Monday December 18, 2006
Al Qaeda Letter Shows Discrepancies in Jihadi Movement, Points to Role of Brotherhood
Today's Washington Post has a fascinating look into the Salafist jihadi movements. The internal letter from the al Qaeda leadership to Zarqawi from December 2005 was translated and provided by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and is available here.
The most interesting element is the dismay of the "core" al Qaeda leadership (bin Laden, Zawahiri et al) at the Zarqawi tactics of killing other Muslims, especially Sunnis, and the insistence on following a much broader overall political policy, rather than just attacking the enemy militarily.
Written by a senior al Qaeda commander using the name Atiya, the letter clearly shows that Zarqawi (and most likely his successor in Iraq) are subordinate to bin Laden and Zawahiri in the conception of the core al Qaeda leadership. This indicates a structured, hierarchical structure, at least among these groups. The letter orders Zarqawi to do many things, rather than requesting the actions. This is somewhat different than the al Qaeda often protrayed as isolated, dispersed and decentralized.
While clearly the overall jihadi movement is decentralized, self-starting etc., the core group is clearly deeply involved in Iraq and has a clear command and control structure.
The primary order is to halt attacks on other Sunni Muslims in Iraq, even if the Sunni leaders do not agree with al Qaeda and are religiously unorthodox at times, "even hypocritical, as long as they are Muslims who agree with us in the resistance and jihad."
Atiya notes that "military action is a servant of policy," not the other way around, and warns that some military victories are counterproductive in terms of winning popular support.
Zarqawi is ordered to consult with al Qaeda leaders and his own advisers, even thouse who are not mujahadeen, before tackling "comprehensive issues." Such issues include "the issue of announcing a war against the Shi’ite turncoats and killing them."
This great divide may explain why senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly Yousef al-Qaradawi, who has been working hard recently to minimize the differences among Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims as well as differences within each group. The guiding principle of the Ikwan is: Sincerely work with Islamic groups and entities on various axes and in agreement on a common number of points where "we cooperate on issue we agreed upon and excuse each other on issues we disagree upon"
It is interesting to see that al Qaeda leaders acknowledge that they have a "hearts and minds" problem in Iraq, not unlike the Coalition forces.
The leadership places a premium on getting Zarqawi to take this issue seriously, commanding him to dedicate himself to "winning over people, bringing them close, being cautious about alienating them, befriending them, helping them, accepting their foibles-which means accepting what they possess, including strengths, weaknesses, prpriety, impropriety, goodness and ill."
Quite a statement to someone who clearly relished not only attacking Shi'ites but also those Sunnis who differed with him.
The most interesting element is the dismay of the "core" al Qaeda leadership (bin Laden, Zawahiri et al) at the Zarqawi tactics of killing other Muslims, especially Sunnis, and the insistence on following a much broader overall political policy, rather than just attacking the enemy militarily.
Written by a senior al Qaeda commander using the name Atiya, the letter clearly shows that Zarqawi (and most likely his successor in Iraq) are subordinate to bin Laden and Zawahiri in the conception of the core al Qaeda leadership. This indicates a structured, hierarchical structure, at least among these groups. The letter orders Zarqawi to do many things, rather than requesting the actions. This is somewhat different than the al Qaeda often protrayed as isolated, dispersed and decentralized.
While clearly the overall jihadi movement is decentralized, self-starting etc., the core group is clearly deeply involved in Iraq and has a clear command and control structure.
The primary order is to halt attacks on other Sunni Muslims in Iraq, even if the Sunni leaders do not agree with al Qaeda and are religiously unorthodox at times, "even hypocritical, as long as they are Muslims who agree with us in the resistance and jihad."
Atiya notes that "military action is a servant of policy," not the other way around, and warns that some military victories are counterproductive in terms of winning popular support.
Zarqawi is ordered to consult with al Qaeda leaders and his own advisers, even thouse who are not mujahadeen, before tackling "comprehensive issues." Such issues include "the issue of announcing a war against the Shi’ite turncoats and killing them."
This great divide may explain why senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly Yousef al-Qaradawi, who has been working hard recently to minimize the differences among Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims as well as differences within each group. The guiding principle of the Ikwan is: Sincerely work with Islamic groups and entities on various axes and in agreement on a common number of points where "we cooperate on issue we agreed upon and excuse each other on issues we disagree upon"
It is interesting to see that al Qaeda leaders acknowledge that they have a "hearts and minds" problem in Iraq, not unlike the Coalition forces.
The leadership places a premium on getting Zarqawi to take this issue seriously, commanding him to dedicate himself to "winning over people, bringing them close, being cautious about alienating them, befriending them, helping them, accepting their foibles-which means accepting what they possess, including strengths, weaknesses, prpriety, impropriety, goodness and ill."
Quite a statement to someone who clearly relished not only attacking Shi'ites but also those Sunnis who differed with him.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Why Tariq Ramadan Was Denied a Visa
There has been some outcry and dismay over the U.S. government decision to deny a visa to Tariq Ramadan, one of the new generation of leaders of the international Muslim Brotherhood, who has achieved near superstar status among Muslims in Europe.
While consistently presenting a moderate face of Islam in public, his ties to more radical groups are several. As is usual in these cases, there is no smoking gun, but the persisent nature of the contacts and references to him by those engaged in Islamist violence gives rightful pause to those deciding on visas.
Earlier this month Jean-Charles Brisard first revealed the following Ramadan ties. to the less than moderate elements of Islamist structure. European intelligence sources had privaely told me of the contents of the Swiss report on Ramadan's arrangement of a 1991 meeting with Zawahiri and the "Blind Sheikh," Omar Abdel Rahman. Since the information is already in the public domain, I am reprinting some of the ties outlined by JCB, from his blog, that may be useful in understanding the decision even if one does not agree with it.
??A Spanish Police General Directorate memo dated 1999 stating that Ahmed Brahim (sentenced to 10 years in prison for incitement to terrorism in April 2006) maintained "regular contacts with important figures of radical Islam such as Tariq Ramadan".??
??The minutes of Djamel Beghal’s (sentenced to 10 years in prison in March 2005) first appearance testimony on October 1st, 2001 (following his indictment by a French antiterrorist judge for his participation to a foiled terrorist attack against the US Embassy in Paris), where he stated that before 1994, he "attended the courses given by Tarek Ramadan".??
??According to the final prosecution documents, during his first interrogation before UAE authorities who arrested him, Beghal stated on September 22, 2001, that "his religious engagement started in 1994" when "he was in charge of writing the statements of Tariq Ramadan".??
??A Swiss intelligence memo of 2001 stating that "brothers Hani and Tariq Ramadan coordinated a meeting held in 1991 in Geneva attended by Ayman Al Zawahiri and Omar Abdel Rahman", respectively Al Qaeda leader and planner of the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in 1993, and sentenced to life in the United States.??
??A human source testimony corroborating this information and stating that at the end of a Friday prayer at the Islamic Center of Geneva in 1991, Hani Ramadan, brother of Tariq Ramadan, told the audience that a conference will be held few days later with Ayman Al Zawahiri, describing him as an "Islamic Mujahideen".??
??New documents reveal that Tariq Ramadan had contacts with other terrorists in Europe.??
??According to the final French prosecution filing (dated December 8, 2005) against the "Chechen networks", who had planned chemical attacks in France "under the supervision of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi", Menad Benchellali (Head of the network who was sentenced to 10 years in prison in June 2006) traveled to Switzerland "one or two times in 2000 to attend conferences on Islam provided by Tariq Ramadan".??
While consistently presenting a moderate face of Islam in public, his ties to more radical groups are several. As is usual in these cases, there is no smoking gun, but the persisent nature of the contacts and references to him by those engaged in Islamist violence gives rightful pause to those deciding on visas.
Earlier this month Jean-Charles Brisard first revealed the following Ramadan ties. to the less than moderate elements of Islamist structure. European intelligence sources had privaely told me of the contents of the Swiss report on Ramadan's arrangement of a 1991 meeting with Zawahiri and the "Blind Sheikh," Omar Abdel Rahman. Since the information is already in the public domain, I am reprinting some of the ties outlined by JCB, from his blog, that may be useful in understanding the decision even if one does not agree with it.
??A Spanish Police General Directorate memo dated 1999 stating that Ahmed Brahim (sentenced to 10 years in prison for incitement to terrorism in April 2006) maintained "regular contacts with important figures of radical Islam such as Tariq Ramadan".??
??The minutes of Djamel Beghal’s (sentenced to 10 years in prison in March 2005) first appearance testimony on October 1st, 2001 (following his indictment by a French antiterrorist judge for his participation to a foiled terrorist attack against the US Embassy in Paris), where he stated that before 1994, he "attended the courses given by Tarek Ramadan".??
??According to the final prosecution documents, during his first interrogation before UAE authorities who arrested him, Beghal stated on September 22, 2001, that "his religious engagement started in 1994" when "he was in charge of writing the statements of Tariq Ramadan".??
??A Swiss intelligence memo of 2001 stating that "brothers Hani and Tariq Ramadan coordinated a meeting held in 1991 in Geneva attended by Ayman Al Zawahiri and Omar Abdel Rahman", respectively Al Qaeda leader and planner of the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in 1993, and sentenced to life in the United States.??
??A human source testimony corroborating this information and stating that at the end of a Friday prayer at the Islamic Center of Geneva in 1991, Hani Ramadan, brother of Tariq Ramadan, told the audience that a conference will be held few days later with Ayman Al Zawahiri, describing him as an "Islamic Mujahideen".??
??New documents reveal that Tariq Ramadan had contacts with other terrorists in Europe.??
??According to the final French prosecution filing (dated December 8, 2005) against the "Chechen networks", who had planned chemical attacks in France "under the supervision of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi", Menad Benchellali (Head of the network who was sentenced to 10 years in prison in June 2006) traveled to Switzerland "one or two times in 2000 to attend conferences on Islam provided by Tariq Ramadan".??
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
A Few Thoughts on the NIE
Admittedly, we have only a few declassified pages of the National Intelligence Estimate, so some of these issues might be addressed there.
But it is striking that the "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" does not discuss financial issues at all. Nor does it discuss the role in radicalization provided by the massive flow of Saudi and Arab Peninsula dollars into radicalization efforts.
It is this fundamental base of Salafist teachings that allow for the spread of radical, decentralized Islamist network described in the findings. There is a basic playbook being taught around the world, with funding by governments that claim to be allies in fighting jihadist movements. With the teachings from early childhood, coupled with corrupted teachings on the Koran spread at Wahhabi mosques around the world, a global community is built.
The lack of recognition of the "pull" factors in Islamist radicalization is surprising. The four "underlying factors fueling the spread of the jihadist movement" are defined as: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad";(3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims-all of which jihadists exploit.
These are clearly legitimate push factors in Islamist radicalization. But they do not effectively touch on the other half of the equation. These include trying to understand why Islamists are making gains outside the Muslim-majority countries, and how not just the jihadis making bombs but the huge Islamist apparatus exploit the above factors.
They do it through the flow of money through charities, the international Muslim Brotherhood and diplomatic channels that teach not only a radical theology of hatred, but also define true Islamic spirituality as being radicalized to the point of being willing to commit suicide to attack the enemies of Islam. This is taught as the the way to redeem to sense of powerlessness, anger and humiliation, wage jihad in Iraq and far beyond, and punish the U.S. and its allies.
These push factors are powerful. The money that enables the push factor is important. Without them, the pull factors would be far less potent. Many people live worse than most of the jihadis do. The grievances alone cannot account for the growth of jihadist movements.
But it is striking that the "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" does not discuss financial issues at all. Nor does it discuss the role in radicalization provided by the massive flow of Saudi and Arab Peninsula dollars into radicalization efforts.
It is this fundamental base of Salafist teachings that allow for the spread of radical, decentralized Islamist network described in the findings. There is a basic playbook being taught around the world, with funding by governments that claim to be allies in fighting jihadist movements. With the teachings from early childhood, coupled with corrupted teachings on the Koran spread at Wahhabi mosques around the world, a global community is built.
The lack of recognition of the "pull" factors in Islamist radicalization is surprising. The four "underlying factors fueling the spread of the jihadist movement" are defined as: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad";(3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims-all of which jihadists exploit.
These are clearly legitimate push factors in Islamist radicalization. But they do not effectively touch on the other half of the equation. These include trying to understand why Islamists are making gains outside the Muslim-majority countries, and how not just the jihadis making bombs but the huge Islamist apparatus exploit the above factors.
They do it through the flow of money through charities, the international Muslim Brotherhood and diplomatic channels that teach not only a radical theology of hatred, but also define true Islamic spirituality as being radicalized to the point of being willing to commit suicide to attack the enemies of Islam. This is taught as the the way to redeem to sense of powerlessness, anger and humiliation, wage jihad in Iraq and far beyond, and punish the U.S. and its allies.
These push factors are powerful. The money that enables the push factor is important. Without them, the pull factors would be far less potent. Many people live worse than most of the jihadis do. The grievances alone cannot account for the growth of jihadist movements.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
New Reports and Disturbing Responses
The U.S. intelligence community has only a single office devoted to understanding political Islam. That is one of the stunning nuggets contained in the recent House Intelligence Committee Report on threats to the United States.
That information, coupled with an interview in Harper's Magazine of Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh, the former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at the CIA, seems to me to point a fundamental, residual problem in the government and intelligence community's approach to Islamists.
The House report, while disputed in its timing and presentation by Democrats, nonetheless presents some interesting findings, some that are particularly critical of the administration. The report found "significant shortfalls" in the government's knowledge of Islamist militancy at home or abroad. It concluded that there are "still gaps in our understanding of Islamist extremist groups, which leave America vulnerable."
At the same time, Nakhleh is saying that political Islam "is not a threat." What does political Islam mean? Can you possibly say that and ignore the political decision of the rulers of Saudi Arabia to put billions of dollars into teaching children to hate the wider world, everyone who is not a Salafist and non-religion based knowledge? The Pakistani decision to allow madrasas to continue to funtion as educational institutions when they teach the rote memorization of the Koran, accompanied only by the teachings of hatred. Does political Islam not embrace the (fundamentally political) international Muslim Brotherhood and its broadbased support of armed Islamist movements? The sharia movements in Northern Nigeria? Somalia in its current state? Sudan?
It is a rather stunning assessment, and may explain why so little is understood of "political Islam." The fundamental point is that "political Islam" is not a concept that can, at least in Salafist and many Shi'ite groups, be separted into two different worlds. Islam, to them, is political, based on Sharia law and the belief that Allah has given the perfect political framework in the Koran. All of Islam is political to jihadists.
This is a fundamenal understanding that seems to be lacking, from the 1993 WTC I attack through 9-11. Nakhleh, seeking to keep the artificial distinction between political Islam and religious Islam, helps strengthen the belief that jihadi actions are not caused by the fundamental belif system embraced by much of Islam, but rather by external, Western-created circumstances. This type of analysis has led, at least it the reporting that has become public on radical Islam, to persistent failure, over several decades, to be right or of any predictive value in relation to radical Islam.
There is a broad agreement in the House report, the National Intelligence Estimate leaked to the Times and Post over the weekend, and other recent studies, that the Islamist threat is growing and spreading. The instruments are the Internet, madrassas, radical mosques, prison recruitment and others.
One can debate the importance of the Iraq invasion in this, but it is somewhat disingenious to argue that the jihadi threat would have disappeared or been significantly crippled without Iraq. Iraq is a training ground for jihadis, and place to become a martyr and fight the infidel.
But I think it would be hard to argue that the jihadis would have gone into retirement without Iraq. They would have still have carried out Spain and British attacks, quietly targeted Somalia, fomented slaughter in Sudan and found areas to regroup, train and spread. The fundamental structure of the new, decentralized Islamist threat would be there, perhaps not as far along, with no Iraq action. The question is, do we understand the movement, and are does the requisite political will and understanding exist to fight it?
That information, coupled with an interview in Harper's Magazine of Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh, the former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at the CIA, seems to me to point a fundamental, residual problem in the government and intelligence community's approach to Islamists.
The House report, while disputed in its timing and presentation by Democrats, nonetheless presents some interesting findings, some that are particularly critical of the administration. The report found "significant shortfalls" in the government's knowledge of Islamist militancy at home or abroad. It concluded that there are "still gaps in our understanding of Islamist extremist groups, which leave America vulnerable."
At the same time, Nakhleh is saying that political Islam "is not a threat." What does political Islam mean? Can you possibly say that and ignore the political decision of the rulers of Saudi Arabia to put billions of dollars into teaching children to hate the wider world, everyone who is not a Salafist and non-religion based knowledge? The Pakistani decision to allow madrasas to continue to funtion as educational institutions when they teach the rote memorization of the Koran, accompanied only by the teachings of hatred. Does political Islam not embrace the (fundamentally political) international Muslim Brotherhood and its broadbased support of armed Islamist movements? The sharia movements in Northern Nigeria? Somalia in its current state? Sudan?
It is a rather stunning assessment, and may explain why so little is understood of "political Islam." The fundamental point is that "political Islam" is not a concept that can, at least in Salafist and many Shi'ite groups, be separted into two different worlds. Islam, to them, is political, based on Sharia law and the belief that Allah has given the perfect political framework in the Koran. All of Islam is political to jihadists.
This is a fundamenal understanding that seems to be lacking, from the 1993 WTC I attack through 9-11. Nakhleh, seeking to keep the artificial distinction between political Islam and religious Islam, helps strengthen the belief that jihadi actions are not caused by the fundamental belif system embraced by much of Islam, but rather by external, Western-created circumstances. This type of analysis has led, at least it the reporting that has become public on radical Islam, to persistent failure, over several decades, to be right or of any predictive value in relation to radical Islam.
There is a broad agreement in the House report, the National Intelligence Estimate leaked to the Times and Post over the weekend, and other recent studies, that the Islamist threat is growing and spreading. The instruments are the Internet, madrassas, radical mosques, prison recruitment and others.
One can debate the importance of the Iraq invasion in this, but it is somewhat disingenious to argue that the jihadi threat would have disappeared or been significantly crippled without Iraq. Iraq is a training ground for jihadis, and place to become a martyr and fight the infidel.
But I think it would be hard to argue that the jihadis would have gone into retirement without Iraq. They would have still have carried out Spain and British attacks, quietly targeted Somalia, fomented slaughter in Sudan and found areas to regroup, train and spread. The fundamental structure of the new, decentralized Islamist threat would be there, perhaps not as far along, with no Iraq action. The question is, do we understand the movement, and are does the requisite political will and understanding exist to fight it?
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Somalia and the Concept of Territoriality for Islamists
The situation is going from bad to worse in Somalia, as the Islamist leaders become more and more like the Taliban and less and less the moderates they pretended to be. A population beaten down by years of abuse and civil war welcomes the initial stability and removal of armed groups. Then the hammer comes down. Nuns are assassinated. Theaters closed, radios censored, dress codes imposed.
This matters on more than just a humanitarian level or from the vantage point of a spreading conflict in a region that is fragile at best. It is important to understand that Islamists view the holding of a territory, virtually any territory, as vital to the re-establishment of the Caliphate. It does not really matter where the banner is raised. It is more important to raise the banner.
This was clear in Afghanistan, when Azzam, backed by many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, agreed that the Afghan struggle took precedence over the Palestian struggle because it would give them an Islamist state. Lawrence Wright points this out in detail in "The Looming Tower."
It was true later when many in al Qaeda viewed the biggest loss, resulting from the 9-11 attacks, as the loss of the head of the Caliphate. This is not an abstract concept to Islamists. While the Shi'ia have their state in Iran, the Sunni Salafists have only the debauched states of the Arab Gulf, corrupt, flacid and abased before foreign powers.
This is why Somalia matters on a more fundamental level in the war on Islamists and their allies. I have been in meetings where the Islamist triumph in Somalia is dismisseed as unimportant because Somalia has no vital natural resources and is not viewed as being of strategic consequence for the United States. Neither did Afghanistan in 1996, when the Taliban rolled in.
There are several things wrong with that argument, but the main one is this: The establishment of the beginnings of a Caliphate is a huge psychological and real victory for Islamists. It is, by their own admission, a vital goal in the struggle to destroy the West, an intermediate step necessary to set up the anihilation of the non-Islamic world.
Assuming it is nothing more than an unpleasant and unimportant struggle in the hinterlands, of no strategic interest, is a serious mistake, being made now. We made the same mistake in Afghanistan, when we didn't know better. Now, they explain their strategy to us, and we still appear to have learned very little.
This matters on more than just a humanitarian level or from the vantage point of a spreading conflict in a region that is fragile at best. It is important to understand that Islamists view the holding of a territory, virtually any territory, as vital to the re-establishment of the Caliphate. It does not really matter where the banner is raised. It is more important to raise the banner.
This was clear in Afghanistan, when Azzam, backed by many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, agreed that the Afghan struggle took precedence over the Palestian struggle because it would give them an Islamist state. Lawrence Wright points this out in detail in "The Looming Tower."
It was true later when many in al Qaeda viewed the biggest loss, resulting from the 9-11 attacks, as the loss of the head of the Caliphate. This is not an abstract concept to Islamists. While the Shi'ia have their state in Iran, the Sunni Salafists have only the debauched states of the Arab Gulf, corrupt, flacid and abased before foreign powers.
This is why Somalia matters on a more fundamental level in the war on Islamists and their allies. I have been in meetings where the Islamist triumph in Somalia is dismisseed as unimportant because Somalia has no vital natural resources and is not viewed as being of strategic consequence for the United States. Neither did Afghanistan in 1996, when the Taliban rolled in.
There are several things wrong with that argument, but the main one is this: The establishment of the beginnings of a Caliphate is a huge psychological and real victory for Islamists. It is, by their own admission, a vital goal in the struggle to destroy the West, an intermediate step necessary to set up the anihilation of the non-Islamic world.
Assuming it is nothing more than an unpleasant and unimportant struggle in the hinterlands, of no strategic interest, is a serious mistake, being made now. We made the same mistake in Afghanistan, when we didn't know better. Now, they explain their strategy to us, and we still appear to have learned very little.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH