as loans instead of equity, offering large potential tax benefits.
The case centers on investments made through a company called Overland Capital Group Inc. Two of Overland's offices in Boston were searched last week by IRS officials, according filings by federal prosecutors.
No one has been charged with any offense and the search warrant remains under seal. What is interesting is that the motion disclosing the investigation was filed by a prosecutor from the DOJ's Counterterrorism division.
Might this be the Al Capone method of getting at opaque Islamist financial structures in the United States?
As is often the case with Islamic banking institutions, the route to DMI is circuitous and not designed to be easily followed. DMI was founded in 1981 by the Arab Gulf elite as an Islamist alternative to the Western banking system.
It is one of the main financial institutions used by the international Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan al-Turabi, Osama bin Laden's benefactor in Sudan, sat on the board for almost a decade, and Yousef al-Qaradawi, one of the chief Brotherhood theologians has also been associated with the financial institution.
While DMI and several of its subsidiaries (including, as the Journal points out, Faisal Private Bank, Switzerland aka Faisal Finance) have been investigated for issues related to alleged terror finance, no charges were filed. This is the first criminal investigation made public against an Islamic banking institution in the United States.
In the forward to a 1981 booklet by DMI entitled "Studies on Islamic Economy and Contemporary Transactions," Dr. Ibrahim Mustapha Kamel wrote that DMI was "founded my desire to engage a Jihad to lift the flaw on Islamic financial and economic transactions". "Among this group of Mujahideen, Dr Ali Abdel Kader [author of the book] remains what he also was, a lighthouse...We are following Jihad in our modern times."
The actual money under investigation came through a DMI subsidiary based in the Bahamas called the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (IICG), who appear on DMI annual reports as wholly-owned subsidiaries of DMI.
What is interesting is that, in its motion to be dismissed from the 9-11 civil law suit, DMI filed a statement saying U.S courts had no jurisidiction over DMI because "DMI S.A. has no substantive contacts at all with this country (the United States). DMI S.A. has never done business, maintained a place of business or been licensed to do business in any U.S. jurisdiction." However, it now appears that its wholly-owned subsidiary did. The _Journal_ quotes a senior DMI official as saying that "DMI has sister companies and those sister companies have retained Overland occassionally as investment advisers."
DOJ's public motion came as the response to IICG's request for discovery in an civil arbitration hearing with disgruntled Overland employees. The judge's ruling granting the stay of discovery says that the "grand jury investigation of Overland Capital will be irreparably harmed" if discovery proceeds in the arbitration case.
The _Journal_ says that, according to corporate and legal records, Overaland's foreign backers have structured many of their U.S. investments through a network of shell companies in offshore havens such as the Cayman Islands. This allows the investors to to structure the investments as loans instead of equity, offering large potential tax benefits.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday January 29, 2007
Africa: Different Paths to Success and Failure
The designation of two South Africans for suspected ties to al Qaeda is the latest public evidence of the radical Islamist pipeline that runs through the heart of sub-Saharan Africa.
The U.S. military and part of the Intelligence Community are slowly focusing on the spreading threat there. As my friend Victor Comras noted on the Counterterrorism Blog, obtaining this designation package has been a long and ardous process, with little support from South Africa or the United Nations. Here is another interesting article on the Imam involved.
But what is just as interesting as the stories of possible Islamist penetrations are those of the Islamists' possible failures. The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements portrays al Qaeda's efforts to mobilize _jihadist_ fighters to Darfur as long on effort and short on results, despite the obvious interest of Osama bin Laden and other core al Qaeda leaders to raising up an Islamist force to fight there.
An April 23, 2006, audiotape of bin Laden, broadcast on al Jazeera TV, called on the "mujahadeen and their supporters, especially in Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula, to prepare for a long war against the Crusader plunderers of Western Sudan," and said the goal of the fight was not to "defend the Kharoum government but to defend Islam, its lands and its people."
Following the statement, _jihadist_ web sites published articles directed to "all Those who Wish to Reach Darfur," and "From Here Stretches the Way to Darfur." On Sept. 29, 2006, Ayman Zawahiri released a video criticizing the possible deployment of an international peace-keeping force and calling on his audience to "defend your land and your honor from the Crusader's aggression, which is now hiding behind the masks of the United Nations...Nothing will protect you but a _jihadi_ popular war led by the _mujahadeen."_
But almost nothing seems to have come of these exhortations and pleas. While a few minor training camps may be used by al Qaeda-affliliated groups, there has been little noticeable response to the pleas to open the new front. Many of us (myself included) focus on the seeming success of the Islamists. But this seems to have been a rather abject failure.
The question is why, and the PRISM piece, to my mind, does not answer the question satisfactorily. It ascribes the failure to the anger Hasan al Turabi, bin Laden's benefactor when the al Qaeda leader lived in Sudan, for recent "liberal" statements that angered fundamentalists. It also credits the Sudanese government with seeing the dangers of having an al Qaeda affiliated insurgency in Darfur.
This seems to me to be, at best, a partial set of reasons. The deeper reasons why so few heeded the call must be studied seriously in order to begin to understand what _jihadi_ appeals draw support among what groups. If that can be understood, then how to counter those appeals can be better understood.
Perhaps bin Laden simply misread the situation in Darfur, where the slaughter by Muslims of other Muslims may have alienated much of the potential African recruiting base. Maybe there are cultural factors, or language factors that caused the message to fall flat.
There is not enough knowledge within most of the IC to be able to really look at what works and what doesn't inside Islamist circles. There is a real opportunity to, I think, slow down the cancer if one can understand why some healthy cells successfully fight it off and others succumb.
The U.S. military and part of the Intelligence Community are slowly focusing on the spreading threat there. As my friend Victor Comras noted on the Counterterrorism Blog, obtaining this designation package has been a long and ardous process, with little support from South Africa or the United Nations. Here is another interesting article on the Imam involved.
But what is just as interesting as the stories of possible Islamist penetrations are those of the Islamists' possible failures. The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements portrays al Qaeda's efforts to mobilize _jihadist_ fighters to Darfur as long on effort and short on results, despite the obvious interest of Osama bin Laden and other core al Qaeda leaders to raising up an Islamist force to fight there.
An April 23, 2006, audiotape of bin Laden, broadcast on al Jazeera TV, called on the "mujahadeen and their supporters, especially in Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula, to prepare for a long war against the Crusader plunderers of Western Sudan," and said the goal of the fight was not to "defend the Kharoum government but to defend Islam, its lands and its people."
Following the statement, _jihadist_ web sites published articles directed to "all Those who Wish to Reach Darfur," and "From Here Stretches the Way to Darfur." On Sept. 29, 2006, Ayman Zawahiri released a video criticizing the possible deployment of an international peace-keeping force and calling on his audience to "defend your land and your honor from the Crusader's aggression, which is now hiding behind the masks of the United Nations...Nothing will protect you but a _jihadi_ popular war led by the _mujahadeen."_
But almost nothing seems to have come of these exhortations and pleas. While a few minor training camps may be used by al Qaeda-affliliated groups, there has been little noticeable response to the pleas to open the new front. Many of us (myself included) focus on the seeming success of the Islamists. But this seems to have been a rather abject failure.
The question is why, and the PRISM piece, to my mind, does not answer the question satisfactorily. It ascribes the failure to the anger Hasan al Turabi, bin Laden's benefactor when the al Qaeda leader lived in Sudan, for recent "liberal" statements that angered fundamentalists. It also credits the Sudanese government with seeing the dangers of having an al Qaeda affiliated insurgency in Darfur.
This seems to me to be, at best, a partial set of reasons. The deeper reasons why so few heeded the call must be studied seriously in order to begin to understand what _jihadi_ appeals draw support among what groups. If that can be understood, then how to counter those appeals can be better understood.
Perhaps bin Laden simply misread the situation in Darfur, where the slaughter by Muslims of other Muslims may have alienated much of the potential African recruiting base. Maybe there are cultural factors, or language factors that caused the message to fall flat.
There is not enough knowledge within most of the IC to be able to really look at what works and what doesn't inside Islamist circles. There is a real opportunity to, I think, slow down the cancer if one can understand why some healthy cells successfully fight it off and others succumb.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday January 26, 2007
A Serious Problem with The Surge
The Bush administration has finally turned its attention in a serious way to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. It has, of course, been seriously deteriorating for some time and the attention is likely to be brief.
Afghanistan has been the victim of international attention deficit disorder. Not only the Bush administration suffers this malady that could snatch dfeat from victory.
What has changed in the past 18 months? The Taliban have new weapons, vehicles, communications equipment with encryption, and outreach and propaganda facilities.
Seriously rethinking how to try to retake the initiative is long overdue. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have gone from a defeated, dejected force under fire even from fellow travelers, to resilient heroes in the past two years.
Given the lack of security, people are helping the Taliban, if not for conviction, then out of fear that, ultimately, the Taliban will return, as they have in several provinces already.
The massive focus on Iraq by the Bush administration would have been less damaging to Afghanistan if NATO and other allies had been more willing to pick up the slack.
Unlike the Iraq invasion, where Bush stood virtually alone and the U.S. set the strategy, Afghanistan was a widely supported effort. There was recognition in Europe and NATO that the persistence of the Taliban state and al Qaeda haven were not just a threat to the United States but to the broader Western world.
The consequences of the years of complacency and blind assumptions are now clear. Coming up on six years after occupation of Afghanistan, more opium than ever before in its history is being grown. My sources recently returned from there say the Taliban (the role of al Qaeda is far less clear) are financing their resurgence, including premium payments for new armed recruits, from the opium and heroin trade. The central government controls little more than Kabul. Warlords have increased in power.
Senior Afghani officials talk of the billions in wasted aid, the massive duplication of efforts, the creation of parallel bureaucracies outside of state control, that led much of the international reconstruction project still-born.
Many NATO nations (with the notable exception of the Dutch, Canadians and Brits) have caveats on what their forces can do, when they can engage and what the operational bounderies are. It is a terrible thing to go to war. It is even worse if you are in a war and your senior civilian authorities are unwilling to admit that fact.
Because of Iraq, including the surge now underway, the U.S. has no ability to put more troops into the Afghanistan theater. NATO will likely do little to alter the current situation. The Taliban continues to recruit, arm and train.
Afghanistan's window of opportunity may already be closed. The circumstances that led to the chance for true change, and the undercutting of the appeal of the Taliban, are radically changed. More money and a few minutes of attention will not recreate the tipping point that seems to have tilted decidedly toward chaos and away from victory.
Afghanistan has been the victim of international attention deficit disorder. Not only the Bush administration suffers this malady that could snatch dfeat from victory.
What has changed in the past 18 months? The Taliban have new weapons, vehicles, communications equipment with encryption, and outreach and propaganda facilities.
Seriously rethinking how to try to retake the initiative is long overdue. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have gone from a defeated, dejected force under fire even from fellow travelers, to resilient heroes in the past two years.
Given the lack of security, people are helping the Taliban, if not for conviction, then out of fear that, ultimately, the Taliban will return, as they have in several provinces already.
The massive focus on Iraq by the Bush administration would have been less damaging to Afghanistan if NATO and other allies had been more willing to pick up the slack.
Unlike the Iraq invasion, where Bush stood virtually alone and the U.S. set the strategy, Afghanistan was a widely supported effort. There was recognition in Europe and NATO that the persistence of the Taliban state and al Qaeda haven were not just a threat to the United States but to the broader Western world.
The consequences of the years of complacency and blind assumptions are now clear. Coming up on six years after occupation of Afghanistan, more opium than ever before in its history is being grown. My sources recently returned from there say the Taliban (the role of al Qaeda is far less clear) are financing their resurgence, including premium payments for new armed recruits, from the opium and heroin trade. The central government controls little more than Kabul. Warlords have increased in power.
Senior Afghani officials talk of the billions in wasted aid, the massive duplication of efforts, the creation of parallel bureaucracies outside of state control, that led much of the international reconstruction project still-born.
Many NATO nations (with the notable exception of the Dutch, Canadians and Brits) have caveats on what their forces can do, when they can engage and what the operational bounderies are. It is a terrible thing to go to war. It is even worse if you are in a war and your senior civilian authorities are unwilling to admit that fact.
Because of Iraq, including the surge now underway, the U.S. has no ability to put more troops into the Afghanistan theater. NATO will likely do little to alter the current situation. The Taliban continues to recruit, arm and train.
Afghanistan's window of opportunity may already be closed. The circumstances that led to the chance for true change, and the undercutting of the appeal of the Taliban, are radically changed. More money and a few minutes of attention will not recreate the tipping point that seems to have tilted decidedly toward chaos and away from victory.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH