Monday December 18, 2006
A Small but Important Step at the CIA
In an interview published in today's Washington Post CIA director Michael V. Hayden made a small but extremely important comment on how he plans to change the agency, particularly the analysis side. He said expertise and "time on target" would be rewarded, rather than just moving analysts around from one area to another, prizing generalists over specialists.
Within the intelligence community culture, those who specialized in a region or topic have traditionally had a limited career track and a slim chance of moving up the ladder. Now, said Hayden, rewards "could now go to someone who has been looking at Iran for 14 years."
This is a vitally importance paradigm shift, one that almost every reform commission on intelligence has recommended. In an era where the primary collection targets-radical Islam and China-require extensive language and cultural skills, as well as knowledge, the routine rotation after a few months or years often simply served to perpetrate ignorance.
None of the skills necessary to understand radical Islam-its variants, teachings, use of language, family and organizational networks-can be acquired in a few months or even a few years.
China, likewise, is a multi-headed creature with a host of exploding global interests (particularly in the areas of energy and weapons sales) that will directly compete with the strategic U.S. interestes. They are skilled in counter-intelligence (where the U.S. remains virtually incapacitated), their language, political structure and factions are not something one can learn in a few months or years.
If we do not give our analysts time to develop a deep understanding of these and other new and crucial issues, we are depriving ourselves of the skills we need to know and combat enemies and potential enemies. These and other new challenges may require a person to spend virtually their entire career on one relatively small segment of the world. The community must be able to assimilate and reward those who make the effort.
Hayedn also pledged to work to lessen the segmentation within the agency, between the DO and DI. This would also be a welcome and long overdue change. Not only are the operational and analytical sides segregated but within each of those directorates people tend to be specialized to such a degree that it is very difficult for them to see outside their narrow boxes.
This is the way the system has worked for decades and Hayden will likely meet resistence as he tries to push these changes through. Painful as they are, the changes are vital to having an intelligence community that can understand and report on threats for which we remain unprepared.
Within the intelligence community culture, those who specialized in a region or topic have traditionally had a limited career track and a slim chance of moving up the ladder. Now, said Hayden, rewards "could now go to someone who has been looking at Iran for 14 years."
This is a vitally importance paradigm shift, one that almost every reform commission on intelligence has recommended. In an era where the primary collection targets-radical Islam and China-require extensive language and cultural skills, as well as knowledge, the routine rotation after a few months or years often simply served to perpetrate ignorance.
None of the skills necessary to understand radical Islam-its variants, teachings, use of language, family and organizational networks-can be acquired in a few months or even a few years.
China, likewise, is a multi-headed creature with a host of exploding global interests (particularly in the areas of energy and weapons sales) that will directly compete with the strategic U.S. interestes. They are skilled in counter-intelligence (where the U.S. remains virtually incapacitated), their language, political structure and factions are not something one can learn in a few months or years.
If we do not give our analysts time to develop a deep understanding of these and other new and crucial issues, we are depriving ourselves of the skills we need to know and combat enemies and potential enemies. These and other new challenges may require a person to spend virtually their entire career on one relatively small segment of the world. The community must be able to assimilate and reward those who make the effort.
Hayedn also pledged to work to lessen the segmentation within the agency, between the DO and DI. This would also be a welcome and long overdue change. Not only are the operational and analytical sides segregated but within each of those directorates people tend to be specialized to such a degree that it is very difficult for them to see outside their narrow boxes.
This is the way the system has worked for decades and Hayden will likely meet resistence as he tries to push these changes through. Painful as they are, the changes are vital to having an intelligence community that can understand and report on threats for which we remain unprepared.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
The Islamist Reponse to the Pope's Comments
I am neither Catholic nor Jewish, but it strikes me as obscene that Islamists would respond with pre-arranged violence to the Pope's recent comments on the nature of Islam and the acceptability of forced conversions, or conversions by the sword. For a look at the historical context of the original remarks, see Andrew Bostom's article here.
Wahhabism, and many branches of Shi'ite Islam not only preach death to Jews and Christians and other unbelievers, they have, for decades, placed such teaching in the textbooks of school children, starting from their entrance into school.
The routine teaching of Jews as pigs and monkeys, the multiple references in the Koran to killing unbelievers and the extensive role of Islam in conquering and enslaving entire peoples (thus, eventually, spreading Islam), all bear out the comments made six centuries ago in the discussion the Pope referenced. That the Pope's decision to discuss this debate in an academic setting led to violence in the name of Islam seems to only confirm those who practice that violence accept that interpretation of the Koran.
Should the non-Islamic world riot at each anti-Semetic remark from the president of Iran, the Saudi royalty and imams? Should we rise up each time a text book portraying us to pre-literate children as sub-human is published? We would have time for nothing else.
The fundamental misconception in this is the very Western idea that we are fighting a war (if we are fighting one at all) on a level playing field. That is to say, we believe the enemy, Islamists, play by the rules we hold as fair and honest. When crowds can form in seemingly spontaneous reaction to an obscure and lightly-reported Papal speech, it is evidence of an organization that has pre-positioned its people to strike when the opportunity arises. It was the same in the Danish cartoon riots.
In this war, the enemy will use denial and deception, propaganda, front groups ready to react with public outrage at even preceived minor grievances to portray everything that happens as an anti-Muslim crusade. So we don't mention what Islam really teaches, or what many in Islam teach as Islam-we believe in free speech and freedom of religion, so we don't want to get involved with what is generally deemed to be protected speech.
And that has vast merit. But it does not mean we cannot point out, and very publicly, the great hypocracy of these groups. It is not all of Islam, but the premediated response by some is designed to broaden the appeal of the Islamists in the Islamic community. We cannot stand by and allow them to define the entire terms of every debate.
Wahhabism, and many branches of Shi'ite Islam not only preach death to Jews and Christians and other unbelievers, they have, for decades, placed such teaching in the textbooks of school children, starting from their entrance into school.
The routine teaching of Jews as pigs and monkeys, the multiple references in the Koran to killing unbelievers and the extensive role of Islam in conquering and enslaving entire peoples (thus, eventually, spreading Islam), all bear out the comments made six centuries ago in the discussion the Pope referenced. That the Pope's decision to discuss this debate in an academic setting led to violence in the name of Islam seems to only confirm those who practice that violence accept that interpretation of the Koran.
Should the non-Islamic world riot at each anti-Semetic remark from the president of Iran, the Saudi royalty and imams? Should we rise up each time a text book portraying us to pre-literate children as sub-human is published? We would have time for nothing else.
The fundamental misconception in this is the very Western idea that we are fighting a war (if we are fighting one at all) on a level playing field. That is to say, we believe the enemy, Islamists, play by the rules we hold as fair and honest. When crowds can form in seemingly spontaneous reaction to an obscure and lightly-reported Papal speech, it is evidence of an organization that has pre-positioned its people to strike when the opportunity arises. It was the same in the Danish cartoon riots.
In this war, the enemy will use denial and deception, propaganda, front groups ready to react with public outrage at even preceived minor grievances to portray everything that happens as an anti-Muslim crusade. So we don't mention what Islam really teaches, or what many in Islam teach as Islam-we believe in free speech and freedom of religion, so we don't want to get involved with what is generally deemed to be protected speech.
And that has vast merit. But it does not mean we cannot point out, and very publicly, the great hypocracy of these groups. It is not all of Islam, but the premediated response by some is designed to broaden the appeal of the Islamists in the Islamic community. We cannot stand by and allow them to define the entire terms of every debate.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
The Downward Spiral of Fragile and Failing States
The latest World Bank study on failed and failing states (now called "fragile states") shows just how rapidly the global situation is deteriorating. As reported in the Washington Post by Karen DeYoung, the number of states that could provide logistical bases and ungoverned spaces for terrorists, transnational criminal organizations and other armed non-state groups has jumped from 17 in 2003 to 26 this year.
The growth of "black holes" and stateless regions is even more alarming when compared to a similar study done by the Bank in 1996, when only 11 states fell into the category of failed states.
Hurdles facing these countries include "weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, lack of mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority" and limited investment resources to meet basic needs, the report said.
This, in a uni-polar world where the Islamists are seeking to exploit the lack of government control, alliances with transnational criminal groups and rear guard areas to train and begin the caliphate, is extremely dangerous. This puts large sections of the world off limits to traditional state levers of diplomacy, aid, intelligence gathering and international sanction.
Of the curent count, Africa, the perenial leader in the field, accounts for 16 of the countries, up from 10 in 2003 (and seven in 1996). This trend justifies the growing DOD concern about Africa as the key region of emerging Islamist threats. No other region is even close.
Most worrisome is the appearance of two of the continent's powerhouses on the list for the first time. Both Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria now join the ranks of Liberia, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Guinea Bissau as nation's where the government is largely ineffective. Nigeria, with is vast oil reserves, is of particular concern for U.S. strategic interests.
But Cote d'Ivoire is of equal concern because it offers a relatively good banking infrastructure, a large expatriate Lebanese community long simpathetic to Hizbollah, and regional access for moving goods and people. DRC and Zimbabwe contol vital strategic minerals that the Chinese are happily exploiting, and the list goes on and on.
The Bush administration has been slow to recognize the danger posed by failed and failing states, but has at least begun to acknoweldge the crisis.
"The danger they pose is now unparalleled," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote in a column that appeared late last year in The Washington Post. "Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a country's borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc.
"Weak and failing states," Rice said, "serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons."
Unfortunately, those words have not translated into a coherent policy or even an ability to place the threats posed by these regions anywhere near the top of the priority list. But, if current trends continue, we will have to pay attention because there will be fewer and fewer states to deal with.
The growth of "black holes" and stateless regions is even more alarming when compared to a similar study done by the Bank in 1996, when only 11 states fell into the category of failed states.
Hurdles facing these countries include "weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, lack of mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority" and limited investment resources to meet basic needs, the report said.
This, in a uni-polar world where the Islamists are seeking to exploit the lack of government control, alliances with transnational criminal groups and rear guard areas to train and begin the caliphate, is extremely dangerous. This puts large sections of the world off limits to traditional state levers of diplomacy, aid, intelligence gathering and international sanction.
Of the curent count, Africa, the perenial leader in the field, accounts for 16 of the countries, up from 10 in 2003 (and seven in 1996). This trend justifies the growing DOD concern about Africa as the key region of emerging Islamist threats. No other region is even close.
Most worrisome is the appearance of two of the continent's powerhouses on the list for the first time. Both Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria now join the ranks of Liberia, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Guinea Bissau as nation's where the government is largely ineffective. Nigeria, with is vast oil reserves, is of particular concern for U.S. strategic interests.
But Cote d'Ivoire is of equal concern because it offers a relatively good banking infrastructure, a large expatriate Lebanese community long simpathetic to Hizbollah, and regional access for moving goods and people. DRC and Zimbabwe contol vital strategic minerals that the Chinese are happily exploiting, and the list goes on and on.
The Bush administration has been slow to recognize the danger posed by failed and failing states, but has at least begun to acknoweldge the crisis.
"The danger they pose is now unparalleled," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote in a column that appeared late last year in The Washington Post. "Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a country's borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc.
"Weak and failing states," Rice said, "serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons."
Unfortunately, those words have not translated into a coherent policy or even an ability to place the threats posed by these regions anywhere near the top of the priority list. But, if current trends continue, we will have to pay attention because there will be fewer and fewer states to deal with.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Al Qaeda's Changing Strategy and Warnings of Attacks
Al Qaeda (meaning the core group led by bin Laden) seems to be adjusting its strategy in the wake of the relative success of Hezbollah in its recent war with Israel. Rather than letting Hezbollah and Shi'ite groups operate there alone with such greatly enhanced stature, the core al Qaeda leadership is working hard to regroup with an eye toward moving into more direct attacks on Israel and corrupt Islamic regimes.
The al Qaeda leadership appears to be concerned that Hezbollah's ability to frontally attack the "Great Satan" of Israel and not only survive, but prosper politically around the Arab world, will undermine al Qaeda's standing and that of its leadership.
As the Asia Times reports, the recent decision by Pakistan to negotiate a truce with the Taliban in several provinces has helped faciliate this by unblocking the flow of money to bin Laden and his network. While the Taliban may not be militarily active in those regions, in technical compliance with the terms of the agreement, the cessation of hostilities has made it far easier for bin Laden to regain his financial footing and project control further than he has been able to in some time. In fact, this consolidation has been going on for several months, taking advantage of the easing of Pakistani pressure during the negotiating process.
Earlier this week bin Laden's chief deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, warned that the Persian Gulf and Israel woudl be the next al Qaeda targets. He has also repeatedly called on others to join in united Muslim efforts to fan the flames of unrest around the globe. This includes not only keeping the Afghan and Iraqi fronts open, but expanding the conflicts in Somalia, the Philippines, Sudan and elsewhere.
It is not hard to see U.S. forces are stretched to their limit. Another war cannot be handled by the current military structure. Nor is there political capital to spend on chasing far-away wars that seem peripheral to our security interests. This is the advantage the jihadis have. For decades Saudi-funded Wahhabist theology has spread like gasoline across much of the Muslim world. It will take a relatively small spark to get the flames going, especially when there is at least the perception on the street that once-invincible enemies (Israel) are suddenly vulnerable.
The al Qaeda leadership may be somewhat isolated, but they surely can read the international winds. With more money flowing, a strengthened Taliban, a resilient Iraqi insurgency, a resurgent Hezbollah and spreading Islamist pockets from Somalia to Sudan, the contours of a strategy to take advantage of this are not hard to see.
I do not believe Hezbollah and al Qaeda can or will form a durable alliance. But there is strong evidence to suggest that they have and will help each other tactically if conditions require it. This correlation of forces, coupled with al Qaeda's repeated warnings to repent and turn to Allah-a key prerequisite to be fulfilled before an attack on infidels, as Mike Scheuer and others have recently correctly pointed out-point to a jihadi offensive of some strength.
The al Qaeda leadership appears to be concerned that Hezbollah's ability to frontally attack the "Great Satan" of Israel and not only survive, but prosper politically around the Arab world, will undermine al Qaeda's standing and that of its leadership.
As the Asia Times reports, the recent decision by Pakistan to negotiate a truce with the Taliban in several provinces has helped faciliate this by unblocking the flow of money to bin Laden and his network. While the Taliban may not be militarily active in those regions, in technical compliance with the terms of the agreement, the cessation of hostilities has made it far easier for bin Laden to regain his financial footing and project control further than he has been able to in some time. In fact, this consolidation has been going on for several months, taking advantage of the easing of Pakistani pressure during the negotiating process.
Earlier this week bin Laden's chief deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, warned that the Persian Gulf and Israel woudl be the next al Qaeda targets. He has also repeatedly called on others to join in united Muslim efforts to fan the flames of unrest around the globe. This includes not only keeping the Afghan and Iraqi fronts open, but expanding the conflicts in Somalia, the Philippines, Sudan and elsewhere.
It is not hard to see U.S. forces are stretched to their limit. Another war cannot be handled by the current military structure. Nor is there political capital to spend on chasing far-away wars that seem peripheral to our security interests. This is the advantage the jihadis have. For decades Saudi-funded Wahhabist theology has spread like gasoline across much of the Muslim world. It will take a relatively small spark to get the flames going, especially when there is at least the perception on the street that once-invincible enemies (Israel) are suddenly vulnerable.
The al Qaeda leadership may be somewhat isolated, but they surely can read the international winds. With more money flowing, a strengthened Taliban, a resilient Iraqi insurgency, a resurgent Hezbollah and spreading Islamist pockets from Somalia to Sudan, the contours of a strategy to take advantage of this are not hard to see.
I do not believe Hezbollah and al Qaeda can or will form a durable alliance. But there is strong evidence to suggest that they have and will help each other tactically if conditions require it. This correlation of forces, coupled with al Qaeda's repeated warnings to repent and turn to Allah-a key prerequisite to be fulfilled before an attack on infidels, as Mike Scheuer and others have recently correctly pointed out-point to a jihadi offensive of some strength.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
My Lessons in Five Years
Like most people who cover terrorism issues, I have had a steep learning curve since 9-11. I, like many, was forced to go from knowing almost nothing to trying to make sense of the new world and the new (to me, but not to the smarter ones) threat. Here are some of the main lessons I have learned:
1) The wahhabis and other radical Islamists of both Sunni and Shi'ite beliefs have a long-terms strategy for dealing with us (U.S., Israel, Europe-the Big Satans), as well as the each other (Little Satans-apostate regimes, and the other sects of Islam).
2) One of the traditional backbones of these plans has been the international Muslim Brotherhood, whose leaders provide vision, money, strategic thinking and tactical advise to the Islamist groups across the board. The role and nature of the Ikwan is still rarely understood in intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement circles. The role is to establish a Muslim caliphate by whatever means necessary.
3) After an initial shock, things tend to go back to the way they were. In the U.S., this has meant an unhealthy return to a lack of intelligence sharing, a creation of larger and less responsive bureaucracies, a return to dealing with "moderate" Muslim groups often tied to the Ikwan who we do not know or properly identify, and a continued inability to understand and develop a strategy for dealing with stateless areas and non-state actors. The concept of networks and how to attack them, while part of academic debates for several years, is only now being revisited by DOD and the DNI.
4) Tactical alliances that seem highly improbable, often occur: Shi'ite-Sunni financial dealings in diamonds, weapons and training; alliances of Islamists with criminal organizations such a that of Dawood Ibrahim and Viktor Bout; alliances between Islamic financial centers and Western banks. Because these trends were not seen before they tend to be dismissed as impossible or unimportant.
5) Our dislike of reading and the inability to take seriously what our enemy says, from the days of al Qaeda's founding in Afghanistan, through Bosnia to the present, is a crippling weakness. The enemy-holy warriors doing what they believe Allah has called them to do-write extensively and explicitly about what they want to do and how they will do it. They are not crazy, marginal figures who can be defined as we (the West) wish they would be defined. They define themselves for us, yet we often want to pretend they cannot even get that right. Except for a few notable exceptions (the West Point project on reading and translating al Qaeda and radical Islamist works) this work of reading and understanding is largely left to academics and think tanks, and the lessons seldom filter up the policy chain.
1) The wahhabis and other radical Islamists of both Sunni and Shi'ite beliefs have a long-terms strategy for dealing with us (U.S., Israel, Europe-the Big Satans), as well as the each other (Little Satans-apostate regimes, and the other sects of Islam).
2) One of the traditional backbones of these plans has been the international Muslim Brotherhood, whose leaders provide vision, money, strategic thinking and tactical advise to the Islamist groups across the board. The role and nature of the Ikwan is still rarely understood in intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement circles. The role is to establish a Muslim caliphate by whatever means necessary.
3) After an initial shock, things tend to go back to the way they were. In the U.S., this has meant an unhealthy return to a lack of intelligence sharing, a creation of larger and less responsive bureaucracies, a return to dealing with "moderate" Muslim groups often tied to the Ikwan who we do not know or properly identify, and a continued inability to understand and develop a strategy for dealing with stateless areas and non-state actors. The concept of networks and how to attack them, while part of academic debates for several years, is only now being revisited by DOD and the DNI.
4) Tactical alliances that seem highly improbable, often occur: Shi'ite-Sunni financial dealings in diamonds, weapons and training; alliances of Islamists with criminal organizations such a that of Dawood Ibrahim and Viktor Bout; alliances between Islamic financial centers and Western banks. Because these trends were not seen before they tend to be dismissed as impossible or unimportant.
5) Our dislike of reading and the inability to take seriously what our enemy says, from the days of al Qaeda's founding in Afghanistan, through Bosnia to the present, is a crippling weakness. The enemy-holy warriors doing what they believe Allah has called them to do-write extensively and explicitly about what they want to do and how they will do it. They are not crazy, marginal figures who can be defined as we (the West) wish they would be defined. They define themselves for us, yet we often want to pretend they cannot even get that right. Except for a few notable exceptions (the West Point project on reading and translating al Qaeda and radical Islamist works) this work of reading and understanding is largely left to academics and think tanks, and the lessons seldom filter up the policy chain.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH