Monday December 18, 2006
The Interesting Role of the Iqwan in Sunni-Shi'ia Reconciliation
The Muslim Brotherhood, through its chief spokesperson Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, is working overtime to try to reconcile Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, particularly in the efforts to support Hezbollah in Lebanon. This puts the international Muslim Brotherhood in direct opposition to the stance taken by Zarqawi in Iraq and other Sunni armed groups that condemn the Shi'ite as heretics and infidels.
This role of mediation for the greater good of Islam-in this case, to support Hezbollah in Lebanon-is a hallmark of the Iqwan's role in the Islamist world. As my colleague Zeyno Baran at the Counterterrorism Blog pointed out, the Lebanese Brothers are making known that they, as Sunnis, are fighting beside Hezbollah with "military combatant units." As she correctly points out, it is the first time on record that the Iqwan have publicly acknowledged having an armed branch that is operational.
How the Sunni and Shi'ite Islamists, with similar agendas and sharply different theologies, react to the Lebanese crisis will be crucial in setting the course for future Islamist armed action.
There is no shortage of people on both sides wanting to attack the other. What makes Qaradawi's statements stand out is that he not only speaks for the Brotherhood, but like Yousef Nada and others, is welcome in Saudi Arabia and Tehran. If there is a way for the Sunnis to become larger players in the Lebanese conflict and any that bleed out of that war, it will be thanks to the Brotherhood's efforts.
In a recent Islam Online discussion Qaradawi listed the five principal points of agreement among Shi'ite and Sunnis, stressing that "the points of agreement are on the fundamental issues of religion, while the points of difference have to do with the minor ones."
Qaradawi also said: "Let it be known to all that the Shi`ah are Muslims who believe in the Oneness of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him).
"Yes, there is no doubt that the Shi`ah have their beliefs and dogmas which we condemn as heresy but this doesn’t make them non-Muslims.
"We should try to make use of what we have in common for the benefit of all Muslims. No one can deny that all Muslims, Sunni and Shi`ah, condemn the Zionists and what they do against our brethren in Palestine. We maintain the same view concerning the persecution of Muslims in many parts of the world. This means that we have many things in common, which should be the pivot of our interaction.
"All Muslims should be alert against the schemes and plots planned by the enemies of Islam. They are the ones that want us to disagree and fight each other. Now they resort to another scheme by filling our minds with hatred against one another under the name of belief. We should not give them this chance."
The Brotherhood is one of the few international organizations able to keep its eye on the long-term, rather than focusing almost exclusively on the crisis de jour. Their leaders understand that united Islamists from all sects are the greatest danger to their enemies, Israel and the United States. How much influence they have to bring about that reconciliation is the question.
This role of mediation for the greater good of Islam-in this case, to support Hezbollah in Lebanon-is a hallmark of the Iqwan's role in the Islamist world. As my colleague Zeyno Baran at the Counterterrorism Blog pointed out, the Lebanese Brothers are making known that they, as Sunnis, are fighting beside Hezbollah with "military combatant units." As she correctly points out, it is the first time on record that the Iqwan have publicly acknowledged having an armed branch that is operational.
How the Sunni and Shi'ite Islamists, with similar agendas and sharply different theologies, react to the Lebanese crisis will be crucial in setting the course for future Islamist armed action.
There is no shortage of people on both sides wanting to attack the other. What makes Qaradawi's statements stand out is that he not only speaks for the Brotherhood, but like Yousef Nada and others, is welcome in Saudi Arabia and Tehran. If there is a way for the Sunnis to become larger players in the Lebanese conflict and any that bleed out of that war, it will be thanks to the Brotherhood's efforts.
In a recent Islam Online discussion Qaradawi listed the five principal points of agreement among Shi'ite and Sunnis, stressing that "the points of agreement are on the fundamental issues of religion, while the points of difference have to do with the minor ones."
Qaradawi also said: "Let it be known to all that the Shi`ah are Muslims who believe in the Oneness of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him).
"Yes, there is no doubt that the Shi`ah have their beliefs and dogmas which we condemn as heresy but this doesn’t make them non-Muslims.
"We should try to make use of what we have in common for the benefit of all Muslims. No one can deny that all Muslims, Sunni and Shi`ah, condemn the Zionists and what they do against our brethren in Palestine. We maintain the same view concerning the persecution of Muslims in many parts of the world. This means that we have many things in common, which should be the pivot of our interaction.
"All Muslims should be alert against the schemes and plots planned by the enemies of Islam. They are the ones that want us to disagree and fight each other. Now they resort to another scheme by filling our minds with hatred against one another under the name of belief. We should not give them this chance."
The Brotherhood is one of the few international organizations able to keep its eye on the long-term, rather than focusing almost exclusively on the crisis de jour. Their leaders understand that united Islamists from all sects are the greatest danger to their enemies, Israel and the United States. How much influence they have to bring about that reconciliation is the question.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
The DRC and Uranium for Iran
The Lumbumbashi uranium mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo produced the uranium that allowed the United States to build its first atomic bombs used against Japan in 1945. Now the Sunday Times is reporting that Iran has been trying to buy large quantities of uranium and smuggle it out through Tanzania. They know because one large shipment was stopped in Tanzania in October 2005 when it was discovered during a routine check. No one knows how many have gotten through.
This again highlights the dangers of stateless areas and failed states in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the enabling of rogue regimes.
Few know what goes on in this area of the DRC, a nation that has been in a perpetual state of conflict for more than a decade. The central government controls little and the armies of neighboring countries, along with armed Congolese warlords, control these mineral-rich areas that operate beyond state supervision. U.S. and European intelligence services are virtually blind in such regions.
It is interesting that North Korea a few years ago also attempted to mine uranium from the same abandoned Shinkolobwe mine, supposedly closed in 1961. Two of the most isolated governments in the world finding the same area hospitable to their efforts to acquire vital ingredients for their weapons of mass destruction tells you a lot about the current state of the DRC.
While presidential elections were recently held, there is little prospect that the fractured results will allow for the emergence of a coherent government. Even if they do, reestablishing sovereignity over the vast nation will require years if not decades.
And therein lies the threat. It is not just states that turn criminal that pose a danger to our strategic interests by providing logistical and financial support to Islamist groups and organized criminal gangs. It is states that cannot control areas of access to vital resources that pose an equal threat.
The first glimmers of the attempted Iranian smuggling of uranium came in a July 18 report submitted to the U.N. Security Council monitoring the international sanctions on the DRC. The official report is expected to be released soon. The uranium was reportedly hidden amid a shipment of coltan, a mineral ore used to make cell phones and computer chips. The coltan was bound for Kazakhstan, via the Irania port of Bandar Abbas.
The report by the experts said: "In reference to the last shipment from October 2005, the Tanzanian government left no doubt that the uranium was transported from Lubumbashi by road through Zambia to the united republic of Tanzania."
Lubumbashi is the capital of mineral-rich Katanga province. The mine has officially been closed since 1961, before the country’s independence from Belgium, but the UN investigators have told the security council that they found evidence of illegal mining still going on at the site.
This again highlights the dangers of stateless areas and failed states in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the enabling of rogue regimes.
Few know what goes on in this area of the DRC, a nation that has been in a perpetual state of conflict for more than a decade. The central government controls little and the armies of neighboring countries, along with armed Congolese warlords, control these mineral-rich areas that operate beyond state supervision. U.S. and European intelligence services are virtually blind in such regions.
It is interesting that North Korea a few years ago also attempted to mine uranium from the same abandoned Shinkolobwe mine, supposedly closed in 1961. Two of the most isolated governments in the world finding the same area hospitable to their efforts to acquire vital ingredients for their weapons of mass destruction tells you a lot about the current state of the DRC.
While presidential elections were recently held, there is little prospect that the fractured results will allow for the emergence of a coherent government. Even if they do, reestablishing sovereignity over the vast nation will require years if not decades.
And therein lies the threat. It is not just states that turn criminal that pose a danger to our strategic interests by providing logistical and financial support to Islamist groups and organized criminal gangs. It is states that cannot control areas of access to vital resources that pose an equal threat.
The first glimmers of the attempted Iranian smuggling of uranium came in a July 18 report submitted to the U.N. Security Council monitoring the international sanctions on the DRC. The official report is expected to be released soon. The uranium was reportedly hidden amid a shipment of coltan, a mineral ore used to make cell phones and computer chips. The coltan was bound for Kazakhstan, via the Irania port of Bandar Abbas.
The report by the experts said: "In reference to the last shipment from October 2005, the Tanzanian government left no doubt that the uranium was transported from Lubumbashi by road through Zambia to the united republic of Tanzania."
Lubumbashi is the capital of mineral-rich Katanga province. The mine has officially been closed since 1961, before the country’s independence from Belgium, but the UN investigators have told the security council that they found evidence of illegal mining still going on at the site.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
GAO Highlights lack of Language Proficiency of State Department in Key Regions
A new study by the GAO has found serious language deficiencies in the State Department, as well as career tracks that make it difficult for those with specific language skills to get ahead in their careers.
The study found that in critical postings such as Cairo and Sana'a, Yemen, 60 percent of the people in positions that should be filled with language proficient officers are not. In China, 71 percent of the "specialists," including those with security functions, do not meet the required language standards. In the Arab world, 75 percent of the specialists do not meet the language requirement that in theory must be met before the person can take the job.
This means that, as far as public reporting and sensitive diplomatic jobs, the United States is largely blind in the two regions where our interests are most challenged. The situation is as bad or worse in the Intelligence Community and the FBI. And there is not likely to be any improvement soon.
It takes years to learn these languages proficiently, and there are only a trickle of people in the pipeline. They will not be emerging as proficient for several more years. This means that, even if recruitment were ramped up and qualified people were attracted to the State Department (or IC), it would take at least 10 years for their presence to make an impact.
It is intersting to note the GAO comments on the disincentives that exist in the structure to develop specialists. They are similar to the disincentives within the IC, who, like the State Deparment, crave generalists and punish specialists. Specialists cannot spend two consecutive assignments in the same post. Those who spend time and tax payer dollars learning a difficult language are almost sure to be tranferred to an unrelated area with a few years. Junior officers are required to move around to different geographic and linguistic areas in order to qualify for promotions.
There is some logic to this, and it is useful in many of the cases. Well-rounded officers with a variety of skills is a desireable cadre. But in an era when the U.S. if facing the highest level of hostility in its history among wide swaths of the world's population, a long war against Islamists who seek to kill us and the Chinese competiton for resources and economic superiority, the parameters must be shifted.
The limited pool of people who master the languages that those who present our greatest threat, must have career paths that put there valuable and rare skills to maximum advantage. We are flying blind in much of the world, and will continue to do so for a considerable period of time. The system must be changed to make that horizon as short as possible.
The study found that in critical postings such as Cairo and Sana'a, Yemen, 60 percent of the people in positions that should be filled with language proficient officers are not. In China, 71 percent of the "specialists," including those with security functions, do not meet the required language standards. In the Arab world, 75 percent of the specialists do not meet the language requirement that in theory must be met before the person can take the job.
This means that, as far as public reporting and sensitive diplomatic jobs, the United States is largely blind in the two regions where our interests are most challenged. The situation is as bad or worse in the Intelligence Community and the FBI. And there is not likely to be any improvement soon.
It takes years to learn these languages proficiently, and there are only a trickle of people in the pipeline. They will not be emerging as proficient for several more years. This means that, even if recruitment were ramped up and qualified people were attracted to the State Department (or IC), it would take at least 10 years for their presence to make an impact.
It is intersting to note the GAO comments on the disincentives that exist in the structure to develop specialists. They are similar to the disincentives within the IC, who, like the State Deparment, crave generalists and punish specialists. Specialists cannot spend two consecutive assignments in the same post. Those who spend time and tax payer dollars learning a difficult language are almost sure to be tranferred to an unrelated area with a few years. Junior officers are required to move around to different geographic and linguistic areas in order to qualify for promotions.
There is some logic to this, and it is useful in many of the cases. Well-rounded officers with a variety of skills is a desireable cadre. But in an era when the U.S. if facing the highest level of hostility in its history among wide swaths of the world's population, a long war against Islamists who seek to kill us and the Chinese competiton for resources and economic superiority, the parameters must be shifted.
The limited pool of people who master the languages that those who present our greatest threat, must have career paths that put there valuable and rare skills to maximum advantage. We are flying blind in much of the world, and will continue to do so for a considerable period of time. The system must be changed to make that horizon as short as possible.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
IIRO Freezings Long Overdue
The Treasury Department's decision to designate two branches of the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is long overdue and overlooks a much broader problem. While the Philippine and Indonesian branches have been particularly troublesome for many years, the entire organization has been alleged to have been involved in terrorist activities on a far broader level.
IIRO is a sister organization of the Muslim World League (MWL), one of the principal Islamist groups operating in the United States. The IIRO, using the name IRO for the U.S. branch, was also part of the Safa Group, the cluster of Islamist charities raided in Herndon, Virginia in March 2002 on supsicion of funding terrorist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
According to an affidavit filed Aug. 14, 2003, by Special Agent David Kane, the IIRO branch in the United States received $10 million from IIRO in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The money was to be invested by a company called Sana-Bell Inc. The proceeds were to go to fund the IRO's U.S. activities.
"I have found evidence corroborating that IIRO/IRO has transferred funds to HAMAS through HAMAS fronts such as Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF")," Kane testified. While the case against the group is going slowly, due to the complexity of the schemes used by the defendants to make tracing their money as difficult as possible, it is moving forward slowly.
But more ominous is a 1996 CIA report on Islamic charities that shows that 10 years ago the intelligence community had at least a working knowledge of some of the more radical Islamist groups.
The paper, which has been declassified, lists the "extremist connections" of the IIRO as being Hamas, the Algerian Al-Gama al Islamiyya, and "Usama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi-born businessman currently residing in Sudan who supports various Islamic extremist groups." The report also outlines the IIRO's extensive ties to Bosnian Islamist groups, its funding of them and the use of charity IDs by combatants.
My colleague on the Counterterrorism Blog, Zachary Abuza gives a good summary of some of the other ties: Ramzi Yousef, who was involved in the first World Trade Center bombing and the mastermind of an elaborate scheme to down airliners and kill the Pope John Paul II in Manila; and the links of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, to the plot while head of the IIRO in the Philippines.
It would seem that all of that would have been ample reason to designate the IIRO, in its entirety, some time ago. That it is happening now gives more sorrow than joy, showing how slow the going is against Islamist groups that can and have been clearly identified a long time ago.
IIRO is a sister organization of the Muslim World League (MWL), one of the principal Islamist groups operating in the United States. The IIRO, using the name IRO for the U.S. branch, was also part of the Safa Group, the cluster of Islamist charities raided in Herndon, Virginia in March 2002 on supsicion of funding terrorist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
According to an affidavit filed Aug. 14, 2003, by Special Agent David Kane, the IIRO branch in the United States received $10 million from IIRO in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The money was to be invested by a company called Sana-Bell Inc. The proceeds were to go to fund the IRO's U.S. activities.
"I have found evidence corroborating that IIRO/IRO has transferred funds to HAMAS through HAMAS fronts such as Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF")," Kane testified. While the case against the group is going slowly, due to the complexity of the schemes used by the defendants to make tracing their money as difficult as possible, it is moving forward slowly.
But more ominous is a 1996 CIA report on Islamic charities that shows that 10 years ago the intelligence community had at least a working knowledge of some of the more radical Islamist groups.
The paper, which has been declassified, lists the "extremist connections" of the IIRO as being Hamas, the Algerian Al-Gama al Islamiyya, and "Usama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi-born businessman currently residing in Sudan who supports various Islamic extremist groups." The report also outlines the IIRO's extensive ties to Bosnian Islamist groups, its funding of them and the use of charity IDs by combatants.
My colleague on the Counterterrorism Blog, Zachary Abuza gives a good summary of some of the other ties: Ramzi Yousef, who was involved in the first World Trade Center bombing and the mastermind of an elaborate scheme to down airliners and kill the Pope John Paul II in Manila; and the links of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, to the plot while head of the IIRO in the Philippines.
It would seem that all of that would have been ample reason to designate the IIRO, in its entirety, some time ago. That it is happening now gives more sorrow than joy, showing how slow the going is against Islamist groups that can and have been clearly identified a long time ago.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
By Holding its Own, Hezbollah Shows Difficulties Ahead
By holding out two weeks longer than the nations that attacked Israel during the Six-Day War, Hezbollah has proven itself to be a formidable military force that has spent recent years increasing its wartime capacity and training even as it was projecting a more moderate image of a party in government.
Granted, the military success to date is built partly on the willingness to hide among the civilian population, in part giving rise to the horrendous civilian toll in the conflict. Nor is Hezbollah capable or seeking to destroy the nation of Israel. Its objectives and means are more limited than the more grandiose plans of previous nations to wage war there.
But when the dust clears at the end of each day, Hezbollah is there, against one of the most formidable armies in the world, fighting on familiar terrain, not far from home.
The double game was not unknown to Israel and others watching the region, but the amount of arms amassed, the constant upgrades of the group's capacity and the training show the dangers that non-state actors pose, especially if they enjoy a high level of state support. These groups often fare better than state militaries, have more flexibility and the ability to break down into small, self-contained units that are not bound by the rules and conventions of states.
The skill of formidable groups like Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other groups-perhaps even including the core al Qaeda group- is often underestimated in calculating the groups' capacity and capability.
The ability of these groups to raise, manage and hide large streams of revenue, engage in political games and build clandestine structures is routinely downplayed, on the assumption that somehow these groups do not have the personnel or intelligence to engage in these types of sophisticated strategies. And routinely these groups surprise with the strength and capabilities.
Hezbollah's ability to endure the Israeli pounding is also projecting an image of heroism in the Shi'ite world, a sign that the IDF is not invincible, that standing and fighting is an option. And that is a dangerous precedent both for the region and groups beyond the Middle East who may want to test the reactions of states. We are woefully unprepared to deal with the challenge.
Granted, the military success to date is built partly on the willingness to hide among the civilian population, in part giving rise to the horrendous civilian toll in the conflict. Nor is Hezbollah capable or seeking to destroy the nation of Israel. Its objectives and means are more limited than the more grandiose plans of previous nations to wage war there.
But when the dust clears at the end of each day, Hezbollah is there, against one of the most formidable armies in the world, fighting on familiar terrain, not far from home.
The double game was not unknown to Israel and others watching the region, but the amount of arms amassed, the constant upgrades of the group's capacity and the training show the dangers that non-state actors pose, especially if they enjoy a high level of state support. These groups often fare better than state militaries, have more flexibility and the ability to break down into small, self-contained units that are not bound by the rules and conventions of states.
The skill of formidable groups like Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other groups-perhaps even including the core al Qaeda group- is often underestimated in calculating the groups' capacity and capability.
The ability of these groups to raise, manage and hide large streams of revenue, engage in political games and build clandestine structures is routinely downplayed, on the assumption that somehow these groups do not have the personnel or intelligence to engage in these types of sophisticated strategies. And routinely these groups surprise with the strength and capabilities.
Hezbollah's ability to endure the Israeli pounding is also projecting an image of heroism in the Shi'ite world, a sign that the IDF is not invincible, that standing and fighting is an option. And that is a dangerous precedent both for the region and groups beyond the Middle East who may want to test the reactions of states. We are woefully unprepared to deal with the challenge.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH