Wednesday December 27, 2006
The War in Somalia Expands as Islamists Promised
The battle for control of Somalia by the Islamic Courts Union has spilled over into an international conflict with Ethiopia and poses a significant threat to the entire Horn of Africa region. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross has posted on some of the details of the military activities.
Yesterday Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the ICU leader most closely indentified with al Qaeda and bin Laden, said Somalia was now at war with Ethiopia and that "All Somalis should now take part is this struggle against Ethiopia." The statement came the day after an EU envoy happily proclaimed that both sides had agreed to negotiate an end to the hostilities and that peace was at hand. Someone must be living in an alternate universe where pledges made by radicals with a history of duplicity are viewed binding.
The spread of this war is by design, not accident. In his statement earlier this week (as translated by Laura Mansfieldal Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri went out of his way to signal support for the Islamist movement in Somalia, saying "Brothers in Islam and _jihad_ in Somalia, know that you are the southern garrison of Islam, so don't allow Islam to be attacked from your flank and know that we are with you and the entire Muslim Umah is with you."
The conflict is designed not only to establish a space that can be defined as the beginning of the Islamist Caliphate, a necessary physical space from which to launch succeeding holy wars against the unbelievers. It is also aimed at creating widespread instability in a fragile region in East Africa, rich in mineral resources with weak and corrupt central governments.
Osama bin Laden has spoken in the past of the need to open a "third front" with a ground war that will bleed the U.S. military dry. He has argued that the al Qaeda front in Iraq, coupled with the front in Afghanistan/Pakistan, has stretched the U.S. military to its limits. A third front would make triumph in the other two more likely.
The stark disinterest of the United States and most European powers, or serious efforts by other African nations to face the consequences of an Islamist triumph in Somalia is striking and dangerous. The consequences of a regional war are difficult to calculate, but they will be serious.
Ethiopia is going to wade into the conflict in significant ways, but U.S. intelligence has been alarmed by the flow of sophisticated weapons in recent months to the ICU, including surface-to-air missiles, heavy anti-tank weapons and mines, and small arms. The ICU also appears to have at least three Russian helicopter gunships, operating with hired crews, to put into operation.
It may be more than Ethiopia can handle alone, and the conflict has already drawn hundreds of foreign _jihadists_ to Somalia. Thousands more will follow if the region becomes part of the global _jihadi_ battleground.
The _jihadists_ have in the paste been unconcerned with governance in the areas they conquer. _Sharia_ law, based on the Quran, is all that is needed. So they do little to consolidate bureaucratically or in a civil governance sense and unencumbered by the desire to establish a functioning government that could be recognized by the outside world. They simply move on to the next conflict, and let _sharia_ law take care of the rest.
In conversations with U.S. officials recently, several expressed the opinion Somalia was of little interest because it has no strategic importance to the United States. It is a backwater with few natural resources and no government. My response is: What was Afghanistan in the years before 9-11? A failed state with few natural resources of international interest and little preceived strategic value.
Yesterday Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the ICU leader most closely indentified with al Qaeda and bin Laden, said Somalia was now at war with Ethiopia and that "All Somalis should now take part is this struggle against Ethiopia." The statement came the day after an EU envoy happily proclaimed that both sides had agreed to negotiate an end to the hostilities and that peace was at hand. Someone must be living in an alternate universe where pledges made by radicals with a history of duplicity are viewed binding.
The spread of this war is by design, not accident. In his statement earlier this week (as translated by Laura Mansfieldal Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri went out of his way to signal support for the Islamist movement in Somalia, saying "Brothers in Islam and _jihad_ in Somalia, know that you are the southern garrison of Islam, so don't allow Islam to be attacked from your flank and know that we are with you and the entire Muslim Umah is with you."
The conflict is designed not only to establish a space that can be defined as the beginning of the Islamist Caliphate, a necessary physical space from which to launch succeeding holy wars against the unbelievers. It is also aimed at creating widespread instability in a fragile region in East Africa, rich in mineral resources with weak and corrupt central governments.
Osama bin Laden has spoken in the past of the need to open a "third front" with a ground war that will bleed the U.S. military dry. He has argued that the al Qaeda front in Iraq, coupled with the front in Afghanistan/Pakistan, has stretched the U.S. military to its limits. A third front would make triumph in the other two more likely.
The stark disinterest of the United States and most European powers, or serious efforts by other African nations to face the consequences of an Islamist triumph in Somalia is striking and dangerous. The consequences of a regional war are difficult to calculate, but they will be serious.
Ethiopia is going to wade into the conflict in significant ways, but U.S. intelligence has been alarmed by the flow of sophisticated weapons in recent months to the ICU, including surface-to-air missiles, heavy anti-tank weapons and mines, and small arms. The ICU also appears to have at least three Russian helicopter gunships, operating with hired crews, to put into operation.
It may be more than Ethiopia can handle alone, and the conflict has already drawn hundreds of foreign _jihadists_ to Somalia. Thousands more will follow if the region becomes part of the global _jihadi_ battleground.
The _jihadists_ have in the paste been unconcerned with governance in the areas they conquer. _Sharia_ law, based on the Quran, is all that is needed. So they do little to consolidate bureaucratically or in a civil governance sense and unencumbered by the desire to establish a functioning government that could be recognized by the outside world. They simply move on to the next conflict, and let _sharia_ law take care of the rest.
In conversations with U.S. officials recently, several expressed the opinion Somalia was of little interest because it has no strategic importance to the United States. It is a backwater with few natural resources and no government. My response is: What was Afghanistan in the years before 9-11? A failed state with few natural resources of international interest and little preceived strategic value.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday December 22, 2006
The Rationale of Zawahiri Statements
To many, the statements of al-Zawahiri and other radical Islamists on elections and _jihad_ can be interpreted as the rantings of mad mullahs who hate freedom and the West.
But a careful reading of Islamist texts, provided by such authors as Andrew Bostom and Mary Habek (Knowing the Enemy) show that these reponses are entirely rational within the _jihadi_ world view. This theology and ideology were developed centuries before Israel came into being and long before Western liberal democracies gained currency in the world.
The rationale, taken from Wahhab, Qutb, al Banna and others is simple: Only the Quran, as interpreted by these groups, can guide the world, providing a religious, political and legal handbook that cannot be abridged. Anything that is contrary to these interpretations of Allah's law-including the statements in the Quran itself that speak less harshly of Jews and Christians, deemed to have been made under specific historic conditions no longer applicable-are punishable by death.
What could democracy offer, even in Arab states or Palestine? Nothing, because it is not divinely ordained. In fact, in _jihadi_ literature, few things receive more scorn than the ideal of democracy, viewed as the imposition of human will over that of Allah. The other thing scorned is the charging of interest on money that is lent, hence the Muslim Brotherhood's long-standing and expensive efforts to set up a completely different, Islamist banking system that is divinely sanctioned.
What can be gained from powersharing in Somalia between Islamists and a moderate, secular government? Absolutely nothing. There is no room for compromise or negotiation except to gain a temporary advantage that leads to Islamist triumph.
What, then, to be gained from negotiating with the Mullahs in Iran? Again, nothing. They are divinely sanctioned to lie, mislead, obfuscate and do whatever necessary to achieve their goal-the implementation of their interpretation of divine law (different from the Sunni version, but just as absolutist.)
These principles of divine rule and _sharia_ are not negotiable to Islamists. They are a matter of life and death, heaven and hell, rational in their own terms. Liberal democracies like to look for ways to find common ground and negotiate solutions. That formula has served well for several centuries. But it is, in the context of Islamists, and irrational response to what, to them, are rational actions.
There is nothing to negotiate with Islamists. They want what they believe will bring them eternal salvation. Unfortunately, that means our destruction. There is really little to talk about.
But a careful reading of Islamist texts, provided by such authors as Andrew Bostom and Mary Habek (Knowing the Enemy) show that these reponses are entirely rational within the _jihadi_ world view. This theology and ideology were developed centuries before Israel came into being and long before Western liberal democracies gained currency in the world.
The rationale, taken from Wahhab, Qutb, al Banna and others is simple: Only the Quran, as interpreted by these groups, can guide the world, providing a religious, political and legal handbook that cannot be abridged. Anything that is contrary to these interpretations of Allah's law-including the statements in the Quran itself that speak less harshly of Jews and Christians, deemed to have been made under specific historic conditions no longer applicable-are punishable by death.
What could democracy offer, even in Arab states or Palestine? Nothing, because it is not divinely ordained. In fact, in _jihadi_ literature, few things receive more scorn than the ideal of democracy, viewed as the imposition of human will over that of Allah. The other thing scorned is the charging of interest on money that is lent, hence the Muslim Brotherhood's long-standing and expensive efforts to set up a completely different, Islamist banking system that is divinely sanctioned.
What can be gained from powersharing in Somalia between Islamists and a moderate, secular government? Absolutely nothing. There is no room for compromise or negotiation except to gain a temporary advantage that leads to Islamist triumph.
What, then, to be gained from negotiating with the Mullahs in Iran? Again, nothing. They are divinely sanctioned to lie, mislead, obfuscate and do whatever necessary to achieve their goal-the implementation of their interpretation of divine law (different from the Sunni version, but just as absolutist.)
These principles of divine rule and _sharia_ are not negotiable to Islamists. They are a matter of life and death, heaven and hell, rational in their own terms. Liberal democracies like to look for ways to find common ground and negotiate solutions. That formula has served well for several centuries. But it is, in the context of Islamists, and irrational response to what, to them, are rational actions.
There is nothing to negotiate with Islamists. They want what they believe will bring them eternal salvation. Unfortunately, that means our destruction. There is really little to talk about.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Friday December 22, 2006
Somalia and Long Range Threat Assessments
One of the most astonishing statements in today's Washington Post look at Somalia comes from John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence.
Negroponte said that "I don't think there are hard and fast views," on al Qaeda in Somalia, noting that Somalia "has come back on the radar screen only fairly recently," and the question is whether the Islamist government "is the next Taliban," he said. "I don't think I've seen a good answer."
It is hard to know what "only recently" means as far as being on the intelligence communty radar screen, but it has been clear for well over a year that Islamist groups were making a move to take over. It is clear for almost eight months that they have, in fact, defeated U.S.-backed forces, imposed _sharia_ law on much of the country and moved to spread the Islamist revolution.
I know that, in the field, intelligence was being reported extensively. But, like much of this type of activitiy in the world's black holes, in the absence of a long-term threat assessment, war gaming and over-the-horizon planning, it may simply never have made it up the food chain.
There is no question the situation in Somalia is deeply complicated, with clans, sub-clans and family relationships all playing significant roles in shaping the current situation. It is also true that many are using the banner of Islamic revolution to achieve personal goals perhaps unrelated to radical Islams. But the fact remains that the result is the strengthening of the most radical elements in the Islamist front, with most moderates out or reduced to insignificance.
I think the second part of Negroponte's statement represents a serious misreading of Islamist intentions, and hence the interest of Osama bin Laden and others in developments there.
There is ample evidence, in the form of written and public statements, both historic and current, that one of the primary goals of the Islamic-jihadist movement, shared by groups like the international Muslim Brotherhood, is to establish an Islamic caliphate. The concept is to give the soldiers of Allah a physical place to proclaim his kingdom, and the seed of a new conquest of once-held Islamic lands.
Almost any piece of land under strict Islamist control meets that criteria, the beginning of what Islam needs to re-establish its earthly rule. It is not an abstract policy discussion but a theological imperative.
From what the _jihadists_ themselves tell us that this of paramount importance, and one of the causes of deep anger toward al Qaeda for the 9-11 attacks by other Islamist groups (and within al Qaeda). The attacks cost them the caliphate in Afghanistan. Hence the need to establish a new one, and the need to expand it.
So now Somalia is poised for war with Ethiopia, armed by Russian and European arms deals who sense the profit potential of a new war. The threat to the region is spreading rapidly, a potential "third front" that _jihadists_ have written about as necessary to sap the U.S. military and political will.
This may explain why bin Laden, in July, taped a statement calling on Somalis to begin preparing for regional war. He recalled the 1994 withdrawal of U.S. military forces after a warlord attack killed 18 U.S. troops, saying, "This time, victory will be far easier."
All of this is public knowledge, and should give ample information for those who red team these types of scenarios and play them out, for the purpose of being able to predict and present options on likely (and unlikely) outcomes. But that is not happening in any significant way as related to Islamist groups around the world.
For U.S intelligence to dismiss the concept of establishing a caliphate, or not understand the significance of the concept to the Islamist project, is either great bluffing or deeply disturbing.
Negroponte said that "I don't think there are hard and fast views," on al Qaeda in Somalia, noting that Somalia "has come back on the radar screen only fairly recently," and the question is whether the Islamist government "is the next Taliban," he said. "I don't think I've seen a good answer."
It is hard to know what "only recently" means as far as being on the intelligence communty radar screen, but it has been clear for well over a year that Islamist groups were making a move to take over. It is clear for almost eight months that they have, in fact, defeated U.S.-backed forces, imposed _sharia_ law on much of the country and moved to spread the Islamist revolution.
I know that, in the field, intelligence was being reported extensively. But, like much of this type of activitiy in the world's black holes, in the absence of a long-term threat assessment, war gaming and over-the-horizon planning, it may simply never have made it up the food chain.
There is no question the situation in Somalia is deeply complicated, with clans, sub-clans and family relationships all playing significant roles in shaping the current situation. It is also true that many are using the banner of Islamic revolution to achieve personal goals perhaps unrelated to radical Islams. But the fact remains that the result is the strengthening of the most radical elements in the Islamist front, with most moderates out or reduced to insignificance.
I think the second part of Negroponte's statement represents a serious misreading of Islamist intentions, and hence the interest of Osama bin Laden and others in developments there.
There is ample evidence, in the form of written and public statements, both historic and current, that one of the primary goals of the Islamic-jihadist movement, shared by groups like the international Muslim Brotherhood, is to establish an Islamic caliphate. The concept is to give the soldiers of Allah a physical place to proclaim his kingdom, and the seed of a new conquest of once-held Islamic lands.
Almost any piece of land under strict Islamist control meets that criteria, the beginning of what Islam needs to re-establish its earthly rule. It is not an abstract policy discussion but a theological imperative.
From what the _jihadists_ themselves tell us that this of paramount importance, and one of the causes of deep anger toward al Qaeda for the 9-11 attacks by other Islamist groups (and within al Qaeda). The attacks cost them the caliphate in Afghanistan. Hence the need to establish a new one, and the need to expand it.
So now Somalia is poised for war with Ethiopia, armed by Russian and European arms deals who sense the profit potential of a new war. The threat to the region is spreading rapidly, a potential "third front" that _jihadists_ have written about as necessary to sap the U.S. military and political will.
This may explain why bin Laden, in July, taped a statement calling on Somalis to begin preparing for regional war. He recalled the 1994 withdrawal of U.S. military forces after a warlord attack killed 18 U.S. troops, saying, "This time, victory will be far easier."
All of this is public knowledge, and should give ample information for those who red team these types of scenarios and play them out, for the purpose of being able to predict and present options on likely (and unlikely) outcomes. But that is not happening in any significant way as related to Islamist groups around the world.
For U.S intelligence to dismiss the concept of establishing a caliphate, or not understand the significance of the concept to the Islamist project, is either great bluffing or deeply disturbing.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday December 20, 2006
A Chilling Look at the Taliban's Success
In a fascinating find Newsweek has published a nine-page "book of rules" that the Taliban is distributing in its areas of control in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The list itself is not earth-shattering, a list of principles to guide its militants on everything from what _infidels_ can be executed to moving from one unit to another.
But what is shows is that the Taliban leadership has the time and space to fashion such a handbook, something a group cannot do when it is seriously pressed militarily or living primarily on the run.
It also clearly demonstrates a coherent command and control structure, with orders coming down, written permission being needed for specific actions (merging units etc.) and a vertical structure that can impose punishment as well as reward. The duties and sole responsibilities of senior commanders, junior commanders and the supreme commander (Mullah Omar) are laid out quite clearly.
It also shows that they may have learned over the years that keeping the population on their side, with measures other than straight coercion, is necessary in to long-term survival. Taking boys without beards to the battlefield, taking weapons and goods from civilians and mistreatment of civilians are all explicitly banned.
It is not a benevolent list, however. How and whom to execute, how to handle kidnap victims and other detainees dominate. It is a matter of who can make the decision to impose Taliban justice-usually death-rather than the form the justice takes, that is outlined.
Of interest is the desire to end education by _infidels_ across the board, both in madrassas and regular school. The fact that teaching to read, write or think is such a threat in an interesting statement on its own. Teachers can be warned before being killed, but if they teach "against the Qoran" they can be executed.
The list shows that the movement has enough penetration in areas outside its direct control to need to give guidence to commanders.
While Iraq has been worse than most people imagined, Afghanistan is the place that baffles me. How it was possible to allow the Taliban to snatch some sort of victory from the jaws of defeat, is really beyond me. That unfinished business will haunt us for many years.
The list itself is not earth-shattering, a list of principles to guide its militants on everything from what _infidels_ can be executed to moving from one unit to another.
But what is shows is that the Taliban leadership has the time and space to fashion such a handbook, something a group cannot do when it is seriously pressed militarily or living primarily on the run.
It also clearly demonstrates a coherent command and control structure, with orders coming down, written permission being needed for specific actions (merging units etc.) and a vertical structure that can impose punishment as well as reward. The duties and sole responsibilities of senior commanders, junior commanders and the supreme commander (Mullah Omar) are laid out quite clearly.
It also shows that they may have learned over the years that keeping the population on their side, with measures other than straight coercion, is necessary in to long-term survival. Taking boys without beards to the battlefield, taking weapons and goods from civilians and mistreatment of civilians are all explicitly banned.
It is not a benevolent list, however. How and whom to execute, how to handle kidnap victims and other detainees dominate. It is a matter of who can make the decision to impose Taliban justice-usually death-rather than the form the justice takes, that is outlined.
Of interest is the desire to end education by _infidels_ across the board, both in madrassas and regular school. The fact that teaching to read, write or think is such a threat in an interesting statement on its own. Teachers can be warned before being killed, but if they teach "against the Qoran" they can be executed.
The list shows that the movement has enough penetration in areas outside its direct control to need to give guidence to commanders.
While Iraq has been worse than most people imagined, Afghanistan is the place that baffles me. How it was possible to allow the Taliban to snatch some sort of victory from the jaws of defeat, is really beyond me. That unfinished business will haunt us for many years.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday December 20, 2006
The Generational War
It is not a popular thing to say in public circles, but there is a growing awareness of the the nature of the Islamist threat to the United States and the West in the Pentagon and elsewhere.
In an interview with the Washington Times, Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler, deputy director for the war on terrorism within the strategic plans office of the Pentagon's Joint Staff, stated that the enemy is "absolutely committed to the 50-. 100-year plan" to establish a caliphate.
This is not news. But this type of public assessment has been sorely lacking since 9-11. People in the Intelligence Community here and abroad, who read the _jihadi_ literature and pay attention to what they say, know this. But there has been an extreme reluctance to make this case publicly and constantly, so people are aware of not only what the stakes are but of the need for an over-arching, long-term strategy.
There is very little work being done in looking at the 10 to 20 year horizon on where Islamists are now, where they are moving and what the potential future threats and opportunities are for moving against them. Almost everything in the Pentagon and IC are geared to the 3 to 5 year horizon. In real terms, this is extremely short.
Most of the thinking that does exit over longer periods are for the military component-that is, where to have troops, where to be prepared to deploy, what the direct military threats can be.
While this is necessary, it is not a strategic plan to counter the Islamist plan and agenda. There is no real public diplomacy component that is functioning, no way to reach out to the moderate Arab and Islamic world without burning them to a crisp on contact.
Furthermore there is no real understanding now of where the _jihadis_ are, what their relative strength in different regions is, how the Sunni and Shia groups cooperate and compete in different areas of the world, no map of the infrastructure of NGOS and mosques. This is a huge setback after 5 years.
Knowing the order of battle of the enemy, in any war, is crucial. We do not know the order of battle of our enemies. At least we are now willing to say they have a plan to carry out, and we better get one too.
In an interview with the Washington Times, Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler, deputy director for the war on terrorism within the strategic plans office of the Pentagon's Joint Staff, stated that the enemy is "absolutely committed to the 50-. 100-year plan" to establish a caliphate.
This is not news. But this type of public assessment has been sorely lacking since 9-11. People in the Intelligence Community here and abroad, who read the _jihadi_ literature and pay attention to what they say, know this. But there has been an extreme reluctance to make this case publicly and constantly, so people are aware of not only what the stakes are but of the need for an over-arching, long-term strategy.
There is very little work being done in looking at the 10 to 20 year horizon on where Islamists are now, where they are moving and what the potential future threats and opportunities are for moving against them. Almost everything in the Pentagon and IC are geared to the 3 to 5 year horizon. In real terms, this is extremely short.
Most of the thinking that does exit over longer periods are for the military component-that is, where to have troops, where to be prepared to deploy, what the direct military threats can be.
While this is necessary, it is not a strategic plan to counter the Islamist plan and agenda. There is no real public diplomacy component that is functioning, no way to reach out to the moderate Arab and Islamic world without burning them to a crisp on contact.
Furthermore there is no real understanding now of where the _jihadis_ are, what their relative strength in different regions is, how the Sunni and Shia groups cooperate and compete in different areas of the world, no map of the infrastructure of NGOS and mosques. This is a huge setback after 5 years.
Knowing the order of battle of the enemy, in any war, is crucial. We do not know the order of battle of our enemies. At least we are now willing to say they have a plan to carry out, and we better get one too.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH