Tuesday January 16, 2007
The Strategy in Somalia
The U.S. efforts to help dismantle the ICU Islamists in Somalia, with proxy forces defending their own national interests, is a model that we will likely seeing with increasing frequency in more remote areas of the world where the Islamist threat exists.
So far U.S. troops for the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa have provided intelligence and air support to Ethiopian and Somali forces to keep the ICU forces from regrouping into a coherent resistence that can challenge the fragile government. The U.S. has helped where others did not possess the capability, but did not take a higly visible stance. So far, so good.
The strategy is risky, but better than almost any alternative available if the threat is already consolidating, as it certainly appeared to be in Somalia. U.S. boots on the ground would create instant hostility, and doing nothing in an area where diplomatic leverage is almost zero allows a threat to remain unchecked.
But the military side was the relatively easy part. The strategy can only be successful if there is awareness of how fragile the current situation is, and how quickly it can change. We are very good at looking back, and analysis are often rooted in a frozen frame, rather than in the reality of the fluctuationg situation on the ground.
The support for the Transitional Government must be supplemented by real aid that makes people's lives better. The Ethiopian troops should be withdrawn or their presence minimized at the soonest possible date to avoid being seen as an occupying army. At the same time, there must be a security force of some strength to give the people what they most liked about the ICU-security on the streets and the ability to do business without fear.
Support is not always, or even primarily, financial. At this juncture it is vital that the Somalis felt needs, rather than the international community's boiler plate remedies, take precedence. It is also vital that, unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, there be no paralell ministries of finance and aid set up that work at cross-purposes. In Afghanistan, the finance minister was, in reality, much less powerful than the donor community, divided into different pieces with different agendas. Billions of dollars were effectively lost because of that.
The Transitional Government must also work to give as many as possible of the clans and subclans a stake in the future of a peaceful Somalia. The ICU did this to a certain degree. It is here where the international community must have the skill to support the process without being seen as supporting one narrow group.
There are, in almost every situation like Somalia currently finds itself in, a brief window, sometimes called an "open moment," when the future of the country is decided. These moments are few and far between in a nation's history, where the past and the future hang in the balance. Ashraf Ghani, former finance minister of Afghanistan, is one of the most eloquent analysts on this topic. He notes that these moments are usually fleeting, and often not appreciated or recognized when they arise.
This is Somalia's "open moment." The national leadership and the international community must recognize this short window or risk having Somalia return to the dismal past.
So far U.S. troops for the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa have provided intelligence and air support to Ethiopian and Somali forces to keep the ICU forces from regrouping into a coherent resistence that can challenge the fragile government. The U.S. has helped where others did not possess the capability, but did not take a higly visible stance. So far, so good.
The strategy is risky, but better than almost any alternative available if the threat is already consolidating, as it certainly appeared to be in Somalia. U.S. boots on the ground would create instant hostility, and doing nothing in an area where diplomatic leverage is almost zero allows a threat to remain unchecked.
But the military side was the relatively easy part. The strategy can only be successful if there is awareness of how fragile the current situation is, and how quickly it can change. We are very good at looking back, and analysis are often rooted in a frozen frame, rather than in the reality of the fluctuationg situation on the ground.
The support for the Transitional Government must be supplemented by real aid that makes people's lives better. The Ethiopian troops should be withdrawn or their presence minimized at the soonest possible date to avoid being seen as an occupying army. At the same time, there must be a security force of some strength to give the people what they most liked about the ICU-security on the streets and the ability to do business without fear.
Support is not always, or even primarily, financial. At this juncture it is vital that the Somalis felt needs, rather than the international community's boiler plate remedies, take precedence. It is also vital that, unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, there be no paralell ministries of finance and aid set up that work at cross-purposes. In Afghanistan, the finance minister was, in reality, much less powerful than the donor community, divided into different pieces with different agendas. Billions of dollars were effectively lost because of that.
The Transitional Government must also work to give as many as possible of the clans and subclans a stake in the future of a peaceful Somalia. The ICU did this to a certain degree. It is here where the international community must have the skill to support the process without being seen as supporting one narrow group.
There are, in almost every situation like Somalia currently finds itself in, a brief window, sometimes called an "open moment," when the future of the country is decided. These moments are few and far between in a nation's history, where the past and the future hang in the balance. Ashraf Ghani, former finance minister of Afghanistan, is one of the most eloquent analysts on this topic. He notes that these moments are usually fleeting, and often not appreciated or recognized when they arise.
This is Somalia's "open moment." The national leadership and the international community must recognize this short window or risk having Somalia return to the dismal past.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 9, 2007
The Wrong Question on Somalia
Part of the policy debate over what do to (or what should have been done) about Somalia centers on the question of the relationship between al Qaed and the Islamic Court movement.
Ambassador David Shinn of George Washington University and many others, have cautioned that the ties of the Islamist movements to al Qaeda have been "overstated." The focus is usually on whether a handful of individuals of the old "core" al Qaeda were being sheltered by the Courts and if so, if that constituted a tie to terrorism.
That is the wrong question. The question that should be asked is not dependent on the presence of specific individuals who have sworn an oath to Osama bin Laden and the old organization of al Qaeda. It is whether the Courts were part of a broader Islamist movement seeking to impose _sharia_ law and create and entirely Muslim enclave that would constitute the beginnings (or the re-beginings) of the Islamist _caliphate_.
The answer in this case is clearly yes. There is a law enforcement interest in knowing if Fazul et al are in Somalia. But there is ample evidence, from their own statements and actions, that the Court leadership that triumphed was a intergral link in the Islamist narrative, woven and rewoven in different conflicts around the globe.
Fazul's presence (or not) is not the indicator of this relationship. Al Qaeda's leadership also clearly views the Somalia situation as part of a wider movement, not dependent on the leadership's willingness to submit personally and directly to bin Laden. It is a broader loyalty to the narrative of the new age that Islamists view as fully within their grasp.
Ayman Zawahiri, in his statement released last week (provided by the SITE Institute) concisely gave the narrative that is fundamental to the _jihadist_ movement:
"My Muslim brothers in Somalia, don't worry about the power of America, you already defeated it with the Help of Allah, and today, it is weaker than before. The Mujahideen already broke its back in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then she sent you its slaves. Don't worry about the first shock; it is not more than empty propaganda, arrogance, and boasting. The real battle will start by your campaigns against the Ethiopian forces, with the Help of Allah, as the gangs of believers will eat up, by rushing to jihad for the Sake of Allah, the invader Ethiopian Crusader army who attacked the Islamic land, Allah willing, as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq where the most powerful force in the world was defeated when they faced the campaigns of the Mujahideen gangs who wanted Paradise. They will then be defeated
by the Somali Muslim Mujahid land, Allah willing."
The organic links between one person and anther in the new Islamist movements are not what is paramount. What is paramount is this Islamist project, where Allah has already given miraculous victory to the _mujahadeen_ in dire circumstances.
Whether one swears alligiance to bin Laden, Mullah Omar or only to Allah, one can be part of the movement of Islamist radicals seeking to fundamentally alter the world order in the name of Allah. The Courts were clearly a part of that movement.
The arguments over the indivduals that one can catalogue, quantify and name, are of very limited use.
The other question is whether the rest of the African Union can seize the brief window of opportunity in Somalia to make it more difficult for the Courts to return, by providing a multinational security force that would allow the fragile government to consolidate.
However, the AU has given few reasons to be optimistic that it can rise to the challenge. It never has. So the question remains, what next?
Ambassador David Shinn of George Washington University and many others, have cautioned that the ties of the Islamist movements to al Qaeda have been "overstated." The focus is usually on whether a handful of individuals of the old "core" al Qaeda were being sheltered by the Courts and if so, if that constituted a tie to terrorism.
That is the wrong question. The question that should be asked is not dependent on the presence of specific individuals who have sworn an oath to Osama bin Laden and the old organization of al Qaeda. It is whether the Courts were part of a broader Islamist movement seeking to impose _sharia_ law and create and entirely Muslim enclave that would constitute the beginnings (or the re-beginings) of the Islamist _caliphate_.
The answer in this case is clearly yes. There is a law enforcement interest in knowing if Fazul et al are in Somalia. But there is ample evidence, from their own statements and actions, that the Court leadership that triumphed was a intergral link in the Islamist narrative, woven and rewoven in different conflicts around the globe.
Fazul's presence (or not) is not the indicator of this relationship. Al Qaeda's leadership also clearly views the Somalia situation as part of a wider movement, not dependent on the leadership's willingness to submit personally and directly to bin Laden. It is a broader loyalty to the narrative of the new age that Islamists view as fully within their grasp.
Ayman Zawahiri, in his statement released last week (provided by the SITE Institute) concisely gave the narrative that is fundamental to the _jihadist_ movement:
"My Muslim brothers in Somalia, don't worry about the power of America, you already defeated it with the Help of Allah, and today, it is weaker than before. The Mujahideen already broke its back in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then she sent you its slaves. Don't worry about the first shock; it is not more than empty propaganda, arrogance, and boasting. The real battle will start by your campaigns against the Ethiopian forces, with the Help of Allah, as the gangs of believers will eat up, by rushing to jihad for the Sake of Allah, the invader Ethiopian Crusader army who attacked the Islamic land, Allah willing, as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq where the most powerful force in the world was defeated when they faced the campaigns of the Mujahideen gangs who wanted Paradise. They will then be defeated
by the Somali Muslim Mujahid land, Allah willing."
The organic links between one person and anther in the new Islamist movements are not what is paramount. What is paramount is this Islamist project, where Allah has already given miraculous victory to the _mujahadeen_ in dire circumstances.
Whether one swears alligiance to bin Laden, Mullah Omar or only to Allah, one can be part of the movement of Islamist radicals seeking to fundamentally alter the world order in the name of Allah. The Courts were clearly a part of that movement.
The arguments over the indivduals that one can catalogue, quantify and name, are of very limited use.
The other question is whether the rest of the African Union can seize the brief window of opportunity in Somalia to make it more difficult for the Courts to return, by providing a multinational security force that would allow the fragile government to consolidate.
However, the AU has given few reasons to be optimistic that it can rise to the challenge. It never has. So the question remains, what next?
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 9, 2007
Iran's Grander Ambitions
It appears that Iranian special Quds Forces are directly aiding Sunni _jihadist_ forces in Iraq, along with the Shi'ite militias, as reported here. But it is highly-calibrated assistance, not to the old regime's Baathist groups, but to individuals directly tied to al Qaeda.
This is in keeping with Iran's long-term strategic interest in seeing the U.S. forces come under the maximum strain, while maintaining leverage with a group that will likely be active in Iraq for years to come. It is not a new strategy for Iran. They are still harboring senior al Qaeda operatives for several years, and allowed safe passage to at least one wife and several children of Osama bin Laden as they fled Afghanistan in 2001.
The Quds Force, in particular, has protected al Qaeda operatives, as well as working extensively with Hezbollah and, at times Hamas (another Sunni group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood). Their presence in Iraq cannot be a surprise, and the documents taken from the captured Iranian officials outlining the overall strategy appears to be genuine.
While the Shi'ite-Sunni divide is real and deep, the importance of it is a source of constant debate in the Islamist community. Some, like Zarqawi, thought that going after the Shi'ia, as apostates and heretics, was at least as important as going after either the corrupt Sunni regimes or the "far enemies" of the United States and Israel.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri, in their missives to Zarqawi, clearly disagreed with the strategy of attacking Shi'ites first, arguing that the hatred engendered in the local population would make it more difficult for _jihadists_ to operate.
Perhaps that view is now prevailing within the al Qaeda in Iraq group. The willingness to work with Iran comes with a serious risk, so the rewards must be equal to the risk. One risk is the wrath of the Saudi funders, who must already be alarmed by the growing influence of Iran, and by extension Hezbollah, in many places.
One of the most noticeable is in sub-Saharan Africa (northern Nigeria, Zimbabwe etc), but Iran is also making significant investments in Latin America (courting Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to increase its leverage in the great oil contests) and investing in mosques, teachings and Spanish-language religious literature.
The Saudis, while attempting to keep up in Africa have no natural base in Latin America. Iranian leaders seem to sense that the time has come for them to expand their influence far beyond what they have tried in the past.
The Iraqi adventure is a dicey proposition, but one that will likely ultimately lead to greatly expanded influence in Iraq in the post U.S. era. The Latin American and African expansions will guarantee supplies of raw materials and some markets for their goods. All in all, a grand scheme with a fair chance of success.
This is in keeping with Iran's long-term strategic interest in seeing the U.S. forces come under the maximum strain, while maintaining leverage with a group that will likely be active in Iraq for years to come. It is not a new strategy for Iran. They are still harboring senior al Qaeda operatives for several years, and allowed safe passage to at least one wife and several children of Osama bin Laden as they fled Afghanistan in 2001.
The Quds Force, in particular, has protected al Qaeda operatives, as well as working extensively with Hezbollah and, at times Hamas (another Sunni group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood). Their presence in Iraq cannot be a surprise, and the documents taken from the captured Iranian officials outlining the overall strategy appears to be genuine.
While the Shi'ite-Sunni divide is real and deep, the importance of it is a source of constant debate in the Islamist community. Some, like Zarqawi, thought that going after the Shi'ia, as apostates and heretics, was at least as important as going after either the corrupt Sunni regimes or the "far enemies" of the United States and Israel.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri, in their missives to Zarqawi, clearly disagreed with the strategy of attacking Shi'ites first, arguing that the hatred engendered in the local population would make it more difficult for _jihadists_ to operate.
Perhaps that view is now prevailing within the al Qaeda in Iraq group. The willingness to work with Iran comes with a serious risk, so the rewards must be equal to the risk. One risk is the wrath of the Saudi funders, who must already be alarmed by the growing influence of Iran, and by extension Hezbollah, in many places.
One of the most noticeable is in sub-Saharan Africa (northern Nigeria, Zimbabwe etc), but Iran is also making significant investments in Latin America (courting Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to increase its leverage in the great oil contests) and investing in mosques, teachings and Spanish-language religious literature.
The Saudis, while attempting to keep up in Africa have no natural base in Latin America. Iranian leaders seem to sense that the time has come for them to expand their influence far beyond what they have tried in the past.
The Iraqi adventure is a dicey proposition, but one that will likely ultimately lead to greatly expanded influence in Iraq in the post U.S. era. The Latin American and African expansions will guarantee supplies of raw materials and some markets for their goods. All in all, a grand scheme with a fair chance of success.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday January 19, 2007
Somalia: The Next Step?
Ethiopia's quick dispatch the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia has opened the way for the next step, which is seldom any easier than the first: rebuilding shattered institutions while providing the security that brought the Courts the support that propelled the radical group to power in the first place.
The new government is in a very difficult position-beholden to a foreign power that will soon be resented as an occupying force, little leverage in negotiating with the different clans and warlords, and unknown in most of the country.
In addition, the new government faces the prospect of a prolonged conflict with the rump of the Islamist movement, and the strong possibility that the remnant will receive support from Islamist movements around the world, including al Qaeda. This group, now scattered, will be able to regroup, as the Taliban has, if the new government cannot or does not act decisively to meet the inflated expectations of a restless and anxious population.
One of the keys will be international support and recognition, with support clearly tied to the government's willingness to take the necessary steps to rebuild a nation that has been without a central government for 15 years.
It was the Court's ability to provide security for businesses, ordinary citizens and international trade that created the atmosphere where their excesses were tolerated. If the new government cannot provide that in the very near term, it will fail one of the first, most crucial tests in many people's mind, and support will erode.
The Courts also provided a semblance of a working judicial system, under sharia law, where the cycle of impunity could be challenged and broken. Again, the new government must fill that void, or risk rapid popular disenchantment.
It is a huge challenge for a government that has done little to prove itself capable of meeting the enormous challenges that it faces. The international community cannot afford to ignore the situation, waffle in its objectives or allow the situation to drift indefinitely.
Ethiopia, at great national cost and considerable risk, took a step of self defense by bearing the brunt of the military side of the equation. But it is severely limited in its ability to assist in the long-term efforts to make sure the threat does not re-emerge in short order. If the international community does not work hard to make the new situation vialbe, the Islamists will be back, and sooner than expected.
The new government is in a very difficult position-beholden to a foreign power that will soon be resented as an occupying force, little leverage in negotiating with the different clans and warlords, and unknown in most of the country.
In addition, the new government faces the prospect of a prolonged conflict with the rump of the Islamist movement, and the strong possibility that the remnant will receive support from Islamist movements around the world, including al Qaeda. This group, now scattered, will be able to regroup, as the Taliban has, if the new government cannot or does not act decisively to meet the inflated expectations of a restless and anxious population.
One of the keys will be international support and recognition, with support clearly tied to the government's willingness to take the necessary steps to rebuild a nation that has been without a central government for 15 years.
It was the Court's ability to provide security for businesses, ordinary citizens and international trade that created the atmosphere where their excesses were tolerated. If the new government cannot provide that in the very near term, it will fail one of the first, most crucial tests in many people's mind, and support will erode.
The Courts also provided a semblance of a working judicial system, under sharia law, where the cycle of impunity could be challenged and broken. Again, the new government must fill that void, or risk rapid popular disenchantment.
It is a huge challenge for a government that has done little to prove itself capable of meeting the enormous challenges that it faces. The international community cannot afford to ignore the situation, waffle in its objectives or allow the situation to drift indefinitely.
Ethiopia, at great national cost and considerable risk, took a step of self defense by bearing the brunt of the military side of the equation. But it is severely limited in its ability to assist in the long-term efforts to make sure the threat does not re-emerge in short order. If the international community does not work hard to make the new situation vialbe, the Islamists will be back, and sooner than expected.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday January 2, 2007
Lessons Learned in 2006
The primary lesson I take away from 2006 is that we often do not believe what we see in front of us, to our own detriment and danger.
The most obvious example is the Islamist triumph in Somalia, begun in the middle of the year, yet receiving virtually no serious policy attention until very recently. It is hard to fathom why a self-proclaimed Islamist-Salafist movement, clear it is aims, could be viewed as a secondary concern. While the bedrock support for the movements is clan-based and the Islamic Courts enjoy some popular support for restoring law and order, there appears to have been little creative thinking as to how to counter-balance the more radical elements.
Now we face a series of bad options. Ethiopia may drive the Islamist groups out of Mogadishu, but Somalia is already viewed by much of the Islamist community as another attempt to establish the beginnings of the Caliphate. Foreign fighters, along with the Somalis, will likely prolong the fight through guerrilla warfare long into the future. It sets up a clear (in the _jihadi_ mind, at least) conflict between Christian/Jewish Crusaders and Islam, a huge drawing card for the Islamist movement. This means the whole Horn of Africa is now in danger of a spreading war that can, in the end, only help those who profit from chaos and unaccountability.
By failing to see what was happening in Somalia, and failing to act once it was clear even from far outside, what was happening, we allowed the Islamist project to expand it ways it predicted it would, giving not only physical sanctuary to the enemy but a huge psychological victory as well. Hard to imagine how that happened, after the lessons Afghanistan supposedly taught us.
The second example is related to the first. There are still few people who read what the _jihadis_ tell us about what they want to do and how they will do it.
It is like having a blueprint for enemy actions, but refusing to read it, even as the enemy systematically follows it. There are serious efforts to read and translate the massive amount of literature and thinking the Islamists put out, but to most top decision makers, the _jihadis_ remain an enigma or their motivations are distorted and simplied.
A third lesson is that the global situation is deteriorating for those who oppose the expansion of the Islamist project. If we don't understand it, we end up with the current piecemeal, haphazard approach that has no core mission and little coherence.
A fourth lesson is that the central problem outside the direct armed conflict with the _jihadist_ movements has yet to be addressed, more than five years after 9-11.
This is the billions of dollars spent in government sponsored efforts to spread _wahhabism_ around the world. This is the funding of radicalism, the push factor that goes with the pull factors of alienation, poverty etc., but a factor that is seldom on the policy agenda with Saudi Arabia and others.
It is the financing, ultimately, of the great anti-American, anti-Western surge by people looking for answers. It is, then, ultimately, the financing of the radicalism that will lead some percentage of these millions and millions of people who receive this message, to join the active, violent _jihadist_ structure.
David Aufhauser, former general counsel at the Treasury Department who led the initial efforts to cut of terrorist funding, said several years ago that this tactic of funding _wahhabism_ while denying responsibility for terrorist attacks was akin to spreading gasoline and lighting a match in a forest and denying responsibility for the ensuing forest fire. He was right.
A final lesson is that there are many courageous, intelligent people risking their lives and reputations by doing serious work to illuminate these issues, both inside and outside of government. Those inside the government are often shunned and marginalized, those outside targetted more openly by the Islamists who hate to see any push back against their years of effort to build a respectable facade. To all of them, I owe a debt of gratitude.
On a personal note, thanks to all who take the time to read this blog, write intelligent comments and let me know when I get it wrong. It is a pleasure and an honor to engage is this type of discussion.
For 2007, onward. The struggle is only beginning, and we owe it to ourselves and our children to fight the good fight. See you there.
The most obvious example is the Islamist triumph in Somalia, begun in the middle of the year, yet receiving virtually no serious policy attention until very recently. It is hard to fathom why a self-proclaimed Islamist-Salafist movement, clear it is aims, could be viewed as a secondary concern. While the bedrock support for the movements is clan-based and the Islamic Courts enjoy some popular support for restoring law and order, there appears to have been little creative thinking as to how to counter-balance the more radical elements.
Now we face a series of bad options. Ethiopia may drive the Islamist groups out of Mogadishu, but Somalia is already viewed by much of the Islamist community as another attempt to establish the beginnings of the Caliphate. Foreign fighters, along with the Somalis, will likely prolong the fight through guerrilla warfare long into the future. It sets up a clear (in the _jihadi_ mind, at least) conflict between Christian/Jewish Crusaders and Islam, a huge drawing card for the Islamist movement. This means the whole Horn of Africa is now in danger of a spreading war that can, in the end, only help those who profit from chaos and unaccountability.
By failing to see what was happening in Somalia, and failing to act once it was clear even from far outside, what was happening, we allowed the Islamist project to expand it ways it predicted it would, giving not only physical sanctuary to the enemy but a huge psychological victory as well. Hard to imagine how that happened, after the lessons Afghanistan supposedly taught us.
The second example is related to the first. There are still few people who read what the _jihadis_ tell us about what they want to do and how they will do it.
It is like having a blueprint for enemy actions, but refusing to read it, even as the enemy systematically follows it. There are serious efforts to read and translate the massive amount of literature and thinking the Islamists put out, but to most top decision makers, the _jihadis_ remain an enigma or their motivations are distorted and simplied.
A third lesson is that the global situation is deteriorating for those who oppose the expansion of the Islamist project. If we don't understand it, we end up with the current piecemeal, haphazard approach that has no core mission and little coherence.
A fourth lesson is that the central problem outside the direct armed conflict with the _jihadist_ movements has yet to be addressed, more than five years after 9-11.
This is the billions of dollars spent in government sponsored efforts to spread _wahhabism_ around the world. This is the funding of radicalism, the push factor that goes with the pull factors of alienation, poverty etc., but a factor that is seldom on the policy agenda with Saudi Arabia and others.
It is the financing, ultimately, of the great anti-American, anti-Western surge by people looking for answers. It is, then, ultimately, the financing of the radicalism that will lead some percentage of these millions and millions of people who receive this message, to join the active, violent _jihadist_ structure.
David Aufhauser, former general counsel at the Treasury Department who led the initial efforts to cut of terrorist funding, said several years ago that this tactic of funding _wahhabism_ while denying responsibility for terrorist attacks was akin to spreading gasoline and lighting a match in a forest and denying responsibility for the ensuing forest fire. He was right.
A final lesson is that there are many courageous, intelligent people risking their lives and reputations by doing serious work to illuminate these issues, both inside and outside of government. Those inside the government are often shunned and marginalized, those outside targetted more openly by the Islamists who hate to see any push back against their years of effort to build a respectable facade. To all of them, I owe a debt of gratitude.
On a personal note, thanks to all who take the time to read this blog, write intelligent comments and let me know when I get it wrong. It is a pleasure and an honor to engage is this type of discussion.
For 2007, onward. The struggle is only beginning, and we owe it to ourselves and our children to fight the good fight. See you there.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH