Wednesday December 13, 2006
Is Viktor B. Flying Weapons to Islamists in Somalia
Twice in one week the airport at Mogadishu, Somalia, was the scene of something almost unseen in the past decade-the landing of two large Soviet-era IL-76 cargo planes, among the biggest in the world, capable of carryng more than 50 tons in its hold. The airport is under the control of the Islamis militias that are intent on turning Somalia into an Islamic nation governed by a radical vision of what sharia law implies. Few flights have landed there at all in the past decade.
News reports from the scene said the aircraft unloaded large amounts of boxes believed to be weapons, into the waiting trucks of the Islamist militias. Little more could be garnered because the militiamen drove off onlookers and journalists.
On the first flight, the plane was painted with the "UN" markings denoting Kazakstan registration, with no other identifiers. The second flight may have been the same aircraft, and if not, was a similar Il-76, and was met by at least six trucks to facilitate the offloading of the cargo.
The BBC reported that "credible sources said that flight originated in Eritrea carrying anti-aircraft guns, uniforms, AK47s and several senior Eritrean officers." AFP managed to squeeze off one picture showing trucks on the ground unloading the aircraft.
Hmm, so an unmarked Soviet-built aircraft probably carrying large amounts of weapons, flying to remote airstrips for unsavory Islamist backers. Kazakstan registration. Fits a certain M.O. There are not many people in the weapons world who can provide the weapons and the transportation, who know the terrain and the militia leaders.
Bout has registered his Reem Air in Kazakstan, including an IL-76, and has flown regularly smaller planes to Somalia in recent times, from Sharjah, UAE. He flew for the Taliban, sold them airplanes and helped them break an international embargo. He did the same for Bosnian Islamist militants in the early 1990s. No one else has that kind of track record.
Intelligence officials are desperately trying to find any further markers on the aircraft. But if it flies like a duck and quacks like a duck, it just might be a duck.
News reports from the scene said the aircraft unloaded large amounts of boxes believed to be weapons, into the waiting trucks of the Islamist militias. Little more could be garnered because the militiamen drove off onlookers and journalists.
On the first flight, the plane was painted with the "UN" markings denoting Kazakstan registration, with no other identifiers. The second flight may have been the same aircraft, and if not, was a similar Il-76, and was met by at least six trucks to facilitate the offloading of the cargo.
The BBC reported that "credible sources said that flight originated in Eritrea carrying anti-aircraft guns, uniforms, AK47s and several senior Eritrean officers." AFP managed to squeeze off one picture showing trucks on the ground unloading the aircraft.
Hmm, so an unmarked Soviet-built aircraft probably carrying large amounts of weapons, flying to remote airstrips for unsavory Islamist backers. Kazakstan registration. Fits a certain M.O. There are not many people in the weapons world who can provide the weapons and the transportation, who know the terrain and the militia leaders.
Bout has registered his Reem Air in Kazakstan, including an IL-76, and has flown regularly smaller planes to Somalia in recent times, from Sharjah, UAE. He flew for the Taliban, sold them airplanes and helped them break an international embargo. He did the same for Bosnian Islamist militants in the early 1990s. No one else has that kind of track record.
Intelligence officials are desperately trying to find any further markers on the aircraft. But if it flies like a duck and quacks like a duck, it just might be a duck.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
The Slow Pace of Intelligence Reform
Despite the high priority supposedly allotted intelligence reform, there is bipartisan agreement that things are not going well on that front. This is especially critical as the United States faces an array of challenges, perhaps unprecedented, where intelligence is crucial.
According to this CQ Online report, a Congressional report from the House Intelligence Oversight subcommittee, to be released today finds the DNI "has failed to revamp its approach to information analysis, neglecting large swaths of potentially useful data. The report also found that the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence has done a poor job of prioritizing key tasks."
Crisis are raging or brewing from Somalia to Beirut, the Tri-Border Area to Southeast Asia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Good intelligence, paired with good analysis, have seldom been more vital to our survival and well being. But we are quite far from the ideal of a fully functional intelligence community.
Much of what we need to know is occuring in soft states or grey areas, where governments, which the intelligence community knows and understands, simply do not exist. The community has taken only hesitant steps to meet these changing challenges and priorities.
Among the other problems are the slowness in getting security clearances, the lack of standardized procedures for getting those, and the lack of human intelligence. There is also criticism of the lack of information sharing across agency lines and within agencies.
It is no secret that information sharing among intelligence agencies has sharply deteriorated in recent months. Despite a brief cessation of hostilities right after 9-11, the overall situation has never been good, and is getting worse. It is mind boggling that almost five years after 9-11 this difficulty and lack of communication still hobbles a unified effort to identify and fight an enemy who has made no secret of its desire to destroy us.
The lack of human intelligence is something that will not be addressed quickly, but is among the most urgent. This is especially true in areas of growing crisis where the intelligence community remains largely bereft of eyes and ears on the ground. Somalia, Ethiopia, the DRC and most of sub-Saharan Africa, the Tri-Border Area, all face sharp new threats to their stability which will likely have reprecussions for our national interests and security.
Liaison relationships with clearly identified counterparts in stateless regions of the world simply does not happen. Senior U.S. officials have stated publicly that the U.S. had no idea of what was brewing in Somalia, leaving us suddenly faced with an Islamist movement in which the predominant faction is clearly identified with al Qaeda.
The seeming inertia and inability of the leadership to move the reform process forward expeditiously is dangerous to all of us.
According to this CQ Online report, a Congressional report from the House Intelligence Oversight subcommittee, to be released today finds the DNI "has failed to revamp its approach to information analysis, neglecting large swaths of potentially useful data. The report also found that the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence has done a poor job of prioritizing key tasks."
Crisis are raging or brewing from Somalia to Beirut, the Tri-Border Area to Southeast Asia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Good intelligence, paired with good analysis, have seldom been more vital to our survival and well being. But we are quite far from the ideal of a fully functional intelligence community.
Much of what we need to know is occuring in soft states or grey areas, where governments, which the intelligence community knows and understands, simply do not exist. The community has taken only hesitant steps to meet these changing challenges and priorities.
Among the other problems are the slowness in getting security clearances, the lack of standardized procedures for getting those, and the lack of human intelligence. There is also criticism of the lack of information sharing across agency lines and within agencies.
It is no secret that information sharing among intelligence agencies has sharply deteriorated in recent months. Despite a brief cessation of hostilities right after 9-11, the overall situation has never been good, and is getting worse. It is mind boggling that almost five years after 9-11 this difficulty and lack of communication still hobbles a unified effort to identify and fight an enemy who has made no secret of its desire to destroy us.
The lack of human intelligence is something that will not be addressed quickly, but is among the most urgent. This is especially true in areas of growing crisis where the intelligence community remains largely bereft of eyes and ears on the ground. Somalia, Ethiopia, the DRC and most of sub-Saharan Africa, the Tri-Border Area, all face sharp new threats to their stability which will likely have reprecussions for our national interests and security.
Liaison relationships with clearly identified counterparts in stateless regions of the world simply does not happen. Senior U.S. officials have stated publicly that the U.S. had no idea of what was brewing in Somalia, leaving us suddenly faced with an Islamist movement in which the predominant faction is clearly identified with al Qaeda.
The seeming inertia and inability of the leadership to move the reform process forward expeditiously is dangerous to all of us.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Somalia Goes From Bad to Worse
The current develpments in Somalia show that a bad situation can almost always get worse. It also shows the limits of the administration's uncoordinated policy, where the military, State Department and intelligence communities barely talk to each other and clearly are not looking at the same play book.
The Washington Post reports that the always-dubious offer of the Islamist militias, who control most of the country, to open a dialogue with the weak and ineffectual nominal government, had been revoked.
The reason given for this was the entrance of Ethiopian troops, predominately Christian, into Somalia to protect the central government. Rather than dialogue, the Islamists have now declared jihad against the government and its backers.
The statements reflect the predominance of Hassan Dahir Aweys, with strong links to al Qaeda and a public defender of suicide bombers, within the Islamist militias. Others in the militias may not be in total agreement, but so far have been unable to exercise any autonomy from Aweys.
The U.S. government has acknowledged it did not see the Islamist triumph coming, and so far has limited its official response to public calls for dialogue among all parties and the usual litany of ineffective responses often given in the absence of a real policy. The intelligence community came across as ham-handed and inept in its failure to successfully help non-Islamist militias defeat Aweys and his allies. The State Deparment comes across as uninterested, disengaged and unwilling to face the reality of the Islamist threat in the impoverished nation.
Now there is the prospect of a wider regional war with heavy religious overtones in an region that is of strategic importance and already volitle. An Ethiopian invasion is likely one of the few things that could unite a majority of the Somalis on the side of the Islamists who will now look like they are fighting for national liberation. No Ethiopian invasion will likely mean the consolidation of an Islamist regime with ties to al Qaeda and other radical Islamist organizations.
Peace talks would have meant little. The government has no chips to put on the table. It is so weak it does not even sit in the capital. It controls no territory, has no army, protects no infrastructure and is now relying on a foreign power to prop it up. The U.S. support for that process was baffling, given the inevitable outcome.
It might be time to face reality, even as the State Department continues to fumble for a response.
Radical Islamists have now established a base in Somalia, which will benefit al Qaeda, both regionally and on a global level. Afghanistan, when the Taliban first seized control, had many of the same characteristics of the current Somali Islamist militias. People are being shot and beaten for watching the World Cup on television. Shaving is being banned, suspected adulterers stoned and women forced from any form of public life. Seems like we have seen this movie before, and grossly misunderstood how it would end. Can there be enough focus and energy to come up with a policy that avoids a repeat of the same fiasco that cost us so dearly?
The Washington Post reports that the always-dubious offer of the Islamist militias, who control most of the country, to open a dialogue with the weak and ineffectual nominal government, had been revoked.
The reason given for this was the entrance of Ethiopian troops, predominately Christian, into Somalia to protect the central government. Rather than dialogue, the Islamists have now declared jihad against the government and its backers.
The statements reflect the predominance of Hassan Dahir Aweys, with strong links to al Qaeda and a public defender of suicide bombers, within the Islamist militias. Others in the militias may not be in total agreement, but so far have been unable to exercise any autonomy from Aweys.
The U.S. government has acknowledged it did not see the Islamist triumph coming, and so far has limited its official response to public calls for dialogue among all parties and the usual litany of ineffective responses often given in the absence of a real policy. The intelligence community came across as ham-handed and inept in its failure to successfully help non-Islamist militias defeat Aweys and his allies. The State Deparment comes across as uninterested, disengaged and unwilling to face the reality of the Islamist threat in the impoverished nation.
Now there is the prospect of a wider regional war with heavy religious overtones in an region that is of strategic importance and already volitle. An Ethiopian invasion is likely one of the few things that could unite a majority of the Somalis on the side of the Islamists who will now look like they are fighting for national liberation. No Ethiopian invasion will likely mean the consolidation of an Islamist regime with ties to al Qaeda and other radical Islamist organizations.
Peace talks would have meant little. The government has no chips to put on the table. It is so weak it does not even sit in the capital. It controls no territory, has no army, protects no infrastructure and is now relying on a foreign power to prop it up. The U.S. support for that process was baffling, given the inevitable outcome.
It might be time to face reality, even as the State Department continues to fumble for a response.
Radical Islamists have now established a base in Somalia, which will benefit al Qaeda, both regionally and on a global level. Afghanistan, when the Taliban first seized control, had many of the same characteristics of the current Somali Islamist militias. People are being shot and beaten for watching the World Cup on television. Shaving is being banned, suspected adulterers stoned and women forced from any form of public life. Seems like we have seen this movie before, and grossly misunderstood how it would end. Can there be enough focus and energy to come up with a policy that avoids a repeat of the same fiasco that cost us so dearly?
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
To Cut of Hezbollah Funds, Cut off its External Support Structure
To diminish Hezbollah's future ability to amass the type of weapons it currently possesses and carry out expensive military operations, it is necessary to go after the organization's far-flug financial structure outside of Lebanon. In addition to the support the group receives from Iran and Syria, it maintains an extensive fund-raising arm among the Shi'ite Muslim disapora.
Key concentrations are West and Central Africa, Panama and the tri-border area in South America, where the organization raises money through contraband; "taxes" on legitimate businesses, where voluntary or not; and taking a cut of illegal businesses and smuggling. Partnership Africa Canada wrote a comprehensive paper on the Lebanese role in the West African "blood diamond" trade and other illiciit activities, which reaps Hezbollah and its sister militia, Amal, millions of dollars a year.
The close-knit family ties and kinship networks that are the basis for the Lebanese business operations make even routine criminal investigations very difficult. Because everyone knows everyone and who is related to whom, infiltrating someone undercover has proved to be largely impossible.
As I testified before Congress in April 2004, "Hezbollah operates in a more institutional manner in West Africa, where it has been operational almost since its birth in the early 1980s. Because of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese in West Africa—the vast majority being Shi’ite Muslims--the organization has a natural constituency and family ties that bind the region to the Lebanese conflict. Hezbollah collects donations from businesses, runs shakedown operations, operates front companies, and is also deeply involved in the "blood diamond" trade. For a glimpse of how much money Hezbollah raises in the region, consider one known case. On Dec. 25, 2003, a flight from Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa to Beirut, crashed on takeoff. On board were senior Hezbollah members, carrying $2 million in contributions to the organization from across the region."
There are also several prominent Lebanese leaders born in West Africa, now active in Lebanon. One is Nabih Berri, the former speaker of the Lebanese parliament and head of the Amal militia.
As the PAC study notes, "It was largely through Berri that Iran became interested in Sierra Leone, building a large cultural center in Freetown. And in 1986, Berri’s friend Jamil persuaded
Sierra Leone’s lackluster President Joseph Momoh to invite Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to Freetown.
"In Freetown, Arafat offered several million dollars to Momoh in exchange for a training base for his PLO fighters. Momoh turned the offer down, but this was merely a tactical move, for he allowed Jamil to have a well-armed 500-man ‘personal security force’, many of them Palestinians."
In Panama and the Tri-border area, the Hezbollah activities appear to be less systematic than in West Africa, and fund raising seems to largely be the result of political pressure or ideological/religious sympathy. Again, kinship networks tie the Panama families to the Isla Margarita families to the Tri-border families, making the widespread criminal activity that flourishes in each of these free trade zones something of a family matter that Hezbollah can take advantage of.
If one believes that following the money is important in cutting off terrorist activities, then one must take these situations very seriously and move to make it more difficult to raise and move the cash.
Key concentrations are West and Central Africa, Panama and the tri-border area in South America, where the organization raises money through contraband; "taxes" on legitimate businesses, where voluntary or not; and taking a cut of illegal businesses and smuggling. Partnership Africa Canada wrote a comprehensive paper on the Lebanese role in the West African "blood diamond" trade and other illiciit activities, which reaps Hezbollah and its sister militia, Amal, millions of dollars a year.
The close-knit family ties and kinship networks that are the basis for the Lebanese business operations make even routine criminal investigations very difficult. Because everyone knows everyone and who is related to whom, infiltrating someone undercover has proved to be largely impossible.
As I testified before Congress in April 2004, "Hezbollah operates in a more institutional manner in West Africa, where it has been operational almost since its birth in the early 1980s. Because of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese in West Africa—the vast majority being Shi’ite Muslims--the organization has a natural constituency and family ties that bind the region to the Lebanese conflict. Hezbollah collects donations from businesses, runs shakedown operations, operates front companies, and is also deeply involved in the "blood diamond" trade. For a glimpse of how much money Hezbollah raises in the region, consider one known case. On Dec. 25, 2003, a flight from Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa to Beirut, crashed on takeoff. On board were senior Hezbollah members, carrying $2 million in contributions to the organization from across the region."
There are also several prominent Lebanese leaders born in West Africa, now active in Lebanon. One is Nabih Berri, the former speaker of the Lebanese parliament and head of the Amal militia.
As the PAC study notes, "It was largely through Berri that Iran became interested in Sierra Leone, building a large cultural center in Freetown. And in 1986, Berri’s friend Jamil persuaded
Sierra Leone’s lackluster President Joseph Momoh to invite Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to Freetown.
"In Freetown, Arafat offered several million dollars to Momoh in exchange for a training base for his PLO fighters. Momoh turned the offer down, but this was merely a tactical move, for he allowed Jamil to have a well-armed 500-man ‘personal security force’, many of them Palestinians."
In Panama and the Tri-border area, the Hezbollah activities appear to be less systematic than in West Africa, and fund raising seems to largely be the result of political pressure or ideological/religious sympathy. Again, kinship networks tie the Panama families to the Isla Margarita families to the Tri-border families, making the widespread criminal activity that flourishes in each of these free trade zones something of a family matter that Hezbollah can take advantage of.
If one believes that following the money is important in cutting off terrorist activities, then one must take these situations very seriously and move to make it more difficult to raise and move the cash.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
While Lebanon Boils, Watch Bosnia
It is always very hard to focus on broad pictures when so many fires are in need of being put out. But it is imperative to keep in mind in the ongoing conflict Iran's long-standing ties not only to Hezbollah, but to Islamists in Bosnia, a relationship that spans more than a decade.
There is concern among Bosnian contacts that, if Iran feels things are going badly in Lebanon and that the war needs another front, it would take little to ignite Bosnia. It would not be hard to do and the international presence in Bosnia is greatly reduced. So is the intelligence capacity developed in the late 1990s. Several key intelligence-gathering units have been dissolved in Bosnia in the past six months, meaning the West is more blind there than any time since the mid-1990s.
To date Iranian intelligence maintains a huge apparatus in Bosnia and several dozen, if not hundreds, of trainers with the elite units of the Bosnian military. In addition, several hundred mujahadeen who fought in Afghanistan and then Bosnia remain scattered around Bosnia, many of them still with the elite Bosnia units or in the intelligence apparatus.
It is worth remembering this heavy Iranian involvement in the Bosnian conflict because it was in Bosnia that al Qaeda developed its template for future operations. One of the most interesting things is that, while the mujahadeen and Bosnian Muslims were supported by Saudi Arabia and many others, much of the aid flowed through Iran, despite the Shi'ite-Sunni divide. The bridge was Hasan Cengic, an Iranian intelligence agent and later Bosnia's deputy defense minister who has been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department. Cengic did some of his earliest weapons deals through Viktor Bout, who flew in hundreds of tons of weapons for the Bosnian Muslims in 1992. He later "sold" Cengic at least one aircraft, and perhaps more.
Cengic, although working on behalf of Iran, coordinated the Saudi's multi-hundred million dollar financial support for the Bosnian Muslims as well. There are concrete examples of this. During one period in the late 1990s, Wa'el Julaidan, now designated by both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as a terrorist financier, received $8 millon from a Cengic-controlled account of the Third World Relief Agency. Julaidan later repaid the money to the TWRA account in a series of smaller payments.
Given Iran's ongoing desire to push a pan-Islamist agenda and the advantages it gains from ongoing turmoil-not only in terms of oil revenues, but in terms of being able to build alliances, move agents and set a pan-Islamist agenda-its leaders could well feel the need to use another arrow from its quiver. But it could be that no one is watching Bosnia as it prepares to burn.
There is concern among Bosnian contacts that, if Iran feels things are going badly in Lebanon and that the war needs another front, it would take little to ignite Bosnia. It would not be hard to do and the international presence in Bosnia is greatly reduced. So is the intelligence capacity developed in the late 1990s. Several key intelligence-gathering units have been dissolved in Bosnia in the past six months, meaning the West is more blind there than any time since the mid-1990s.
To date Iranian intelligence maintains a huge apparatus in Bosnia and several dozen, if not hundreds, of trainers with the elite units of the Bosnian military. In addition, several hundred mujahadeen who fought in Afghanistan and then Bosnia remain scattered around Bosnia, many of them still with the elite Bosnia units or in the intelligence apparatus.
It is worth remembering this heavy Iranian involvement in the Bosnian conflict because it was in Bosnia that al Qaeda developed its template for future operations. One of the most interesting things is that, while the mujahadeen and Bosnian Muslims were supported by Saudi Arabia and many others, much of the aid flowed through Iran, despite the Shi'ite-Sunni divide. The bridge was Hasan Cengic, an Iranian intelligence agent and later Bosnia's deputy defense minister who has been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department. Cengic did some of his earliest weapons deals through Viktor Bout, who flew in hundreds of tons of weapons for the Bosnian Muslims in 1992. He later "sold" Cengic at least one aircraft, and perhaps more.
Cengic, although working on behalf of Iran, coordinated the Saudi's multi-hundred million dollar financial support for the Bosnian Muslims as well. There are concrete examples of this. During one period in the late 1990s, Wa'el Julaidan, now designated by both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as a terrorist financier, received $8 millon from a Cengic-controlled account of the Third World Relief Agency. Julaidan later repaid the money to the TWRA account in a series of smaller payments.
Given Iran's ongoing desire to push a pan-Islamist agenda and the advantages it gains from ongoing turmoil-not only in terms of oil revenues, but in terms of being able to build alliances, move agents and set a pan-Islamist agenda-its leaders could well feel the need to use another arrow from its quiver. But it could be that no one is watching Bosnia as it prepares to burn.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH