Monday December 18, 2006
More Bad News on Darfur
A new report by the UN monitoring group for Sudan paints a grim picture of the deteriorating situation in Sudan, largely at the hands of the government-backed _janjaweed_ and now, Chadian rebels allied with Khartoum. (Link to come)
The situation is inevitably messy in drawing lines among myriad factions all seeking their own agenda. But one element is often overlooked in trying to place the Darfur disaster in a broader context--the long-standing relationship between the Sudanese government and the most radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, and, as a direct outgrowth of that, the government's direct sponsorship of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and multiple other Islamist groups.
These ties have not gone away. The Brotherhood continues to hold regular leadership meetings in Khartoum, under the protection of the government, and has set up a financial structure there as well. It is this structure that helps sustain the regime as well as encourage the slaughter in Darfour.
It is not an accident that bin Laden used one of his rare public appearances, aired April 23 on al Jazeera, to reject the still-born peace accord in Sudan and call for jihad in Darfur. He urged _mujahadeen_ to acquaint themselves with the territory and tribes of the region.
This can only be done in conjunction with the government of Sudan. As the UN report found:
_The Panel has credible information that the Government of the Sudan continues to support the Janjaweed through the provision of weapons and vehicles._
_The Janjaweed/armed militias appear to have upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, pickup trucks and rocket-propelled grenades. Reliable sources indicate that the Janjaweed continue to be subsumed into the Popular Defence Force in greater numbers than those indicated in the previous reports of the Panel._
The report noted that "Their continued access to ammunition and weapons is evident in their ability to coordinate with the Sudanese armed forces in perpetrating attacks on villages and to engage in armed conflict with rebel groups.
Reliable sources indicate that the attack by the Sudanese armed forces on JEM at Jebel Moon, which
occurred over a period of time late in July, was such an operation. There are also reliable reports that Chadian rebels also supported the Sudanese armed forces in
return for military materiel support and their continued unopposed presence inside the Sudan."
No one has the will-certainly not the Arab states that continually frame themselves as victims in the world-are willing to help the true victims in this case. The incompetence and reluctance of the AU to do its job, the unwillingness of Europe and the United States to apply necessary pressure and the Muslim world's willingness to stand silent in the face of the slaughter is unforgiveable.
What compounds that is our unwillingness to do more than hurl meaningless threats in the face of a strategic failure, not just a humanitarian catastrophe.
The situation is inevitably messy in drawing lines among myriad factions all seeking their own agenda. But one element is often overlooked in trying to place the Darfur disaster in a broader context--the long-standing relationship between the Sudanese government and the most radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, and, as a direct outgrowth of that, the government's direct sponsorship of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and multiple other Islamist groups.
These ties have not gone away. The Brotherhood continues to hold regular leadership meetings in Khartoum, under the protection of the government, and has set up a financial structure there as well. It is this structure that helps sustain the regime as well as encourage the slaughter in Darfour.
It is not an accident that bin Laden used one of his rare public appearances, aired April 23 on al Jazeera, to reject the still-born peace accord in Sudan and call for jihad in Darfur. He urged _mujahadeen_ to acquaint themselves with the territory and tribes of the region.
This can only be done in conjunction with the government of Sudan. As the UN report found:
_The Panel has credible information that the Government of the Sudan continues to support the Janjaweed through the provision of weapons and vehicles._
_The Janjaweed/armed militias appear to have upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, pickup trucks and rocket-propelled grenades. Reliable sources indicate that the Janjaweed continue to be subsumed into the Popular Defence Force in greater numbers than those indicated in the previous reports of the Panel._
The report noted that "Their continued access to ammunition and weapons is evident in their ability to coordinate with the Sudanese armed forces in perpetrating attacks on villages and to engage in armed conflict with rebel groups.
Reliable sources indicate that the attack by the Sudanese armed forces on JEM at Jebel Moon, which
occurred over a period of time late in July, was such an operation. There are also reliable reports that Chadian rebels also supported the Sudanese armed forces in
return for military materiel support and their continued unopposed presence inside the Sudan."
No one has the will-certainly not the Arab states that continually frame themselves as victims in the world-are willing to help the true victims in this case. The incompetence and reluctance of the AU to do its job, the unwillingness of Europe and the United States to apply necessary pressure and the Muslim world's willingness to stand silent in the face of the slaughter is unforgiveable.
What compounds that is our unwillingness to do more than hurl meaningless threats in the face of a strategic failure, not just a humanitarian catastrophe.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
The Perenial Language Problems Demonstrate Conceptual Problems
The Washington Post's stunning revelation that only 33 of the FBI's 12,000 agents have even generously-defined minimal Arabic-none working on terrorism issues-is a symptom of a much broader problem within much of the law enforcement and intelligence communities.
The Post piece on the catastrophic lack of language ability five years after 9-11 says that we have still not taken this war seriously. There is no widespread effort to understand radical Islam, read the literature, understand what their plan is or what their motivations are.
After five years, one would think every IC and law enforcement person involved in terrorism issues would have read the Muslim Brotherhood literature, al Qaeda literature, "Ghost Wars," "The Looming Towers," "Imperial Hubris," etc. This should not be optional, but required. There are different perspectives presented and one can debate the meanings, the way forward and the tactical and strategic responses, but only if everyone is starting from the same point.
The fundamental flaw is an ongoing inability or unwillingness to identify the enemy as Islamist who want to kill us, and deal with that enemy for what it is-a sophisticated, multi-pronged, coherent group that constantly runs intelligence, counterintelligence and propaganda operations.
The most visible of these operations is the huge success Brotherhood front groups like CAIR, MPAC, NAIT and others have consistently had in getting invited by the FBI, DHS and other U.S. government authorities as representatives of the Muslim community. These groups, which have members who have and continue to support violence and push the separtist Islamist agenda, have worked and planned for years for the credibility they now enjoy.
Once these groups meet with the FBI, they set the agenda and work assidously to exclude any other Muslim voices. Then the State Department and White House meet with them because, well, the FBI did, so they must be okay. The ciruclar reasoning and unwillingness to even use the public record on what these groups represent and what their leaders say, is truely scary. Each such meeting is a victory for the Islamist movement and shows how little we know about the war we are fighting and will be fighting for a long time. Each is a defeat for the Muslims who came, intergrated into American life without the agenda of making the United States an Islamic nation and living in Islamic enclaves.
The use of front grops is not a new tactic. The U.S. ran some successful operations like this during the Cold War, as did the Soviets. In El Salvador and the rest of Central America, front groups were widely used by all sides, in an effort to move the body politic in a certain direction and set an agenda. It is standard political warfare. But we have forgotten those lessons, I believe, in part because of the political correctness of not wanting to attack anything that has religion attatched it. Or maybe we think they are too stupid to know how to do this.
I would say the same of Christians, Hindus and Jews who define themselves and their agenda in starkly religous terms (as Islamists do) and work to support violence here and abroad. The Islamist agenda is to convert the world to Islam by whatever means necessary. They write it, preach it, teach it to their children. There is no ambiguity. There are no nuances in what they say about themselves and how they define themselves.
We dumb down what these groups stand for and what they ARE because we are uncomfortable with it. If there is one lesson to be learned about the Islamists it is that they mean what they say. They may sound crazy, marginal, paranoid and isolated. But they have advanced this far because we think that means they are stupid, incapable and unable to advance their agenda. No matter how many times they prove our assumptions wrong, we retreat to them.
Yesterday's New York Times piece on the struggle of the FBI to adapt to the new world shows how true this remains.
The Times quotes the assessment of Amy Zegart, the author of a new counter-terrorism book on the FBI: If you look at, for example, the four key ingredients for counterterrorism success-agents, analysts, managers and computers-the FBI is struggling to get the basics right on all of them. New agents still get more time for vacation thatn they do for counterterrorism training. Analysts are still treated as glorified secretaries."
So, this is where we are five years later. Scary indeed.
The Post piece on the catastrophic lack of language ability five years after 9-11 says that we have still not taken this war seriously. There is no widespread effort to understand radical Islam, read the literature, understand what their plan is or what their motivations are.
After five years, one would think every IC and law enforcement person involved in terrorism issues would have read the Muslim Brotherhood literature, al Qaeda literature, "Ghost Wars," "The Looming Towers," "Imperial Hubris," etc. This should not be optional, but required. There are different perspectives presented and one can debate the meanings, the way forward and the tactical and strategic responses, but only if everyone is starting from the same point.
The fundamental flaw is an ongoing inability or unwillingness to identify the enemy as Islamist who want to kill us, and deal with that enemy for what it is-a sophisticated, multi-pronged, coherent group that constantly runs intelligence, counterintelligence and propaganda operations.
The most visible of these operations is the huge success Brotherhood front groups like CAIR, MPAC, NAIT and others have consistently had in getting invited by the FBI, DHS and other U.S. government authorities as representatives of the Muslim community. These groups, which have members who have and continue to support violence and push the separtist Islamist agenda, have worked and planned for years for the credibility they now enjoy.
Once these groups meet with the FBI, they set the agenda and work assidously to exclude any other Muslim voices. Then the State Department and White House meet with them because, well, the FBI did, so they must be okay. The ciruclar reasoning and unwillingness to even use the public record on what these groups represent and what their leaders say, is truely scary. Each such meeting is a victory for the Islamist movement and shows how little we know about the war we are fighting and will be fighting for a long time. Each is a defeat for the Muslims who came, intergrated into American life without the agenda of making the United States an Islamic nation and living in Islamic enclaves.
The use of front grops is not a new tactic. The U.S. ran some successful operations like this during the Cold War, as did the Soviets. In El Salvador and the rest of Central America, front groups were widely used by all sides, in an effort to move the body politic in a certain direction and set an agenda. It is standard political warfare. But we have forgotten those lessons, I believe, in part because of the political correctness of not wanting to attack anything that has religion attatched it. Or maybe we think they are too stupid to know how to do this.
I would say the same of Christians, Hindus and Jews who define themselves and their agenda in starkly religous terms (as Islamists do) and work to support violence here and abroad. The Islamist agenda is to convert the world to Islam by whatever means necessary. They write it, preach it, teach it to their children. There is no ambiguity. There are no nuances in what they say about themselves and how they define themselves.
We dumb down what these groups stand for and what they ARE because we are uncomfortable with it. If there is one lesson to be learned about the Islamists it is that they mean what they say. They may sound crazy, marginal, paranoid and isolated. But they have advanced this far because we think that means they are stupid, incapable and unable to advance their agenda. No matter how many times they prove our assumptions wrong, we retreat to them.
Yesterday's New York Times piece on the struggle of the FBI to adapt to the new world shows how true this remains.
The Times quotes the assessment of Amy Zegart, the author of a new counter-terrorism book on the FBI: If you look at, for example, the four key ingredients for counterterrorism success-agents, analysts, managers and computers-the FBI is struggling to get the basics right on all of them. New agents still get more time for vacation thatn they do for counterterrorism training. Analysts are still treated as glorified secretaries."
So, this is where we are five years later. Scary indeed.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
In Somalia, Islamist Rapid Gains Leave Room for Changes
The Union of Islamic Courts, the Islamist movement that has taken over much of Somalia, may already be running into difficulty sustaining its rapid gains. Like most Islamist movements such as the Taliban and al Qaeda, little thought appears to have been given to how to govern if and when power is attained. Simply repeating that _sharia_ law provides the answers does not lead to a platform of governance.
At the American Enterprise Institute's discussion of Somalia last week several important points were made by panalists. One is the the UIC is, like most of Somali structures, based on clans and sub-clans. In the case of the UIC, the dominant clan structures constitutes less than 10 percent of the population.
This relatively small base, coupled with the rapid ascent of the UIC, for which its leaders were completely unprepared, leads some to believe radicalization of the movement will cause a backlash that will make it impossible for the ICU, at least in its most radical incarnation, to succeed in even the short term.
The BBC reports on the cracks on UIC, between what it interestingly calls the Salafists (led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys) and the Qutubists (led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed). The Qutubists take their name from Sayyis Qutub, the great thinker of the Muslim Brothers, or _Ikwan_. The Salafists would be closer to al Qaeda and the Taliban.
It is unclear what the basic distinction is between the two groups, or whether this divison is exploitable to weaken the more radical Islamist bent of some of the ICU leadership. But what is clear is that Aweys controls the military power, and therefore the real power. He has invited foreign fighters to train in the new military camps the ICU has set up across the terrirtory they control.
But it also appears the ICU's heavy-handed attempts to impose strict _sharia_ law may be rapidly eroding the goodwill the group established by driving out the warlords. The closeing of cinemas, interruptions of weddings, bans on radio stations playing music and growing intolerance for all things outside of the Salafist vision could push many supporters to back away. It is almost exactly the same situation the Taliban faced in 1996, when it took over Afghanistan.
London's Daily Telegraph has a fascinating look at the militia training and the efforts to rehabilitate, through Islam, some of the worst thugs from the days of the warlords.
The ICU may soon need the increased military muscle. The BBC and others are reporting on the possibly inevitable war between the ICU and neighboring Ethiopia. The ICU, allied with Eritrea, Ethiopia's traditional enemy, has set the stage for a possible regional conflict.
At the American Enterprise Institute's discussion of Somalia last week several important points were made by panalists. One is the the UIC is, like most of Somali structures, based on clans and sub-clans. In the case of the UIC, the dominant clan structures constitutes less than 10 percent of the population.
This relatively small base, coupled with the rapid ascent of the UIC, for which its leaders were completely unprepared, leads some to believe radicalization of the movement will cause a backlash that will make it impossible for the ICU, at least in its most radical incarnation, to succeed in even the short term.
The BBC reports on the cracks on UIC, between what it interestingly calls the Salafists (led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys) and the Qutubists (led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed). The Qutubists take their name from Sayyis Qutub, the great thinker of the Muslim Brothers, or _Ikwan_. The Salafists would be closer to al Qaeda and the Taliban.
It is unclear what the basic distinction is between the two groups, or whether this divison is exploitable to weaken the more radical Islamist bent of some of the ICU leadership. But what is clear is that Aweys controls the military power, and therefore the real power. He has invited foreign fighters to train in the new military camps the ICU has set up across the terrirtory they control.
But it also appears the ICU's heavy-handed attempts to impose strict _sharia_ law may be rapidly eroding the goodwill the group established by driving out the warlords. The closeing of cinemas, interruptions of weddings, bans on radio stations playing music and growing intolerance for all things outside of the Salafist vision could push many supporters to back away. It is almost exactly the same situation the Taliban faced in 1996, when it took over Afghanistan.
London's Daily Telegraph has a fascinating look at the militia training and the efforts to rehabilitate, through Islam, some of the worst thugs from the days of the warlords.
The ICU may soon need the increased military muscle. The BBC and others are reporting on the possibly inevitable war between the ICU and neighboring Ethiopia. The ICU, allied with Eritrea, Ethiopia's traditional enemy, has set the stage for a possible regional conflict.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Al Qaeda's Growing Danger in Northern Africa
As noted recently by the Washington Post's Craig Whitlock, the formal merger of the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is an enormously important development of the jihadist plans for northern and western Africa.
As Zawahiri stated in his address last month announcing the formal alliance of the two groups, the GSPC "will be a thorn in the necks of the American and French crusaders and their allies, and a dagger in the hearts of the French traitors and apostates."
This is even more important when combined with the growing f al Qaeda presence and interest in Darfur, the jihadi rallying point to the east. According to folks who have recently spent time in Darfur, the janjaweed, protected and aided by the Sudanese government, are allowing al Qaeda training camps. Bin Laden and Zawahiri have singled out Darfur as a key area of jihadi expansion, along with Somalia and Yemen to the east.
As I reported on July 10, intelligence reports have recently found "al Qaeda operatives in Sudan are providing training to troops under the control of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal."
In Somalia, the Islamic Courts continue to consolidate, faced with little opposition except from Ethiopia.
And to the west, bordering the desert stretches of Mali, Niger, Maurtiania and Chad, the heralding of a new alliance that formalizes al Qaeda's presence, if only by proxy, in a region of the world that is seeing a rapid rise in Salafist mosques, charities and al Qaeda recruiters.
"Al-Qaeda's objective is to have a base in the region of the Sahel," Chakib Benmoussa, the Moroccan interior minister, told the Post.
To me, this points to a concerted strategic push by the traditional al Qaeda leadership, to build alliances with existing groups to move toward an area they clearly consider to be a high priority.
Africa, including West Africa, have been a point of great interest to bin Laden personally, according to the writings and debriefings of al Qaeda leaders. Somalia was the site of al Qaeda's first military foray, when bin Laden lived in Sudan. Yemen is bin Laden's ancestoral home, and he was meddling there in the mid-1990s. Sudan in general, and the janjaweed offer strong ideological and military support for the jihadist agenda.
These developments lead me to question the conventional wisdom that the core al Qaeda group is essentially incapable of exercising command and control over the different groups now in its orbit.
Clearly there are decentralized, self-starting groups inspired by al Qaeda. But, given the recent al Qaeda documents that are being translated and circulated, and this development, along with the new alliance with Egyptian groups, I am becoming far less sure that the core al Qaeda group is as marginalized as often portrayed. Perhaps they still have a plan, and, while adapting, are still able to push it toward implementation.
As Zawahiri stated in his address last month announcing the formal alliance of the two groups, the GSPC "will be a thorn in the necks of the American and French crusaders and their allies, and a dagger in the hearts of the French traitors and apostates."
This is even more important when combined with the growing f al Qaeda presence and interest in Darfur, the jihadi rallying point to the east. According to folks who have recently spent time in Darfur, the janjaweed, protected and aided by the Sudanese government, are allowing al Qaeda training camps. Bin Laden and Zawahiri have singled out Darfur as a key area of jihadi expansion, along with Somalia and Yemen to the east.
As I reported on July 10, intelligence reports have recently found "al Qaeda operatives in Sudan are providing training to troops under the control of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal."
In Somalia, the Islamic Courts continue to consolidate, faced with little opposition except from Ethiopia.
And to the west, bordering the desert stretches of Mali, Niger, Maurtiania and Chad, the heralding of a new alliance that formalizes al Qaeda's presence, if only by proxy, in a region of the world that is seeing a rapid rise in Salafist mosques, charities and al Qaeda recruiters.
"Al-Qaeda's objective is to have a base in the region of the Sahel," Chakib Benmoussa, the Moroccan interior minister, told the Post.
To me, this points to a concerted strategic push by the traditional al Qaeda leadership, to build alliances with existing groups to move toward an area they clearly consider to be a high priority.
Africa, including West Africa, have been a point of great interest to bin Laden personally, according to the writings and debriefings of al Qaeda leaders. Somalia was the site of al Qaeda's first military foray, when bin Laden lived in Sudan. Yemen is bin Laden's ancestoral home, and he was meddling there in the mid-1990s. Sudan in general, and the janjaweed offer strong ideological and military support for the jihadist agenda.
These developments lead me to question the conventional wisdom that the core al Qaeda group is essentially incapable of exercising command and control over the different groups now in its orbit.
Clearly there are decentralized, self-starting groups inspired by al Qaeda. But, given the recent al Qaeda documents that are being translated and circulated, and this development, along with the new alliance with Egyptian groups, I am becoming far less sure that the core al Qaeda group is as marginalized as often portrayed. Perhaps they still have a plan, and, while adapting, are still able to push it toward implementation.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Inspiring Islamist Violence Goes Back Decades
A new document by the West Point Combating Terrorism Centerexamines the 1,600 page Islamist treastise by veteran jihadi thinker, propagandist, and historian Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. Published in 2005, the jihadi document lists 25 "paradigmatic jihadi movements," or
particularly edifying historical cases, where jihadis have both succeeded and failed to rally supporters, defeat their opposition, or establish territorial control.
The CTC document examines four of the jihadi movements that al Suri, who was attempting to write the definitive jihadi cirriculum for the coming generation. What is particularly interesting is that even the more obsucre groups discussed all have ties back to the international Islamic Brotherhood, some to the late 1960s.
The Haraka al-Shabiba in Morocco, though little known and enjoying almost no success during its brief existence in 1969, drew almost all of its inspiration from the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al Banna, the Brotherhood's two most influential thinkers.
What I find most intersting is the perserverance of the ideology and theology of these men that spreads through every Islamist movement. While it is clear that Al Qaeda, Hamas and other more modern Islamist movements (GSPC etc.) drew much of their inspiration and thought from the _ikwan_, I was unfamiliar with the earlier groups and movements that all form the mosaic of what jihad today has become. It is clear that the most violent interpretation of the words of the Brotherhood thinkers was accepted and acted on early on.
Just as many Islamists like to portray _jihad_ as an inner spiritual struggle despite the clear historical evidence that it was considered primarily (or at least equally) a justification for violence from the earliest days of Islam, many also try to portray the more radical interpretation of the _ikwan_ statements as a more recent, perhaps erroneous interpretation. But it is not.
The teachings of al Banna and Qutb are clear and unequivocal in their call to rebuild the caliphate and attack unbelievers. This is _jihad_ as warfare, and understood as such from the very beginning.
That is one of the interesting ways people like Tariq Ramadan, Sami al Arian and ohters try to evade responsibility for what they teach and believe. They try to pass off the real interpretation of their texts as figments of the imagination of people in the West who do not grasp the nuances of Islam. But there are no nuances there. Al Suri understood that, which is why he was able to identify the _jihadist_ movements so effectively that led to the creation of al Qaeda and beyond.
particularly edifying historical cases, where jihadis have both succeeded and failed to rally supporters, defeat their opposition, or establish territorial control.
The CTC document examines four of the jihadi movements that al Suri, who was attempting to write the definitive jihadi cirriculum for the coming generation. What is particularly interesting is that even the more obsucre groups discussed all have ties back to the international Islamic Brotherhood, some to the late 1960s.
The Haraka al-Shabiba in Morocco, though little known and enjoying almost no success during its brief existence in 1969, drew almost all of its inspiration from the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al Banna, the Brotherhood's two most influential thinkers.
What I find most intersting is the perserverance of the ideology and theology of these men that spreads through every Islamist movement. While it is clear that Al Qaeda, Hamas and other more modern Islamist movements (GSPC etc.) drew much of their inspiration and thought from the _ikwan_, I was unfamiliar with the earlier groups and movements that all form the mosaic of what jihad today has become. It is clear that the most violent interpretation of the words of the Brotherhood thinkers was accepted and acted on early on.
Just as many Islamists like to portray _jihad_ as an inner spiritual struggle despite the clear historical evidence that it was considered primarily (or at least equally) a justification for violence from the earliest days of Islam, many also try to portray the more radical interpretation of the _ikwan_ statements as a more recent, perhaps erroneous interpretation. But it is not.
The teachings of al Banna and Qutb are clear and unequivocal in their call to rebuild the caliphate and attack unbelievers. This is _jihad_ as warfare, and understood as such from the very beginning.
That is one of the interesting ways people like Tariq Ramadan, Sami al Arian and ohters try to evade responsibility for what they teach and believe. They try to pass off the real interpretation of their texts as figments of the imagination of people in the West who do not grasp the nuances of Islam. But there are no nuances there. Al Suri understood that, which is why he was able to identify the _jihadist_ movements so effectively that led to the creation of al Qaeda and beyond.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH