Tuesday December 19, 2006
Hezbollah-al Qaeda Ties Increase Danger in Lebanon
In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, the conventional wisdom in the intelligence community was that the Shi'ite Hezbollah and the Sunni al Qaeda did not and could not operate together because of the religious divide between the two groups.
However, al Qaeda's own writings, and testimony of senior al Qaeda operatives in U.S. custody (Jamal al Fadl) recount the extensive contacts bewtween the two organizations while bin Laden was in Sudan, including joint military and explosives training.
It has taken the conventional wisdom a long time to catch up with reality on the ground, but it is important to remember that things that were often considered inconceivable in the shadow infrastructure of non-state actors were simply based on our preconceptions, not reality.
If the Lebanese conflict drags on, it would be likely that al Qaeda would try to work again with its occassional ally in an alliance of convenience that could benefit both groups. The chaos in the region benefits all the non-state armed groups, and such circumstances often give rise to transitory (or perhaps permanent) alliances between groups that share the same goals and resources. While Zarqawi fanned the flames of the Sunni-Shi'ite divide inside Iraq, it was in part a tactical decision to weaken the government and cause a civil war, rather than a theological decison.
The point of contact with bin Laden in Sudan was Imad Mugniya, the person currently considered to be Hezbollah's chief of military operations and the likely instigator of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers. Mugniya, as noted elsewhere on this blog, has been at this for a long time and the sophisticated operation bear the hallmarks of his style. in addition, his high-level contacts in Iran, and his long-time protection from Iran's revolutionary government have given him the ability to operate with impunity and survive for many years.
Since the early 1990s contact between the two groups there have been other interactions. Hezbollah operatives-Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly- provided the infrastructure for al Qaeda's diamond operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone that helped al Qaeda transfer millions of dollars into fungible assets and out of the range of the West's financial sanctions.
Mugniya has worked extensively in West Africa among the Lebanese diaspora of several hundred thousand that populate the West coast. The Ivory Coast is an especially active place for Hezbollah, both for fund raising and R&R.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and in the case of Lebanon, that saying could well apply to Hezbollah and al Qaeda regardless of religious differences.
However, al Qaeda's own writings, and testimony of senior al Qaeda operatives in U.S. custody (Jamal al Fadl) recount the extensive contacts bewtween the two organizations while bin Laden was in Sudan, including joint military and explosives training.
It has taken the conventional wisdom a long time to catch up with reality on the ground, but it is important to remember that things that were often considered inconceivable in the shadow infrastructure of non-state actors were simply based on our preconceptions, not reality.
If the Lebanese conflict drags on, it would be likely that al Qaeda would try to work again with its occassional ally in an alliance of convenience that could benefit both groups. The chaos in the region benefits all the non-state armed groups, and such circumstances often give rise to transitory (or perhaps permanent) alliances between groups that share the same goals and resources. While Zarqawi fanned the flames of the Sunni-Shi'ite divide inside Iraq, it was in part a tactical decision to weaken the government and cause a civil war, rather than a theological decison.
The point of contact with bin Laden in Sudan was Imad Mugniya, the person currently considered to be Hezbollah's chief of military operations and the likely instigator of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers. Mugniya, as noted elsewhere on this blog, has been at this for a long time and the sophisticated operation bear the hallmarks of his style. in addition, his high-level contacts in Iran, and his long-time protection from Iran's revolutionary government have given him the ability to operate with impunity and survive for many years.
Since the early 1990s contact between the two groups there have been other interactions. Hezbollah operatives-Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly- provided the infrastructure for al Qaeda's diamond operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone that helped al Qaeda transfer millions of dollars into fungible assets and out of the range of the West's financial sanctions.
Mugniya has worked extensively in West Africa among the Lebanese diaspora of several hundred thousand that populate the West coast. The Ivory Coast is an especially active place for Hezbollah, both for fund raising and R&R.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and in the case of Lebanon, that saying could well apply to Hezbollah and al Qaeda regardless of religious differences.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Religious Visa Fraud Haunts DHS, Potential Terrorist Tool
The Boston Globe has a deeply disturbing article on another one of the gaping loopholes that give radical Islamists unfettered, easy access to the United States-the little-known R or Religious Visa, that allows visitors to enter the United States with minimal scrutiny if they claim to belong to a religious order.
The program has been riddled with abuse for years, and a 1999 GAO report found wide-spread fraud, which has since not been addressed. The 1999 GAO report highlighted persistent lapses in oversight. "Neither INS nor [the] State [Department] knows the overall extent of fraud in the religious worker visa program," the report concluded.
The Globe report, based on an internal DHS review of the program said "The probe found a particularly high fraud rate among applicants from countries the government deemed to pose a security risk, such as Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, the report found. There were 11 applications for people from special-risk countries among the 220 petitions that were audited -- and 8 of those 11 were fraudulent, it said."
Michelle Malkin reports that the program has already been exploited to illegally bring in more than 200 Islamic applicants:
"According to a complaint from the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York unsealed last week, Muslim religious leader Muhammed Khalil, his son Asim, and three other individuals submitted false R visa applications on behalf of more than 200 Middle Eastern aliens. Although Khalil and his cronies were nabbed after an 18-month investigation, federal authorities are mum on the whereabouts of the Middle Eastern illegal aliens who purchased fake R visas from Khalil and his colleagues."
She reports that Khalil was taped by undercover agents admiring bin Laden and hoping another attack would soon hit the United States. Along the way, he charged $8,000 to dummy up the necessary, minimal paperwork to those coming in, inventing names, university degrees, etc., that were never checked.
So, another hole large enough to drive a truck through. DHS says it is studying the problem and trying to crack down on abuse. It is probably several years too late to worry about that. Almost all the foreign workers for Benevolence International and other shuttered, designated Islamist charities were here on R visas. The Blind Sheik, Omar Abdul Rahman, was on an R visa when he plotted to destroy New York City and inspired Osama bin Laden.
No one seems to know where the 200 fraudulent visa holders Khalil helped, are now. Nor how many more there are out there, legally living in a country they long to destroy.
The program has been riddled with abuse for years, and a 1999 GAO report found wide-spread fraud, which has since not been addressed. The 1999 GAO report highlighted persistent lapses in oversight. "Neither INS nor [the] State [Department] knows the overall extent of fraud in the religious worker visa program," the report concluded.
The Globe report, based on an internal DHS review of the program said "The probe found a particularly high fraud rate among applicants from countries the government deemed to pose a security risk, such as Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, the report found. There were 11 applications for people from special-risk countries among the 220 petitions that were audited -- and 8 of those 11 were fraudulent, it said."
Michelle Malkin reports that the program has already been exploited to illegally bring in more than 200 Islamic applicants:
"According to a complaint from the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York unsealed last week, Muslim religious leader Muhammed Khalil, his son Asim, and three other individuals submitted false R visa applications on behalf of more than 200 Middle Eastern aliens. Although Khalil and his cronies were nabbed after an 18-month investigation, federal authorities are mum on the whereabouts of the Middle Eastern illegal aliens who purchased fake R visas from Khalil and his colleagues."
She reports that Khalil was taped by undercover agents admiring bin Laden and hoping another attack would soon hit the United States. Along the way, he charged $8,000 to dummy up the necessary, minimal paperwork to those coming in, inventing names, university degrees, etc., that were never checked.
So, another hole large enough to drive a truck through. DHS says it is studying the problem and trying to crack down on abuse. It is probably several years too late to worry about that. Almost all the foreign workers for Benevolence International and other shuttered, designated Islamist charities were here on R visas. The Blind Sheik, Omar Abdul Rahman, was on an R visa when he plotted to destroy New York City and inspired Osama bin Laden.
No one seems to know where the 200 fraudulent visa holders Khalil helped, are now. Nor how many more there are out there, legally living in a country they long to destroy.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Who is Dawood Ibrahim?
The chief suspect in the Mumbai train attacks is one of the most fascinating characters in the nexus of terrorism and organized crime. This is true even if he was not involved it what appears to be a well-coordinated, sophisticated attack of the type he has been involved in before. Indian authorities are naming his as the primary suspect in the bloody attacks of yesterday.
A criminal kingpin, ally of al Qaeda, large-scale drug runner and financer of some of Bollywood's biggest movies, Ibrahim loves to hang out with movie stars and live the good life. Not exactly a natural ally of radical Islamist groups, but he appears to provide the muscle and know-how to attacks, rather than being the intellectual author of the violence he has pariticpated in. His ideology seems more firmly wedded to his financial well-being than to his religious beliefs.
Ibrahim has a enormous mansion in Karachi, Pakistan, but spends a great deal of time in Dubai, UAE. He has a long history of violence. His flamboyant life style made it difficult to believe that he was not protected by the Pakistani intelligence services for whom he worked, or officials in the UAE.
My friend David Kaplan did one of the best looks at him in U.S. News.
When the Treasury Department designated him in October 2003, hardly anyone paid attention. He had come across my radar screen, however, because of his reported role in the gold trade and in helping al Qaeda and the Taliban ship their money and gold reserves out of Afghanistan as the U.S. invaded in 2001. As my book describes, the Taliban and bin Laden kept much of their financial holdings in gold, for cultural and other reasons.
Ibrahim has kept a lower profile since his designation but prior to that used to consort fairly openly with starlets and actors in the epic Indian movies he bankrolled, reportedly making a large fortune in the process.
The Treasury Deparment's description of Ibrahim says in part that his criminal syndicate "is involved in large-scale shipments of narcotics in the U.K. and Western Europe.
"The syndicate's smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa are shared with Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network.
"Successful routes established over recent years by IBRAHIM'S syndicate have been subsequently utilized by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes.
"In the late 1990's, IBRAHIM traveled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.
"IBRAHIM'S syndicate has consistently aimed to destabilize the Indian government through inciting riots, acts of terrorism, and civil disobedience. He is currently wanted by India for the March 12, 1993 Bombay Exchange bombings, which killed hundreds of Indians and injured over a thousand more.
"Information, from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that IBRAHIM has financially supported Islamic militant groups working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)."
A criminal kingpin, ally of al Qaeda, large-scale drug runner and financer of some of Bollywood's biggest movies, Ibrahim loves to hang out with movie stars and live the good life. Not exactly a natural ally of radical Islamist groups, but he appears to provide the muscle and know-how to attacks, rather than being the intellectual author of the violence he has pariticpated in. His ideology seems more firmly wedded to his financial well-being than to his religious beliefs.
Ibrahim has a enormous mansion in Karachi, Pakistan, but spends a great deal of time in Dubai, UAE. He has a long history of violence. His flamboyant life style made it difficult to believe that he was not protected by the Pakistani intelligence services for whom he worked, or officials in the UAE.
My friend David Kaplan did one of the best looks at him in U.S. News.
When the Treasury Department designated him in October 2003, hardly anyone paid attention. He had come across my radar screen, however, because of his reported role in the gold trade and in helping al Qaeda and the Taliban ship their money and gold reserves out of Afghanistan as the U.S. invaded in 2001. As my book describes, the Taliban and bin Laden kept much of their financial holdings in gold, for cultural and other reasons.
Ibrahim has kept a lower profile since his designation but prior to that used to consort fairly openly with starlets and actors in the epic Indian movies he bankrolled, reportedly making a large fortune in the process.
The Treasury Deparment's description of Ibrahim says in part that his criminal syndicate "is involved in large-scale shipments of narcotics in the U.K. and Western Europe.
"The syndicate's smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa are shared with Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network.
"Successful routes established over recent years by IBRAHIM'S syndicate have been subsequently utilized by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes.
"In the late 1990's, IBRAHIM traveled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.
"IBRAHIM'S syndicate has consistently aimed to destabilize the Indian government through inciting riots, acts of terrorism, and civil disobedience. He is currently wanted by India for the March 12, 1993 Bombay Exchange bombings, which killed hundreds of Indians and injured over a thousand more.
"Information, from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that IBRAHIM has financially supported Islamic militant groups working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)."
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Intelligence Report Links Al Qaeda to Janjaweed in Sudan
A recent international intelligence document says there are credible reports that a cadre of about 15 al Qaeda operatives in Sudan are providing training to troops under the control of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal.
This is striking given the recent mentions of the janjaweed in Osama bin Laden's most recent public pronouncements, where the Arabs fighters in Sudan are congratulated along with the Islamists in Somalia.
Sudanese officials, who have done nothing so far to halt the Darfur slaughter by the janjaweed, have seized on the report and others like it insist the government's hands are tied in controlling the murderous raiders because the janjaweed are tied to al Qaeda, not the government.
Such logic may be a useful way to try to deflect the accusations of government participation in the genocide there, when faced with strong evidence of al Qaeda support. But the government, which hosted bin Laden and continues to maintain contact with al Qaeda groups, cannot and should not be allowed to get away with such egregious support for mass murder.
The confidential report says the trainers are foreigners who have arrived in Sudan from Kenya, Mali, Libya, Somalia and southern Egypt, and possibly Yemen. There are indications the cadre came out of Afghanistan and Iraq to join the janjaweed for training and combat.
The report suggests that "in the last week of April 2006, Arab militia have left from Kabkabiya, Misteria and Fata Borno. Their movement has allegedly been ordered by the prominent Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal.
"Hilal who is allegedly being supported by Al Osman Mohamed Taha (VP) has recently received 20 Toyota vehicles from VP Taha. It was also reported that the go-between person for VP Taha and Musa Hilal is a military officer whose name is Saeed (last name not yet known). Assisting him in some of his efforts is
a person called Mohamed Suleiman Rabi who is a "waha" or chief of some of the Arab Nomads especially around the Mallit area.
"Other report suggests that an Arab chief by the name of Mohamed Quiness Toe (last name spelt phonetically) who is from the Old Rashead tribe, received 17 vehicles from an unknown sponsor who then transported them to Giri village, one of the three suspected training camps. "
Given the world's inability to sustain its focus even on the most egregious abuses, such reports may help bring attention on Sudan and its government's organic ties to al Qaeda and the janjaweed for counter-terrorism reasons, rather than humanitarian, ethical or moral reasons.
While this is a good reason, Darfur has languished for far too long n an unsavory mix of politics, ethnic cleansing, religiously-justified murder, AU incompetence and world indifference.
This is striking given the recent mentions of the janjaweed in Osama bin Laden's most recent public pronouncements, where the Arabs fighters in Sudan are congratulated along with the Islamists in Somalia.
Sudanese officials, who have done nothing so far to halt the Darfur slaughter by the janjaweed, have seized on the report and others like it insist the government's hands are tied in controlling the murderous raiders because the janjaweed are tied to al Qaeda, not the government.
Such logic may be a useful way to try to deflect the accusations of government participation in the genocide there, when faced with strong evidence of al Qaeda support. But the government, which hosted bin Laden and continues to maintain contact with al Qaeda groups, cannot and should not be allowed to get away with such egregious support for mass murder.
The confidential report says the trainers are foreigners who have arrived in Sudan from Kenya, Mali, Libya, Somalia and southern Egypt, and possibly Yemen. There are indications the cadre came out of Afghanistan and Iraq to join the janjaweed for training and combat.
The report suggests that "in the last week of April 2006, Arab militia have left from Kabkabiya, Misteria and Fata Borno. Their movement has allegedly been ordered by the prominent Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal.
"Hilal who is allegedly being supported by Al Osman Mohamed Taha (VP) has recently received 20 Toyota vehicles from VP Taha. It was also reported that the go-between person for VP Taha and Musa Hilal is a military officer whose name is Saeed (last name not yet known). Assisting him in some of his efforts is
a person called Mohamed Suleiman Rabi who is a "waha" or chief of some of the Arab Nomads especially around the Mallit area.
"Other report suggests that an Arab chief by the name of Mohamed Quiness Toe (last name spelt phonetically) who is from the Old Rashead tribe, received 17 vehicles from an unknown sponsor who then transported them to Giri village, one of the three suspected training camps. "
Given the world's inability to sustain its focus even on the most egregious abuses, such reports may help bring attention on Sudan and its government's organic ties to al Qaeda and the janjaweed for counter-terrorism reasons, rather than humanitarian, ethical or moral reasons.
While this is a good reason, Darfur has languished for far too long n an unsavory mix of politics, ethnic cleansing, religiously-justified murder, AU incompetence and world indifference.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
The Importance of Networks in Terrorist Structures
One think I find particularly missing in the current look at several important terrorist-related areas-Somalia, the role of the international Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda's growing efforts in Africa, Viktor Bout-is the discussion of the networks that connect different Salafist/Islamist groups that make them so lethal and so important.
While there is some discussion of networks and their importance in the structures of non-state actors in intelligence and policy circles, there is no broad recognition that networks are what make non-state actors threats of the same order of magnitude or greater, than most states.
This is not a new concept. Jonathan Winer and others in the mid-1990s began to seriously push policy and intelligence to focus on networks, leading Winer and others to do the first serious studies of the Muslim Brotherhood's financial links to different groups. Bout, in his weapons supplies, was viewed through the same lens, making him, in the waning years of the Clinton administration, a high-value, multi-agency target.
Networks are also vitally important in the newly-emerging "self-starting" Islamist groups. Most of these groups, in Spain, Great Britain etc. that are known have received significant help from the existing jihadi networks, in developing concepts, obtaining material and ideological orientation.
Networks also provide the ability to move across national bounderies, find expertise, share knowledge and exploit the existing strengths of each group. The lack of understanding of networks, for example, that led to the long-standing belief that Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims could not work together. But they did, repeatedly, and by the admission of in their own writings.
Al Qaeda's diamond buyers did not set up their own pipeline in West Africa, they simply plugged into Hezbollah's existing structure. The other examples are endless. Networks also explain the interaction between terrorist and criminal organizations, for mutual benefit, and how and why the lines often blur.
Somalia, Bout or other issues do no pose security threats by themselves, in isolation. What makes Somalia important in strategic terms is not just the Islamist state it will create, but that it will add another important link in a web of connections that are part of the Salafist efforts to attack the West. On its own, it is not much of a threat. But plug Islamist Somalia into the network of jihadists moving from Africa to Pakistan, from Pakistan to Iraq etc., and its importance become clear.
Networks made Bout far more important that he would have been otherwise. Without the Russian organized criminal networks and the GRU networks, he would have been one more small-time arms trader in Africa and Afghanistan. But he became far more than that.
The argument over the importance of Somalia is particularly telling. The argument that it is of no strategic value because it is a relatively worthless piece of real estate is one of the same arguments used by those who chose not to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan early on. Over time the networks, developed during the war against the Soviets, re-routed and brought in money, recruits and trainers from the Arab penisula and elsewhere. The network expanded in the Balkans and spread through Southeast Asia.
With the increasing fragmentation and specialization within the intelligence community, there are very few analysts and policy makers looking at the networks that make possible the individual acts they focus on. That is a mistake.
While there is some discussion of networks and their importance in the structures of non-state actors in intelligence and policy circles, there is no broad recognition that networks are what make non-state actors threats of the same order of magnitude or greater, than most states.
This is not a new concept. Jonathan Winer and others in the mid-1990s began to seriously push policy and intelligence to focus on networks, leading Winer and others to do the first serious studies of the Muslim Brotherhood's financial links to different groups. Bout, in his weapons supplies, was viewed through the same lens, making him, in the waning years of the Clinton administration, a high-value, multi-agency target.
Networks are also vitally important in the newly-emerging "self-starting" Islamist groups. Most of these groups, in Spain, Great Britain etc. that are known have received significant help from the existing jihadi networks, in developing concepts, obtaining material and ideological orientation.
Networks also provide the ability to move across national bounderies, find expertise, share knowledge and exploit the existing strengths of each group. The lack of understanding of networks, for example, that led to the long-standing belief that Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims could not work together. But they did, repeatedly, and by the admission of in their own writings.
Al Qaeda's diamond buyers did not set up their own pipeline in West Africa, they simply plugged into Hezbollah's existing structure. The other examples are endless. Networks also explain the interaction between terrorist and criminal organizations, for mutual benefit, and how and why the lines often blur.
Somalia, Bout or other issues do no pose security threats by themselves, in isolation. What makes Somalia important in strategic terms is not just the Islamist state it will create, but that it will add another important link in a web of connections that are part of the Salafist efforts to attack the West. On its own, it is not much of a threat. But plug Islamist Somalia into the network of jihadists moving from Africa to Pakistan, from Pakistan to Iraq etc., and its importance become clear.
Networks made Bout far more important that he would have been otherwise. Without the Russian organized criminal networks and the GRU networks, he would have been one more small-time arms trader in Africa and Afghanistan. But he became far more than that.
The argument over the importance of Somalia is particularly telling. The argument that it is of no strategic value because it is a relatively worthless piece of real estate is one of the same arguments used by those who chose not to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan early on. Over time the networks, developed during the war against the Soviets, re-routed and brought in money, recruits and trainers from the Arab penisula and elsewhere. The network expanded in the Balkans and spread through Southeast Asia.
With the increasing fragmentation and specialization within the intelligence community, there are very few analysts and policy makers looking at the networks that make possible the individual acts they focus on. That is a mistake.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH